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Abstract 
This thesis empirically investigates whether corporate governance has effects on lending and 
risk-taking at Japan-listed banks. The conventional views are that (i) board compositions and 
ownership structures affect lending behaviours at banks, and (ii) corporate governance 
measures are very often ineffective at safeguarding against excessive risk-taking by banks. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide empirical analyses on the effects of corporate 
governance measures, such as board compositions and ownership structures, on lending and 
risk-taking at Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
To this end, this thesis contains four sub-topics. First, it examines whether levels of external 
directors, external director tenures, internal and external director share ownerships, board 
expertise, and board homogeneity have an impact on bank lending and risk-taking. Second, it 
examines whether bank ownership structures impact lending and risk-taking behaviours. The 
assessments focus on shareholders which are domestic and foreign financial institutions, 
domestic and foreign non-financial companies, and domestic and foreign governmental 
institutions. Third, it investigates whether bank boards serve as substitution or complementary 
monitors for shareholders and regulators. Lastly, it examines whether shareholder supremacy 
corporate governance measures weaken or strengthen the internal and external governance of 
banks. To investigate these issues, this thesis uses two regression models: fixed-effects, and 
generalised method of moments Arellano Bond estimations. 
The empirical findings indicate that (i) external directors increase risk-taking, but decrease 
levels of impaired loans, (ii) foreign financial institutional shareholders are likely to induce risk-
taking at banks, (iii) a positive relationship exisits between domestic government share 
ownerships and risk-taking of Japan-listed banks, (iv) internal directors and regulators 
complementarily monitor banks, (v) institutional shareholders of Japan-listed banks are likely 
to play active roles in monitoring risk-taking, and (vi) a corporate governance approach to 
shareholder supremacy increases risk-taking at banks. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Since the mid-1990s, corporate governance reform was driven in response to the rise of 
foreign shareholdings in Japanese companies and a series of scandals at Japanese companies 
(Jacoby, 2009; The Economist, 2012). The Japanese government proposed various measures to 
address issues relating to the corporate governance mechanisms of Japanese companies and 
banks. These reforms have offered scholars opportunities to assess the impact of Anglo-
American-like corporate governance mechanisms on Japan-listed companies/banks.  
Some scholars regard Japan’s corporate governance model as being a mix of shareholder and 
stakeholder supremacy, and the model is gradually being adopted for some governance 
mechanisms similar to those of their Anglo-American counterparts (Aoki, 2001, 2000; Dore, 
2000), while others consider that Japan’s corporate government model is not significantly 
different from its Anglo-American counterparts (Miwa et al., 2002), and others argue whether 
companies adopting approaches to shareholder or stakeholder supremacy are determined by 
their ownership structures (Berle and Means, 1932; Turnbull, 1997a). In each case, the 
theoretical frameworks being used in the majority of corporate governance studies revolve 
around agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and/or stakeholder theory (Dodd, 1932). 
Aoki (2001) proposes that the Japanese institutional arrangement is unique, and Japan’s 
corporate governance model emphasises stakeholder supremacy, in which companies focus 
on protecting the welfare of their stakeholders, such as their employees and customers. 
However, Aoki (2001) also argues that Japanese companies are gradually adopting governance 
controls similar to those of their Anglo-American counterparts. According to Aoki (2001) and 
(Dore, 2000), Japan’s corporate governance model has emerged to become a hybrid model 
consisting of the corporate governance mechanisms of both shareholder and stakeholder 
supremacy. These mechanisms include (i) Japanese managers acting as stewards and working 
collaboratively, (ii) main banks monitoring their corporate borrowers, and disciplining and 
rescuing failing companies by appointing bank employees to the boards of failing companies 
and providing additional financial assistance, (iii) implicit lifetime employment contracts being 
offered to their employees, (iv) some Japanese companies, such as Sony, adopting 
performance-incentive schemes as rewards, and (v) some Japanese companies reducing their 
board sizes and adopting committee-based board structures. 
Contrary to the views of Aoki (2001), Miwa et al. (2002) argue that Japan’s corporate 
governance approach is similar to that of their Anglo-American counterparts, and their 
differences are due to Japanese companies being restricted by their legal frameworks and 
15 
 
being required to apply corporate governance mechanisms favouring stakeholder supremacy. 
For example, the authors argue that main banks, which are also the biggest lenders to their 
corporate borrowers and act similarly to Anglo-American banks, would not hesitate to monitor 
their corporate borrowers because of their considerable corporate borrowings. In the case of 
lifetime employment, Japanese companies do not implicitly offer their employees lifetime 
employment contracts; however, they are barred from any cost-cutting measures such as 
employee redundancies to increase profits.  
Lastly, scholars suggest that controls arise from ownership rights (Berle and Means, 1932; 
Turnbull, 1997a), in which the corporate governance approaches of companies are likely to be 
associated with their ownership structures. In assessing the corporate governance approaches 
(to shareholder or stakeholder supremacy) of financial institutions, Groeneveld and Llewellyn 
(2012) argue that cooperative banks, which are owned by their members and whose 
ownerships are non-tradable, are likely to pursue relationship banking models and lend to 
companies among their strong local networks. They are, therefore, likely to be risk averse and 
to focus on long-term growth, instead of emphasising short-term profit maximisation. The 
authors also stress that cooperative banks pursue corporate governance approaches to 
stakeholder supremacy because of their “one-member-one-vote” systems, and their ‘limited-
distributed-profit’ policies; and their profits are likely to be added to their reserves or used to 
fund their lending businesses, instead of paying dividends. Their objectives are to maximise 
profits for their members and surpluses for their corporate borrowers. Contrary to stakeholder 
banks, shareholder (supremacy) banks are owned by their shareholders, and their objectives 
are to maximise shareholder wealth. Profits are expected to be distributed to their 
shareholders. In summary, these scholars suggest that financial institutions, which are owned 
by cooperative members, are likely to pursue corporate governance approaches to 
stakeholder supremacy; while financial institutions, which are owned by shareholders and 
whose shares are trade-able in the capital markets, are likely to be subjected to market for 
corporate control and to pursue corporate governance approaches to shareholders 
supremacy. 
The objective of this thesis is to develop conceptual frameworks based on Aoki (2001) and 
Dore (2000). This is because this thesis is primarily interested in finding ways to explain (i) the 
effects of various governance mechanisms (in relation to board compositions, director share 
ownerships and institutional shareholders) on lending and risk-taking at Japan-listed banks, 
and (ii) the effects of these corporate governance mechanisms on the evolution of Japan’s 
hybrid corporate governance model. Secondly, this thesis only focuses on listed-banks, whose 
controls arguably arise from shareholder rights. Lastly, in Japan, banks with international 
16 
 
operations are required to comply with the Basel recommendations1 (Suzuki, 2011a), and 
listed banks are required to comply with corporate governance practices that are similar to 
their Anglo-American counterparts (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2015). For example, the number of 
external (and independent) directors rose from seven percent to 15 percent between 2005 
and 2013, and some Japan-listed banks such as Mizuho Financial Group, and Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group, have adopted three board committees structures. 
For these reasons, the Japanese corporate governance model may be able to provide 
additional information on which corporate governance mechanisms may be effective for 
Japan-listed banks, whose social norms focus on stakeholder supremacy.  
This thesis focuses on Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013, when Japan-listed banks 
started to take part in securitisation businesses as a result of the revisions of the trust law and 
security law. Securitisation is likely to change the ways of banks manage their funding, lending 
and risk-taking strategies. As a result, banks are able to convert illiquid assets to liquid assets 
by securitising their loans, leading to banks increasing their lending abilities (Loutskina, 2011). 
Using a unique sample of Japan-listed banks, the data includes (i) city banks, (ii) regional banks, 
and (iii) bank holding companies. But it excludes trust banks, credit associations, and financial 
institutions which engage in trust businesses, because they are not listed on their local stock 
exchanges, and their business models differ from city banks, regional banks, and bank holding 
companies (Uchida and Tsutsui, 2005). Although the asset sizes of individual regional banks are 
smaller than city and bank holding companies, they are not segmented by prefecture (Kano 
and Tsutsui, 2003).  
The literature on internal and external governance controls focuses on agency theory and 
stakeholder theory. Agency theory focuses on the economic approach to governance. Its 
objectives are to (i) achieve board efficiency, and (ii) maximise shareholder wealth (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Contrary to the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model, although some Japanese companies have adopted shareholder supremacy 
corporate governance mechanisms such as having external directors on their boards, the 
Japanese corporate governance model primarily focuses on the interests of its stakeholders 
(Aoki et al., 2008; Dore, 2000), which is known as stakeholder supremacy (or stakeholder 
theory). Stakeholder theory places an emphasis on both the economic approach to corporate 
organisation and governance (Aoki, 2000), and the anthropological conception of 
organisations (Dore, 2008). In the former, the economic approach to corporate governance 
                                                          
1 The Basel I regulations took effect in Japan in 1992. Banks without any international operations are 
subject to looser capital adequacy requirements, and are not required to comply with Basel I, II and III. 
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suggests that stakeholders have economic interests in their companies, and managers are 
responsible for safeguarding the interests of their employees and the other stakeholders 
associated with their companies. In the latter, the anthropological approach addresses the 
(social) relationships between companies and their stakeholders, and how these relationships 
influence company efficiencies. Stakeholder theory assesses the trade-offs of interests among 
stakeholders. It theorises that companies should maintain good relationships with their 
stakeholders with the aim of maximising the long-term performances of their companies 
(Alam, 2006). 
Despite the differences between shareholder and stakeholder supremacy theories, countries 
continue to enforce similar (shareholder supremacy approaches to) internal corporate 
governance mechanisms on companies, while the social norms of companies in their own 
countries favour maintaining shareholder or stakeholder supremacy (Dore, 2000). Shareholder 
and stakeholder supremacy are, arguably, incompatible, because companies may need to 
sacrifice the interests of their stakeholders in order to satisfy shareholder supremacy, or vice 
versa. Therefore, these companies may require different internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
Prior research also addressed internal governance controls by evaluating the effects of 
financial board expertise (Hoitash et al., 2009), board composition (Battaglia and Gallo, 2017), 
committee structures (Yeh et al., 2011), and director share ownerships (Hoskisson et al., 2002) 
on financial disclosures, company performances, risk-taking and corporate strategies. On the 
other hand, the literature on external governance controls focuses on corporate governance 
mechanisms emanating from the capital markets - such as market for corporate control 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983) and shareholder influences (Hill and Snell, 1988) - and their effects 
on internal controls such as management turnovers (Krug et al., 2015). Moreover, regulators 
may also be characterised as external governance controllers (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Ciancanelli and Reyes-Gonzalez, 2000), because regulators act as external forces to influence 
bank governance.  
This thesis focuses on various aspects on the internal and external governance of banks. It 
attempts to present some theoretical and practical contributions for corporate governance 
theories such as agency theory, and practical issues of bank governance. 
First, it analyses the effects of bank (lending, risk-taking and engaging in securitisation 
businesses) strategies in adopting Anglo-American-like corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as having external directors on bank boards, and rewarding share ownerships to internal 
and external directors. The key internal governance mechanisms being examined are: (i) board 
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compositions, such as the ratios of external directors to the total number of board members, 
(ii) the levels of internal and external director share ownerships, (iii) financial and legal experts, 
and (iv) board homogeneity/diversity. Two types of external governance controls being 
assessed are levels of institutional shareholder ownerships, and the influences of bank 
regulators.  
Second, it contributes to the debate concerning the introduction of external directors at 
Japanese banks. The Japanese corporate governance framework is composed of Company Law 
and codes introduced by interested parties such as the Japan Audit and Supervisory Board 
Members Association. Although policymakers and interested parties are keen to introduce 
Anglo-American-like corporate governance mechanisms, the effects of external directors may 
be questionable. Other structural factors, such as insider corporate governance systems (John 
and Senbet, 1998; Whittaker and Deakin, 2009) and limited markets for directors (Ariga, 2000) 
affect corporate governance practices in Japan. 
Third, it provides empirical evidence of the effectiveness of domestic shareholder monitoring 
at Japan-listed banks. Previous literature argued that domestic financial institutions – such as 
main banks – play a dominant role in monitoring Japanese companies (Aoki, 1994a), but there 
is a lack of literature and empirical evidence in assessing how Japan-listed banks are being 
monitored domestically.  
Fourth, it analyses the effects of foreign shareholders on Japan-listed banks, which previous 
literature rarely presented as empirical evidence; although scholars suggest that, in the 
context of Japan, the rise of foreign share ownerships are likely to affect the corporate 
governance of Japanese companies (Ahmadjian, 2008; Jacoby, 2009).  
Fifth, it argues that corporate governance mechanisms work concurrently in a bundle to 
reduce agency costs (Rediker and Seth, 1995). This thesis empirically assesses the substitution 
and complementarity of (i) internal governance mechanisms and shareholder monitoring, and 
(ii) internal governance mechanisms and regulatory monitoring.  
Sixth, this thesis provides empirical evidence in comparing the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms to shareholder supremacy between Japan-listed banks and UK-listed banks. 
Previous comparative corporate governance literature provided little evidence of the 
corporate governance of listed-banks focusing on these two countries, which consist of two 
contrasting social norms (Charkham and Ploix, 2008).  
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In this thesis, the positivism approach is chosen, because quantitative studies allow analytical 
works to be carried out objectively. Empirical analyses can be used to confirm or reject 
hypotheses which are designed based on corporate governance theories. 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two reviews (i) theoretical perspectives on 
corporate governance theories and their associated mechanisms, (ii) the practical issues of 
bank governance, and (iii) Japanese corporate governance practices, including the stakeholder 
supremacy approach and relationship lending. It summarises and critiques theoretical 
literature covering agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, and resource 
dependency theory. This chapter also briefly reviews and critiques literature focusing on 
theories and empirical studies. 
Chapter three provides descriptions and reasoning on why the epistemological approach is 
chosen. It offers methodological considerations on implications between paradigms, theories, 
and the underlying assumptions of quantitative methods. This chapter also explains the 
choices of why the fixed-effects estimation, random-effects estimation, the system generalised 
method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimation, the Cox proportional hazard model, 
and principal component analysis are adopted in this thesis. A brief overview of each method 
is provided.  
Chapter four (i) examines the effectiveness of the Anglo-American approach to internal 
governance mechanisms, and their effects on the lending and risk-taking behaviours of Japan-
listed banks, and (ii) assesses the bank-specific factors that affect the likelihood of banks 
participating in securitisation businesses. The empirical studies cover between 2005 and 2013.  
In the first part of this chapter, the empirical studies focus on eight elements of internal 
governance mechanisms such as board characteristics and director share ownership levels. 
Some of these elements are proposed to mitigate the agency costs resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Extending the views of Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) and Casu et al. (2011), the second part 
of this chapter examines the bank-specific factors that affect the likelihood of banks 
participating in securitisation businesses. The objective is to assess the motives of Japan-listed 
banks to participate in securitisation business, and whether their decisions to engage in 
securitisation are affected by board characteristics and the presence of assets and liabilities 
committees. Eight board characteristics, used in the preceding section, are considered: (i) the 
ratio of external directors to the total number of board members, (ii) the ratio of lifetime 
bankers to the total of number of board members, (iii) the ratio of financial experts to the total 
20 
 
number of board members, and (iv) the ratio of legal experts to the total number of board 
members. 
Chapter five examines the effects of institutional share ownerships on the lending and risk-
taking behaviours of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. Extending the conventional 
arguments that shareholders perform ex ante monitoring to mitigate agency costs (La Porta et 
al., 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), the objective of this chapter is to examine the effects of 
different types of institutional shareholders on the lending and risk-taking behaviours of their 
investee banks, and argues that their effects differ because they have dissimilar investment 
objectives. Six types of institutional shareholders are considered: (i) foreign financial 
institutions, (ii) foreign non-financial companies, (iii) foreign governmental institutions, (iv) 
domestic financial institutions, (v) domestic non-financial companies, and (vi) domestic 
governmental institutions. 
Chapter six assesses the substitution and complementary effects between the internal and 
external monitoring of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. Scholars suggest that 
external monitoring may be a substitute for weak internal monitoring (Weisbach, 1988; 
Williamson, 1983), or that external monitoring can complement strong internal governance 
(Fung and Tsai, 2012; Kim et al., 2007). 
In this chapter, eight internal corporate governance mechanisms are considered. In order to 
capture the multiple dimensionalities of the internal corporate governance mechanisms, 
internal corporate governance (CG) indices are developed using principal component analysis. 
In the case of external monitoring in Japan, scholars suggest that regulatory and institutional 
shareholder monitoring may be substituted for the weak market for corporate control (Kanaya 
and Woo, 2000; Prowse, 2014). Therefore, three external monitors are considered: (i) financial 
regulators, (ii) domestic financial institutional shareholders, and (iii) institutional shareholders.  
Chapter seven assesses the effects of the corporate governance approach to shareholder 
supremacy. It examines the effects of shareholder monitoring (external controls) and board 
characteristics and director share ownerships (internal controls) on risk-taking by UK-listed and 
Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. By evaluating the effects on risk-taking levels at 
banks in both countries, the assessment offers empirical comparisons of the UK’s corporate 
governance system with the Japanese corporate governance system. This chapter argues that 
a corporate governance approach to shareholder supremacy incentivises banks to take greater 
risks for shareholder wealth maximisation.  
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This chapter is based on three important theoretical frameworks. First, it emphasises the 
conventional arguments that shareholders perform ex ante monitoring to mitigate agency 
costs (La Porta et al., 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Second, this chapter focuses on agency 
theory, and empirically examines the effects of the board characteristics (internal controls) of 
UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. Third, shareholders are able to diversify their risks through 
portfolio management; as a result, they are eager to encourage their investee banks to take 
greater risks for greater expected profits. In this case, corporate governance approaches to 
shareholder supremacy are likely to encourage risk-taking at banks (Terence Tse, 2011; 
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
In this chapter, four types of institutional investors and six internal governance mechanisms 
are considered. The four types of institutional investors are (i) foreign financial institutions, (ii) 
foreign non-financial companies, (iii) domestic financial institutions, and (iv) domestic non-
financial companies. The six types of internal governance mechanisms include (i) the ratio of 
external directors to the total number of board members, (ii) the average tenure of external 
directors at boards, (iii) the amount of external director share ownerships, (iv) the amount of 
internal director share ownerships, (v) the ratio of lifetime bankers to the total of number of 
board members, and (vi) board age diversity.  
Chapter eight summarises the empirical findings and proposes the associated theoretical and 
policy implications. It also provides summaries on the limitations of this thesis, and highlights 
recommendations for future studies. 
In summary, this thesis investigates the relationships between corporate governance 
mechanisms, and the levels of bank lending and risk-taking at Japan-listed banks between 
2005 and 2013. Chapters four and five focuses on board characteristics, levels of director share 
ownerships, and ownership structures. Chapter six explains the interactions between the 
board compositions (and director share ownerships), and institutional shareholders and 
regulators. Chapter seven compares the corporate governance mechanisms of Japan-listed 
banks with UK-listed banks and highlights the effects of the corporate governance approach to 
shareholder supremacy. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance describes all the influences affecting company behaviour (Turnbull, 
1997b). These influences include the appointments of external directors, board characteristics, 
and shareholder and regulatory monitoring mechanisms. Four major theories are commonly 
used in corporate governance studies : (i) agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), (ii) 
stewardship theory (Barney, 1990; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990), (iii) resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and (iv) stakeholder theory (Alam, 2006; 
Dodd, 1932). 
This chapter provides the outlines of key theoretical backgrounds, whereas the subsequent 
chapters address the above key theories in-depth. This chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 2.2 and 2.3 provide reviews of the theoretical backgrounds of the four major corporate 
governance theories. Section 2.4 provides brief discussions on various corporate governance 
mechanisms. Section 2.5 reviews literature focusing on the practical issues of corporate 
governance in relation to banks, which includes qualified boards, management incentive 
structures, levels of shareholder monitoring, and the problems of information asymmetry. 
Section 2.6 focuses on Japanese corporate governance practices, including the Japanese 
corporate governance approach to stakeholder supremacy, and the Japanese banking 
approach to lending. 
2.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is developed from two concepts proposed by Berle and Means (1932), who 
examine two aspects that affect non-financial companies in the United States: (i) private 
property (i.e. property rights), and (ii) the divergence of interests between ownership and 
control. The theoretical framework of Berle and Means (1932) explains that the prime 
objective of a company is to ensure shareholder supremacy, and it explains the consequences 
of a separation of ownership and control, in which principals (owners/shareholders) and 
agents (managers) sometimes do not necessarily share the same interests. These concepts are 
then extended by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and lead to what is known as agency theory. 
Agency theory highlights the problems of the separation of ownership and control, and 
information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The former is addressed in the context of 
management studies. It proposes that the problems resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control that occurs when the objectives of managers are no longer about 
maximising the wealth of their companies. Agency costs are incurred when managers exploit 
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company resources such as maximising managerial compensation or non-pecuniary benefits, 
or attempt to maximise their own interests via excessive risk-taking. The latter suggests that 
agency costs arise from information asymmetry as a result of the separation of ownership and 
control. For example, managers may choose to exploit company resources by investing in risky 
projects, and may harm the wealth of their shareholders. However, shareholders may not have 
sufficient information, and devices/tools to monitor the actions of their managers.  
In order to minimise these agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control 
and information asymmetry, agency theory proposes using monitoring and bonding 
mechanisms to ensure that company decisions will be aligned with the interests of 
shareholders. For example, outsiders are appointed to monitor company managements, and 
managers are rewarded using performance-based incentives. 
In the context of shareholder supremacy, shareholders are referred to as the principals, and 
the agents are referred to as the managers (Berle and Means, 1932), and the interests of 
shareholders are safeguarded by the use of the monitoring and bonding mechanisms proposed 
by agency theory. 
Agency theory is widely used in corporate governance and management literature. The theory 
addresses company behaviours resulting from the separation of ownership and control (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983a), and company relationships with the labour and capital markets (Fama, 
1980). Additionally, agency theory offers unique and empirically testable assumptions which 
enable scholars to study company behaviours (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Critiques on agency theory highlight seven improbable assumptions about the theory. First, 
the theory assumes that the labour market is efficient, and managers and owners can freely 
enter or exit contractual relationships. In the real world, there are often shortages of skilled 
senior managers with industry-specific experiences (Walker, 2009). Second, the theory ignores 
other stakeholders such as employees and regulators, who may also act as key monitors, and 
affect how their companies performed. Third, the theory overlooks the characteristics of 
individual managers, such as those who serve as stewards, whose actions ultimately benefit 
their companies and society. Fourth, the theory ignores the effects on the risk preferences of 
principals through portfolio diversification. Fifth, the theory fails to address the possible 
affiliations of internal directors and external directors prior to their directorship appointments, 
and the chance that these external directors may collude with internal directors. Sixth, the 
theory neglects the board dynamics that exist as a result of insider-dominated or outsider-
dominated boards, in which internal and external directors (agents) have different risk 
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preferences, and have the ability to influence others. Seventh, the theory focuses on majority 
shareholders, and ignores the rights of minority shareholders (Backer, 2002). 
Additionally, several ideas have been extended from agency theory. Eisenhardt (1989) 
proposes that the actions of agents are aligned with the interests of their principals as a result 
of reduced information asymmetry. Fama and Jensen (1983b) suggest that (i) it is cost efficient 
for unrestricted common stock residual claimants, who are principals, to delegate the decision-
making process in a large complex organisation; (ii) mutual monitoring systems can enhance 
human capital among agents who acquire additional knowledge through competitive 
interactions; (iii) internal agents who are promoted internally and who acquire greater levels 
of company-specific information are more influential than agents who are hired from outside 
the company; (iv) the appointments of directors signal to the managerial labour market that 
internal and external agents are regarded as company/policy decision-making experts; and (v) 
external agents who have acquired expert knowledge are appointed because their skills in 
their monitoring roles enhance the values of their companies. Warther (1998) suggests that 
passive dissent boards increase board efficiencies. 
Overall, agency theory and its extended theories provide frameworks for linking board 
monitoring to company performance.  
2.3 Other Corporate Governance Theories 
Other corporate governance theories offer alternative perspectives of shareholder supremacy. 
They examine additional aspects of governance such as stewardship, and how director 
resources and stakeholder monitoring can play a part in improving company performance and 
risk-taking. The first two aspects, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory, focus 
on the characteristics of external managers. The latter aspect, stakeholder monitoring, places 
an emphasis on the relationships between managers and their stakeholders, i.e. stakeholder 
theory. 
Stewardship theory is often compared to shareholder supremacy. Scholars argue that the 
theoretical distinction between these two theories is based on their views of social comparison 
(Barney, 1990; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990). Contrary to shareholder supremacy, 
stewardship theory suggests that the objectives of principals and agents are aligned, and 
agents (managers) always act in the interests of their companies, and that they are 
trustworthy. Managers who work to achieve organisational goals may also satisfy the interests 
of other stakeholders, and also their own needs, and do not require additional monitoring and 
incentive mechanisms. This is due to (i) managers being motivated by a sense of ‘esteem and 
self-actualisation’ (Nordberg, 2011); (ii) managers caring for their reputations, which means 
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that their previous and current performances are likely to affect their prospective careers 
(Aditi Gupta et al., 2008; Fama, 1980); and (iii) managers needing to fulfil their fiduciary duties 
to safeguard the interests of their shareholders (Macey and O’Hara, 2003). Stewardship theory 
suggests that CEO duality is desirable as a result improved board effectiveness, and that 
boards do not require any independent chairmen, because CEOs know that the success of their 
companies will boost their reputations. As a result, managers who act as good stewards lower 
agency costs (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
However, in contrast with agency theory, stewardship theory ignores (i) the possible 
opportunistic behaviours of agents, and (ii) problems including moral hazard and adverse 
selection as a result of information asymmetry. The theory also ignores conflicts of interest 
between principals and agents. For example, principals may focus on maximising short-term 
returns and encourage their agents to take greater risks, while their agents act in the interests 
of their companies and instead focus on long-term returns. In this case, the objectives of the 
principals and agents are no longer aligned, although the agents still act in the interests of 
their companies.  
Resource dependence theory proposes a framework to explain organisational behaviours in 
relation to the availability of external resources. In the context of corporate governance, the 
theory is used to examine the relationship between (outside) managers and company 
performances (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The 
theory suggests that outside managers often have useful specialised skills and external 
networks, which typically results in their companies gaining comparative advantages over their 
competitors whose board members do not have these skills and networks with external 
interested parties (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In other words, resource dependence theory 
provides a framework for linking board level human capital and company performance 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) further develop a model linking agency theory to resource 
dependence theory. The authors suggest that agency theory alone cannot adequately explain 
the relationship between board level compensation and company performance, and suggest 
that companies which are required to align their objectives with competent and resourceful 
managers can be effectively monitored. The theory focuses on the supervisory and tactical 
roles of external directors, instead of on the monitoring roles. 
Overall, resource dependence theory is widely used in studies related to organisational theory 
and strategic management (Hillman et al., 2009), instead of corporate governance. For 
example, in the context of organisational theory, resource dependence theory links the 
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influences of external resources and organisational behaviours, i.e. identifying the patterns of 
how companies use external resources to solve problems. Studying US airline companies 
between 1968 and 1988, Hillman et al. (2000) examine the types of experts being appointed to 
boards in order to position their companies to compete in regulated and unregulated 
environments. Contrary to organisational theory, strategic management focuses on how 
management strategically allocates resources to optimise performances (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Studying the top 500 Australian companies in 1996, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) examine 
the relationship between the external resources of board members and company 
performances. 
Resource dependence theory is often studied in connection with stakeholder theory, because 
external directors not only provide external resources, but they may also be affiliated with, or 
represented the stakeholders of their companies (Hillman et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 1998). 
Stakeholder theory assesses the trade-offs of interests among stakeholders who are 
employees, suppliers, customers, and shareholders, and places an emphasis on safeguarding 
their interests (Dodd, 1932). The theory is that stakeholders have legitimate interests in their 
companies (Dodd, 1932), and companies can maximise their long-term performances by 
maintaining good relationships with their stakeholders (Alam, 2006). However, critiques on 
stakeholder theory argue that, first, the theory has not defined how to balance interests 
among stakeholders, and also point out that the lack of scoring systems often create confusion 
among managers (Jensen, 2002). Second, the theory focuses on stakeholder supremacy, which 
harms shareholder value (Jensen, 2002; Stout, 2012). This is because the objectives of 
stakeholders and shareholders differ, i.e. the objective of profit maximisation is waived to 
protect the interests of stakeholders, such as maintaining employment stability which may 
require managers to forgo their part of company profits (Smith, 2003).  
In summary, the stewardship, resource dependence, and stakeholder theories provide 
additional theoretical perspectives on corporate governance research (Daily et al., 2003). 
Scholars also suggest that each of these theoretical frameworks can be applied to the different 
stages of a company’s life cycle. Lynall et al. (2003) argue that (i) the resource dependence 
theory explains the effects of CEO resources on companies in the early stages of their 
formation (i.e. early innovation), because companies require resources to develop their 
businesses, and (ii) agency theory can explain the effects of bonding and monitoring in the 
formalisation and control stages (i.e. stability and institutionalisation). The different stages of a 
company’s life cycle are accommodated in most corporate governance empirical studies which 
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focus on large, mature public companies (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; 
Van Ness et al., 2010). 
2.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
A number of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms have been proposed to 
minimise principle-agent conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The internal control 
mechanisms comprise external directors, managerial ownerships, and performance-based 
remuneration schemes, which attempt to align the interests of shareholders through 
monitoring and incentive mechanisms. External control mechanism include corporate for 
market control, concentrated share ownerships, and regulatory monitoring (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985), which act as a substitute for weak internal governance (Daily et al., 2003; Rediker 
and Seth, 1995; Williamson, 1983). 
Scholars also argue that levels of governance effectiveness depend on a bundle of internal and 
external governance mechanisms (Jensen, 2010; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Williamson, 1983), in 
which strong external governance mechanisms may be substituted (or complement) for weak 
(or strong) internal governance mechanisms. 
To illustrate the effects of various corporate governance mechanisms in empirical studies, 
scholars pursue two approaches. In the first approach, scholars focus on the individual 
(internal or external) corporate governance mechanism with regard to each individual benefit 
or risk that affects company performance (Deyoung and Nolle, 1996; Grove et al., 2011; Michel 
and Hambrick, 1992; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Thereby, scholars examine each individual 
corporate governance mechanism by controlling for company-specific effects (Grove et al., 
2011) and country-specific effects (Laeven and Levine, 2009). For example, Grove et al. (2011) 
examine the effects of corporate governance on the financial performances of US commercial 
banks by controlling for the effects of bank asset sizes and the opportunity to grow, in which 
these variables minimise the effects of lending policies on the financial performances of banks. 
Laeven and Levine (2009) examine the effects of shareholder (cash flow rights) on risk-taking 
at banks in 48 countries by controlling for country-specific effects such as levels of economic 
development, because the levels of economic developments affect institutional frameworks 
such as good laws and regulations, which are likely to influence the attitudes of banks towards 
risk-taking. 
In addition, scholars are also able to provide insights on each corporate governance 
mechanism by focusing on explaining one mechanism at a time. Literature focuses to a large 
extent on external directors (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2008; 
Mishra and Nielsen, 2000), external director tenures (Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Smith et al., 
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1994), director share ownerships (Low, 2009; Morck et al., 1988), board expertise (Booth and 
Deli, 1999; Van Ness et al., 2010), board homogeneity (Berger et al., 2014; Core et al., 1999), 
and ownership structures (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2008; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). At the 
industry or country level, these studies find mixed evidence on board characteristics and 
ownership structures in association with company performances or risk-taking, indicating that 
agency costs differ between different types of mechanisms across companies and countries, 
and the interactions between different types of mechanisms. 
Second, following the above arguments, scholars assess a bundle of internal and external 
governance mechanisms. From a theoretical perspective, company performances/risk-taking 
depends on the efficiency of a bundle of internal and external governance mechanisms 
(Williamson, 1983), and external controls may substitute (or complement) for weak (or strong) 
internal controls (Rediker and Seth, 1995). For example, studying US banks in 1982, Rediker 
and Seth (1995) find strong substituted monitoring effects between external directors and 
large shareholders, and between external directors and internal director share ownerships. 
Drawing on these diversified methodologies, this thesis assesses the effects of corporate 
governance on Japan-listed banks by (i) focusing on explaining one mechanism at a time, and 
(ii) assessing the interactions between internal and external governance mechanisms. 
The above provides a brief overview of the theoretical frameworks and mechanisms of 
corporate governance, which offer analytical frameworks to examine the effectiveness of bank 
governance mechanisms that focus on board composition, management incentive structures, 
and shareholder monitoring. The following section provides short reviews on the practical 
issues arising from bank governance. 
2.5 Bank Governance 
Effective bank governance is vital to financial and economic stability. Scholars and 
policymakers tried to identify the ineffectiveness of the bank governance mechanisms that 
lead to the 2008 financial crisis (Erkens et al., 2012; Kirkpatrick, 2009). Some suggest that the 
crisis was partly due to failures of bank governance which include (i) inadequate levels of 
qualified directors on boards, (ii) incentive structures encouraging risk-taking, (iii) a lack of 
shareholder monitoring, and (iv) insufficient levels of shareholder monitoring arising from 
insufficient disclosure. 
2.5.1 Qualified Boards 
Scholars argue that qualified boards provide better management oversight and reduce risk-
taking at banks (Berger et al., 2014) because (financial) experts are better at understanding the 
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technical aspects of the risks being taken by banks. Studying German banks between 1994 and 
2010, Berger et al. (2014) find a negative relationship between levels of risk-taking and the 
numbers of PhD-holders serving on bank boards, suggesting that directors who are PhD-
holders are more likely to have superior risk management and monitoring skills or may be 
more risk averse. 
However, contrary to the above-mentioned empirical evidence, scholars find positive 
relationships between levels of financial experts and risk-taking when they study US financial 
companies and banks between 2000 and 2008 (Minton et al., 2010), suggesting that experts 
tend to encourage their financial companies and banks to take greater risks. One possible 
explanation is that these financial experts are likely to encourage risk-taking in an attempt to 
increase their company performances in order to align them with the expectations of their 
shareholders. 
Apart from levels of expertise, qualified, or ‘good’ boards should also consider elements such 
as frequencies of board meetings, levels of director share ownerships, ages of board members, 
board independence, board sizes and committees, and mutual respect and trust among board 
members (Sonnenfeld, 2002), and some of these elements are examined in chapter four. 
2.5.2 Management Incentive Structures 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, scholars, policy makers, and the media warned 
that performance-based incentives might encourage the employees of financial institutions to 
take excessive risks (OECD, 2010; Suntheim, 2010; Walker, 2009), although performance-based 
incentives were originally designed to minimise agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The underlying assumption of agency theory is that managers exploit company resources to 
enhance their own welfare, instead of maximising shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Performance-based incentives are designed to align the interests of managers with their 
shareholders, which should reduce exploitations by managers. Therefore, performance-based 
incentives lower monitoring costs (Almazan et al., 2005). 
However, empirical studies show mixed results (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Mehran and 
Rosenberg, 2007). Part of the results show that performance-based remuneration incentivises 
excessive risk-taking, in which managers may consider taking optimal levels of risks (or 
sometimes taking excessive risks) to maximise expected returns (Kahane, 1977). 
Studying the effects of the remuneration schemes of the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the 
world’s largest banks between 2000 and 2008, Suntheim (2010) finds that performance-based 
remuneration schemes incentivise risk-taking. The results show greater effects of 
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performance-based remuneration on risk-taking at US banks. Similar results are found in 
studies focusing on US banks (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2007). 
These authors suggest that possible relationships exist between the composition of incentive 
schemes and corporate policies, such as enhancing bank charter values (Houston and James, 
1995). 
However, studying US commercial banks in the 1980s and 1990s, the results of Houston and 
James (1995) show no relationship between equity-based incentives and risk-taking, but find 
positive relationships between equity-based incentives and bank charter values. Overall, these 
studies indicate that performance-based incentives are likely to be designed to increase 
charter values, instead of reducing risk-taking (Galloway et al., 1997; Houston and James, 
1995). 
Additionally, these risk-taking behaviours may be related to the charter values or franchise 
values of banks (Galloway et al., 1997). Studying US banks between 1983 and 1989 during the 
period of US financial deregulation, Galloway et al. (1997) find that when the charter values or 
franchise values of banks are low, banks tend to take greater risks, and vice versa. Similar 
results are found in Konishi and Yasuda (2004), whose study shows that declining franchise 
values increase risk-taking at Japanese banks between 1990 and 1999. 
2.5.3 Shareholder Monitoring 
In order to limit agency problems, scholars urge (concentrated) shareholders to monitor the 
managements of their investee companies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997), because, first, these shareholders have greater levels of expertise and access to 
resources to monitor their investee companies. Second, shareholders are incentivised to 
monitor their investee companies for the purpose of shareholder wealth maximisation 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), during which shareholder gains are required to offset the 
monitoring costs (Maug, 1998). 
Nevertheless, mixed results are found when assessing the effects of ownership structures and 
risk-taking at banks. One of the most recent findings is that shareholders encourage their 
investee banks to take greater risks (Laeven and Levine, 2009; OECD, 2009), and this may be 
for two reasons. First, shareholders may try to optimise their returns by encouraging their 
investee banks to take greater risks. The downside possibilities of investing in risky banks can 
be offset by using a diversified portfolio of investments. Second, shareholders may demand 
short-term returns which will lead to excessive risk-taking (Laeven and Levine, 2009; OECD, 
2009). In a cross-country study in 2001, Laeven and Levine (2009) find that a positive 
relationship exists between levels of share ownerships and risk-taking at banks, and the results 
31 
 
show that the effects on risk-taking are greater with concentrated shareholders. Similar results 
are found in earlier studies examining US banks during periods of financial deregulation 
between 1978 and 1985 (Saunders et al., 1990). 
Contrary to these results, studying European banks between 1999 and 2004, Iannotta et al. 
(2007) find a negative relationship between levels of share ownerships and loan losses, except 
for state-owned banks. The results indicate that non-state-owned banks (mutual and privately-
owned banks) are better at screening and monitoring loans. In addition, the authors also find 
that non-state-owned banks are more profitable, i.e. greater ratios of net returns to earning 
assets. This shows two possibilities: non-state-owned banks may have greater market shares, 
or that they charge higher interest rates on loans. The results imply that different types of 
institutional investors are likely to affect risk monitoring, because they have different 
investment objectives and investment horizons, as well as different levels of skilled employees 
(Almazan et al., 2005).  
In summary, empirical studies show that (i) the levels and types of share ownerships are likely 
to affect risk-taking at banks, and (ii) shareholder incentives to monitor risks are likely to vary. 
In chapter five, the relationships between various types of institutional investors, and bank 
lending and risk-taking, will be further explained. 
2.5.4 Insufficient Disclosure 
Kirkpatrick (2009) suggests that shareholders were unable to monitor banks during the 2008 
financial crisis as a result of information asymmetry. The author stresses that financial data on 
banks was insufficient to explain the types and levels of risks on the balance sheets of banks, 
including the complex financial products they had exposure to. In brief, without an adequate 
level of disclosure, shareholders are unlikely to be able to effectively monitor the 
managements of their banks. 
The theoretical framework of agency theory states that shareholder monitoring relies on 
information being provided by (internal) managers, for which information symmetry is 
essential (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Following the above argument, the majority of corporate governance studies focusing on 
information asymmetry assess the effects of corporate disclosure, and these studies argue that 
the quality of disclosure affects shareholder monitoring as a result of inadequate reporting on 
company performances (or levels of risk-taking) (Lowenstein, 1996; Sowerbutts et al., 2013). 
Scholars argue that the financial disclosures of banks are inadequate for shareholder 
monitoring (Lowenstein, 1996; Sowerbutts et al., 2013), because their reports on 
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performances and their risk-taking may be understated, overstated or inadequate. Lowenstein 
(1996) reviews the accounting practices of US-listed companies in the mid-1990s, and finds 
that US accounting practices allowed the application of derecognised liabilities resulting from 
higher return on assets (ROA) ratios. The author argues that these higher ROA ratios 
potentially provide misleading pictures on company performances to investors. 
Apart from inadequate reporting on performances, scholars also find inadequate disclosures 
on the types and levels of risks being taken by banks (Sowerbutts et al., 2013). The authors 
examine the types of information being disclosed by the 50 largest banks2 in a cross-country 
analysis, and construct indices3 to measure levels of disclosure. Their finding is consistent with 
(Pérignon and Smith, 2010), whose empirical study argues that the disclosure of Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) presents very little information on the levels of risk-taking at banks by examining the 
relationship between a self-constructed VaR disclosure index and the trading revenue of 60 
banks from 16 countries between 1996 and 2005. In summary, scholars and policy makers find 
that inadequate levels of information limit shareholder monitoring. 
The above offers overviews of the critiques of corporate governance theories and the practical 
issues of bank governance, which provide the foundations to address four research questions 
that focus on the corporate governance of Japan-listed banks: (i) whether board composition 
and expertise affect bank lending and risk-taking, (ii) whether bank ownership structures have 
an impact on bank lending and risk-taking, (iii) whether bank boards serve as complementary 
or substitute monitors for shareholders of banks.  
In order to link corporate governance theories and the practical issues of bank governance to 
Japan-listed banks, the following provides and regulators, and (iv) whether the corporate 
governance approach to shareholder supremacy (maximising shareholder value) weakens or 
strengthens the internal and external governance overviews of issues affecting the corporate 
governance of Japan-listed banks.  
2.6 Japanese Corporate Governance 
2.6.1 Stakeholder Supremacy 
Scholars argue that Japanese companies have long favoured stakeholder supremacy, which 
emphasises safeguarding the interests of their stakeholders, especially their employees (Dore, 
2000; Jackson, 2008). Araki (2005a) argues that (i) internally promoted board members, (ii) the 
                                                          
2 The samples of the empirical study consist of nine US banks, eight UK banks, five Canadian banks, four 
Australian banks, and 24 European banks. 
3 The indices were constructed by Sowerbutts et al. (2013) to measure disclosure over funding risks, 
group structures, valuation methodologies, intra-annual information and financial interconnections. 
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lifetime employment system, and (iii) cross-shareholding facilitate the employee-centred 
corporate governance model in Japan. 
First, Araki (2005) argues that internally promoted board directors are likely to have similar 
interests and views with other employees. This is because these board directors have 
experienced similar career grooming and organisational socialisation, and are able to affiliate 
themselves with other employees (Wiersema and Bird, 1993). Second, Araki (2005) further 
argues that the lifetime employment system increases social integration among employees, 
who have been promoted to the board and are able to protect the long-term interests of their 
companies. Third, Araki (2005) suggests that the purpose of cross-shareholding is to maintain 
long-term relationships with their business partners, instead of focusing on the levels of capital 
gains or dividend incomes. Therefore, these cross-shareholders are less likely to intervene in 
the corporate governance of their investee companies. 
However, Japanese companies may have gradually changed their corporate governance 
approaches to shareholder supremacy as a result of increasing numbers of foreign institutional 
shareholders in Japanese companies. These foreign shareholders demand that their investee 
companies should adopt corporate governance mechanisms to safeguard shareholder 
interests (Ahmadjian, 2008; Araki, 2005a; Jacoby, 2009). In the mid-1990s, large Japanese 
companies were under pressure to increase their dividend payments (Jacoby, 2009), and to 
adopt corporate governance mechanisms similar to those operating in Anglo-American 
companies. For example, under pressure from foreign investors, Sony and Toshiba 
restructured their boards and adopted Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms 
(Yoshikawa and Phan, 2001). Sony drastically reduced its board size by a third. It also 
appointed independent directors to its board, adopted a committees-based board structure, 
and introduced performance-based remuneration schemes such as share options. Toshiba, 
which belongs to a large keiretsu group, reduced its board size, and established nomination 
and compensation committees. Nevertheless, Toshiba’s board remains insider-dominated, 
despite adopting some of the Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms.  
These two cases show that Japanese companies have slowly adopted some of the mechanisms 
of the Anglo-American corporate governance model, such as the introduction of 
external/independent directors, board size reductions and the separation of the roles of the 
chief executive officers and chairmen (Jacoby, 2009). Nevertheless, stakeholder supremacy, 
such as the employee-centred corporate governance model prevails in Japan as a result of 
social norms, the lifetime employment system and cross-shareholding (Araki, 2005b; Yorozu et 
al., 2013). 
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2.6.2 Relationship Banking: The Japanese Bank Approach to Lending  
The Japanese banking system relies on long-term partnerships between companies and their 
banks, which is known as the main bank system. In the main bank system, banks develop their 
relationships with their borrowers/customers through cross-shareholdings, and by providing 
relationship banking services to their borrowers (Aoki and Patrick, 1994). 
Through relationship banking, bank managers are able to reduce information asymmetry by 
collecting information on their borrowers through their daily transactions, and by monitoring 
their financial conditions while gathering soft information on their borrowers. According to 
Aoki (1994), relationship banks perform three stages of monitoring before, during and after 
providing lending services. These are (i) ex ante monitoring, (ii) interim monitoring, and (iii) ex 
post monitoring. In ex ante monitoring, bank managers perform credit evaluations and screen 
the financial conditions of potential borrowers prior to any possible lending. During the interim 
monitoring stage, bank managers closely monitor their borrowers. In ex post monitoring, bank 
managers verify the results of the investment projects of their borrowers, and assess the 
financial conditions of their borrowers. They may also have to discipline their borrowers in the 
event of poor outcomes, and are likely to provide financial assistance or lower loan interest 
rates if their borrowers are experiencing financial distress (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Hoshi et 
al., 1990). Most of the empirical research on ex post monitoring of financial assistance was 
undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s, and the research focused on the phenomena of Japan’s 
main banks. Studying Japanese companies between 1978 and 1985, Hoshi et al. (1990) find 
that financially distressed companies that have relationships with main banks are likely to 
receive financial assistance from their main banks, compared to those without main bank 
relationships. Similar results are found in Elsas and Krahnen (1998), whose study focuses on 
German banks between 1992 and 1997. 
The following sub-sections provide overviews of the strengths and weaknesses of relationship 
lending.  
2.6.2.1 Strengths of Relationship Lending (compared to Transactional Lending) 
Monitoring costs are generally higher at relationship banks. This is because loan officers at 
relationship banks are required to tailor their monitoring processes in order to collect 
borrower-specific information. The associated (soft) information cannot be easily observed, 
verified and transmitted (Berger and Udell, 2002). Although the monitoring costs are generally 
higher in relationship banks, scholars tend to favour relationship lending over transactional 
lending for five reasons. First, scholars argue that relationship banks are better monitors 
(Bolton et al., 2013), and that relationship banking reduces information asymmetry through 
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the three aforementioned monitoring stages (Aoki, 1994a). As the durations of banking 
relationships lengthen, soft information is accumulated. As a result, information asymmetries 
are reduced. Therefore, the costs of monitoring and the costs of loans decline over time 
(Blackwell and Winters, 1997). Studying Italian banks between 2008 and 2010, Bolton et al. 
(2013) find that relationship banks lend less to risky companies, compared to transactional 
banks, indicating that soft information reduces the levels of risky loans. 
Second, relationship banks have greater liquidity buffers/reserves compared to those of 
transactional banks, which tend to lower the effects of economic downturns/credit crunches. 
Bolton et al. (2013) find that relationship banks tend to lend more and charge lower interest 
rates during economic contractions, compared to those of transactional banks. The authors 
find that relationship banks may be inclined to provide additional financial assistance to 
financially distressed companies, which in turn lowers the default rates of their borrowers and 
subsequently minimises the impact of credit crunches on the wider economy. Similar results 
are also found at Japanese banks, and the empirical results of Dewenter and Hess (2000) 
suggests that there is a statistically insignificant relationship between relationship banks and 
their default risks, indicating that relationship banks are likely to provide assistance to their 
financially distressed customers. 
Third, (Japanese) relationship bank managers usually consider the importance of economic and 
social values in the lending process, rather than focus purely on profit maximisation (Suzuki, 
2011b). Banks act in a socially responsible4 manner towards their customers, the environment, 
and society (Fukukawa and Moon, 2004; The Economist, 2002). Moreover, some banks 
promote their corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives through investing in related 
projects in non-financial companies (Tanimoto, 2010). 
Fourth, relationship banks facilitate funds for new industries (Allen and Gale, 2000), while ex 
post monitoring provides flexibilities for companies, and encourages those companies to 
support long-term projects (Suzuki, 2011b), because companies whose efforts raise additional 
funds from their relationship banks/main banks will in turn lead to increased internal liquidity. 
Studying Japanese companies between 1965 and 1986, Hoshi et al. (1991) find that the effects 
of liquidity on investments are less statistically sensitive in keiretsu-affiliated companies, 
                                                          
4 For example, the 2008 annual report of Mizuho Financial Group states that their social corporate 
responsibilities are to “promote support of financial education and environmental conservation”. 
Similarly, the 2013 annual report by Nomura Holdings states that they aim to “ensure that business 
divisions maintain a consistent and proactive approach to their community affairs activities in line with 
their operations as well as the needs of the local community”. 
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compared to independent companies, indicating that keiretsu-affiliated companies may 
borrow from their banks for future investments instead of relying on internal liquidity. 
Fifth, relationship banks are perceived to be safer than transactional banks because 
relationship banks generally have greater liquidity buffers and/or hold greater reserves against 
unexpected economic downturns (Bolton et al., 2013; Dewenter and Hess, 2000; Suzuki, 
2011b). Liquidity buffers are held in case of unforeseen events, such as having to provide 
financial assistance to distressed companies. Studying the banking industries in the UK, US, 
Germany, and Japan between 1984 and 1996, Dewenter and Hess (2000) find that the share 
prices of Japanese banks outperformed the market index during economic contractions, 
compared to those of UK and US banks in the same period. These results indicate that 
Japanese banks are considered to be less risky, compared to those in the UK and the US. 
2.6.2.2 Weaknesses of Relationship Lending 
Although relationship banks are perceived to be safer banks, and provide greater social 
benefits such as dampening the effects of possible credit crunches, the relationship and main 
bank systems have certain obvious weaknesses.  
First, relationship banks have greater levels of human capital and higher costs (Bolton et al., 
2013; Dewenter and Hess, 2000). As a result, the cost of borrowing is higher in relationship 
banks, compared to those of transactional banks. 
Second, the possibility exists of management collusion occurring between banks and their 
borrowers, because (i) the managements of banks and their borrowers are insulated from 
market disciplines as a result of cross-shareholding, and (ii) investors are unable to monitor 
and evaluate the credit quality of their loan portfolios as a result of information asymmetry 
(Hanazaki and Horiuchi, 2003). For these two reasons, bank managers, without the risks of 
being disciplined by the markets, may choose to continue to support companies whose 
financial conditions are unlikely to improve (i.e. zombie companies). 
Third, Peek and Rosengren (2005) find that the balance sheets of relationship banks are 
weakened when they overstate their loan portfolio credit quality, and understate their capital 
levels. For example, banks may choose to provide loans to financially distressed companies 
whose financial conditions are unlikely to improve, and these companies may then use the 
additional financial assistance for repayments. As a consequence, the loans of zombie 
companies are misclassified as good loans, instead of nonperforming loans. 
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2.6.2.3 Summary: Relationship Banking 
In summary, relationship banking strengthens relationships between banks and companies, 
lowers information asymmetry, and improves the monitoring abilities of banks. However, 
relationship banks are perceived to need more monitoring to prevent bank managements 
from collusion, and to prevent them from committing insider lending. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research methodology used in this thesis. It offers 
explanations on the methodological considerations, and explains econometric methods used. 
3.2 Connections between Theory and Research Methods 
Positivism is chosen in this thesis, because it enables the researcher to (i) test a list of 
hypotheses using the theoretical foundations underpinning corporate governance and 
statistical data to describe the features of Japan-listed banks, (ii) the researcher to present 
objective facts using empirical or scientific experiences (Crotty, 1998), which are free from 
opinions, beliefs, feelings and assumptions5. However, a number of disadvantages lie within 
positivism studies: (i) positivism studies rely on a valid source of data, in which measurement 
errors may arise; (ii) any misuse of inferential statistical tests leads to results being 
misinterpreted; (iii) positivism studies are descriptive, which may lack insights in the research 
question being studied. Nevertheless, positivism enables researchers to explain social facts 
using statistical data. 
From the methodology standpoint, the doctrine of positivism epistemological considerations is 
composed of a deductive approach and an inductive strategy in three stages. In the first stage, 
the relationship between the theory and social research is established, in which the researcher 
obtains a basic knowledge and theoretical understanding with regard to the research topic. In 
the second stage, the researcher deduces the hypotheses which are subject to the empirical 
analyses for the confirmations or rejections of the hypotheses. In the third stage, the 
researcher is required to employ a deductive approach for an inductive process (i.e. inductive 
strategy), which revises the theory reflecting the empirical findings. In summary, an empirical 
study should be used to examine the relationship between theory and social research, which 
enables the researcher to examine the relationship objectively. 
The following four fundamental principles are likely to be the reasons why positivism 
epistemological considerations are employed in corporate governance-related studies and 
cross-country analyses, which are conducted using quantitative modelling. 
First, corporate governance theories are a set of normative principles prescribing 
organisational behaviours (Donaldson, 2012). These normative principles enrich views on 
                                                          
5 Crotty (1998, p. 27) describes positivism epistemological as “objects in the world have meaning prior 
to, and independently of, any consciousness of them”. 
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corporate governance theories, and help researchers to design concepts of empirical studies 
examining the associated theoretical frameworks. The empirical assumptions of the 
conceptual frameworks must be based on normative theories. For this reason, this thesis 
attempts to incorporate the normative principles of organisational behaviours and corporate 
governance theories, and develops conceptive frameworks to advance the understandings of 
corporate governance practices at Japan-listed banks (and UK-listed banks). Much of the 
extent of this study focuses on the influences of board characteristics and those of institutional 
shareholders, and empirical studies are used to examine their effects on levels of bank lending 
and risk-taking.  
Second, corporate governance theories rely on explicit normative expressions including (i) 
property rights and authorities on agency theory, (ii) equities, commitments and authorities on 
stewardship theory, (iii) the fiduciary duties of corporate entities in stakeholder theory, and 
(iv) social power in resource dependence theory. The normative aspects of these theories can 
be tested by a set of facts based on numerical observations. For example, in this thesis 
quantitative methods are used in examining corporate governance mechanisms in terms of the 
effects of managerial ownerships on lending ratios/insolvency risk levels. The corporate 
governance mechanisms are observed using a set of facts that are based on levels of 
managerial compensation, company financial and accounting data, and ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
governance which are measured based on lending ratios and insolvency risk levels. 
Third, although qualitative methods can examine the complementary and/or substitution 
effects of using an inductive data analysis to focus on the meanings of participants (Misangyi 
and Acharya, 2014), it cannot examine the characteristics of the complementary and/or 
substitution effects of internal and external governance. In this study, quantitative methods 
are used to examine the complementary and/or substitution effects of internal and external 
governance, in which individual internal governance controls are considered with respect to 
external governance controls.  
Fourth, quantitative modelling enables researchers to compare observational data on multiple 
countries objectively without any interference from the researchers, and the comparative 
corporate governance of the two countries (i.e. Japan and the UK) is examined in chapter 
seven. In conducting comparative corporate governance empirical studies, the researcher 
must understand the data and statistical modelling limitations in order to present accurate or 
complete interpretations. The researcher should also be aware of the weaknesses of these 
cross-country empirical analyses, such as Simpson's paradox.  
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Scholars often ignore the Simpson's paradox, and instead provide a statistical generalisation. 
Simpson's paradox refers to trends that appear to be different from each other when groups 
are examined independently, and these effects of trends are reversed or cancelled when 
individual groups are examined under a combined data set (Ma, 2015). Although the 
normative concepts are examined using statistical modelling, empirical analyses of cross-
country studies may ignore the differences in the statistical inference and institutional setups 
of the studied countries. As a result, the aggregated methods – ignoring the Simpson's paradox 
– are likely to present inaccurate or incomplete interpretations (Ma, 2015). In designing 
statistical models, the researcher should be aware of the Simpson's paradox, and pursue 
appropriate methods to generate accurate or complete results. In chapter seven of this thesis, 
an interaction country dummy variable is used as a country specific function when comparing 
the two countries, or two groups of data (Conway and Roberts, 1983). The interaction country 
dummy variable is used to isolate the effects caused by the independent variables of the two 
countries in a single regression analysis.  
In the case of this thesis, the researcher is required to identify the financial data to explain 
company corporate governance practices within the literature of financial economics and 
comparative law. The financial data can be used to quantify the effects of corporate 
governance practices comparable with other country corporate governance studies. The 
following section will discuss the advantages and the disadvantages of using quantitative 
methods in corporate governance studies, and the types of econometric methods used in the 
analysis. 
3.3 Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research is used to assess the causal relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. The numerical approach allows researchers to simplify complex 
problems and to explain them numerically. 
Researchers and econometricians first approach numerical problems using the pooled ordinary 
least square (OLS) estimation, because the OLS estimation presents a number of desirable 
properties such as efficiency (minimum variance and unbiased results) and unbiasedness, 
which is also known as BLUE (‘best linear unbiased estimator’). Consider a linear model. 
Model 3.1:  
𝒀 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝑿 + 𝜺 
where Y is the dependent variable, X is the independent variable, and 𝜀 is the idiosyncratic 
error term. 
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The OLS estimator of the coefficient is unbiased when the estimator represents the true value 
of the population parameter, and the OLS estimator of the coefficient is efficient when it is 
unbiased with a minimum variance.  
However, bias occurs if (i) there is a presence of omitted variable(s); (ii) the omitted variable is 
correlated with the error; (iii) the regression residuals (errors) are autocorrelated or serial 
correlated; (iv) the error variances are not consistent (heteroscedasticity), (v) there is a 
presence of outliers; (vi) the independent variable(s) is correlated with the error term (i.e. 
endogeneity); and (vii) the dependent variable and independent variable(s) influence each 
other at the same time (i.e. simultaneity). 
However, to avoid biased results, researchers should consider model errors arising from 
endogeneity as a result of the presence of omitted variables. Therefore, panel data analysis 
(fixed-effects or generalised method of moments estimations), and/or instrumental variables 
(created by principal component analysis) should be used, because the nature of corporate 
governance empirical studies present problems of endogeneity and simultaneity, and 
unobservable heteroskedasticity (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Wintoki et al., 2012). 
In the absence of an omitted variable(s) or when the omitted variable(s) is uncorrelated with 
the independent variables, random-effects estimation is more appropriate when examining 
the effects of independent variables that persist over time (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). 
A panel data set is used in the empirical studies of this thesis, which is also known as 
longitudinal data or cross-sectional time series data. It consists of i company-year observations 
across a period of time t. In this thesis, 662 bank-year observations are collected for Japan, and 
45 bank-year observations are collected for the UK. Both data sets cover the years between 
2005 and 2013.  
The panel data analysis is different from the pooled OLS estimation. The former measures the 
change of cross-sectional data over time. The latter ignores the statistical differences between 
different time periods. Compared to the pooled OLS estimation, the panel data analysis 
provides six advantages. First, the panel data analysis controls for individual heterogeneity, 
and time-invariant and state-invariant variables. Second, it provides “more informative data, 
more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more 
efficiency” (Baltagi, 1995, p. 4). Third, it is more adept at investigating the dynamics of 
adjustment, which is suitable in estimations containing “intertemporal relations, life-cycle and 
intergenerational” elements (Baltagi, 1995, p. 5). Fourth, it is able to investigate effects which 
are not detectable in cross-sectional or time series data. Fifth, it adjusts for bias in 
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microeconomic models arising from aggregated company-level data. Sixth, it is suitable for 
both balanced and unbalanced data sets. 
For the reasons highlighted above, three panel analyses are chosen to examine the effects of 
corporate governance mechanisms in this thesis: (i) the fixed-effects (FE) estimation, (ii) 
random-effects (RE) estimation, and (iii) the generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano 
Bond estimation. Additionally, the Cox proportional hazard model, and principal component 
analysis are also employed in this study. These econometric techniques are outlined in the 
following sections. 
The first three econometric techniques (FE, RE, and system GMM Arellano Bond estimations) 
are used in chapters four to seven. The Cox proportional hazard model is used chapter four, 
and principal component analysis is used in chapter six.  
3.3.1 Fixed-Effects (FE) Estimation 
Fixed-effects (FE) estimation is chosen because the nature of empirical corporate governance 
studies present problems of endogeneity arising from omitted variables, such as unobserved 
company characteristics. As a result, the problems of endogeneity lead to bias and inconsistent 
results (Boubaker and Nguyen, 2015, p. 333). Hence, the inconsistent estimators do not 
converge to the true values and the estimators are asymptotically biased, and the values of 
biased (and inconsistent) sample estimators are no longer able to represent estimators of 
population. In theory, the inconsistency can be resolved by increasing the number of sample 
sizes. However, it is not possible to increase the number of sample sizes in this thesis, because 
there are only specific numbers of listed-banks in each country. For these reasons, FE 
estimation is used in this study to mitigate for problems of endogeneity arising from omitted 
variables. 
The FE estimation is designed to examine the within-company effects, instead of examining 
the cross-sectional effects (Roberts and Whited, 2012, p. 78), because the FE transformation 
produces the time-invariant effects of unobservable heterogeneity.  
Consider a linear model. 
Model 3.2:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 are the variables of corporate governance mechanisms of bank i at time t. 𝑢𝑖 is the 
individual-specific error term, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. 
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The FE estimation uses the within-cluster variation (Cameron and Miller, 2015), and removes 
unobserved time-invariant unobservable characteristics/omitted variables through the 
following transformation: 
Model 3.3:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖) + (𝑢𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?) 
where 𝑢𝑖 is the individual-specific error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term, ?̅?𝑖 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝑖𝑡 ,  
𝐶𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 = ∑ 𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝑖𝑡 ,  ?̅?𝑖 = ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝑖𝑡 , and  𝜀?̅? = ∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝑖𝑡 . 
As shown in Model 3.3, the FE estimation can address omitted (time-invariant) variable 
problems by eliminating time-invariant variables. The threat of omitted variable bias can be 
reduced by controlling for the average differences across groups (i.e. companies) in any 
observable or unobservable regressors.  
Several studies have used FE estimations to ameliorate the bias arising from endogeneity (Bai 
et al., 2004; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Schultz et al., 2010; Yermack, 1996), and researchers 
suggest that FE estimations remove the time-invariant unobservable characteristics/omitted 
variables through the FE transformations (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). The FE transformations 
eliminate the omitted variables of Japan-listed banks that are likely to be time-invariant 
(Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Wailerdsak and Suehiro, 2004). 
In terms of model specifications, the Hausman test is used to determine whether the FE 
estimation is consistent (Hausman, 1978). The null hypothesis of the Hausman test must 
satisfy two conditions to avoid misspecification and to be asymptotically efficient. First, the 
independent variable(s), 𝐶𝐺, must be orthogonal to the error term, i.e. 𝐸(𝜀|𝐶𝐺) = 0. Failure 
to satisfy the orthogonal condition leads to a biased estimation, in which the estimators are 
unable to represent population estimations. Second, 𝜀 has a spherical covariance matrix, i.e. 
𝑉(𝜀|𝐶𝐺) = 𝜎2𝐼. Failure to satisfy the spherical covariance matrix will lead to a loss of 
efficiency, i.e. the variances of estimators are unable to converge to their minimum. The null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the desired method would be a random-effects (RE) 
estimation that presents more efficient estimators, while the alternative hypothesis indicates 
that the FE estimation is preferred; although the estimators of the FE estimation are 
consistent, regardless of whether the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is accepted or 
rejected.  
The FE estimation cannot address several problems for three reasons. First, estimators are 
likely to be biased if the independent variables do not change greatly over time. Therefore, RE 
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estimation is preferred. Second, it cannot ameliorate the bias in the presence of dynamic 
relationships (Wintoki et al., 2012). In a dynamic relationship, the independent variable(s) is 
continuously changing over time, which then causes the change in the dependent variable. In 
attempts to model dynamic relationships, econometricians include lagged dependent 
variable(s) in the right-hand side of the regression model. To ameliorate the bias in the 
presence of dynamic relationships, the generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond 
estimation is used (Wintoki et al., 2012). Third, it cannot ameliorate the bias arising from 
endogenous time-varied variables. 
In this thesis, lagged independent and control variables are used, which assume that the 
current outcomes (lending and insolvency risk levels) are affected by historical company 
performances, governance mechanisms or board characteristics. This suggests that particular 
governance mechanisms or board characteristics are chosen to affect future outcomes, i.e. 
lending and insolvency risk levels. 
In this study, the fixed-effects models are based on the following. 
Model 3.4:  
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Yi,t is the level of lending of bank i at time t, or the z-score of bank i at time t. CGi,t-1 
represents the variables of the corporate governance mechanisms of bank i at time t-1. CTROL 
represents the company-specific and time-specific control variables of bank i at time t-1. m is 
the number of variables of corporate governance mechanisms, and n is the number of control 
variables. 
Although the FE estimation already controls for the within-cluster variation, the regressors and 
the errors may be caused by individual (company-specific) effects, in which companies have 
different corporate governance characteristics such as ratios of external directors, or 
companies have different corporate governance characteristics due to the differences in 
corporate governance frameworks between countries. In order to address the problems of 
heteroskedasticity, the FE estimation clusters standard errors at the company level (Acharya et 
al., 2013; Black et al., 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2009) or country level (John et al., 2008). 
Clustering allows each unit within the cluster to be correlated, but it assumes that each cluster 
is independent from each other (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 134), because the correlation error 
terms are likely to be within the company level, or country level. In other words, ‘𝑢𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖’ is 
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the group-level (i.e. industry level or country level) shock, and the clustering also assumes no 
correction across groups.  
In this thesis, the FE estimations cluster standard errors at the bank level in single country 
studies (chapters four to six), and cluster standard errors at the country level in two country 
studies (chapter seven). 
3.3.2 Random-Effects (RE) Estimation 
In the case of that the independent variables do not change greatly over time, random-effects 
(RE) estimation is likely to be preferred over FE estimation. In the RE estimation, the 
independent variables are assumed to be exogenous. RE estimation is often used to measure 
time variations (of corporate governance measures) between individual samples in panel data.  
The RE estimation is designed to examine the between-company effects. Consider Model 3.2, 
which is a linear model measuring the impacts of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Model 3.2: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 are the variables of corporate governance mechanisms of bank i at time t. 𝑢𝑖 is the 
individual-specific error term (which is also known as the unobserved heterogeneity term), and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. 
In RE estimation, it assumes that independent variables are uncorrelated with unobserved 
effects, i.e. 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖, 𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡) = 0. 
In order to obtain consistent RE estimators of the error terms (𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡), the estimation must 
undergo RE transformation. The following model is transformed under the RE transformation. 
Model 3.5: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − λ?̅?𝑖 = λ𝛼 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 − λ𝐶𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖) + (𝑢𝑖 − λ?̅?𝑖) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − λ𝜀?̅?) 
where 𝑢𝑖 is the individual-specific error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term, ?̅?𝑖 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝑖𝑡 , 
𝐶𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 = ∑ 𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝑖𝑡 , ?̅?𝑖 = ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝑖𝑡 ,  𝜀?̅? = ∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝑖𝑡 , and λ = 1 −  (
𝜎𝜀
2
𝜎𝜀2+𝑇𝜎𝜇2
) . 
If λ approaches zero, the unobserved heterogeneity term (𝑇𝜎𝑢
2) is relatively small, and 
Model 3.5 becomes an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. In the case of λ being bigger 
than zero, then the random-effects estimators of Model 3.5 are more efficient than those of FE 
estimation (Pesaran, 2015, p. 648). If λ approaches one, then the unobserved heterogeneity 
term (𝑇𝜎𝑢
2) becomes very big. Then Model 3.5 is close to the fixed-effects estimation.  
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RE estimation offers three advantages. First, the RE estimation, employing RE transformation, 
allows the independent variables to be constant over time (Wooldridge, 2003, p. 490). Second, 
RE estimators contain the information of both within-group and between-group variations. 
Third, RE estimation is able to examine the impact of time-invariant variables, while the FE 
estimation eliminates the effects of time-invariant variables through FE transformation. 
The majority of panel data studies employ FE and RE estimations (Bin-Sariman et al., 2016; 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; Unite and Sullivan, 2003; Wu et al., 2007), and researchers 
employ the Hausman test to determine the appropriateness of the FE and RE estimations 
(Hausman, 1978). In addition, an RE estimation is likely to be more suitable if the independent 
variables are persistent over time (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002). 
In terms of model specifications, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is also 
used to examine whether the variances across entities are zero (Wooldridge, 2002). The null 
hypothesis of the LM test is that the ordinary least squares (OLS) is consistent, while the 
alternative hypothesis is that the RE estimation is preferred. 
In this thesis, the RE estimators provide the information of within-group and between-group 
effects, i.e. the average effects of independent variables (𝐶𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖) over the dependent variable 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡) when the independent variables (𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡) vary over time, and between banks by one unit. In 
this case, the researcher should consider using information obtained from the FE and RE 
estimations to determine the within-group and between-group effects.  
Lagged independent and control variables are used in this thesis, which assumes that historical 
company performances, governance mechanisms, or board characteristics have an impact on 
the current outcome, such as the levels of lending and insolvency risks.  
The random-effects models in this thesis are based on the following. 
Model 3.6: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Yi,t is the level of lending of bank i at time t, or the z-score of bank i at time t. CGi,t-1 
represents the variables of the corporate governance mechanisms of bank i at time t-1. CTROL 
represents the company-specific and time-specific control variables of bank i at time t-1. TD is 
the time dummy variable, which is used to avoid serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors 
across time (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 261). m is the number of variables of corporate governance 
mechanisms, and n is the number of control variables. 
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Although the RE estimation already controls for the within-cluster and the between-cluster 
variations (Dieleman and Templin, 2014), the regressors and the errors may be caused by 
individual (company-specific) effects. In order to address the problems of heteroskedasticity, 
the RE estimation clusters standard errors at the company level or country level. 
In this thesis, the RE estimations cluster standard errors at the bank level in single country 
studies (chapters four to six), and cluster standard errors at the country level in two country 
studies (chapter seven). 
3.3.3 System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Arellano Bond Estimation 
Scholars suggest that the results of corporate governance empirical studies are likely to be 
biased arising from the problems of endogenous, unobservable heteroskedasticity, and 
simultaneity (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Wintoki et al., 2012). To resolve the bias, they 
suggest that the generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimation can be 
used (Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). 
The GMM Arellano Bond estimation introduces a modelling approach to analyse the dynamic 
relationships between dependent and independent variables. The model uses lagged 
dependent variable(s) as instrument variable(s), from which these instrument variable(s) are 
used as regressor(s) (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The instrument variables affect the 
independent variable(s) but have no effects on the dependent variable. 
Under the GMM Arellano Bond estimation, the instrument variables are the lagged values of 
the explanatory variables in the levels and the first-difference forms. 
Model 3.7: 
[
𝑌𝑖𝑡
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡
] = 𝜒 [
𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑝
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑝
] + 𝛽 [
𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡
∆𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡
] +  𝛾 [
𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
∆𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
] + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
The first-difference form (∆𝑌𝑖𝑡) can be derived from a linear model. 
Consider the following the linear model.  
Model 3.8: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where Yi,t is the level of lending of bank i at time t, or the z-score of bank i at time t. 
𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the variables of the corporate governance mechanisms of bank i at time t-1. 
𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1  represents the company-specific and time-specific control variables of bank i at 
time t-1. 𝑢𝑖 is the individual-specific error term, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. 
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The first-difference form of Model 3.6 is: 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜒𝑝 ∑ ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑝
𝑝
+ 𝛽∆𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾∆𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where p >0. The p lags in the first-difference form captures the information related to previous 
bank lending levels (outcomes). 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic generalised method of 
moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimators allows for endogeneity in the model. 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
correlated with the unobserved individual level fixed-effects 𝑣𝑖, and 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 is orthogonal to the 
differenced disturbances. The unobserved individual level fixed-effects 𝑢𝑖 is likely to be a time 
invariant variable that includes country characteristics, which may be correlated with 
independent variables. 
The difference GMM Arellano Bond estimator may have finite sample bias problems resulting 
from employing weak instrument(s)6, and the lagged level instruments may be weak under the 
difference GMM estimator. This is because the lagged dependent and independent variables 
are persistent over time (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The finite sample bias problems can be 
minimised by implementing the system GMM Arellano Bond estimator, which has a greater 
level of asymptotic efficiency compared to the difference GMM Arellano Bond estimator. 
The system GMM Arellano Bond estimation is composed of the first difference and the levels 
instruments. First difference instruments are the lagged dependent variables, and the lagged 
first difference of the independent and control variables. Levels instruments are the lagged 
first difference of the dependent variables. 
Additionally, the system GMM Arellano Bond estimation allows additional moment conditions 
such as endogenous and predetermined variables to be added as instruments (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2010, p. 301). The number of lags are limited in GMM Arellano Bond estimations, 
because serial correlation will be lower with limited lag depth, and deeper lag instruments are 
likely to be weak and do not present any new information (Mehrhoff, 2009, p. 8). For example, 
Wintoki et al. (2012) suggest that the information reflecting the historical corporate 
governance mechanisms and company-specific characteristics (at time t-4, t-3, t-2) affect the 
outcomes at time t-1. The current outcome (t) is also affected by the previous outcome (t-1) 
and company-specific information at time t-1, but the company-specific information (at time t-
4, t-3, t-2) is independent from the current outcome (t). Therefore, the bias arising from the 
                                                          
6 A weak instrument may be correlated with the endogenous variables, and the instrument variable 
regressor is biased.  
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problems of endogeneity and simultaneity improve in the system GMM Arellano Bond 
estimations. 
To detect model misspecifications, the Sargan test, and the Arellano Bond first-order (AR(1)) 
and second-order correlation (AR(2)) tests are used to assess the validity of instrument(s) in 
this thesis. 
The Sargan test is used to test for overidentifying restrictions, and the test is required to first 
verify whether the number of additional instruments are greater than the number of 
endogenous regressors in the model. Then, if the model is overidentified, the Sargan test 
assesses whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.  
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the overidentifying restrictions are valid, i.e. the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. For example, if the instrumental variable(s) 
is endogenous, then the null hypothesis of the Sargan test is rejected. As a result, the 
instrumental variable(s) may be invalid. 
Arellano Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests determine whether the instrumental variable(s) used in 
the GMM Arellano Bond estimation suffers from problems of endogeneity. They are used to 
test for the zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors, where the null hypothesis shows 
that no autocorrelation is present in the estimation. To satisfy the conditions of orthogonality, 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in AR(1) is rejected, and the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation in AR(2) is accepted, i.e. the residuals in first difference (AR(1)) are serially 
correlated, and the residuals (AR(2)) are not correlated (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, p. 300).  
In conclusion, the model is valid when the valid instruments are used, and the conditions of 
orthogonality are satisfied.  
Several studies have used the system GMM Arellano Bond estimation (Beck and Levine, 2004; 
Lilling, 2006; Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012), in which the estimation model controls 
for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity through first differencing.  
In the empirical study of Lilling (2006), the author employs system GMM Arellano Bond 
estimations to address problems of endogeneity and simultaneity arising from the regression 
model estimating the relationship between the levels of chief executive officer (CEO) 
compensation and the values of US companies. The author argues that the levels of CEO 
compensation are persistent over time, and jointly affect company values. As a result, the 
system GMM Arellano Bond estimation is used, because it controls for company-specific 
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effects and the endogeneity of all explanatory variables, and includes the lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor.  
Scholars argue that the board characteristics of Japanese companies lack diversity, and are 
likely to be persistent over time (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Wailerdsak and Suehiro, 2004). If 
this is the case for Japan-listed banks, their board characteristics are likely to jointly affect their 
lending and risk-taking strategies. As a result of the persistent board characteristics, the 
system GMM Arellano Bond estimation is more suitable in this thesis, compared to the 
difference GMM Arellano Bond estimation. 
The system GMM Arellano Bond estimation models are based on the following model. 
Model 3.9: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  γ𝑖𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 is the level of lending of bank i at time t-1, or the insolvency risk level (z-score) of 
bank i at time t-1. 𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the variables of the corporate governance mechanisms of 
bank i at time t-1. 𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑗,𝑡−1 represents the company-specific and time-specific control 
variables of bank i at time t-1. m is the number of variables of corporate governance 
mechanisms, and n is the number of control variables. In the system GMM Arellano Bond 
estimation models, bank-specific effects and the endogeneity of all explanatory variables are 
controlled for. 
Additionally, two options are included in the models: (i) predetermined regressors, and (ii) 
options providing a heteroskedastic-consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of 
the estimator. 
The first option, predetermined regressor(s), is used to correct the model when the model 
cannot satisfy the orthogonality conditions, i.e. the dependent variable is not correlated with 
past errors. The predetermined variable is correlated with the structure error of lagged values, 
but is uncorrelated with the present and future values (Arellano, 2003; Cameron and Trivedi, 
2010, p. 295). 
The second option is to avoid any misspecification causing weak instruments and large sample 
biases (Windmeijer, 2005). However, the use of vce(robust) inhibit the Sargan test in Stata, 
because the test requires the errors to be independent and identically distributed (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2010, p. 301). According to Cameron and Trivedi (2010), the GMM Arellano Bond 
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estimation needs to be run first without the options of vce(robust) to test for overidentifying 
restrictions using the Sargan test.  
3.3.4 The Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
The Cox proportional hazard model (Cox model) is used in chapter four of this thesis, instead 
of logit or probit models. This is because logit and probit models assume that the probability of 
an event occurring (the hazard rate) is invariant to time due to models being parameterised 
under exponential distribution (Jones and Branton, 2005). 
In chapter four of this thesis, the categorical variable is used to indicate whether banks are 
participating in securitisation businesses, which are repeatable events in some banks. The 
problem of the hazard rate being time-invariant can be resolved by introducing a duration 
dependency parameter. To analyse the probabilities of banks participating in securitisation 
businesses, the Cox model is used. The Cox model is able to model repeatable events, and 
allows one of the independent variables to be a categorical variable (Allison, 1982). The 
duration time of the hazard rate is reset after each discrete time period, which allows 
repeatable events to be modelled and to recalculate the probability of an event occurring.  
The Cox model is also known as the survival analysis, which can be used to model the expected 
time to failure (or survival) of a given event (Cox, 1972). The Cox model examines a functional 
relationship between a binominal dependent variable and independent variable(s). The 
dependent variable is known as the hazard rate, or the relative risk. The relative risk is used to 
calculate the probability of an event occurring within the treatment group with respect to the 
control group.  
The Cox model is often used in medical science studies to estimate survival rates. It is used to 
analyse a set of dynamic path events (Gietzmann et al., 2016), in which hazard rates always 
increase or decrease with time (Allison, 1984). In addition, the Cox model allows for repeated 
events in which multiple intervals are assumed to be statistically independent. It is used to 
determine the regression coefficients (i.e. the effects of covariates) and hazard rates of a given 
event, which is semi-parametric; and to examine the relationship between the probability of 
an event occurring and independent variables. 
The hazard function of a proportional hazard model is 𝜆𝑖(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝜆0(𝑡)𝑒
𝛽′𝑥, where 𝜆0(𝑡) is the 
hazard rate of the control group, and 𝜆𝑖(𝑡) is the hazard rate of the treatment group. The 
hazard rates between the two groups is represented as  
𝜆𝑖(𝑡)
𝜆0(𝑡)
= 𝑒𝛽
′𝑥, and the log of the hazard 
ratio is 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜆𝑖(𝑡)
𝜆0(𝑡)
) = 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑝𝑖. 
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The hazard function is composed of the baseline hazard 𝜆0(𝑡), and the hazard function relative 
risk7 is associated with covariate values x, i.e. 𝑒𝛽
′𝑥, in which all of the covariates are set to zero 
in the baseline hazard function. These time-varying covariates are easily introduced in panel 
data hazard models (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Prior to computing the Cox model, the Kaplan–Meier estimation and the survivor function are 
used as exploratory analyses. The Kaplan–Meier survival function provides useful initial 
diagnostics, which offer the survival probability of individual sample groups. In the context of 
this thesis, the survival probability is the probability of banks not participating in the 
securitisation business.  
The Kaplan–Meier estimation is a nonparametric estimation (Kaplan and Meier, 1958), which 
calculates the survival probability using cumulative incidence of an event at a given time, or 
calculates the hazard rate (the probability of failure) from which the Kaplan–Meier estimate of 
survival probability is subtracted by one. However, the Kaplan–Meier estimation is constrained 
from estimating covariate-adjusted survival. The survivor function is also known as the hazard 
model, which provides an estimate of the probability at a given time that an individual is at risk 
of an event occurring; and shows how various characteristics affect survival times (Wooldridge, 
2002, chap. 20). 
There are three reasons that the Cox model is chosen for chapter four of this thesis. First, the 
hazard rate changes over time. As a result, the exponential regression model is not suitable8. 
Second, the estimators remain unbiased under the circumstance that the baseline model is 
misspecified (Meyer, 1990). Third, the Cox model allows for repeatable events9 to be used in 
the statistical analysis (Allison, 1984, p. 13). However, the Cox model requires covariates to be 
strictly exogenous (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 714). 
Several financial studies have used the Cox model (Dickerson et al., 1998; Gomez-Gonzalez and 
Kiefer, 2009; Lane et al., 1986). In the empirical study of Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer (2009), 
the Cox model is used to characterise the failure rates of Colombian financial institutions. The 
authors compare the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimator, the estimated smoothed hazard 
function (the behaviour of the baseline hazard), and the Cox model.  
                                                          
7 In this thesis, the hazard function relative risk is referred to as the risks of banks participating in 
securitisation businesses.  
8 The likelihood-ratio chi-square test can be used to compare the relative fit between the exponential 
regression model and the Cox model.  
9 In this thesis, the repeatable events are referred to as banks participating in securitisation businesses. 
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In chapter four of this thesis, the Cox model is used to examine whether the probability of 
banks participating in securitisation businesses is determined by board characteristics, the 
presence of assets and liabilities committees, levels of risk-taking, bank asset sizes, and total 
capital reserve ratios. Contrary to the survival probability, the hazard ratio is the probability of 
banks participating in securitisation businesses. Two sample groups are investigated: (i) the 
treatment group, and (ii) the control group. In chapter four, the treatment group is composed 
of banks which adopt assets and liabilities management committees (ALCO =1) and the control 
group, which is composed of banks that do not adopt assets and liabilities management 
committees (ALCO =0). The covariates are likely to be the factors (board characteristics, 
regulatory requirements, etc.) which affect the decisions of banks to participate in 
securitisation businesses. 
Following Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer (2009), a list of graphical and numerical methods are 
used in section 4.5.3 to determine the overall fitting adequacy of the Cox model: (i) the Kaplan-
Meier survival function, (ii) the tests of the equality of survival functions, and (iii) the 
estimated smoothed hazard function. The Kaplan-Meier survival function offers a graphical 
overview of the survival probability of individual sample groups. The tests of the equality of 
survival functions include the log rank and the Wilcox tests, in which the null hypotheses are 
that there is no difference between the population survival curves. The estimated smoothed 
hazard function provides a graphical overview of the probabilities of banks participating in 
securitisation businesses against time.  
3.3.5 Principal Component Analysis 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is used in chapter six to create corporate governance 
indices, which include eight internal corporate governance mechanisms consisting of board 
characteristics and director share ownerships.  
PCA is used in this thesis for three reasons. First, PCA reduces the dimensionality of a data set 
and preserves the variations of the data by concentrating on the diagonal elements 
simultaneously, in which the data set contains a part of the interrelated variables. Second, the 
principal components (PCs) are uncorrelated and orthogonal, because the PCs are a list of 
eigenvectors, which are obtained from the eigenvalues decomposition of a matrix of variables. 
The PCs are computed using a linear transformation technique, and the orthogonal linear 
components maximise the total variance. 
To explain further, the PCs (eigenvectors), and their eigenvalues are mathematically 
represented as: 
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𝒁 = 𝑿𝑨 
where Z is the eigenvalues of the PCs for the observations, A is an orthogonal matrix (i.e. 
𝐴𝑇𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴𝑇 = 𝐼), and X is the column of the eigenvectors.  
PCs are selected based on the Kaiser’s rule, i.e. the eigenvalues of the PCs exceed one. Once 
the PCs are selected, researchers are required to decide whether PCs are rotated prior to the 
regression analysis. The reduction of the variables used in the estimations can also increase 
the efficiency of the analysis (Mehrhoff, 2009). 
The unrotated PCs are likely to suffer large sample errors if the neighbouring eigenvalues are 
close to each other (North et al., 1982). As a result, PCs with varimax rotation are used in the 
regression analysis, in which the varimax rotation maximises the sum of the variances of the 
squared loading and preserving orthogonality. Varimax rotation is used when any one variable 
can have high loading in one component, and other variables have near-zero loading in the 
same component. Under this circumstance, normalisation takes place in varimax rotation, and 
transforms the matrix closer to the sample. 
After the rotated PCs are selected, regression analysis is used to determine the relationship 
between the dependent variable and PCs, i.e. 
𝑦 = 𝒁𝛾 + 𝜀 
where y is the dependent variable, and 𝛾 = 𝐴′𝛽; since A is orthogonal and 𝑋𝛽 is equal to 
𝑋𝐴𝐴′𝛽 = 𝑍𝛾. 𝜀 is a vector of the error terms.  
Some scholars suggest interpreting PCs using the loading of variables (Bushman et al., 2004; 
Eng and Mak, 2003), but Ali et al. (1985) argue that the interpretation could be misleading. 
Instead, the authors propose that the correlations between the PCs and the variables should 
also be considered in interpreting the regression results. In chapter four, both the loadings, 
and the correlations between the PCs and the variables are considered. 
Several corporate governance empirical studies have used PCA (Bushman et al., 2004; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Larcker et al., 2007; Westphal and Zajac, 1998). In the study of Larcker et al. 
(2007), a two-step model is used. First, PCA is used to create 14 corporate governance indices, 
and these indices retain 61.7 percent of the total variance in the original data. Second, the 
corporate governance indices are used as regressors in multivariate regression analyses. 
Following Larcker et al. (2007), a two-step model is used in chapter six. In the first-step, PCA is 
used to create three corporate governance indices from eight variables of corporate 
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governance mechanisms, which contain 64.4 percent of the total variance in the original data. 
In the second-step, FE and system GMM Arellano Bond estimations are used. This method is 
able to minimise the dimensions of a large set of corporate governance variables, which 
ensures the validity of the regression analysis (Grove et al., 2011).
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Chapter 4 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the relationships between the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms of banks, and lending and risk-taking behaviours. It focuses on potential conflicts 
of shareholder supremacy with the corporate governance model of Japan-listed banks. It 
assesses the effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the levels of lending and 
insolvency risk between 2005 and 2013. 
Moreover, this chapter also examines the likelihood of banks participating in securitisation 
businesses, where securitisation is used as a form of risk-taking or as a risk management tool. 
This chapter argues that the likelihood is affected by the ratios of external directors and board 
experts to the total number of board members, and the presence of assets and liabilities 
management committees. 
Some scholars view Anglo-American and Japanese corporate governance models as being two 
dichotomous models and employ them in comparative analyses (Loewenstein, 2001; Macey 
and O’Hara, 2003). The former emphasises shareholder supremacy, promotes board 
independence, and contains an element of active market for corporate control (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). The latter stresses stakeholder supremacy, enabling stakeholders (such as 
employees) to exercise their ‘voice’ to influence company decision-making, and contains an 
element of weak market for corporate control (Loewenstein, 2001). However, these 
dichotomous models no longer represent the full picture of the corporate governance models 
operating in Anglo-American countries and in Japan. Scholars argue that countries such as the 
UK and Japan (and many other countries) create their own versions of hybrid corporate 
governance models combining local practices and emerging global standards (Deeg and 
Jackson, 2007; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009).  
For example, Japanese domestic shareholders are increasingly acting like their Anglo-American 
counterparts, in which the institutional shareholders, such as the Japan Pension Fund 
Association, are encouraged to actively monitor their investee companies and to constructively 
engage with their investee companies for the contribution of the sustainable growth of their 
investee companies (Aronson, 2011; Financial Services Agency, 2014). Based on these 
observations, scholars argue that the corporate governance practices of Japanese companies 
are increasingly like those of the Anglo-Americans (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). This ‘new’ 
emerging model is described as a hybrid model (Aoki, 2000). 
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Nevertheless, in the context of Japan, the social and economic norms of listed-banks arguably 
align with the ideas of stakeholder theory, because these banks maintain stable employment 
and stable relationships with their borrowers (Jackson and Moerke, 2005); although the 
relationships between banks and their stakeholders (such as borrowers) are better described 
by the economic model (Hendry, 2001).  
However, researchers have seldom assessed the effects of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance mechanisms (such as the ratios of external directors to boards) on banks operating 
in countries where their social norms arguably align with the stakeholder theory.  
This chapter aims to provide insights on the above enquiries by examining (i) the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms of Japan-listed banks, in which the social norms of these 
banks focus on stakeholder supremacy (Dore, 2000; Loewenstein, 2001); and (ii) the effects of 
Japan-listed banks which adopt Anglo-American-like corporate governance mechanisms on 
three central characteristics of banks: lending, risk-taking, and the probability of banks 
participating in securitisation businesses. 
Existing research provides views on stakeholder supremacy by comparing the institutional 
frameworks of Japan with other Anglo-American countries. Dore (2000) compares the 
Japanese corporate governance system with its Anglo-Saxon equivalent, and suggests that (i) 
the Japanese corporate governance system is referred to as an inside system, suggesting that 
managers are trusted to run their companies properly, but that the trust placed in them often 
leads to fraudulent cases; and (ii) there is little concern over shareholder interests, i.e. 
companies have low stock appreciations and a propensity to pay low dividends. 
The majority of empirical studies examine the relationships between individual internal 
corporate governance mechanisms, performances, and risk-taking in Japanese 
companies/banks. The results are inconclusive. In the studies of Japanese banks, scholars find 
that the levels of performances and risk-taking (i) reflect the interests of their shareholders 
(Konishi and Yasuda, 2004), (ii) are associated with performance-based incentives (Kato and 
Kubo, 2006), and (iii) are related to the backgrounds of external directors (Horiuchi and 
Shimizu, 2001; Kato and Kubo, 2006). But scholars seldom discuss the effects of board 
independence, and external director expertise and tenure, because the majority of Japanese 
boards are insider-dominated (John and Senbet, 1998; Whittaker and Deakin, 2009), and there 
is also a limited talent pool of external or independent directors (Dore, 2000).  
In this chapter, empirical analyses are designed to examine the internal governance 
mechanisms that are based on six theoretical keystones of corporate governance and 
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management. First, a theoretical argument suggests that maintaining good relationships 
among stakeholders may promote good long-term performances by companies (Alam, 2006; 
Dodd, 1932), while stakeholder wealth is likely to be eroded when the interests of managers 
and their stakeholders diverge (Hill and Jones, 1992). The divergence may be minimised by 
implementing various internal corporate governance mechanisms similar to those proposed 
under agency theory. 
Second, increased board independence (increasing the ratios of external directors to the total 
number of board members) tends to increase levels of board monitoring (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, the monitoring mechanisms may differ between (i) performance 
monitoring mechanisms, and (ii) risk and stakeholder-interests monitoring mechanisms. In the 
former system, external directors (i.e. the monitors) may encourage their companies to take 
greater levels of risks for greater returns, i.e. the performance monitoring mechanisms exist to 
maximise shareholder wealth by investing in risky projects. Under the risk and stakeholder-
interests monitoring mechanisms, the monitors may encourage banks to control the levels of 
risks and to provide lending while promoting financial stability and economic growth. 
Third, Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposes a theoretical argument that the interests of 
managers are aligned with those of their shareholders through incentive schemes such as 
having managers owning shares in companies in which they serve. These incentive schemes 
also act as risk-sharing mechanisms between shareholders and managers (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b), which may prevent their banks from engaging in excessive risk-taking, while 
attempting to maximise shareholder wealth.  
Fourth, highly skilled experts understand the complexities of their industries, and are able to 
assess risks and opportunities. Instead of monitoring risk-taking, these experts may promote 
risk-taking for greater returns (Minton et al., 2014), and to develop their reputation as experts 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
Fifth, (board) homogeneity encourages groupthink and lowers the probabilities of task 
conflicts (Lau and Murnighan, 1998; Zander, 1979), because board homogeneity leads to 
greater levels of integration among group managements, and facilitates interpersonal 
communication (Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Murray, 1989). However, board homogeneity is 
likely to affect monitoring mechanisms at banks, and increase the possibilities of board 
members making extreme decisions (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). This is because individuals 
are likely to act by consensus in groups (Bainbridge, 2002). As a result, this thesis argues that 
board homogeneity is likely to increase levels of risk-taking at banks.  
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Sixth, assets and liabilities committees (ALCOs) are set up in a context of reducing agency costs 
through monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is based on the assumptions that (i) 
principals who are able to diversify their portfolios are risk neutral (Demski and Feltham, 
1978); (ii) agents10 who are unable to diversify their employment opportunities under the 
lifetime employment system are risk averse (Demski and Feltham, 1978); (iii) ALCOs, which are 
composed of experts to manage bank risk and liquidity, are likely to minimise the risk on their 
balance sheets (Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic, 2009). In the context of agency theory, 
ALCOs may use risk and liquidity management tools, such as securitisation, to minimise risks as 
a result of lowering agency costs.  
To assess these theoretical arguments, a database composed of 662 bank-year observations is 
built to collect financial and governance data on Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013, 
and to examine the effects of various internal corporate governance mechanisms on levels of 
lending and insolvency risks. To deal with unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity in panel 
data, the fixed-effects, random-effects and the system Arellano Bond GMM regression 
analyses are used. 
Additionally, the likelihood of banks participating in securitisation businesses is examined using 
the duration analysis (Cox proportional hazard model), which allows for a categorical 
dependent variable to be used in repeated events, because multiple intervals are assumed to 
be statistically independent. 
This chapter uses a few different dependent variables: (i) lending ratios, (ii) the z-score, and (iii) 
the likelihood of banks participating in securitisation businesses. The lending ratios are the 
ratios of loans to total deposits, money market and short-term funding. The z-score is used as a 
measure of the insolvency risk levels. The likelihood of banks participating in securitisation 
businesses is a categorical variable, in which 1 equals the presence of securitisation 
businesses; otherwise, it equals 0. 
The key findings are as follows. First, the findings show that the increased ratios of external 
directors to the total number of board members (henceforth are referred to as the ratios of 
external directors) lead to a rise in insolvency risk levels at Japan-listed banks, but the 
increased ratios of external directors reduce the levels of impaired loans, indicating that 
external directors may persuade internal managers to reduce their lending risks, but also to 
increase other risks in non-lending businesses. These findings indicate that hiring external 
directors leads to an increase in insolvency risk levels, which are inconsistent with the 
                                                          
10 Agents are likely to experience personal financial losses in the event of their employers becoming 
insolvent.  
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corporate governance approach to shareholder supremacy, i.e. decreased agency costs (Berle 
and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Overall, the results indicate that (i) external 
directors may be ineffective at monitoring risk-taking at banks, and (ii) the introduction of 
external directors may lower lending support for domestic businesses and may destroy 
stakeholder value, because external directors are likely to view that lending to their existing 
corporate borrowers, whose businesses are failing, would incur significant costs to their 
shareholders (Slovin et al., 1993). 
Second, board expertise homogeneity reduces the insolvency risks of Japan-listed banks, 
where the majority of board members are lifetime bankers who are promoted internally to 
their boards. These lifetime bankers are also bank stakeholders, who arguably have implicit 
claims to lifetime employment in return for their hard work and competency (Cornell and 
Shapiro, 1987). These lifetime bankers are likely to have concerns about the financial 
conditions of their banks, because they may fear being unemployable if their banks become 
insolvent (Demski and Feltham, 1978). As a result, it is likely that these directors (internal and 
external) act as monitors who are likely to restrain their banks from taking excessive risks. 
Third, the increased ratios of external directors – who serve at banks with assets and liabilities 
committees (ALCOs) – increase the likelihood of Japan-listed banks securitising their debts. 
These external directors might be hired to assist their banks with participating in the 
derivatives markets. In addition, banks with ALCOs are likely to engage in securitisation 
businesses, if they have greater asset sizes or lower capital reserves. 
To explore more fully the effects on lending and risk-taking behaviours of banks, section 4.7 
also examines the result robustness by testing the effects of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on the levels of interest incomes and impaired loans. Although the findings 
indicate that the results presented in section 4.7 are not fully robust, they provide additional 
views on the effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms, in which external directors, 
legal experts, and internal and external director ownerships are effectively monitoring 
impaired loan ratios at Japan-listed banks. 
In conclusion, the results of Japan-listed banks are also consistent with the assumption that 
Japanese corporate governance mechanisms are internal (Dore, 2000), and confirm that, in the 
context of risk monitoring, board monitoring mechanisms such as the appointments of 
external directors are ineffective in monitoring company managements. As a result, greater 
ratios of external directors lead to increased insolvency risks. This indicates that external 
directors may show a lack of understanding of the non-lending businesses of their banks; 
and/or external directors may be ineffective monitors as a result of insider-dominated boards, 
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even though the empirical result shows a negative relationship between the ratios of external 
directors and impaired loans. 
The empirical findings also show that internal managers are able to lower the insolvency risk 
levels of their banks. These results are consistent with the conventional views of the Japanese 
corporate governance model (Allen and Gale, 2000; Dore, 2000; Whittaker and Deakin, 2009), 
in which ‘internal control’ governance may characterise the nature of internal corporate 
governance at Japan-listed banks. 
Lastly, the result finds that external directors act as supervisors at banks with assets and 
liabilities committees (ALCOs), and increase the likelihood of banks engaging in securitisation 
businesses. It also shows that banks with ALCOs are likely to participate in securitisation 
businesses, if they have bigger assets sizes, and/or lower capital reserves. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides backgrounds on the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms in Japan, and the Japanese securitisation market. 
Section 4.3 reviews the literature on various internal corporate governance mechanisms, and 
assets and liabilities management committees. Section 4.4 presents the conceptual framework 
and its associated hypotheses. Section 4.5.1 summarises the data samples. Section 4.5.2 
provides descriptions on the variables used in the empirical analyses. Section 4.5.3 provides 
summary statistics. Section 4.6 describes the methodology used in these empirical 
assessments. Section 4.7 discusses the results and the associated robustness tests. Section 4.8 
contains the conclusions. 
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4.2 Backgrounds 
4.2.1 The Internal Corporate Governance Model in Japan 
Compared to the Anglo-American corporate governance model, the Japanese corporate 
governance model is considered to be stakeholder supremacy, and to have limited board 
independence and shareholder rights.  
Consistent with the perspective of stakeholder supremacy, the Japanese corporate governance 
model requires companies to maintain economic and non-economic relationships with their 
stakeholders. To illustrate this point, the element of stakeholder supremacy can be found in 
the 2015 Japan’s Corporate Governance Code, which states that “Companies should fully 
recognize that their sustainable growth and the creation of mid- to long-term corporate value 
are brought as a result of the provision of resources and contributions made by a range of 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, business partners, creditors and local 
communities”. 
Moreover, Japan-listed companies differ from their Anglo-American counterparts for two 
reasons. First, with regard to board compositions, Japan-listed companies can choose to adopt 
one of three board structures: a ‘corporate (statutory) auditors system’, a ‘company with 
committees’, and a 'company with an audit committee’11. The ‘corporate (statutory) auditors 
system’ requires the company to elect full-time statutory auditors. Under the new ‘committees 
system’, the board is required to consist of an auditing committee, an appointment 
committee, and a remuneration committee, and more than half of each committee is required 
to be composed of outsiders. The ‘company with an audit committee’ requires the company to 
have an audit committee in which the majority of members must be outsiders and elected by a 
resolution at the shareholders' meeting. Unlike the UK, the (Japanese) Company Act does not 
have any restrictions on chief executive officer duality. Until 200912, the majority of listed 
companies (97 percent) adopted the ‘corporate (statutory) auditors system’ (OECD, 2011). 
However, the ‘corporate (statutory) auditors system’ does not require companies to have 
external directors on their boards, in which 97 percent of these listed company boards are 
arguably insider-dominated. 
Second, in terms of remuneration schemes, Japan-listed companies are required to determine 
the remuneration levels of their senior managers by using the remuneration committees that 
                                                          
11 The amendments to the Company Act introduced a new corporate governance model for board 
composition: ‘a company with an audit committee’, which became effective on 1 May 2015. 
12 The data was collected in 2009. 
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have resulted from their adoption of the ‘committees system’. Companies are also required to 
disclose information relating to their directors’ remunerations in their company reports. 
In summary, the Japanese internal corporate governance model considers the boards to be 
jointly responsible for both supervisory and monitoring roles, and to promote the interests of 
their stakeholders. 
4.2.2 Japan’s Securitisation Market 
Securitisation was not active in Japan until the mid-2000s, when the Japanese government 
revised its trust law (i.e. Special Purpose Company (SPC) law) and security law (the enactment 
of Asset Securitization Law) to lower the costs of securitisation. 
To facilitate the development of a domestic securitisation market, a government-supported 
housing agency, the Japan Housing Finance Agency (JHF), was created to replace the 
Government Housing Loan Corporation in 2007. The objectives of the JHF are to (i) promote 
domestic mortgage lending by purchasing mortgage portfolios from Japanese banks, (ii) to 
provide mortgage insurance to Japanese banks, and (iii) to finance social welfare projects 
including the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, 
redeveloping concentrated urban areas, rebuilding aged condominiums, etc. 
In the securitisation process, the JHF purchases loan portfolios from Japanese banks, and these 
loans are then securitised and sold to investors. The JHF issued nearly a third of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) in Japan in the mid-2000s (Chan et al., 2006), and ‘Flat 35’ of JHF is 
arguably one of the biggest MBS issuances in Japan (Suumo, 2015). 
The Japan’s securitisation market is relatively small, compared to those in the United States, 
Europe and the United Kingdom (Nassr and Wehinger, 2015, p. 109), and the 2008 financial 
crisis led to a substantial decrease in the number of securitisation issuances. In Japan, on the 
supply side of the Japan’s securitisation issuance, the number of securitised issuances amounts 
decreased by ¥ 3.1 trillion from 2007 to 2008, and remains low compared to corporate bond 
issuance (see Table 4.1). On the demand side, the majority of buyers are banks and insurance 
companies, whose strategies are buy-and-hold as a result of illiquid secondary markets in 
Japan (BCBS, 2011). 
In summary, Japan’s securitisation market remains small, and the securitisation of mortgage 
loans through the JHF appears to be a government policy which aims to help it finance its 
social welfare projects, such as by providing low interest rate loans for purchasing energy 
efficient houses, and to assist borrowers who were affected by the 2011 Great East Japan 
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Earthquake (Kobayashi, 2012; Standard & Poor’s, 2018), as well as to provide additional 
liquidity to banks to encourage lending (Park, 1996). 
Table 4.1 Securitised products: issuance amounts and numbers of issuances 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number of 
Issuances of 
Securitised 
Products 
312 314 261 204 146 107 91 90 127 
Securitised 
Products Issuing 
Amounts 
(¥ Trillion) 
8.2 9.8 6.8 3.7 2.9 2.6 3.4 2.9 2.7 
Corporate Bonds 
Issuing Amounts 
(¥ Trillion) 
6.9 6.8 9.4 9.6 10.3 9.9 8.3 8.2 8.1 
Source: Japan Securities Dealers Association. 
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4.3 Literature Review 
4.3.1 External Directors 
The effectiveness of board independence is being debated by scholars and policymakers, with 
some emphasising that the introduction of external directors may improve board monitoring. 
Yet, researchers have not empirically concluded how the effects of external directors differ 
between countries which have adopted corporate governance frameworks based on 
stakeholder supremacy or shareholder supremacy (Dore, 2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The research gap is surprising, because external directors are required to be a part of listed 
company requirements, regardless of whether the listed companies are in favour of 
stakeholder supremacy or shareholder supremacy (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Kaplan, 
1997). 
The former refers to stakeholder theory, which argues that managers are accountable to their 
stakeholders (Freeman and McVea, 2001). Alam (2006) suggests that companies can maximise 
their long-term performances by maintaining good relationships with their stakeholders. On 
the contrary, the latter, referred to as shareholder supremacy, argues that the interests of 
shareholders and mangers may diverge due to a separation of ownership and control. In order 
to align the interests of shareholders and managers, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that 
companies hire external directors to monitor their company managements to prevent them 
from exploiting company resources (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
Other than being expected to monitor company managements, external directors are also 
expected to provide guidance to junior internal directors, and to decide on levels of executive 
compensation for internal directors. According to the standard corporate governance 
literature using the agency theoretical framework, potential conflicts between managers and 
shareholders over company performances/levels of risk-taking may be evaluated and 
monitored by external directors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The efficiency of management 
decisions improves and residual losses are minimised as a result of the separation of 
management and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
The conventional monitoring roles of external directors may not apply in Japanese companies 
that adopt stakeholder supremacy, because governance controls are internal rather than 
external (Dore, 2000), which means that managers are monitored internally as well as by their 
stakeholders. Unlike shareholders, stakeholders trust managers to run their companies 
properly. For these reasons, external directors are hired to comply with legal requirements, or 
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to obtain external resources to benefit the development of their companies (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), instead of monitoring the conduct of their managers.  
Empirical literature assesses the monitoring effectiveness of external directors by examining 
the relationship of board independence and company performance (or levels of risk-taking). 
Studies of US companies show mixed results. Kor and Sundaramurthy (2008) and Mishra and 
Nielsen (2000) find positive relationships between the ratios of external directors and 
company performances, which indicate increased rates of sales growth, and increased return 
on assets (ROA) as a result of having external directors on boards, respectively. These studies 
show that the functions of external directors are not only limited to monitoring, but they also 
act as key advisors who help their companies to gain competitive advantages over their rivals 
by using their skills and experiences to spot possible opportunities, and to advance 
technologies and to deal with industry-specific regulations (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2008), as 
well as by helping companies to develop their businesses by providing access to their external 
networks (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, hiring knowledgeable and skilled external 
directors may not be enough to improve company performances. Bhagat and Black (1999) 
show that external directors are negatively associated with company performances. This is 
because outside-dominated boards may weaken board dynamics when external directors do 
not have sufficient levels of company-specific and industry-specific knowledge to advise and to 
monitor their company managements efficiently. 
In summary, these studies, which are based on US companies where shareholder supremacy is 
the norm, shows that board composition – such as board expertise and inside-dominated or 
outside-dominated boards – are important elements in determining whether external 
directors improve company performances. 
Weak financial performance may be associated with levels of risk-taking at companies, 
because the balance between risk and return is likely to be associated with levels of external 
director monitoring. Sufficient levels of external director monitoring provide safeguards which 
prevent banks from taking excessive risks, which could lead to poor financial performances. 
For example, weak external director monitoring may lead to poor quality loan portfolios as a 
result of weak lending policies (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001), which are also unlikely to increase 
returns. 
Instead of examining the effects on financial performance, it is worth investigating the 
relationships between external directors and risk-taking, because performances should be risk-
adjusted as result of risk-return trade-offs. Studying financial companies, Pathan (2009) finds 
that external directors – who are independent from shareholder influences – are negatively 
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associated with risk-taking, while Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) and Minton et al. (2010) find 
that positive relationships exist between risk-taking and ratios of external directors. Pathan 
(2009) argues that these external directors – who can provide industry-specific knowledge free 
from the restrictions of shareholders – can improve risk monitoring at banks. This argument is 
affirmed by Mehran et al. (2011)., who suggest that the key objectives of banks are to balance 
the interests of non-shareholder-stakeholders such as depositors, debtholders, and regulators. 
This is because (i) banks hold both economic and non-economic relations with depositors, 
debtholders, and regulators, and (ii) bank managers have fiduciary duties to safeguard the 
assets and maintain the financial stability of their banks.  
Contrary to the negative relationships, other studies suggest that risk levels may increase 
when regulators loosen their risk controls and reduce monitoring, or external directors try to 
improve bank performances by investing in risky projects. In the first case, moral hazard 
problems occur when amakudari are appointed as external directors. Amakudari are soon-to-
be-retired employees of financial authorities or the Ministry of Finance, and are incentivised to 
lower the monitoring on their prospective employers. As a result, regulatory monitoring fails. 
Studying Japanese banks between 1977 and 1992, Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) find a positive 
relationship between the ratios of external directors, who are amakudari, and risk-taking at 
banks (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001). In the second case, external directors may try to improve 
bank performances by increasing risk-taking (Minton et al., 2010), which is consistent with 
agency theory such as shareholder wealth maximisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The relationships between the ratios of external directors and company performances (and 
risk-taking) may also be underpinned by the prime objectives of companies, and other board 
characteristics. The prime objectives of companies may be shareholder supremacy, in which 
companies try to increase their profits by investing in risky projects, or stakeholder supremacy, 
in which companies try to balance the interests of their stakeholders, such as regulators or 
customers. 
4.3.2 External Director Tenures 
As discussed in the previous section, sufficient ratios of external directors on boards may 
improve board efficiencies and minimise residual losses (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This is because external directors often have acquired sufficient knowledge 
and skills from previous work experiences, and can independently monitor and advise their 
company boards.  
However, monitoring may be inadequate due to insufficient levels of company-specific 
experience or increased board homogeneity. Insufficient levels of company-specific experience 
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may be the result of short tenures, from which external directors have not acquired sufficient 
levels of company-specific information to enable them to efficiently monitor and advise their 
boards (Van Ness et al., 2010). Board homogeneity increases with external director tenures, 
which leads to enhanced board cohesion. Michel and Hambrick (1992) measure levels of 
cohesion using the average tenure of top management teams, and argue that managers share 
similar perspectives and experiences that often lead them having a single, dominant, general 
management logic. 
However, increased external director tenures may lead to a loosening of board monitoring, 
because external directors may more easily conform with the views of other board members 
as their tenures lengthen, resulting in a decrease in their abilities to monitor and become more 
homogeneous with internal directors (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2008). Studying US financial 
companies, Sun and Liu (2014) find that increased levels of external director tenures weaken 
their abilities to monitor, and increase levels of risk-taking at companies. As a result, some 
policy makers suggest putting a cap on external director tenures to ensure effective 
monitoring mechanisms on boards (Walker, 2009). In summary, these studies imply a convex 
relationship between the strength of board monitoring and external director tenures. 
4.3.3 Internal and External Director Share Ownerships 
Scholars argue that managerial ownerships can be used as a bonding mechanism to align the 
interests of shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and as a risk-sharing 
mechanism for shareholders and managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). The objective of the 
bonding mechanism is to maximise shareholder wealth, while the objective of the risk-sharing 
mechanism is to prevent managers from taking excessive risks. However, these two 
mechanisms may be offsetting the effects of each other, because bank managers are required 
to consider taking optimal levels of risks to maximise expected returns (Kahane, 1977), and to 
maintain the profitability of their banks. Consistent with the bonding mechanism hypothesis, 
managerial ownerships are positively associated with company performances, but this may be 
achieved by taking greater levels of risks (Grove et al., 2011), which may be excessive. Scholars 
argue that director share ownership is directly associated with company financial 
performance, and this increased financial performance is often at the expense of stakeholders 
(McGuire et al., 2003). 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the bonding and the risk-sharing mechanisms, empirical 
studies examine the effects on company performances/levels of risk-taking. However, results 
are mixed. Studying financial companies, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find no relationships 
between company performances and amounts of internal director share ownerships. Grove et 
69 
 
al. (2011) find that the relationships are positive which is consistent with the bonding 
mechanism hypothesis. 
On the contrary, Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) find that these relationships are negative. Their 
results indicate that highly concentrated internal director share ownerships dampen company 
performances, because managers may expropriate company resources from other (minority) 
investors. Under this circumstance, the bonding and risk-sharing mechanisms fail, because 
highly concentrated internal director share ownerships prevent managers from being removed 
by their boards, and managers can resist their companies from being taken over and continue 
to expropriate company resources (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, internal director share ownerships may incentivise their managements to pursue 
risky projects with higher possible returns, and the risk-taking behaviour may be further 
induced by government subsidies or weak regulatory environments. Bank managers may be 
motivated to take greater risks because their banks are protected by government subsidies, 
such as deposit protection insurance schemes (Demsetz et al., 1997), or could benefit from a 
weak regulatory environment, such as having low capital reserve requirements (Anderson and 
Fraser, 2000). 
Therefore, once internal director share ownerships fail to incentivise managers to maximise 
shareholder wealth, companies may introduce external directors as substitutes to monitor 
their boards. For example, companies are likely to increase their numbers of external directors 
following poor performances (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). 
In some cases, these external directors are rewarded with company shares. Studying US 
companies, Johnson et al. (1993) suggest that increased external director share ownerships are 
positively associated with the involvement of their boards in restructuring decisions and other 
major strategic initiatives. The authors argue that external directors, with equity ownerships, 
are incentivised to monitor and to take charge of restructuring actions. 
Following the above arguments, internal director share ownerships fail to align the interests of 
managers and their shareholders, and internal and external directors are likely to encourage 
their companies to take greater risks for their own benefits (Low, 2009). They may also be 
under the influences of their shareholders who are seeking higher returns (Saunders et al., 
1990), or exploit weak regulatory environments (Anderson and Fraser, 2000). 
4.3.4 Board Expertise 
In order to increase their competitiveness, companies can hire experts to help them spot 
possible opportunities, or technologies and deal with industry-specific regulations (Kor and 
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Sundaramurthy, 2008). The levels and types of expertise on boards may affect the risk 
preferences of boards, in which individuals’ understandings of their businesses and their 
decision-making processes are likely to be affected by their backgrounds and previous 
experiences (Kesner, 1988). Boards are usually composed of experts who are familiar with 
their businesses and they may hire financial and legal experts to gain tactical advantages when 
dealing with complex financial and compliance matters. 
Studies of US companies which hire financial experts for their boards find that there are 
positive relationships between ratios of financial experts and risk-taking in both non-financial 
companies (Booth and Deli, 1999; Van Ness et al., 2010) and financial companies (Minton et 
al., 2010). These scholars argue that financial experts are more inclined to take greater risks as 
a result of their perceived abilities to use their market understandings to influence the 
financial policies of their companies (Booth and Deli, 1999). They may also encourage their 
companies to engage in riskier projects/investments (Guerrera and Larsen, 2008). 
However, these findings are inconsistent with the views that financial experts enhance risk 
monitoring on boards, when the objective of hiring financial experts is to provide adequate 
levels of risk controls and higher levels of financial reporting standards (Berger et al., 2014). 
Minton et al. (2010) suggest that increased risk levels are the results of the experts’ 
understandings of the residual natures of equity claims and their attempts to improve 
company performances, despite the fact that these experts are hired as external 
(independent) directors to perform monitoring functions. 
Legal experts may also be hired as external directors to advise on appropriate regulatory and 
compliance policies (Linck et al., 2009), and serve as monitors (Krishnan et al., 2011). Studying 
US Russell 1000 companies between 2003 and 2005, Krishnan et al. (2011) find that 
appointments of legal experts as directors lead to improvements in company financial 
reporting standards, indicating that legal experts may be hired as monitors to ensure their 
companies comply of financial reporting regulations, and help to minimise legal liability risks. 
Additionally, legal and compliance matters are often dealt with by the attorney generals (AGs) 
and/or the chief compliance officers (CCOs) who are rarely appointed to bank boards. These 
AGs and CCOs are, arguably, able to provide comprehensive legal risk analyses, but they may 
not understand the complexity of the financial risks on bank balance sheets. By studying the 
behaviours of the in-house lawyers of financial companies, Langevoort (2012) argues that legal 
professionals are more inclined to be in harmony with their co-workers and conform with the 
corporate missions, and rarely oppose the ideas of the majority of their co-workers. These 
legal professionals believe that being in harmony with their co-workers helps them to maintain 
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their roles and to enhance their promotion opportunities. These findings lead to questions of 
whether legal experts should promote or restrain risk-taking at banks. For example, if the 
objectives of banks are to increase their profits by taking greater risks, this leads to questions 
of whether legal experts are employed to promote risky projects for greater returns, which are 
in line with their corporate missions, or to restrain their banks from taking greater risks by 
advising them on appropriate regulatory and compliance policies. 
It is debatable whether financial and legal experts should be on the boards of banks. In the 
review of corporate governance at UK banks, Walker (2009) recommends that financial 
institutions should hire independent directors with relevant experiences and skills who may 
not be required to have previously worked in the financial services industry, which suggests 
that a board with a broader knowledge base is likely to provide competitive advantages to a 
company/bank (Mahadeo et al., 2012). It is a question of whether hiring non-bankers to 
boards may decrease board homogeneity. The effects of board homogeneity/diversity are 
examined in the following section.  
4.3.5 Board Homogeneity 
Psychologists and management scholars propose that levels of diversity alter social pressures 
within groups and their subgroups, which subsequently affect group cohesiveness and 
transform the dynamics of decision-making processes within groups (Lau and Murnighan, 
1998; Zander, 1979). 
Consistent with these arguments, finance scholar, Murray (1989), argues that senior 
management homogeneity allows managers to interact efficiently and is preferable in a 
competitive business environment, because greater levels of top management members with 
similar core function experiences are likely to increase cohesiveness in decision-making 
processes and increase levels of strategic controls (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Therefore, 
board homogeneity increases board efficiency.  
Studying the banking industry, scholars also find that board expertise homogeneity tends to be 
the case in banks which hire external (independent) directors with similar banking experience 
(Ferreira et al., 2010), because industry relevant directors can provide complementary industry 
insights, and foster a culture in their banks in order to increase market share and industry 
concentration (Dass et al., 2014). Furthermore, board homogeneity is also likely to improve 
board cohesiveness, as boards tend to encourage group think (Berger et al., 2014), and react 
better during crises (Hau and Thum, 2009).  
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Other reasons for having homogeneous boards are sizes of companies (Mahadeo et al., 2012) 
and the complexities of businesses. Ferreira et al. (2010) find that levels of board members 
with banking experiences are positively associated with bank asset sizes in a cross-country 
analysis between 2000 and 2008. The authors argue that larger banks tend to be more 
complex, and require board members to have a greater understanding of banking. 
However, some scholars promote board diversity in contrast with board homogeneity. They 
argue that homogeneous boards are likely to affect the abilities of boards to adapt to rapidly 
changing business environments, to affect board dynamics and succession planning, and to 
encourage risk-taking (Berger et al., 2014; Core et al., 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Van 
Ness et al., 2010).  
For example, scholars suggest that board diversity assists companies in developing new 
opportunities through their external connections to members who have dissimilar previous 
experiences, compared to other board members (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and they are 
better at adapting to rapidly changing business environments (Murray, 1989). 
Age diversity arguably also affects board dynamics and succession planning (Houle, 1990), 
because managers who are dissimilar in age may be better at risk monitoring, because they 
tend to differ in their risk preferences (Berger et al., 2014; Kesner, 1988; Van Ness et al., 2010) 
and are better at promoting board dynamics. Board age diversity also allows older and more 
experienced directors to advise and mentor younger directors who are energetically driven 
when dealing with day-to-day tasks (Houle, 1990). 
Other than board dynamics, board homogeneity/diversity also affects board monitoring 
effectiveness. Studying German banks, Berger et al. (2014) find that banks with greater board 
homogeneity tend to have lower capital adequacy ratios and greater levels of off-balance 
sheet items to total assets. They argue that groupthink within the homogeneity group is likely 
to lower risk monitoring effectiveness. Similarly, tenure diversity is likely to increase risk 
aversion on boards (Van Ness et al., 2010), because board members with different tenures 
lead to greater arrays of ideas, thereby delaying action on certain capital projects. From these 
perspectives, if companies maximise their profits by taking greater risks, senior management 
homogeneity may weaken the risk monitoring mechanisms of their companies, because the 
nature of cohesiveness on boards, and among individual board members, means that 
individuals are less likely to oppose to the consensus of engaging in risky projects. 
Based on the above arguments, board homogeneity should perhaps be considered when 
promoting internal directors or hiring external directors to monitor their boards, because 
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board homogeneity often affects the strategic policies and risk-taking levels at 
companies/banks. 
4.3.6 Assets and Liabilities Management Committees (ALCOs) 
Assets and liabilities management committees (ALCOs) are unique to banking and insurance 
businesses, and are a key governing body (BCBS, 2016a). The responsibilities of ALCOs include 
monitoring the levels of assets and liabilities on balance sheets, sharing information with chief 
financial officers, chief risk officers and the heads of individual business units 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009), and facilitating the management of balance sheets in volatile 
capital markets (Canada, Oct/Nov2004). 
Effective assets and liabilities management (ALM) involves minimising maturities mismatches 
between assets and liabilities, optimising the surplus on bank balance sheets, and increasing 
the level of profitability (Shrestha, 2016), because ALM lowers income stream volatilities, 
improves liquidity, and provides risk management at banks (Memmel and Schertler, 2012).  
Without maturities mismatches, banks would have higher asset-liability dependencies. In some 
cases, banks may engage in securitisation and use it as a risk management tool, such as to 
reduce cash flow mismatches between the maturities of their assets and liabilities on their 
balance sheets, and to remove credit risks from their balance sheets (Altunbas et al., 2009). 
The use of risk-transfer instruments – such as asset securitisation – enables banks to reduce 
their interest rates and credit exposures, and increase their liquidity, and could be used for 
regulatory capital arbitrage to allow them to lower their required capital reserves (Dionne and 
Harchaoui, 2008). 
Although ALM and securitisation provide liquidity cushions for banks during changes in 
monetary policies or economic downturns (Altunbas et al., 2009; Novickytė and Petraitytė, 
2014), they also arguably induce banks to take greater risks (Lui, 2011). Studying German 
banks between 1994 and 2007, Memmel and Schertler (2012) documented that banks 
decreased their asset-liability dependencies and increased in their use of derivatives at the 
same time, indicating an increased usage of risk-transfer instruments. If shareholders are risk 
averse, the use of securitisation in ALM may arguably worsen agency problems, because bank 
managers may pursue securitisation businesses by taking excessive levels of risk which could 
result in investment losses, thereby impacting shareholder wealth. 
In summary, ALCOs may enhance the function of ALM by allowing banks to optimise their 
balance sheets and lower liquidity risks through the use of derivative contracts. As a result, 
ALCOs increase interest rates and credit exposures on balance sheets. 
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4.3.7 Banking Lending, Risk-taking and Securitisation 
Lending and risk-taking are arguably the key functions of banks. As a result of lending, banks 
obtain rents from taking deposits, borrowing from the wholesale markets, and obtaining 
profits by charging their borrowers higher interest rates. In addition, banks are required to 
monitor their borrowers, and manage their interest rate and credit risk exposures. Policy 
considerations motivate researchers to focus on assessing the effects on lending. For example, 
scholars examine the effects on the relationships between lending and economic growth 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Romer et al., 1990), between lending and risk-taking at banks 
(Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005), between lending and monitoring/information asymmetry (Black, 
1975; Fama, 1985), and between relationship and transactional lending (Dewenter and Hess, 
2000). Yet, financial innovations have changed bank lending and risk-taking behaviours (Dynan 
et al., 2006; Santomero and Trester, 1998), which has drawn the attentions of scholars to 
assess the relationships between bank lending, risk-taking and securitisation (Altunbas et al., 
2009; Loutskina, 2011). 
Views on the relationships between bank lending, risk-taking and securitisation have led to 
two schools of thought. In the first, scholars have praised the benefits of securitisation, such as 
the increased supply of credit (Altunbas et al., 2009), and the lowering of the amounts of 
required regulatory capital (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987). In the second school, scholars 
argue that securitisation may increase levels of risk-taking at banks. As a result, securitisation 
increases the levels of off-balance sheet items and leverage of banks, and inappropriately 
lowers the required capital reserves and lending standards (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Shin, 
2009). The majority of former scholarships were published prior to the 2008 financial crisis, 
and those of the latter scholarships were published after the crisis. 
There are benefits and costs to securitisation, and banks, scholars and policy makers should 
consider both prior to the securitisation of their assets. The majority of studies suggest that 
the costs of securitisation outweigh the benefits. Studying US banks between 2001 and 2007, 
Wang and Xia (2014) find securitisation lowers monitoring incentives for banks. Banks loosen 
their lending requirements (i.e. loan covenants), and securitisation allows them to increase 
their book leverage. These findings may suggest that banks use securitisation to grow their 
balance sheets (Adrian and Shin, 2009). Other findings also suggest that securitisation is used 
as regulatory capital arbitrage, which lowers their effective risk-based capital requirements 
(Ambrose et al., 2005; Jones, 2000).  
Contrary to these views, securitisation can be used as a risk management tool to lower credit 
exposures on the balance sheets. Studying US banks between 2001 and 2007, Casu et al. 
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(2011) find that securitisation effectively lowers the credit exposures on the balance sheets of 
banks, but those banks typically have greater proportions of non-performing loans and charge-
off rates. Nevertheless, the costs of non-performing loans are likely to lower the benefits of 
the fees obtained from loan sales and other activities related to securitisation. 
In summary, banks are likely to engage in securitisation because it allows them to enhance 
their credit risk management (Casu et al., 2011), lower capital reserves (Jones, 2000), and 
obtain additional liquidity to grow their balance sheets (Estrella, 2002). However, banks should 
be cautious when taking excessive risks through securitisation. 
4.3.8 (Internal) Corporate Governance of Japanese Companies and Banks 
In Japanese internal corporate governance literature, the majority of studies focus on three 
elements: (i) insider-dominated boards, (ii) the lifetime employment system, and (iii) the 
adoption of internal corporate governance mechanisms similar to those in Anglo-American 
countries, which is also known as corporate governance reform. The former two elements are 
arguably inter-connected with each other, because the lifetime employment system has led to 
insider-dominated boards, which often means that board members are likely to be internally 
promoted. The latter element is a result of foreign investor influence, which promotes 
shareholder supremacy, i.e. maximising shareholder wealth. The literature on these three 
elements is reviewed in the following sections. 
4.3.8.1 Insider-Dominated Boards and the Lifetime Employment System 
Contrary to the traditional corporate governance view on hiring external directors to monitor 
boards and increase board efficiency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), Japanese corporate 
governance is heavily reliant on internal controls rather than external controls. Managers are 
promoted internally and their abilities are monitored by their peers and their company 
stakeholders (Dore, 2000). The boards of most Japanese companies are insider-dominated as a 
result of the lack of distinction between the roles of monitors and operating executives. 
Scholars argue that insider-dominated boards lead to board inefficiencies, and insulate board 
managements from disciplinary pressures (John and Senbet, 1998; Whittaker and Deakin, 
2009). Therefore, insider-dominated boards increase agency costs. 
Comparing the insider-dominated and outsider-dominated boards of Japanese and German 
non-financial companies between 1979 and 1983, John and Senbet (1998) find no relationship 
between executive turnover and poor performance in companies with insider-dominated 
boards, while their results show a positive relationship between executive turnover and poor 
performance in companies with outsider-dominated boards. The empirical findings show that 
insider-dominated boards weaken disciplinary pressures. Contrary to this finding, scholars find 
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that executive turnover is positively associated with company performance, in which the 
sample companies have close ties with their main banks or large shareholders (Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1995; Kaplan, 1994), indicating that main banks or large shareholders act as 
monitors when internal governance is weak (i.e. insider-dominated boards). The results are 
not surprising, because main banks and large shareholders are often the main creditors of the 
companies and have business affiliations with the companies. 
In addition to disciplinary pressures, executive turnover may also increase board 
independence by replacing internal directors with external directors. However, scholars also 
find that external directors may not be independent in Japan, because they are often 
appointed by their cross-shareholders or stakeholders (Ahmadjian, 2000), have worked in 
companies belonging to the same keiretsu group (Lincoln et al., 1996), have retired from senior 
roles in the same company, or are retired government officials who were formerly bank 
monitors13 (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001; Konishi and Yasuda, 2004). 
This may be because the labour market for external directors is weak in Japan, and as a result 
it is easier to recruit candidates who have ties with companies (Knyazeva et al., 2013). Dore 
(2008) suggests that the talent pool of external directors may be extremely small as a result of 
the lifetime employment system, because potential candidates for external director roles tend 
to be employed by the same companies until they retire. This has caused difficulties when 
hiring qualified and experienced external directors. As a result of the small talent pool, and 
free from regulatory restrictions, external directors tend to serve longer on Japanese company 
boards, compared to those in Anglo-American countries. Scholars suggest that the problems of 
a small talent pool may be resolved with technological advancements (Knyazeva et al., 2013).  
Knyazeva et al. (2013) examine the effects between the external director labour market and 
company sizes among US non-financial companies between 1996 and 2006, and find that the 
size of the local talent pool is only relevant to small companies. Large companies are less 
constrained by the local talent pool, because they can hire external directors from abroad, and 
benefit from their communications technologies that allow their external directors to attend 
board meetings via video conferencing. Although technological advancements enlarge talent 
                                                          
13 Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) find that external directors, who were former monitors (amakudari), are 
likely to have lower monitoring standards compared to the financial authorities, which leads to greater 
risk-taking at banks. This is because amakudari are likely to loosen their monitoring criteria as a result of 
being offered a job after their retirement. The authors argue that amakudari lower board 
independence, and often create moral hazards. Contrary to these arguments, Miwa and Ramseyer 
(2005) suggest that amakudari, who are appointed as external directors, enhance the monitoring 
efficiency of their financial authorities, because amakudari can identify the appropriate level of 
information which is required by the financial authorities. 
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pool of directors, hiring non-Japanese directors may be inapplicable in Japanese companies, 
because the unique business culture in Japan. 
As a result of the insider-dominated boards and the lifetime employment system, the expertise 
of Japanese boards tend to be homogenous, and employees tend to be trained as generalists 
to acquire company-specific information. The lack of board diversity often results in decisions 
taking a single direction. Studying Japanese non-financial companies between 2003 and 2007, 
Nakano and Nguyen (2012) find no relationship between board size and risk-taking (ROA 
volatility and stock), indicating that homogenous boards negate board size effects. Greater 
board sizes should increase the number of layers in the evaluation process as a result of the 
reduction in risk-taking. 
In summary, studies that show insider-dominated boards, cross-shareholding and the illiquid 
labour market hinder Japanese companies from adopting the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model. Moreover, it is questionable whether Japan could achieve the same 
corporate governance standards as its Anglo-American counterparts. The following section 
discusses the progress and the effects of corporate governance reform in Japan. 
4.3.8.2 Corporate Governance Reforms in Japan 
As a result of reduced cross-shareholding and increased levels of foreign ownerships in the late 
1990s, Japanese companies have been under pressure to reform their corporate governance 
practices which emphasise maximising shareholder wealth (Ahmadjian, 2008).  
In response to capital market pressures, the Japanese government and the Japanese 
investment communities and companies introduced various reforms. In 2003, the Japanese 
Commercial Code was revised and the board committee-based system was introduced, which 
put an emphasis on board independence. In 2004, the Japan Pension Fund Association 
published guidelines on shareholder rights and fiduciary duties, and recommended that their 
members exercise their voting rights. Japanese companies subsequently adapted their 
corporate governance practices such as the introduction of performance-based incentives, and 
increased board independence and disclosures. 
In the light of these changes, scholars shifted their focus from cross-shareholding (keiretsu 
groups) and main bank monitoring to foreign investors. Scholars argue that these foreign 
investors are gradually taking the role of monitoring which is being performed by the main 
bank and large domestic shareholders (Ahmadjian, 2008; Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005). As a 
result, these foreign investors are beginning to influence the internal governance of their 
investee companies, and a hybrid Japanese corporate governance practice has developed. 
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Jackson and Moerke (2005) argue that the hybrid Japanese corporate governance practice has 
embedded some of the features of the Anglo-American corporate governance models (such as 
the adoption of the board committee-based system, the introduction of performance-based 
incentives, and the promotion of greater transparency and disclosure), while the practices of 
insider-dominated boards and employee-oriented corporate governance continue.  
In a qualitative study of Japan-listed companies, Yoshikawa et al. (2007) find that Japan-listed 
companies (such as Sony and Toshiba) have increased their board independence and 
established nomination and compensation committees, but that their external directors act as 
advisors rather than monitors. In their survey study, company managers explained that the 
objective of introducing external directors is to increase their competitiveness overseas, 
instead of enhancing their corporate governance practices at home. 
Although the Commercial Code reinforces board independence and puts an emphasis on the 
separated roles between supervision and monitoring, it is questionable whether external 
directors can efficiently monitor management at Japanese companies, because of resistance to 
change from within the business community and from the organisational culture of Japanese 
companies (Yoshikawa et al., 2007). 
4.3.8.3 Governance and Risk Management (Applicable to Japanese Banks) 
Contrary to transactional banking, Japanese banks provide relationship banking and lending by 
providing banking services, and debt and equity financing to their clients, and are able to 
reduce the levels of information asymmetry through three stages of monitoring: ex ante, 
interim, and ex post monitoring (Dewenter and Hess, 2000). As a result of relationship banking, 
banks normally provide long-term loans to their clients, and may continue to provide financing 
to companies in financial distress arising from short-term liquidity problems or bad 
investments. Therefore, relationship banking is likely to increase levels of risky loans or non-
performing loans on bank balance sheets.  
Consequently, the balance sheets of banks consist of large maturities mismatches between 
short-term funds and long-term loans. As a result, Japanese banks are heavily exposed to 
interest rate risks and credit risks. However, there is little evidence to show the extensive use 
of derivatives contracts to manage risks by Japanese banks, although the majority of Japanese 
banks have implemented Value at Risk (VaR) in their risk management frameworks (Nishiguchi, 
2011).  
In terms of risk management, the banks of Anglo-American countries may choose to hedge 
their interest rate and credit exposures by using derivatives contracts or off-balance sheet 
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hedging instruments. Studying US commercial banks, Angbazo (1997) finds that banks affected 
by default risks have high concentrations of short-term assets and off-balance sheet hedging 
instruments, while other banks are sensitive to interest rate risks as a result of unhedged 
maturities mismatches between assets and liabilities on their balance sheets. The study 
highlights that the risk sensitivities of banks are due to unhedged exposures.  
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) find similar results when studying US commercial banks 
between 1988 and 1993. The authors find a positive relationship between loan sales and risk-
taking (greater proportion of risky loans) at banks, although loan sales are used to manage 
credit risks. The authors argue that banks engaging in loan sales activities tend to manage their 
interest risks using derivatives contracts, to have lower capital buffers, and to have lower on-
balance-sheet risks. Although risk management can reduce risk sensitivities, it may also create 
moral hazards, because the use of derivatives contracts enables banks to lend more 
(Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004), and loan sales are likely to lower incentives for banks to 
monitor their borrowers. 
In summary, these studies highlight the importance of risk management in bank governance. 
Moreover, boards should ensure that their companies/banks acquire sound risk management 
and internal controls to safeguard shareholder interests (Van der Elst, 2011). 
80 
 
4.4 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
This section develops the conceptual framework that examines the effects of internal 
governance characteristics on bank lending ratios, risk-taking, and the decisions to participate 
in securitisation businesses. The internal governance characteristics include board monitoring 
and bonding mechanisms, and board risk preferences, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1. Conceptual Framework – Internal Governance (IG) Mechanisms 
The effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms have been questioned by scholars, 
regulators and policy makers, and have often yielded inconclusive results on whether these 
mechanisms have improved bank performances and their levels of risk-taking. A conceptual 
framework is designed to address questions that focus on the internal governance 
mechanisms of banks, and their relationships with bank lending ratios, risk-taking and debt 
management strategies, such as participating in securitisation. 
The conceptual framework argues that bank lending and risk management are the core 
functions of banks, in which the lending and risk-taking levels are determined by the strategic 
policy and decision-making processes of bank boards. The issues relating to lending and risk-
taking are constantly being debated by scholars and policy makers, who encourage banks to 
lend more and to reduce their risk-taking levels. Based on this framework, 11 hypotheses are 
developed and attempt to connect the internal governance of banks with their lending, risk-
taking levels and risk management strategies. They examine whether the internal governance 
mechanisms of banks relate to their bank lending ratios, risk-taking levels and the probabilities 
of them participating in securitisation.
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4.4.1 The Board Monitoring Mechanism 
This section aims to develop the effects of the board monitoring mechanism (including the 
ratios of external directors at boards and the average tenures of external directors) on lending 
and risk-taking at banks. 
Risks occur through bank lending, and banks are required to closely monitor their borrowers in 
order to detect any potential losses, such as defaults (Nakamura, 1991). Through relationship 
banking and lending, bank managers collect information on their borrowers through their daily 
transactions, and by monitoring their borrowers’ financial conditions while gathering soft 
information on them. In order to evaluate their borrowers’ abilities to repay their loans, bank 
managers perform ex ante monitoring, interim monitoring, and ex post monitoring. In 
addition, banks are likely to consider lending to risky industries in order to increase revenues 
and market share in low interest rate environments (Nikkei Asian Review, 2017).  
Boards of directors are arguably responsible for deciding policies for lending strategies and 
(credit) risk management, including “identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling credit 
risks” (BCBS, 2000, p. 4). However, lending strategies/risk preferences are likely to differ 
between internal and external directors.  
Theoretically, external directors may be hired for the purposes of (i) monitoring to minimise 
principal-agent conflicts (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), (ii) obtaining 
external resources to benefit the development of their companies (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and (iii) safeguarding the interests of stakeholders 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
However, with regard to Japan, external directors may be less effective at monitoring their 
company managements, because (i) most Japanese bank/company boards are insider-
dominated (Dore, 2000), and (ii) external directors, who may be affiliated with other 
stakeholders, are able to provide external resources and safeguard the interests of their 
stakeholders (Bonn et al., 2004).  
This section argues that external directors on boards do not sufficiently improve monitoring at 
banks. As a result, levels of lending and risk-taking at banks increase. This hypothesis argues 
that these external directors are likely to be affiliated with stakeholders (who are also 
borrowers), and the lack of independence of external directors of Japan-listed banks weakens 
the effects of monitoring. In some cases, these external directors are likely to advise banks to 
continuously provide relationship loans to their stakeholders, despite economic downturns. 
Moreover, external directors may be hired to advise on the non-core businesses of their banks, 
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which the banks do not have sufficient resources or expertise with which to develop these 
businesses. As a result, increased numbers of external directors lead to increased risk-taking at 
banks.  
Hypothesis 4.1 suggests that (i) a positive relationship exists between external directors at 
boards (ExDir) and bank lending ratios (LoanDeps), and (ii) a negative relationship exists 
between ExDir and the z-score. The z-score is a measure of a bank being insolvent, in which the 
lower value of the z-score indicates a higher probability of insolvency risks at a bank. 
In the context of monitoring abilities, scholars suggest that external directors may require a 
minimum amount of time to gain sufficient knowledge of their companies to be able to 
effectively monitor their banks (Van Ness et al., 2010). As their tenures lengthen, the 
monitoring mechanism is likely to strengthen.  
The following hypothesis argues that (i) external directors overcome the difficulties of insider-
dominated boards as their tenures lengthen by becoming more persuasive, and (ii) external 
directors are more interested in demonstrating their monitoring abilities as their tenures 
lengthen. 
Hypothesis 4.2 argues that lending ratios and risk-taking decrease as average external director 
tenures lengthen, i.e. (i) a negative relationship exists between ExDir_T and LoanDeps, and (ii) 
a positive relationship exists between ExDir_T and the z-score. 
Hypothesis 4.1 and Hypothesis 4.2 are examined using the following models.  
Model 4.1: 
𝑌1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝐷𝑖𝑟_𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 4.2: 
𝑌2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝐷𝑖𝑟_𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑇𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌1𝑖,𝑡 is the lending ratio (LoanDeps) of bank i in time t, and the level of interest income 
(IntInc) of bank i in time t. 𝑌2𝑖,𝑡 is the insolvency risk level (z-score) of bank i in time t, and the 
level of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) of bank i in time t. The monitoring mechanism is composed 
of the ratios of external directors (ExDir) and the average of external director tenures 
(ExDir_T). 
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The levels of financial disclosure (Disc), market-based performance (TobinQ), bank board size 
(Size), interest income (IntInc), and total capital regulatory ratio (TCapR) control for bank-
specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. Post2008 is a categorical variable in 
which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, and 0 equals 2005-2007. The fixed-effects (FE) 
estimations are used to examine Model 4.1 and Model 4.2.  
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4.4.2 The Board Bonding Mechanism 
Board bonding mechanisms are described as incentive contracts (internal and external director 
share ownerships), which are meant to align the interests of shareholders and managers, and 
prevent managers from exploiting company resources (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In the context of stakeholder theory, director ownerships with long-term vesting periods may 
be used to align the interests of managers with the long-term interests of their companies and 
stakeholders (Falck and Heblich, 2007).In the case of banks, managers may choose to lend to 
support domestic businesses (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015), and provide additional 
assistance to financially distressed companies during economic downturns (Nishiguchi, 2011). 
In the case of Japan, the following argues that Japan-listed banks may try to maximise their 
profits by adapting their business models to make them suit the Japanese corporate 
governance frameworks, whereby banks increase customer engagements, and continue to 
nurture their long-term commitments with their customers; because their proximities to their 
customers are likely to affect their profitability (Wan et al., 2008). Japan-listed banks may try 
to maximise their profits by lending, which can also balance the interests of shareholders and 
other stakeholders such as customers and regulators. For example, banks provide funds to 
customers to invest in long-term projects or to resolve short-term liquidity problems, and 
regulators can closely monitor the lending profiles of their banks.  
Under these assumptions, Japan-listed banks may be encouraged to lend more as a result of 
maintaining relationships with their customers. Internal and external directors may be 
incentivised (by rewarding ownerships) to promote relationships between their banks and 
their customers to maximise the long-term interests of their banks.  
Hypothesis 4.3 suggests that positive relationships exist between the amounts of internal 
director ownerships (InDir_O) and bank lending ratios (LoanDeps), and between external 
director ownerships (ExDir_O) and bank lending ratios (LoanDeps). 
However, continued lending may harm shareholder wealth, because the risk-taking levels of 
banks increase as a result of their fragile credit-granting structures (Nishiguchi, 2011). 
Therefore, Japan-listed banks may try to reduce their credit risk levels, and managers may be 
incentivised to diversify their businesses. As a result of increasing the levels of non-lending 
businesses, the insolvency risk levels of banks also increase. 
Hypothesis 4.4 suggests that negative relationships exist between the amounts of internal 
director ownerships (InDir_O) and the z-score, and between external director ownerships 
(ExDir_O) and the z-score. 
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Hypothesis 4.3 and Hypothesis 4.4 are analysed in the following models. 
Model 4.3: 
𝑌1𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝐷𝑖𝑟_𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑟_𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 4.4: 
𝑌2𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝐷𝑖𝑟_𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑟_𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌1𝑖,𝑡 is the lending ratio (LoanDeps) of bank i in time t, and the level of interest income 
(IntInc) of bank i in time t. 𝑌2𝑖,𝑡 is the insolvency risk level (z-score) of bank i in time t, and the 
level of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) of bank i in time t. The bonding mechanism is composed of 
external director share ownerships (ExDir_O) and internal director share ownerships (InDir_O). 
Disc, TobinQ, Size, IntInc, and TCapR control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for 
year-specific effects. Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, 
and 0 equals 2005-2007. The fixed-effects (FE) estimations are used to examine Model 4.3 and 
Model 4.4. 
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4.4.3 The Board Risk Preference: Board Expertise 
The risk preferences of individual board members may be affected by their experiences and 
gained expertise from previous employments. This section focuses on the ratios of financial 
and legal experts at boards.  
This section argues that Japan-listed banks may be more risk averse, and hire financial and 
legal experts to improve risk management. These experts are likely to encourage their banks to 
diversify their businesses, and to recognise the need for greater regulatory compliance. Yet, 
Japan-listed banks may not be able to reduce their lending ratios, because of their obligations 
to their borrowers and to society (Wan et al., 2008). The core objective of Japan-listed banks is 
arguably to enhance social values such as providing jobs to local communities and by assisting 
their corporate borrowers during periods of financial distress. 
In the context of hiring financial and legal experts, this section argues that they are able to 
provide professional financial and legal advice to their banks (Booth and Deli, 1999; Linck et al., 
2009). These experts are committed to their corporate missions (Langevoort, 2012), whose 
aims are to generate returns for stakeholders and shareholders. 
Additionally, these financial and legal experts are likely to have close ties with other 
stakeholders (Lincoln et al., 1996). Under these assumptions, financial and legal experts may 
encourage their banks to lend more in order to safeguard the interests of stakeholders. For 
example, these experts may previously have worked for companies within their keiretsu 
networks, which borrow from their banks. In this particular circumstance, these experts may 
be more inclined to lend to their previous employers.  
Hypothesis 4.5 argues that positive relationships exist between the ratios of financial experts 
(BF) and the levels of bank lending ratios (LoanDeps), and between the ratios of legal experts 
(BL) and LoanDeps. 
From a risk management perspective, financial and legal experts are able to use their market 
knowledge to influence the financial policies of their banks (Booth and Deli, 1999), improve 
monitoring (Linck et al., 2009), and are able to safeguard the interests of their stakeholders 
such as regulators and depositors. 
Given the low interest rate environment and reduced demands for loans in Japan (Nishiguchi, 
2011), financial and legal experts are likely to advise their banks to diversify their investments 
away from their lending businesses for risk reduction purposes. As a result, Hypothesis 4.6 
argues that positive relationships exist between the ratios of financial experts (BF) and the z-
score, and between legal experts (BL) and the z-score. 
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These hypotheses are examined using Model 4.5 and Model 4.6. 
Model 4.5: 
𝑌1𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 4.6: 
𝑌2𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐵𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑇𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌1𝑖,𝑡 is the lending ratio (LoanDeps) of bank i in time t, and the level of interest income 
(IntInc) of bank i in time t. 𝑌2𝑖,𝑡 is the insolvency risk level (z-score) of bank i in time t, and the 
level of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) of bank i in time t. BL and BF represent the legal and 
financial experts, respectively. 
Disc, TobinQ, Size, IntInc, and TCapR control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for 
year-specific effects. Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, 
and 0 equals 2005-2007. The fixed-effects (FE) estimations are used to examine Model 4.5 and 
Model 4.6. 
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4.4.4 Board Homogeneity 
Diversification of board expertise may also affect bank lending ratios and risk-taking, because 
board risk preferences may be influenced by board homogeneity with regard to age and 
backgrounds. From a psychological perspective, members of a similar age and background are 
less likely to create task conflicts, because they are more likely to share similar ideas (Lau and 
Murnighan, 1998; Zander, 1979). 
Although board homogeneity improves the cohesiveness of boards, it is also likely to decrease 
board monitoring effectiveness, because directors are inclined to follow the consensus and are 
less likely to object to group decisions. This results in weak internal governance. 
To improve internal governance/risk monitoring, banks may decrease their board 
homogeneity. For example, companies may consider increasing their board sizes or ratios of 
external (independent) directors (Smith et al., 1994), although decreased board homogeneity 
may not be effective if boards do not have adequate levels of banking expertise to understand 
the complexities of their businesses (Berger et al., 2014). Board homogeneity is theoretically 
suitable for less complex businesses. 
In the context of Japan, this section argues that increased board expertise homogeneity (i.e. 
high levels of lifetime bankers) promotes lending, because internally promoted directors are 
likely to encourage their banks to maintain their lending practices. Moreover, these lifetime 
bankers may be concerned with the domestic low interest rate environment and reduced 
levels of profits. As a result, they may encourage their banks to seek alternative investments, 
such as by investing in non-lending businesses.  
Hypothesis 4.7 suggests that positive relationships exist (i) between the ratios of lifetime 
bankers (BB) and lending ratios (LoanDeps), and (ii) between BB and insolvency risk levels ( i.e. 
BB is negatively associated with the z-score).  
Board age diversity results in board directors having similar levels of experience and risk 
preferences. But board age diversity increases when older (or younger) board members join 
boards, and have acquired greater (or lesser) levels of experience compared to the existing 
board members. These recently-joined board members are likely to upset the social 
integration and may increase communication difficulties among team members (Smith et al., 
1994). Therefore, they may weaken board dynamics (Lau and Murnighan, 1998; Zander, 1979). 
This may be because recently-joined board members may be at a different stage of their 
training and may not have similar experiences compared to the existing board members. 
Additionally, recently-joined board members may be eager to demonstrate their abilities to 
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encourage their banks to increase their risk-taking for greater returns (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b). 
Hypothesis 4.8 suggests that (i) a positive relationship exists between the levels board age 
diversity (AgeRange) and lending ratios (LoanDeps), and (ii) a negative relationship exists 
between the levels of board age diversity (AgeRange) and the z-score. 
These hypotheses are examined using Model 4.7 and Model 4.8. 
Model 4.7: 
𝑌1𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 4.8: 
𝑌2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑇𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌1𝑖,𝑡 is the lending ratio (LoanDeps) of bank i in time t, and the level of interest income 
(IntInc) of bank i in time t. 𝑌2𝑖,𝑡 is the insolvency risk level (z-score) of bank i in time t, and the 
level of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) of bank i in time t. BB is the level of lifetime bankers on 
boards, which measures the level of board expertise homogeneity. AgeRange is calculated by 
subtracting the age of the oldest directors from the youngest directors on the boards, which 
measures board age diversity. 
Disc, TobinQ, Size, IntInc, and TCapR control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for 
year-specific effects. Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, 
and 0 equals 2005-2007. The fixed-effects (FE) estimations are used to examine Model 4.7 and 
Model 4.8. 
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4.4.5 The Probability of Banks Participating in Securitisation 
This section argues that banks use securitisation as part of their risk management, and assets 
and liabilities management (ALM).  
A bank’s assets typically consist of (i) cash, (ii) government issued fixed-interest loan securities, 
and (iii) secured and unsecured loans. Its liabilities contain customer deposits and funds 
borrowed from the wholesale markets. Maturities mismatches between assets and liabilities 
occur when loan durations differ from the durations of customer deposits and wholesale 
market funds. For example, a bank issues long-term mortgage loans, while deposits are 
typically short-term (i.e. customers can withdraw their deposits at any time). As a result, 
interest rate risks arise due to maturities mismatches. 
To resolve maturities mismatches, banks may sell their loans in a process known as 
securitisation. This section argues that banks are likely to establish a specialised function – 
such as an assets and liabilities committee (ALCO) – to set policies and monitor the assets and 
liabilities on their balance sheets, and to ensure that they have sufficient levels of liquidity to 
manage their daily operations as part their ALM. As a result, the presence of ALCOs may 
indicate a greater competency in risk monitoring. Contrary to the risk management view of 
ALM using securitisation, scholars argue that securitisation induces risk-taking at banks and 
partly caused the 2008 financial crisis (Adrian and Shin, 2009; Hellwig, 2009). 
This section argues that the probability banks participating in securitisation businesses 
(henceforth the probability) is determined by board characteristics such as ratios of external 
directors (ExDir), lifetime bankers (BB), financial experts (BF), and legal experts (BL), insolvency 
risks (z-score), impaired loans (ImpLoanR), bank asset sizes (logA), the presence of ALCOs, and 
total capital reserve ratios (TCapR). The probability is assessed using the proportional hazard 
model between two groups: (i) banks with ALCOs (the treatment group), and (ii) banks without 
ALCOs (the control group), because banks signal that they have greater abilities to manage 
their assets and liabilities by establishing ALCOs.  
Hypothesis 4.9 argues that banks with ALCOs are more likely to participate in securitisation 
businesses, because securitisation may also be used for risk management purposes.  
Additionally, in the treatment group banks (banks with ALCOs), greater ratios of lifetime 
bankers (BB), and financial and legal experts (BF, BL) are likely to enable banks to benefit from 
participating in securitisation businesses as a result of lowering their asset-liability 
dependencies. This section argues that the experts working treatment group banks tend to 
have greater skills in risk management and ALM (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), compared to the 
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control group banks (banks without ALCOs). Although the majority of board members are 
lifetime bankers, financial and legal experts are able to provide specialised technical assistance 
to their banks. 
Hypothesis 4.10 argues that treatment group banks with greater levels of lifetime bankers 
(BB), financial experts (BF), and legal experts (BL) increase the probabilities of their banks 
participating in securitisation businesses. 
In addition, bank characteristics such as bank asset sizes, and regulatory capital ratios may also 
affect the business strategies of banks. Dionne and Harchaoui (2008) find that bigger banks 
may prefer to engage in securitisation businesses, which they use it as regulatory capital 
arbitrage to lower their required capital reserves. This is because, prior to the 2008 financial 
crisis, banks were able to remove their loans from their balance sheets, and as a result lesser 
regulatory capital reserves were required (Altunbas et al., 2009).  
This hypothesis argues that banks that have lower required capital reserves (TCapR) or greater 
asset sizes (logA) are likely to enter into securitisation businesses, because bigger banks are 
expected to have the resources (i.e. expertise and technologies) to engage in securitisation. As 
a result of having securitised their debts, banks are able to operate with lower levels of capital 
reserves. 
Hypothesis 4.11 suggests that bigger banks with ALCOs are likely to use securitisation to 
resolve their problems of having low levels of required capital reserves.  
Hypothesis 4.9 - Hypothesis 4.11 are examined using the proportional hazard model hi(t) in 
Model 4.9, in which the proportional hazard model is not required to make any assumptions 
on the function form of the baseline hazard. 
Model 4.9: 
𝜆𝑖(𝑡, 𝑥) = 𝜆0(𝑡)𝑒
𝛽′𝑥𝑖 
where the function 𝜆𝑖(𝑡) contains two elements: the baseline hazard (𝜆0(𝑡)), and the hazard 
ratio (𝑒𝛽
′𝑥). 𝜆𝑖(𝑡) is the hazard rate of banks with ALCO (treatment group banks: ALCO = 1), 
and 𝜆0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard, which represents the hazard rate of banks without ALCO 
(control group banks: ALCO = 0). The hazard rate is the probability of banks participating in 
securitisation businesses. 
𝑋𝑖  is a vector of the ratios of external directors (ExDir), lifetime bankers (BB), legal experts (BL), 
financial experts (BF), the presence of ALCOs (ALCO), the total capital regulatory ratio (TCapR), 
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bank asset sizes (logA), the insolvency risk levels (z-score), the impaired loans ratios 
(ImpLoanR). 𝛽 is a vector of the corresponding coefficient 𝑋𝑖. logA also controls for bank-
specific effects. Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, and 0 
equals 2005-2007. 
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4.5 Data and Variable Descriptions 
4.5.1 Data Sample 
The objective of this research is to examine the effects of various internal governance 
mechanisms on bank lending, risk-taking and the probability of banks participating in 
securitisation businesses using data from Japan-listed banks from 2005 to 2013. 
The sample data consists of information relating to the balance sheets and corporate 
governance of each bank. The balance sheet information was extracted from the Bankscope 
database, from which consolidated data is used. 
The corporate governance information on Japan-listed banks was extracted from the Nikkei 
Needs database and annual company reports. The annual reports were downloaded from the 
websites of each bank. However, some annual reports were not available from the websites of 
Japan-listed banks, and were instead downloaded from the websites of Kabupro14 (株主プロ) 
and the Electronic Disclosure for Investors’ NETwork15. 
The information relating to the backgrounds of individual Japanese bank board directors was 
extracted from the Nikkei Telecom 21 database, and hand-collected from the individual annual 
reports. Levels of managerial ownership were extracted from the annual reports of banks, and 
then cross-checked with the data extracted from the Bankscope database and the Nikkei 
Needs database. 
The sample banks are listed on their domestic stock exchanges, which fulfilled the listed bank 
requirements such as corporate governance requirements, disclosure requirements, etc. These 
listed-bank corporate governance requirements include the need to appoint outsiders to 
boards, to adopt specific board structures (such as a company with statutory auditors, a 
company with committee, company with audit and supervisory committee system), and the 
need to fulfil the regulatory capital and disclosure requirements. 
In addition, the sample set is unbalanced. 
 
                                                          
14 http://www.kabupro.jp/list/t0028.htm 
15 disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp 
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4.5.2 Variable Descriptions 
This chapter attempts to examine (i) the effects of internal governance mechanisms (board 
characteristics and the levels of internal and external director ownerships) on lending and risk-
taking at Japan-listed banks, and (ii) whether the probability of banks participating in 
securitisation is determined by board characteristics, the presence of assets and liabilities 
committees, levels of risks, bank asset sizes, and total capital reserve ratios. 
Three dependent variables are used in this chapter: bank lending ratios (LoanDeps), insolvency 
risk levels (z-score), and the presence of securitisation businesses (Sec). 
The first two variables are arguably interrelated, because the composition of bank assets can 
be divided into lending, and non-lending assets, i.e. banks may choose to lend to the real 
sector, or to invest their non-lending assets in risky assets and businesses. 
The bank lending ratios arguably present elements of a stakeholder supremacy perspective. 
Scholars argue that bank lending ratios have welfare implications, indicating that bank lending 
supports domestic businesses (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015). 
The z-score is used to measure bank-specific insolvency risks including lending and non-lending 
risks. 
The last dependent variable (Sec) is used to measure the presence of securitisation businesses. 
This chapter argues that for the purpose of assets and liabilities management, banks may 
choose to securitise their debts, or enter into other types of derivatives contracts to lower 
their risks and the liquidity exposures on their balance sheets.  
The following sub-sections present the definitions of dependent, independent and control 
variables used in this chapter.  
4.5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
There are five dependent variables. Banking lending ratios (LoanDeps) and the z-score are used 
in Model 4.1 - Model 4.8, which assess the effects of various board characteristics. 
The levels of interest incomes (IntInc) and impaired loans (ImpLoanR) are used as alternative 
measures of LoanDeps and the z-score in robustness tests. 
The categorical variable, the presence of securitisation business (Sec), is used as a dependent 
variable in Model 4.9.  
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4.5.2.1.1 Bank Lending Ratios (LoanDeps) 
Bank lending ratios are the ratios of loans to total deposits, money market and short-term 
funding (LoanDeps), which the data was extracted from using the Bankscope database. The 
ratios of loans to total assets also show the composition of the asset portfolios of banks 
(Novickytė and Petraitytė, 2014), which consist of loans and investment securities. 
A similar term is used in the empirical study of Andres and Vallelado (2008), which is the ratios 
of loans to total assets16. Andres and Vallelado (2008) examine the effects of board 
characteristics on bank performances in six developed countries, in which LoanDeps is used to 
control for bank-specific effects. 
4.5.2.1.2 Insolvency Risk Levels (z-score) 
The level of bank risk-taking is a measure of a bank being insolvent (z-score), in which the 
lower value of the z-score indicates a higher probability of insolvency risks at a bank (Hannan 
and Hanweck, 1988; Roy, 1952). 
It is often used in a number of empirical studies to examine the relationships between the 
financial stabilities of countries and their banking sectors (De Nicolo, 2000; Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Yeyati and Micco, 2007). The z-score is defined as  
𝑧 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
∑ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
where the car is a ratio of a bank’s total equity to its total assets, and 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 are the mean 
and standard deviations of the return on assets (ROA) of bank i at time t, respectively. ROA is 
defined as the ratio of net income (or loss) to total assets. The z-score is a measure of the 
falling profits which offset equity, and the natural logarithm of the z-score is normally 
distributed.  
Although the z-score does not provide the risk profiles of banks, it is able to simply represent 
the levels of insolvency risks at banks for comparative purposes. The z-score measures the 
progression to insolvency (Roy, 1952). Insolvency is defined as the losses (∑ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0 ) exceeding 
equity (𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡). In other words, if the z-score is negative, the bank is insolvent.  
                                                          
16 The ratio of loans to total assets is not used in this empirical study because the Bankscope database 
classifies total assets differently in Japan, compared to other countries. According to Bankscope, “The 
difference in total assets is due to the item “Customers’ liabilities for acceptances and guarantees” that 
are deducted from total assets. This is the case for all the Japanese banks.” 
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A high and positive z-score indicates that the bank is more stable, because the z-score is 
skewed (Laeven and Levine, 2009), and measures the variability of returns can be absorbed by 
capital without the bank being insolvent (Li et al., 2017). 
In this thesis, the mean and the standard deviation of the ROA are calculated using the entire 
population of each bank between 2005 and 2013, which are used to minimise errors caused by 
using an unbalanced panel.  
4.5.2.1.3 The presence of Securitisation Businesses (Sec) 
Sec is a dummy variable in which 1 represents a bank participating in the securitisation 
business. Otherwise, Sec equals 0. 
4.5.2.1.4 Other Dependent Variables: (i) levels of interest incomes (IntInc) and (ii) levels 
of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) 
IntInc and ImpLoanR are used in the robustness tests. The reasons for using these alternative 
measures are that (i) interest incomes are one of the key bank incomes, which are generated 
from lending, and (ii) impaired loan ratios reflect the loan qualities and risk-taking 
behaviours/lending strategies of banks. 
The levels of interest incomes (IntInc) are the percentages of interest incomes over gross 
loans. The gross loans include net loans minus the reserves for impaired loans/non-performing 
loans. 
The levels of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) are the percentages of impaired loans over gross 
loans. The gross loans include net loans minus reserves for impaired loans/non-performing 
loans. ImpLoanR can be an indicator of bank risk, and is used as a proxy for measuring ex post 
credit risks (Deyoung and Nolle, 1996), or for measuring a bank’s asset risks (Shehzad et al., 
2010). Loan qualities or levels of impaired loans also reflect the abilities and efforts of bank 
managers to monitor their loans (Boyd et al., 1998). 
4.5.2.2 Independent Variables 
Nine independent variables are used in Model 4.1 - Model 4.9, which are used to assess the 
effects of internal corporate governance mechanisms on lending ratios (LoanDeps), insolvency 
risk levels (z-score), and the probabilities of banks participating in securitisation businesses 
(Sec). 
First, the presence of assets and liabilities management committees is a categorical variable, in 
which ALCO equals 1 indicating that a bank consists of an assets and liabilities management 
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committee; and 0 otherwise. ALCO measures the effectiveness of monitoring on the level of 
assets and liabilities on the balance sheet (BCBS, 2016a). 
In addition, eight variables are used to examine the effects of internal governance controls 
(board characteristics and the amounts of director share ownerships): (i) the ratio of external 
directors to the total number of board members (ExDir), (ii) the average tenure of external 
directors on boards (ExDir_T), (iii) the amount of external director share ownerships (ExDir_O), 
(iv) the amount of internal director share ownerships (InDir_O), (v) the ratio of financial 
experts to the total number of board members (BF), (vi) the ratio of legal experts to the total 
number of board members (BL), (vii) the ratio of lifetime bankers to the total of number of 
board members (BB), and (viii) the level of age diversity (AgeRange), which is calculated by 
subtracting the age of the oldest directors from the youngest directors on the boards. 
The ratio of external directors (ExDir) and the average tenure of external directors on boards 
(ExDir_T) are used to measure the effectiveness of board monitoring mechanisms by external 
directors. External directors include both non-executives and independent directors. Scholars 
suggest that potential conflicts between managers and shareholders over company 
performances/levels of risk-taking may be evaluated and monitored by external directors 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, external directors tend to acquire sufficient levels of 
company-specific information to enable them to efficiently monitor and advise their boards as 
their tenures lengthen (Van Ness et al., 2010). 
The amounts of external and internal director share ownerships (ExDir_O, InDir_O) are used to 
measure the effectiveness of board bonding mechanisms, and scholars suggest that 
performance-based incentives can be used to motivate agents to maximise shareholder wealth 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Financial experts (BF) are those who have previously worked in the area of corporate finance, 
or as chartered accountants. Legal experts (BL) include lawyers and those who have previously 
held senior positions in financial regulatory authorities. The ratios of financial and legal experts 
to the total number of board members are used to measure the board risk preferences. 
Scholars argue that companies can hire experts to help them spot possible opportunities, 
and/or technologies and deal with industry-specific regulations (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 
2008). In addition, their abilities and work experiences influence the financial policies of their 
companies (Booth and Deli, 1999) and may encourage their companies to engage in riskier 
investments (Guerrera and Larsen, 2008). 
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Lifetime bankers are those who have at least 20 years of work experience in the banking 
industry. The ratio of lifetime bankers to the total number of board members (BB) and age 
diversity (AgeRange) are used to measure board homogeneity and diversity, respectively. 
These two variables measure the effectiveness of strategic controls, because scholars suggest 
that greater levels of top management members with similar core function experiences are 
likely to increase cohesiveness in decision-making processes and increase levels of strategic 
controls (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). 
4.5.2.3 Control Variables 
Control variables are used to isolate any potential influences on the results. A set of control 
variables is used to control for bank-specific, and year-specific effects. 
At the bank level, the levels of financial disclosure (Disc), market-based performance (TobinQ), 
board size (Size), interest income (IntInc), total regulatory capital ratio (TCapR), bank asset 
sizes (logA), insolvency risks (z-score), and impaired loans (ImpLoanR) control for bank-specific 
effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. 
Five variables are used in Model 4.1 -Model 4.8 to control for bank-specific effects: Disc, 
TobinQ, Size, IntInc, and TCapR. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. 
Four variables are used in Model 4.9 to control for bank-specific effects: TCapR, logA, z-score, 
and ImpLoanR. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. 
Disc measures the level of bank financial disclosure which is constructed using 18 categories17 
of core disclosures that are published in the annual reports of the banks (Nier and Baumann, 
2006). The level of accounting information is voluntarily disclosed according to director 
expertise and board characteristics (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), which improves board 
monitoring. Appendix B describes the method of the construction of the bank financial 
disclosure (Disc) index in detail. 
TobinQ is a measure of market-based performance, and is a ratio of the total market value 
over the total asset value. The level of market-based performance is likely to affect lending and 
risk-taking strategies (Galloway et al., 1997; Konishi and Yasuda, 2004), because banks may 
                                                          
17 Disc is constructed using 18 categories of information on bank balance sheets (Nier and Baumann, 
2006), which includes (i) loans by maturity, (ii) loans by type, (iii) loans by counterparty, (iv) problem 
loans, (v) problem loans by type, (vi) securities by type (detailed breakdown), (vii) securities by type 
(coarse breakdown), (viii) securities by holding purpose, (ix) deposits by maturity, (x) deposits by type of 
customer, (xi) money market funding, (xii) long-term funding, (xiii) reserves, (xiv) capital, (xv) contingent 
liabilities, (xvi) off-balance sheet items, (xvii) non-interest incomes, and (xviii) loan loss provisions. The 
breakdowns of the 18 categories are listed in Appendix Table A.2. 
99 
 
change their asset allocations between lending and non-lending businesses to focus on long-
term growth or short-term profits.  
Size is the total number of board members, and scholars argue that larger boards are less likely 
to adopt extreme decisions (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012), because it is more difficult for them 
to persuade their peers to make unconventional decisions, i.e. investing in extremely risky 
projects. 
IntInc is the level of interest income over gross loans, and controls for bank-specific effects. 
This is because interest income levels are likely to affect levels of risk-taking (z-score, 
ImpLoanR) at banks, i.e. banks are required to earn adequate returns from interest incomes in 
order to offset their monitoring costs. As a result, the levels of IntInc may affect bank 
corporate governance practices such as the effectiveness of ex ante monitoring, interim 
monitoring, and ex post monitoring. Therefore, IntInc should be controlled for when assessing 
risk-taking at banks. 
TCapR is the total regulatory capital ratio. It is used to measure capital regulatory stringency in 
literature (Barth et al., 2004), because banks are required to hold a minimum level of capital 
against their asset risks, i.e. a bank is required to hold a greater level of capital to act as a 
buffer against a higher level of risk-taking. Therefore, TCapR controls for bank-specific effects. 
logA is the natural logarithm of total bank assets, which measures bank asset sizes. logA 
controls for bank-specific effects, because large banks have greater abilities to diversify their 
risk portfolios (Saunders et al., 1990), or to engage in securitisation businesses (Cardone-
Riportella et al., 2010). 
The z-score measures insolvency risks, and the level of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) is used as a 
proxy for credit risks. Both variables control for bank-specific effects when assessing the 
probability of banks participating in securitisation businesses. 
Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, and 0 equals 2005-
2007. Post2008 is used as a year dummy to capture the influences of the 2008 financial crisis 
and control for year-specific effects. Post2008 is used to control for the change of regulations 
prior to and in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (Blundell-Wignall et al., 2008). 
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4.5.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the statistics for the variables used in the empirical analyses. 
The mean of lending ratios (LoanDeps) of Japan-listed banks is 0.71, while its minimum is 0.49 
and its maximum is 1.0718. This indicates that some Japan-listed banks lend more than their 
total deposits, money market and short-term funding. The mean of insolvency risk (z-score) of 
Japan-listed banks is 125.25, and its standard deviation is 173.49. The mean of interest 
incomes (IntInc) is 1.95 percent, and the mean of non-interest income (NIIR) is 15.70 percent, 
indicating that, on average, Japan-listed banks have greater levels of incomes contributing 
from non-lending businesses, compared to those of lending businesses. The mean of total 
regulatory capital ratio (TCapR) is 11.55 percent, but its minimum is 5.71 percent. The mean of 
market-based performance (TobinQ) is 0.03. 
Figure 4.2 shows that the levels of non-interest incomes (NIIR) decreased rapidly between 
2007 and 2008, and have gradually increased since the 2008 financial crisis. The figure also 
shows that levels of regulatory capital ratio (TCapR) have gradually increased, and levels of 
interest incomes (IntInc) and impaired loans (ImpLoanR) have decreased. LoanDeps remain at 
roughly the same level between 2005 and 2013. 
In terms of board independence, the means of the ratios of external directors to the total 
number of board members (ExDir) is 0.1. Figure 4.3 shows that the average ratios of external 
directors19 have slowly increased between 2005 and 2013, although Japan-listed banks have 
insider-dominated boards. Table 4.4 shows that 96 percent of Japan-listed banks in the sample 
data are insider-dominated boards. This result might be expected, given that Japan-listed 
companies can choose to adopt the kansayaku system that requires that they have statutory 
auditors on their boards, but it does not require them to have any external directors on their 
boards. 
Compared to Anglo-American countries, there are no specific guidelines restricting the tenures 
of external/independent directors. On average, external director tenures (ExDir_T) are 1.73 
years, but the maximum is 26 years. In some cases, Japan-listed banks appoint their former 
                                                          
18 LoanDeps is the ratio of loans to total deposits, money market and short-term funding. When 
LoanDeps exceeds one, a part of a bank’s lending is funded using long-term liabilities/capital. In this 
case, Aozora Bank funded its lending business using long-term liabilities/capital in 2007. 
19 For each bank, directors are classified as internal and external directors. Internal directors, who are 
the full-time employees of the banks, manage the bank on a day-to-day basis. External directors consist 
of non-executive directors and independent directors. Non-executive directors do not have any business 
or family affiliations with the bank, and may also be the shareholders of the bank. Independent directors 
do not have any business or family affiliations with the bank and do not hold any shares in the bank. 
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retired board directors as external directors, resulting in unusually long external director 
tenures (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005).  
In terms of incentives, Table 4.2 shows that the internal directors of Japan-listed banks, on 
average, own 0.15 percent of the shares of their banks, while external directors own 0.07 
percent of the shares. 
In terms of types of board expertise, Japan-listed banks have an average of 0.64 percent of 
financial experts, 1.1 percent of legal experts, and Figure 4.4 shows that the majority of the 
boards are composed of lifetime bankers who have at least 20 years of finance or banking-
related work experience, and who are mostly promoted internally. 
Board homogeneity is measured by the ratios of lifetime bankers at banks (BB) and age 
diversity (AgeRange). On average, the ratios of BB are close to 90 percent, and the AgeRange is 
16.38 years between the youngest and the oldest board directors. The age diversity is 
calculated by subtracting the age of the oldest directors from the youngest directors on the 
boards.  
In terms of having assets and liabilities committees (ALCOs) and participating in securitisation 
businesses (Sec), Table 4.2 shows that, on average, 66 percent of Japan-listed banks have 
assets and liabilities committees. Table 4.5 shows that Japan-listed banks have gradually 
adopted ALCOs, and the adoption increased by 20 percent between 2005 and 2013. But, on 
average, only 25 percent of Japan-listed banks have participated in securitisation businesses. 
Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show bank and board characteristics between banks participating and 
not participating in securitisation businesses, respectively. Table 4.6 shows that banks with 
greater total asset sizes tend to participate in securitisation businesses, but the mean of bank 
lending ratios, the z-score and the total regulatory capital ratio are similar between banks 
participating and not participating in securitisation. Table 4.7 shows that banks participating in 
securitisation tend to have slightly higher ratios of financial experts (BF) compared to banks 
that are not participating in securitisation, but the ratios of legal experts (BL) are higher in 
banks not participating in securitisation. Moreover, the ratios of board size (Size), lifetime 
bankers (BB), and external directors (ExDir) are similar between banks participating in and not 
participating in securitisation. 
The survival analysis shown in Table 4.8 suggests that the rates of banks participating in 
securitisation businesses (equals 1 minus the survivor function) increases over time. Overall, 
34 percent of Japan-listed banks in the sample participate in securitisation between 2005 and 
2013. Figure 4.5 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function by groups: (i) banks that have assets 
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and liabilities committees or an equivalent (treatment group: ALCO =1), and (ii) banks do not 
have assets and liabilities committees or an equivalent (control group: ALCO =0). It shows that 
the hazard ratios increase over time, indicating that the probability of banks participating in 
securitisation increases over time. 
For the purpose of equality, the patterns between the treatment group (banks with ALCOs) 
and the control group (banks without ALCOs) are similar. Table 4.9 shows that the null 
hypotheses of log-rank and Wilcoxon tests are accepted, indicating that the two groups are the 
same. 
Figure 4.6 shows the estimated smoothed-hazard function for Japan-listed banks, and the 
function is monotonic. This indicates a steady increase in banks participating in securitisation, 
although the rate of banks participating is relatively small (0.13). The figure also shows that, 
prior to 2010, the banks with ALCOs (the treatment group) are less likely to engage in 
securitisation, compared to banks without ALCOs (the control group), and the probability of 
banks participating in securitisation is 38 percent at the end of 2013. 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 4.3. In terms of lending ratios (LoanDeps), four 
variables – Disc, IntInc, ExDir, and Sec – are positively correlated with LoanDeps at a 10 percent 
significance level. Eleven variables – ALCO, BB, InDir_O, IogA, NIIR, ExDir_T, Post2008, Size, 
TCapR, TobinQ, and the z-score – are negatively correlated with LoanDeps at a 10 percent 
significance level. These findings indicate that Japan-listed banks with greater asset sizes (logA) 
tend to lend less, and Japan-listed banks, which have smaller lending ratios (LoanDeps), are 
likely to have lower regulatory capital levels (TCapR), and have larger proportions of non-
interest incomes (NIIR). 
In terms of risk-taking at banks (z-score), five variables – ALCO, BB, logA, Size and TCapR– are 
positively correlated with the z-score at a 10 percent significance level. This indicates that 
banks, which have lower insolvency risks, may have (i) assets and liabilities committees, (ii) 
greater ratios of lifetime bankers, (iii) bigger asset sizes, (iv) bigger board sizes, and (v) higher 
total capital regulatory ratios. Six variables – BL, ImpLoanR, IntInc, LoanDeps, ExDir and TobinQ 
– are negatively correlated with the z-score at a 10 percent significance level. This suggests 
that banks, which have higher insolvency risks, are likely to have (i) greater ratios of legal 
experts, (ii) higher levels of impaired loans, (iii) higher interest rate incomes, (iv) greater 
lending ratios, (v) greater ratios of external directors, and (vi) higher market-based 
performances. 
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In the board monitoring mechanism model, ExDir and ExDir_T are statistically significant and 
are positively correlated with each other, indicating that boards with greater numbers of 
external directors tend to have them serving longer on their boards. In the board bonding 
mechanism model (InDir_O, ExDir_O), ExDir_O is negatively correlated with InDir_O, and is 
statistically insignificant. In the board risk preference model, BF and BL are positively 
significantly correlated with each other, indicating that banks with financial board experts are 
likely to hire legal experts for their boards, or vice versa. In examining board homogeneity, 
AgeRange and BB are negatively significantly correlated with each other, indicating that banks 
with fewer ratios of lifetime bankers tend to have greater age diversity on their boards.  
In the model estimating the probability of banks participating in securitisation businesses, four 
variables – ALCO, IntInc, logA, and ExDir– are significantly and positively correlated with Sec. 
Only one variable –ImpLoanR – is significantly and negatively correlated with Sec. 
In the context of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor does not exceed five in each 
model. Each pair of variables, in which the correlation coefficients exceed 0.5 (Dormann et al., 
2013), will not be used in the regression model. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics: variables used. 
This sample consists of (approximately) 662 Japan-listed bank-year observations between 2005 and 2013. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. of Obs. 
AgeRange 16.38 6.85 0 37.00 662 
ALCO 0.66 0.48 0 1.00 631 
BB 88.97 13.48 0 100.00 624 
BF 0.64 2.20 0 12.50 624 
BL 1.10 3.85 0 27.27 624 
Disc 0.53 0.04 0.40 0.70 655 
ExDir 0.10 0.15 0 0.86 657 
ExDir_O 0.07 0.50 0 6.59 662 
ExDir_T 1.73 3.46 0 26.00 657 
InDir_O 0.15 0.31 0 6.86 662 
ImpLoanR 3.67 1.32 0.84 10.83 653 
IntInc 1.95 0.41 1.15 4.56 655 
LoanDeps 0.71 0.08 0.49 1.07 655 
logA 17.34 0.99 15.35 21.66 655 
NIIR 15.70 13.78 -62.27 191.04 654 
Post2008 0.66 0.47 0 1 662 
Sec 0.36 0.48 0 1 625 
Size 10.64 3.12 4.00 19.00 657 
TCapR 11.55 1.96 5.71 19.48 655 
TobinQ 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.14 635 
z-score 125.25 173.49 -0.85 1,948.99 649 
 
105 
 
Table 4.3 Pairwise correlation coefficients. 
* indicates that the pairwise correlation coefficient is statistically significant at a 10 percent level. 
 
 
AgeRange ALCO BB BF BL Disc ExDir ExDir_O ExDir_T ImpLoanR InDir_O IntInc LoanDeps logA NIIR Post2008 Sec Size TCapR TobinQ z-score
AgeRange 1
ALCO 0.0136 1
BB -0.1601* 0.1880* 1
BF 0.1043* -0.1436* -0.3280* 1
BL 0.2130* -0.2456* -0.3922* 0.2531* 1
Disc -0.0172 0.0458 -0.0730* 0.011 0.0186 1
ExDir 0.4731* -0.0673* -0.7936* 0.4405* 0.4207* 0.0971* 1
ExDir_O 0.2005* 0.0740* -0.2170* 0.2430* 0.1029* 0.0949* 0.4484* 1
ExDir_T 0.2992* -0.0661* -0.2285* 0.0629 0.0564 -0.1059* 0.3008* 0.1607* 1
ImpLoanR -0.0662* -0.1689* -0.1007* 0.0256 0.0435 0.0422 0.0119 0.1351* 0.0327 1
InDir_O 0.1539* 0.0557 -0.0037 0.0279 0.0308 -0.0634 0.0465 -0.0371 -0.0081 -0.0820* 1
IntInc -0.016 -0.1426* -0.1897* 0.1234* 0.0168 0.0624 0.2248* 0.3797* 0.038 0.3467* 0.0362 1
LoanDeps -0.0583 -0.0941* -0.0803* 0.0022 0.0116 0.0719* 0.0795* -0.0065 -0.1633* 0.0034 -0.0691* 0.3369* 1
logA 0.2098* 0.1221* -0.1246* 0.2369* 0.1066* 0.2011* 0.2904* 0.1050* 0.0684* -0.3605* -0.1115* -0.2141* -0.1580* 1
NIIR 0.0884* 0.0443 -0.2325* 0.1096* 0.0361 0.1351* 0.3057* 0.1704* 0.0791* -0.0842* 0.0541 -0.1550* -0.0718* 0.4208* 1
Post2008 0.0345 0.1214* -0.025 0.1063* 0.0289 -0.1225* 0.0754* -0.0066 0.1361* -0.3056* -0.0695* -0.3098* -0.0967* 0.1675* 0.0301 1
Sec 0.0365 0.1077* -0.0599 0.0532 -0.0317 0.1701* 0.2171* 0.1380* -0.0549 -0.0891* -0.0204 0.1741* 0.1371* 0.2827* 0.1717* 0.0464 1
Size 0.2157* 0.2538* 0.2594* -0.0416 -0.1235* -0.0052 -0.1471* -0.0136 0.0381 -0.2617* 0.1229* -0.1793* -0.2956* 0.3641* 0.0681* -0.0228 -0.0849* 1
TCapR 0.2535* 0.1479* 0.0557 0.0881* 0.0043 -0.0447 0.2304* 0.0054 0.2576* -0.3407* -0.018 -0.3821* -0.3226* 0.4793* 0.3048* 0.2144* 0.0248 0.2493* 1
TobinQ -0.0627 0.0258 -0.1379* 0.0499 0.1485* -0.1188* 0.0304 -0.0081 0.0307 0.0879* -0.017 -0.1657* -0.1002* -0.2236* -0.0953* 0.5298* 0.0162 -0.2028* -0.2760* 1
z-score -0.0203 0.0988* 0.1469* -0.0526 -0.1068* 0.0439 -0.1177 -0.0607 0.0261 -0.1445* -0.0427 -0.2711* -0.1047* 0.0799* 0.031 -0.0257 -0.008 0.1305* 0.2465* -0.1147* 1
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Figure 4.2 A summary of the levels of lending ratios (LoanDeps), interest incomes over gross loans (IntInc), impaired 
loans over gross loans (ImpLoanR ), non-interest incomes over gross revenues (NIIR), and the total regulatory capital 
ratios (TCapR) of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013.  
 
Figure 4.3 The average ratios of external directors at the boards of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
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Table 4.4 A summary of the types of boards of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
To distinguish between insider-dominated boards, outsider-dominated boards, and mixed boards, this study follows 
the categorisation technique used in Weisbach (1988). Insider-dominated boards have at least 60 percent of their 
board members as internal directors. Outsider-dominated boards have no more than 40 percent of their board 
members as internal directors. A mixed board contains between 40 and 60 percent of their board members as 
internal directors. 
Year Mixed Boards Insider-Dominated Boards Outsider-Dominated Boards 
2005 0% 96% 4% 
2006 1% 95% 4% 
2007 0% 96% 4% 
2008 1% 96% 3% 
2009 1% 96% 3% 
2010 0% 96% 4% 
2011 0% 96% 4% 
2012 1% 96% 3% 
2013 1% 96% 3% 
 
Figure 4.4 The distribution of skills of the board members of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
‘Others’ represent the population of board members who do not have any banking, financial, or legal-related 
experience, but have previously worked as marketing experts, sales experts, engineering experts, or civil servants. 
BF is the ratio of financial experts on boards. BB is the ratio of lifetime bankers on boards. BL is the ratio of legal 
experts on boards.  
 
Table 4.5 The percentage of banks with assets and liabilities committees (ALCOs) at board levels, and the 
percentage of banks participating in securitisation businesses (Sec) among 662 bank-year observations. 
Year Number of Banks ALCOs Sec 
2005 74 37 (50% ) 19 (26% ) 
2006 74 41 (55% ) 24 (32% ) 
2007 74 42 (57% ) 26 (35% ) 
2008 74 41 (55% ) 29 (39% ) 
2009 74 48 (65% ) 30 (41% ) 
2010 73 52 (71% ) 29 (40% ) 
2011 73 51 (70% ) 26 (36% ) 
2012 73 51 (70% ) 24 (33% ) 
2013 73 51 (70% ) 19 (26% ) 
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Table 4.6 The characteristics of the sample banks participating in and not participating in securitisation businesses. 
Sec is a categorical variable in which 1 indicates that banks are participating in securitisation businesses, and 0 
otherwise. The z-score measures the levels of insolvency risks at banks. TCapR is the total regulatory capital ratio. 
Country Sec 
Number of 
Banks 
Mean of 
Total Assets 
(million USD) 
Mean of 
Loan Ratio 
(LoanDeps) 
Mean of 
z-score 
Mean of 
TCapR 
Ja
p
an
 1 226 181 0.72 125.67 11.69 
0 399 36 0.70 128.61 11.59 
 
Table 4.7 The board characteristics of the sample banks participating in and not participating in securitisation 
businesses. 
Sec is a categorical variable in which 1 indicates that banks are participating in the securitisation businesses, and 0 
otherwise. 
Country Sec Board Size 
Ratio of 
Financial 
Experts 
Ratio of 
Lifetime 
Bankers 
Ratio of 
Legal 
Experts 
Ratio of 
External 
Directors 
Ja
p
an
 1 10.39 0.81 88.05 0.95 0.15 
0 10.95 0.56 89.73 1.21 0.08 
 
Table 4.8 A list of the results showing the survivor function (Stata command: sts list). 
+ indicates the number of banks entering into securitisation businesses in a given year. ++ indicates the probability of 
the number of banks not participating in securitisation businesses. 
Year Beginning Total Sec =1 Net Loss+ 
Survivor 
Function++ 
2005 662 19 55 0.9713 
2006 588 24 50 0.9317 
2007 514 26 48 0.8845 
2008 440 29 45 0.8262 
2009 366 30 44 0.7585 
2010 292 29 44 0.6832 
2011 219 26 47 0.6021 
2012 146 24 49 0.5031 
2013 73 19 54 0.3722 
.
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Figure 4.5 The Kaplan-Meier survival function between groups. 
 
Table 4.9 Tests for equality of the survivor functions: Log-rank and Wilcoxon tests. 
Test χ (1) Prob > χ2 
Log-rank 0.68 0.4106 
Wilcoxon 0.38 0.5351 
 
Figure 4.6 Estimated smoothed hazard function. 
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4.6 Methodology 
This chapter argues that board characteristics, amounts of director share ownerships, and the 
presence of assets and liabilities committees affect levels of bank lending and risk-taking, as 
well as the probability of banks participating in securitisation. This chapter is divided into two 
parts.  
The first part investigates the effects of board characteristics and the amounts of director 
share ownerships on bank lending and insolvency risk levels. In order to address problems of 
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity, (i) fixed-effects (FE) estimations with lagged 
independent (and control) variables, (ii) random-effects (RE) estimations with lagged 
independent (and control) variables and (iii) system generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Arellano Bond estimations are used. If the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is accepted, 
then the RE estimation is preferred over the FE estimation. The FE, RE and GMM estimations 
control for bank-specific effects. The FE estimations cluster standard errors at the bank level.  
The GMM estimations are used as robustness tests, and are run using two-step estimators 
with an option that the estimated variance–covariance matrix is robust to heteroskedasticity in 
case of any misspecification causing weak instruments and large sample biases (Windmeijer, 
2005). In the GMM estimations, the control variables lead to endogenous explanatory 
variables that are less correlated with the instrumental variable(s). Additionally, alternative 
measures (IntInc, ImpLoanR) are used to test the robustness results in Table 4.13. 
The second part examines whether the probability of banks participating in securitisation 
businesses is determined by board characteristics, the presence of assets and liabilities 
committees, levels of risk-taking, bank asset sizes, and total regulatory capital ratio. In order to 
assess the probability, the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox model) is used. The Cox model 
is able to deal with repeatable events in the left-hand side of the model (Allison, 1982).  
Both assessments are focused on Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
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4.7 Results 
4.7.1 The Relationships Between Board Characteristics, Bank Leading Ratios, and 
Insolvency Risk Levels 
The results shown in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 are consistent with Hypothesis 4.1, 
Hypothesis 4.2, Hypothesis 4.4, and Hypothesis 4.8, but they are weakly supported. 
Hypothesis 4.3, and Hypothesis 4.5 - Hypothesis 4.7 are inconsistent. The message from 
Table 4.10 - Table 4.13 is that board independence weakens monitoring at Japan-listed banks, 
which indicates that alternative governance mechanisms may need to be considered. 
The summary results on the effects on the levels of lending ratios (LoanDeps), interest incomes 
(IntInc), insolvency risks (z-score), and impaired loans (ImpLoanR) are shown in Table 4.10 - 
Table 4.13. Table 4.10 summaries the results of the fixed-effects (FE) estimations. Table 4.11 
summarises the results of the random-effects (RE) estimations. In terms of robustness tests: (i) 
Table 4.12 summaries the results of the system generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Arellano Bond estimations; and (ii) Table 4.13 summaries the results of fixed FE estimations 
using alternative dependent variables: levels of interest income (IntInc) and impaired loans 
(ImpLoanR). 
In terms of the model specification test, the Hausman test is used to determine the 
consistencies and efficiencies of the fixed-effects (FE) estimations. Except for columns (1) – (4) 
of Table 4.10, the results of the Hausman tests in Table 4.10 and Table 4.13 return p-values of 
less than 0.05, in which the null hypotheses of the Hausman tests are rejected. Therefore, only 
the FE estimations are suitable, and the RE estimators are inconsistent. 
On the contrary, the Hausman tests in columns (1) – (4) of Table 4.10 return p-values of more 
than 0.05, indicating that the null hypotheses of the Hausman tests are accepted, and the RE 
estimations are more efficient. As a result, the RE estimations are used to assess the 
relationships between board characteristics, and the levels of lending ratios. The results of RE 
estimations are shown in Table 4.11. In addition, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
(LM) test is used to test for unobserved heterogeneity in Table 4.11. The p-values of the LM 
tests shown in Table 4.11 indicate that the null hypotheses (the variance of the unobserved 
fixed effects is zero) are rejected. Therefore, the RE estimations are suitable.  
In terms of the GMM Arellano Bond estimations, Sargan and Arellano Bond autocorrelation 
(AR) tests are used. The results of Table 4.12 satisfy the null hypotheses of the Sargan and 
Arellano Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests.  
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The majority of independent variables in Table 4.10, Table 4.11, and Table 4.12 are statistically 
insignificant, and only half of the results in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 are robust against 
Table 4.12 and Table 4.13. However, the results show that the models are poorly explained, in 
which neither R2 (overall), R2 (between) or R2 (within) are more than 0.25 in examining the 
impacts on LoanDeps and the z-score. The results provide seven key findings relating to bank 
board characteristics. 
First, the results shown in Table 4.10, Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 are consistent with 
Hypothesis 4.1. The results indicate that ExDir is positively associated with LoanDeps, and ExDir 
is negatively associated with the z-score. More importantly, the result presented in column (5) 
of Table 4.12 shows that the relationship between ExDir and the z-score is statistically 
significant at a one percent level in the system GMM Arellano Bond estimation. This indicates 
that the increased ratios of external directors are likely to lead to greater insolvency risk levels 
at banks. The result of the system GMM Arellano Bond estimation shown in column (5) of 
Table 4.12 suggests the presence of dynamic endogeneity (Schultz et al., 2010), indicating that 
the current governance structure, such as the levels of external directors, are likely to be 
determined by the banks’ previous risk-taking levels of Japan-listed banks.  
But that is contrary to the results presented in columns (1) and (5) of Table 4.13, which shows 
that the relationships between ExDir and LoanDeps, and between ExDir and the z-score are not 
robust compared to those between ExDir and IntInc, and between ExDir and ImpLoanR. The 
results indicate that increased ratios of external directors lead to reduced levels of interest 
incomes and impaired loans. The relationships between ExDir and IntInc, and between ExDir 
and ImpLoanR are statistically and economically significant. The results show that the 
relationship between ExDir_T and ImpLoanR is insignificant, although the relationship between 
ExDir_T and IntInc is statistically significant at a one percent level.  
The overall findings offer two explanations: (i) external directors (ExDir) effectively monitor 
risk levels associated with lending, but insufficiently monitor insolvency risk levels at banks. 
This may be because external directors are less likely to acquire adequate levels of information 
such as the structures of portfolio exposures to monitor risk-taking at a bank level, especially 
risks associated with non-lending businesses. (ii) External directors encourage their banks to 
invest in non-lending businesses in order to add value for their shareholders, especially as 
Japan-listed banks add little value for their shareholders when making loans with declining 
interest incomes. These results suggest that the introduction of external directors may lower 
lending support for domestic businesses, indicating that external directors may destroy value 
for stakeholders. 
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Second, the findings shown in Table 4.10 are consistent with Hypothesis 4.2 and suggest that 
longer average external director tenures (ExDir_T) lower lending ratios (LoanDeps) and 
insolvency risks levels (i.e. ExDir_T are positively related to the z-score). But the hypothesis 
(the increased average external director tenures enhance the monitoring abilities of external 
directors) is weakly supported; because the coefficients of ExDir_T in Table 4.10 - Table 4.12 
are statistically insignificant. These results are robust to the results of the GMM estimations 
and FE estimations using alternative dependent variables in Table 4.11 - Table 4.13.  
Third, the findings shown in column (6) of Table 4.10 are consistent with Hypothesis 4.4 (the 
external director ownerships (ExDir_O) and internal director ownerships (InDir_O) are 
negatively related to the z-score), but it is weakly supported. The results are statistically 
insignificant in Table 4.10 and Table 4.12. The results are robust to those of the GMM 
estimations in Table 4.12, but are not robust to those of the FE estimations using alternative 
dependent variables in Table 4.13. The results shown in Table 4.13 indicate that InDir_O and 
ExDir_O are negatively and statistically significantly associated with ImpLoanR, which are 
contrary to the relationships between InDir_O and the z-score, and between ExDir_O and the 
z-score. 
These results indicates that internal director share ownerships may incentivise risk-taking 
behaviours at banks, which are likely to be in line with shareholder expectations (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009), and consistent with the corporate governance approach to shareholder 
supremacy (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). But the results in Table 4.13 
also imply that increased internal and external director share ownerships incentivise directors 
to encourage their banks to actively monitor levels of impaired loans. One possible explanation 
is that performance-based incentives may encourage directors to re-consider their lending 
strategies, and to re-distribute their resources to non-lending businesses. Therefore, there are 
negative effects on levels of impaired loans, and positive effects on insolvency risk levels. 
Fourth, the findings shown in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 suggest that board age diversity 
(AgeRange) is negatively related to the z-score, and AgeRange is positively related to 
LoanDeps. The findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4.8, but it is weakly supported. The 
results are statistically and economically insignificant.  
Fifth, the findings shown in Table 4.10 suggest that increased board expertise homogeneity 
reduces levels of insolvency risks at banks, i.e. the ratio of lifetime bankers (BB) is positively 
associated with the z-score. Although the result is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4.7, it shows an 
interesting view on board expertise homogeneity, in which lifetime bankers are mostly 
internally promoted. The findings indicate that greater ratios of lifetime bankers decrease 
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insolvency risks at banks, and increase levels of interest incomes (IntInc in Table 4.13), and 
impaired loans (ImpLoanR in Table 4.13), but the coefficients of these variables are 
economically insignificant.  
Sixth, financial experts are less likely to increase monitoring at banks. The result is inconsistent 
with Hypothesis 4.6 (financial experts (BF) enhance risk monitoring on boards) and suggests 
that financial experts encourage risk-taking at banks. The results also show that the 
relationships between BF and the z-score (and other dependent variables: LoanDeps, IntInc, 
and ImpLoanR) are statistically insignificant in Table 4.10 - Table 4.13. This may be due to the 
low ratios of financial experts on the boards of Japan-listed banks (the mean of BF is only 0.64 
percent), and the fact that financial experts tend to be external directors who are likely to be 
less influential on insider-dominated boards.  
Seventh, the result in Table 4.10 shows a positive relationship between the ratios of legal 
experts (BL) and insolvency risks (z-score) but is statistically and economically insignificant. The 
result is consistent with Hypothesis 4.6 (legal experts reduce levels of insolvency risks at banks) 
and is only robust against the results shown in Table 4.12 (BL is negatively and statistically 
significantly associated with ImpLoanR), indicating that legal experts may be focusing on the 
increased numbers of upcoming compliance and regulatory issues arising from impaired loans, 
and that they are more inclined to agree with their co-workers and conform with the 
corporate missions of their banks (Langevoort, 2012). 
In summary, the results find that external monitoring (which is performed by external 
directors) tends to increase risk-taking at banks, although external directors may have positive 
effects on reducing impaired loans. The board bonding mechanism may be ineffective, as the 
results show that: (i) director share ownerships (ExDir_O, InDir_O) have positive impacts on 
the insolvency risks at banks, although the results are statistically insignificant; and (ii) director 
share ownerships (ExDir_O, InDir_O) induce directors to reduce impaired loan ratios. Overall, 
the results show that other internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as board experts, 
and board homogeneity, seem to be ineffective in monitoring risk-taking at Japan-listed banks.  
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Table 4.10 A summary of the results of the fixed effects (FE) estimations assessing the relationships between board 
characteristics and the levels of lending ratios (LoanDeps), and between board characteristics and insolvency risks 
(z-score). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. ExDir is the ratio of external directors to the total 
number of board members. ExDir_T is the average tenure of external directors on boards. ExDir_O is the amount of 
external director share ownerships. InDir_O is the amount of internal director share ownerships. BF is the ratio of 
financial experts to the total number of board members. BL is the ratio of legal experts to the total number of board 
members. BB is the ratio of lifetime bankers to the total number of board members. AgeRange is calculated by 
subtracting the age of the oldest directors from the youngest directors on the boards. Disc, Size, IntInc, TobinQ, 
TCapR control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The Hausman test is used to test for the consistency and efficiency of 
the FE estimations. 
 
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.770*** 0.770*** 0.7734*** 0.7539*** 621.9*** 601.2** 655.83*** 624.50*
(22.13) (21.57) (20.53) (11.19) (3.63) (3.25) (3.51) (2.49)
L.ExDir 0.0144 -265.9
(0.25) (-1.96)
L.ExDir_T -0.00214 5.298
(-1.36) (0.97)
L.ExDir_O -0.00496 -7.110
(-0.76) (-0.21)
L.InDir_O 0.000781 -32.13
(0.12) (-1.10)
L.BF -0.0012 -3.2398
(-0.58) (-0.38)
L.BL 0.0005 1.6228
(0.49) (0.55)
L.BB 0.0001 0.3366
(0.19) (0.17)
L.AgeRange 0.0005 -0.9565
(0.74) (-0.35)
L.Disc -0.0667 -0.0677 -0.0723 -0.0696
(-1.15) (-1.15) (-1.14) (-1.14)
L.Size -15.23 -11.96 -15.7184 -14.2931
(-1.97) (-1.18) (-1.65) (-1.68)
L.Post2008 -0.0259*** -0.0274*** -0.0268*** -0.0270*** -25.07 -24.53 -19.5888 -20.3852
(-3.68) (-3.71) (-3.60) (-3.71) (-1.44) (-1.31) (-1.03) (-1.04)
L.IntInc -216.4*** -215.8*** -2.1e+02*** -2.1e+02***
(-4.06) (-4.56) (-4.04) (-4.11)
L.TobinQ -0.274 -0.275 -0.3189 -0.3235
(-0.99) (-0.98) (-1.10) (-1.14)
L.TCapR 11.46 9.224 5.2139 5.5739
(1.41) (1.16) (0.73) (0.76)
No. of obs. 563 563 539 539 574 574 542 542
R2 0.220 0.215 0.221 0.221 0.111 0.105 0.099 0.098
Adj. R2 0.213 0.208 0.214 0.214 0.102 0.096 0.088 0.088
R2 (within) 0.220 0.215 0.2213 0.2213 0.111 0.105 0.0985 0.0984
R2 (between) 0.0188 0.00168 0.0017 0.0101 0.117 0.0853 0.0270 0.0486
R2 (overall) 0.0565 0.0343 0.0345 0.0267 0.0887 0.0797 0.0475 0.0598
RMSE 0.0303 0.0304 0.0306 0.0306 145.0 145.4 144.4132 144.4191
Hausman test 1.242 1.522 0.6685 2.5157 17.92 13.24 15.6562 15.0829
Hausman test: p-value 0.941 0.911 0.9847 0.7741 0.00643 0.0394 0.0157 0.0196
LoanDeps z-score
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Table 4.11 A summary of the results of the random effects (RE) estimations assessing the relationships between 
board characteristics and the levels of lending ratios (LoanDeps). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. ExDir is the ratio of external directors to the total 
number of board members. ExDir_T is the average tenure of external directors on boards. ExDir_O is the amount of 
external director share ownerships. InDir_O is the amount of internal director share ownerships. BF is the ratio of 
financial experts to the total number of board members. BL is the ratio of legal experts to the total number of board 
members. BB is the ratio of lifetime bankers to the total number of board members. AgeRange is calculated by 
subtracting the age of the oldest directors from the youngest directors on the boards.  
Disc and TobinQ control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is used to test 
for whether the variance of the unobserved fixed effects is zero. 
  
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.769*** 0.768*** 0.772*** 0.770***
(23.93) (23.20) (22.13) (13.44)
L.ExDir 0.0237
(0.45)
L.ExDir_T -0.00237
(-1.61)
L.ExDir_O -0.00544
(-1.20)
L.InDir_O 0.0000499
(0.01)
L.BF -0.00114
(-0.58)
L.BL 0.000450
(0.50)
L.BB -0.0000389
(-0.08)
L.AgeRange 0.000289
(0.45)
L.Disc -0.0652 -0.0633 -0.0678 -0.0674
(-1.16) (-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.10)
L.Post2008 -0.0259*** -0.0274*** -0.0269*** -0.0273***
(-3.74) (-3.85) (-3.72) (-3.90)
L.TobinQ -0.271 -0.269 -0.311 -0.311
(-1.02) (-0.99) (-1.12) (-1.14)
No. of obs . 563 563 539 539
R2 (within) 0.220 0.215 0.221 0.221
R2 (between) 0.0247 0.00115 0.00169 0.00610
R2 (overa l l ) 0.0601 0.0348 0.0347 0.0314
RMSE 0.0324 0.0325 0.0326 0.0327
LM test: p-va lue 0 0 0 0
LoanDeps
117 
 
Table 4.12 A summary of the results of the system generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond 
estimations assessing the relationships between board characteristics and the levels of lending ratios (LoanDeps), 
and between board characteristics and risk-taking (z-score). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. ExDir is the ratio of external directors to the total 
number of board members. ExDir_T is the average tenure of external directors on boards. ExDir_O is the amount of 
external director share ownerships. InDir_O is the amount of internal director share ownerships. BF is the ratio of 
financial experts to the total number of board members. BL is the ratio of legal experts to the total number of board 
members. BB is the ratio of lifetime bankers to the total number of board members. AgeRange is calculated by 
subtracting the age of the oldest directors from the youngest directors on the boards. Disc, Size, IntInc, TobinQ, 
TCapR control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The instruments are the first-differenced and the levels equations. 
The first-differenced equations are the lagged observations of the explanatory variables. The number of lags used 
varies slightly across the estimations. The levels of equations include TCapR and TobinQ. All instruments pass the 
Sargan test for the validity of instruments. 
 
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L.ExDir 0.0136 -384.1*
(0.67) (-2.06)
L.ExDir_T -0.000140 6.910
(-0.10) (1.34)
L.ExDir_O 0.000734 -30.79
(0.05) (-0.59)
L.InDir_O 0.00471 -24.15
(0.29) (-0.58)
L.BF 0.0004 -8.2583
(0.13) (-0.71)
L.BL -0.0028 -0.4058
(-1.25) (-0.07)
L.BB 0.0002 2.6927
(0.48) (1.31)
L.AgeRange -0.0000 -4.1095
(-0.08) (-1.20)
L.Disc 0.114*** 0.117*** 0.1177*** 0.1077**
(4.03) (4.26) (4.93) (2.90)
L.Size -4.240 -0.781 -2.5239 -2.3355
(-0.82) (-0.11) (-0.37) (-0.28)
L.Post2008 -0.0260*** -0.0258*** -0.0273*** -0.0265*** -22.56 -22.48 -19.3907 -18.0572
(-8.08) (-7.38) (-6.69) (-8.95) (-1.33) (-1.24) (-0.91) (-0.95)
L.LoanDeps 0.920*** 0.917*** 0.9202*** 0.9004***
(42.99) (43.24) (49.44) (23.93)
L.IntInc -140.0*** -144.7*** -1.4e+02*** -1.7e+02***
(-4.56) (-5.07) (-4.87) (-3.78)
L.zscore 0.392*** 0.425*** 0.4356*** 0.3970***
(4.28) (4.45) (3.97) (3.78)
L.TobinQ 0.407** 0.427** 0.4905** 0.4639***
(2.89) (3.07) (3.11) (3.61)
TobinQ -0.137 -0.145 -0.1800 -0.1965
(-1.01) (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.47)
L.TCapR 18.33* 10.48 9.4320 7.3892
(1.96) (1.14) (0.95) (0.98)
TCapR 21.60* 24.73** 25.3647** 18.2510
(2.52) (2.71) (2.71) (1.64)
No. of obs. 563 563 539 539 571 571 539 539
No. of instruments 55 55 55 55 62 62 62 62
Sargan test 54.59 54.09 53.1369 55.0104 66.71 66.55 64.8398 63.2064
Sargan test: p-value 0.238 0.253 0.2829 0.2264 0.115 0.117 0.1483 0.1832
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test -3.473 -3.317 -3.5055 -3.3456 -2.517 -2.503 -2.4010 -2.3977
AR(1) test: p-value 0.000515 0.000909 0.0005 0.0008 0.0118 0.0123 0.0164 0.0165
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test -0.962 -0.968 -0.9983 -0.9508 -0.913 -0.999 -0.9851 -1.0320
AR(2) test: p-value 0.336 0.333 0.3181 0.3417 0.361 0.318 0.3246 0.3021
LoanDeps z-score
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Table 4.13 Summary of results of fixed effects (FE) estimations assessing the relationships between board 
characteristics, and the levels of interest income (IntInc) and impaired loans (ImpLoanR). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. ExDir is the ratio of external directors to the total 
number of board members. ExDir_T is the average tenure of external directors on boards. ExDir_O is the amount of 
external director share ownerships. InDir_O is the amount of internal director share ownerships. BF is the ratio of 
financial experts to the total number of board members. BL is the ratio of legal experts to the total number of board 
members. BB is the ratio of lifetime bankers to the total number of board members. AgeRange is calculated by 
subtracting the age of the oldest directors from the youngest directors on the boards. Disc, Size, IntInc, TobinQ, 
TCapR control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The Hausman test is used to test for the consistency and efficiency of 
the FE estimations. 
 
 
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 3.259*** 3.308*** 3.2657*** 2.5423*** 2.302* 1.697 2.3117* 0.0167
(16.30) (17.32) (14.87) (5.69) (2.36) (1.64) (2.48) (0.01)
L.ExDir -0.381* -3.012*
(-2.09) (-2.52)
L.ExDir_T -0.0167* -0.0307
(-2.14) (-0.79)
L.ExDir_O -0.00204 -0.911***
(-0.04) (-5.49)
L.InDir_O -0.0705* -1.016***
(-2.11) (-6.39)
L.BF -0.0019 -0.0165
(-0.20) (-0.31)
L.BL 0.0012 -0.1241***
(0.26) (-4.11)
L.BB 0.0058* 0.0256
(2.33) (1.60)
L.AgeRange 0.0087 -0.0016
(1.90) (-0.11)
L.Disc -1.852*** -1.996*** -1.9471*** -1.8536***
(-5.74) (-6.36) (-5.56) (-4.98)
L.Size -0.0318 0.0408 -0.0270 -0.0371
(-0.50) (0.76) (-0.66) (-0.58)
L.Post2008 -0.325*** -0.346*** -0.3422*** -0.3329*** -0.153 -0.271 -0.1755 -0.1658
(-9.63) (-9.60) (-9.45) (-11.87) (-0.98) (-1.89) (-1.09) (-0.94)
L.IntInc 1.318** 1.289*** 1.3891*** 1.4097**
(3.21) (3.66) (3.73) (3.44)
L.TobinQ -2.327 -2.613 -2.5565 -2.7073
(-1.18) (-1.27) (-1.23) (-1.50)
L.TCapR -0.0556 -0.0677 -0.0838 -0.0887
(-0.84) (-1.18) (-1.29) (-1.25)
No. of obs. 563 563 539 539 575 575 543 543
R2 0.571 0.567 0.556 0.567 0.316 0.339 0.338 0.311
Adj. R2 0.568 0.563 0.552 0.563 0.308 0.332 0.330 0.304
R2 (within) 0.571 0.567 0.5557 0.5673 0.316 0.339 0.3376 0.3115
R2 (between) 0.132 0.0379 0.0175 0.1054 0.0154 0.00728 0.0247 0.0622
R2 (overall) 0.0718 0.167 0.1713 0.0911 0.0853 0.0417 0.0981 0.1436
Hausman test 44.08 27.28 25.1989 38.6275 29.80 40.56 36.1978 19.9083
Hausman test: p-value 0 0 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0.0029
IntInc ImpLoanR
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4.7.2 The Probability of Participating in Securitisation Businesses 
Table 4.14 shows that the probability of any securitisation business participation is driven by (i) 
the ratios of external directors (ExDir), and (ii) the ratios of financial experts (BF), and both 
variables are statistically significant at one percent levels in model (1). In terms of control 
variables, the levels of total regulatory capital (TCapR) and total asset sizes (logA) are 
statistically significant, while the z-score and ImpLoanR are statistically insignificant. The results 
shown in Table 4.14 are consistent with Hypothesis 4.11. Additionally, the results are 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 4.9 and Hypothesis 4.10. 
In order to examine the probabilities (the relative risks/hazard rates) between two groups: the 
control group (ALCO = 0) and the treatment group (ALCO =1) entering into securitisation 
businesses, the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox model) is used. ALCO = 0 represents banks 
without assets and liabilities committees, and ALCO = 1 represents banks with assets and 
liabilities committees. The Cox model controls for bank-specific effects (logA, TCapR, z-score, 
ImpLoanR) and clusters standard errors at a bank level. 
In terms of robustness tests, the results of the Cox model are compared to those of the 
exponential regression model, in which the Cox model is a time-varied model, and the 
exponential regression model is a time-non-varied model. The signs of the coefficients 
between the two models remain the same, but there are some changes in the statistical 
significance levels. Two variables (BL, Post2008) are noticeable, and are statistically 
insignificant in the Cox model. 
The results shown in model (1) of Table 4.14 compare the relative risks (hazard rates) between 
two groups: the control group (ALCO = 0) and the treatment group (ALCO =1). The relative risks 
(hazard rates) are the probability of banks participating in securitisation.  
The results in model (1) of Table 4.14 suggest that (compared to the control group banks,) the 
(treatment group) banks with ALCO may hire more external directors to help them develop 
their securitisation businesses as the profit margins of their lending businesses deteriorate. 
This is because of increased capital market competition resulting in higher-quality borrowers 
obtaining loans from the capital markets (Boot and Thakor, 2000). As a result, banks may be 
required to develop other businesses to substitute for the loss of high-quality borrowers. 
But the results also show that increased ratios of financial experts in the treatment group 
banks tend to decrease the probabilities of banks engaging in securitisation, indicating that 
financial experts are likely to play monitoring roles, instead of supervision roles, in banks with 
ALCOs.  
120 
 
Interestingly, ALCO, the z-score, and ImpLoanR are statistically insignificant, and the total 
capital reserve ratios (TCapR) and asset sizes (logA) are statistically significant. The former 
shows that the decisions of banks to engage in securitisation businesses are not related to the 
presence of ALCOs, and securitisation is not an effective credit risk management tool. 
The results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 4.9, which show that the z-score and ImpLoanR 
are statistically and economically insignificant. The finding is consistent with Cardone-
Riportella et al. (2010), whose study focuses on Spanish banks between 2000 and 2007. 
Additionally, securitisation may pose problems in the loan risk-sharing market, because the 
market is likely to break down if there are large numbers of loan defaults (Duffee and Zhou, 
2001). 
The results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 4.10, in which the coefficients of BF and BL are 
negative, and BF is statistically significant in models (1) and (2), indicating that the increased 
ratios of financial and legal experts on the boards of the treatment group (ALCO =1) lower the 
probabilities of banks participating in securitisation businesses. 
The results are consistent with Hypothesis 4.11, which show that: (i) the treatment group 
banks which have larger asset sizes (logA) tend to engage in securitisation, i.e. bigger banks 
with ALCOs are likely to engage in securitisation businesses, compared to banks that do not 
have ALCOs. (ii) The results show that an increase of one unit of required regulatory capital 
(TCapR) in banks with ALCOs reduces the probability of banks participating in securitisation. 
This indicates that banks with low required regulatory capital are likely to securitise their 
debts, which is consistent with the views that securitisation also allows banks to remove credit 
risks from their balance sheets as a result of reductions in capital requirements (Altunbas et 
al., 2009). 
In summary, board composition affects decisions by banks to use complex financial problems 
to enhance growth and facilitate regulatory arbitrage. 
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Table 4.14 A summary of the results of the Cox proportional hazard model and the exponential regression model. 
The table presents the estimates indicating the probability of banks participating in securitisation (hazard 
rates/relative risks) between the control group banks (ALCO =0) and the treatment group banks (ALCO =1). ALCO is 
the presence of the assets and liabilities committee at a bank, in which ALCO equals 1 when a bank has an ALCO or 
equivalent at board level; otherwise, ALCO equals 0. ExDir is the ratio of external directors to the total number of 
board members. BB is the ratio of lifetime bankers to the total number of board members. BF is the ratio of 
financial experts to the total number of board members. BL is the ratio of legal experts to the total number of board 
members. TCapR is the total regulatory capital ratio. logA is the natural logarithm of the total bank assets. The z-
score measures the level of insolvency risks at banks. ImpLoanR is the percentage of impaired loans over gross 
loans. Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, and 0 equals 2005-2007. *, ** and 
*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Model (1) (2) 
 Cox Proportional Hazard Model Exponential Regression Model 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Intercept   -8.908** 0.00 
   (-3.04)  
ALCO 0.157 1.17 0.168 1.18 
 (0.71)  (0.78)  
ExDir 2.620* 13.74 2.673*** 14.48 
 (2.50)  (3.42)  
BB 0.0222 1.02 0.0170 1.02 
 (1.02)  (0.91)  
BF -0.0822* 0.92 -0.0761* 0.93 
 (-2.00)  (-1.99)  
BL -0.0771 0.93 -0.0801* 0.92 
 (-1.95)  (-2.33)  
TCapR -0.188** 0.83 -0.161** 0.85 
 (-2.87)  (-2.82)  
logA 0.450*** 1.57 0.401*** 1.49 
 (3.58)  (3.36)  
z-score -0.00103 1.00 -0.000285 1.00 
 (-1.01)  (-0.45)  
ImpLoanR 0.0765 1.08 0.0229 1.02 
 (0.87)  (0.28)  
Post2008 -38.10 0.00 -1.038*** 0.35 
 (.)  (-8.71)  
No. of Obs. 606  606  
Log Likelihood -1,047.9  -413.5  
χ2 36.17  147.8  
Prob > χ2 0.00  0.00  
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4.8 Conclusion 
This section provides empirical assessments on the effects of the board characteristics and the 
director share ownerships on lending and risk-taking at Japan-listed banks. The empirical 
findings highlight that internal corporate governance mechanisms which are popular in Anglo-
American countries are ineffective at Japan-listed banks. External directors are likely to induce 
risk-taking at banks. The possible reasons are (i) the nature of insider-dominated boards (i.e. a 
lack of board independence); and (ii) external directors may act as supervisors or advisors for 
the development of non-lending businesses at Japan-listed banks. 
The results also find that any participation in securitisation businesses by Japan-listed banks is 
when their assets sizes are large, and their capital reserves are low. 
From a policy perspective, alternative governance mechanisms are required to enhance the 
monitoring effectiveness of Japan-listed banks. This is not to say that banks should replace the 
majority of their board members with external/independent directors. Given the limited 
supply of suitable external directors in Japan, Japanese policy makers and banking 
communities should consider alternative internal governance mechanisms which separate the 
roles of supervision and monitoring, such as by adopting a two-tier board corporate 
governance model. 
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Chapter 5 Institutional Ownerships 
5.1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, policy makers urged institutional shareholders to 
act as stewards to monitor listed banks (FRC, 2012; Walker, 2009), because institutional 
shareholders are considered to have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the banking 
industry to enable them to be effective monitors. Under the efficient market hypothesis, 
markets signal the performances of companies, and punish their managements when they 
perform poorly or they govern inadequately (Fama, 1980). In the event of ex ante monitoring, 
shareholders may also insist that managers of investee companies pursue the interests of their 
shareholders when they gather for private or annual general meetings (La Porta et al., 1998; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
While the conventional view on institutional shareholder monitoring focuses on shareholder 
wealth maximisation, it ignores the fact that ensuring shareholder maximisation may require 
forgoing the interests of stakeholders (Hawley and Williams, 1997). The theoretical arguments 
of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) propose that the effects of ownership structures may differ 
between the Anglo-American and Japanese systems due to concentrated ownerships and legal 
investor protections. The authors suggest that Anglo-American countries have strong legal 
systems that protect both majority and minority shareholders, which emphasise shareholder 
supremacy.  
However, shareholder supremacy and bank governance are likely to be undermined in the 
banking industry because of regulation restrictions on takeovers, and because of interference 
by regulatory agencies (Levine, 2003; Prowse, 2014). In order to protect shareholder wealth 
and improve bank governance, Levine (2003) suggests enhancing investor protections to 
empower shareholders to act as monitors. 
Consistent with the views of Levine (2003), the traditional approach argues that agency costs 
occur when control and ownership are separated, and agency costs increase with greater non-
managerial ownership levels (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is because managers may 
exploit company resources and their decisions may involve taking excessive risks. To resolve 
the problems of excessive risk-taking, non-managerial shareholders who own residual control 
rights may develop relationships with their managements and allow agency problems to be 
controlled by monitoring and by implementing reward systems (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
In order to examine the effectiveness of (non-managerial) shareholder monitoring, existing 
empirical research examines the relationships between company performances (or risk-taking 
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levels), and levels of ownership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), investor protections (Levine, 
2003), information asymmetry (Gompers and Metrick, 2001), and cross-share ownerships 
(Araki, 2009), in which each element is arguably inter-dependent with the other. However, it is 
difficult to examine some of these elements due to data availability. Therefore, the majority of 
empirical studies focus on examining the effects of ownership structures on monitoring. 
In terms of corporate governance studies focusing on Japan, the majority of empirical studies 
assess the effects of non-financial companies on corporate governance (Miyajima and Kuroki, 
2008; Prowse, 1992; Randall et al., 2000; Sakawa et al., 2014). Studying non-financial 
companies between 1979 and 1984, Prowse (1992) finds that financial institutions and 
companies that are outside the keiretsu groups, and which are majority shareholders, lead to 
positive relationships between cross-shareholdings and investee company performances. But 
shareholders belonging to the same keiretsu groups lead to negative investee company 
performances. Similar results are found in Miyajima and Kuroki (2008) whose studies are 
focused on Japanese companies between 1995 and 2001. 
Most empirical studies assess the effects of various types of ownership structures on financial 
and non-financial companies. Yet, only a few studies (such as Iannotta et al. (2007), De Nicolò 
and Loukoianova (2007), García-Marco and Robles-Fernández (2008), and Gedajlovic et al. 
(2005)) assess the effects of ownership structures in terms of different types of shareholders 
which may have different effects on bank lending and risk-taking. This study argues that the 
interests of stakeholders and shareholders may be better protected by institutional 
shareholders who have long-term business relationships with their investee banks. Meanwhile, 
internal governance mechanisms and the market for corporate control remain weak. This is 
because mergers and acquisitions are extremely rare in Japan due to cross-shareholding, the 
protection of community companies, and anti-takeover measures (Hayakawa and Whittaker, 
2009; Milhaupt and West, 2003; Whittaker and Hayakawa, 2007).  
In Japan, the weak market for corporate control is substituted by long-term shareholder 
monitoring, which is arguably able to influence the managements of investee companies 
through long-term relationships (Gibson, 1998; Gilson and Roe, 1993). For example, some of 
these shareholders may have other business affiliations with their investee companies, and 
also protect the interests of their stakeholders in an attempt to ensure long-term returns 
(McGuire and Dow, 2003). Moreover, if internal control mechanisms have not been effective 
as a result of excessive risk-taking at banks/companies, the governance mechanisms may be 
substituted by the institutional investors/shareholders (Walker, 2009). 
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The empirical framework of this chapter is based on the theoretical frameworks proposed by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Levine (2003), and makes two testable predictions assessing (i) 
whether six different types investors affect the levels of lending and insolvency risk of their 
investee banks; and (ii) whether domestic financial institutional shareholders are better at 
monitoring Japanese banks, compared to other types of investors. 
To assess the predictions empirically, a database was compiled and consisting of 662 bank-year 
observations of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. The data was extracted from the 
Bankscope database. On ownership, bank level data were collected based on the types of 
investors, of which only 11 types of institutional investors and were considered and were re-
assigned into six categories of institutional shareholders: (i) foreign financial institutions, (ii) 
foreign non-financial companies, (iii) foreign governmental institutions, (iv) domestic financial 
institutions, (v) domestic non-financial companies, and (vi) domestic governmental 
institutions. Among these institutional investors, some of the foreign and domestic financial 
institutions were not among the top 10 shareholders, but hold sufficient levels of bank 
shareholdings. This study argues that the nature of each institutional shareholder may differ. 
Some may focus on shareholder wealth maximisation, while others may emphasise the health 
of the financial conditions of their banks, or may safeguard the interests of their stakeholders. 
Furthermore, in order to mitigate the problems arising from endogeneity and heterogeneity, 
the fixed-effects (FE), random-effects (RE) and the system generalised method of moments 
(GMM) Arellano Bond estimations are used to investigate the effects of different types of 
shareholders on lending and risk-taking (i.e. insolvency risks (z-score)). In order to resolve the 
problems of the large heterogeneity of the sample and the overly persistent autoregressive 
process, the GMM estimations are computed using (i) an option that the estimated variance–
covariance matrix is robust to heteroscedasticity, and (ii) an additional moment condition is 
used (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
The results show that only three independent variables (FNFC, DGov and FFI) are statistically 
significant in testing against levels of lending (LoanDeps) or risk-taking (z-score) in the FE and 
GMM estimations. 
The key findings are as follows. First, contrary to the recommendations of policy makers (FRC, 
2012) and previous findings relating to foreign investors in Japan (Ahmadjian, 2008; Jacoby, 
2009), this chapter finds that foreign financial institutional shareholders may not be the best 
monitors. Instead, the results show a positive relationship between foreign financial 
institutional share ownerships and the insolvency risks of the associated investee banks. This 
may be due to (i) financial institutional shareholders encouraging risk-taking at banks as a 
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result of increased exposures to non-lending businesses, or (ii) foreign financial institutional 
shareholders not having sufficient levels of information to monitor their investee banks 
effectively as a result of the home bias, i.e. the information may only be available to domestic 
investors. 
Second, governmental institutional ownerships dampen corporate governance at banks as a 
result of increased insolvency risk levels. The findings are consistent with theoretical 
assumptions (Levine, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), which argue that state ownerships lead 
to lower levels of corporate governance at banks and increase the possibility of excessive risk-
taking. 
Third, a negative relationship exists between levels of domestic financial institutional 
ownerships (DFI) and the z-score, indicating that domestic financial institutions, which are also 
majority shareholders, encourage risk-taking at banks. The finding is contrary to the theoretical 
assumptions proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), in which concentrated shareholders have 
greater resources and incentives to effectively monitor their investee companies. 
To explore more fully the effects on the lending and risk-taking behaviours of banks, 
section 5.6 tests the robustness of the results by assessing the effects of various types of 
institutional shareholders on the levels of interest incomes and impaired loans. Although the 
findings are not fully robust, they provide additional information relating to the effects of 
institutional investors on corporate governance.  
This section concludes that the effectiveness of risk-monitoring may be subject to shareholder 
objectives, and state-ownerships may hinder risk-monitoring at banks as their objectives differ 
from those of private-ownerships. Moreover, foreign financial investors increase risk-taking at 
banks.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews literature on the effects of various 
types of institutional investors. Section 5.3 presents the conceptual framework and its 
associated hypotheses. Section 5.4.1 summarises the data samples. Section 5.4.2 provides 
descriptions of the variables used in the empirical analyses. Section 5.4.3 provides summary 
statistics. Section 5.5 provides brief overviews of the methodology used in this chapter. 
Section 5.6 discusses the results. Section 5.7 contains the conclusions.
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5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Institutional Shareholders 
Scholars argue that investment strategies are often affected by residual claims (Fama and 
Jensen, 1985), in which concentrated shareholders (institutional investors) are incentivised to 
monitor the managements of their investee companies for shareholder wealth maximisation 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), and, ideally, shareholder gains are required to offset the 
monitoring costs (Maug, 1998). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that large shareholders (i.e. block shareholders/institutional 
investors) limit agency problems, and are likely to have greater resources and incentives to 
monitor the boards of their investee companies for three reasons, although there may be free-
riding by minority shareholders. First, institutional investors are likely to have greater access to 
information compared to small investors. Therefore, they are able to negotiate informally with 
company managements over any institutional changes. Second, institutional investors have 
greater controls over their investee companies through their shareholdings, which allow them 
to request proxy votes to overturn decisions or replace the managements of their investee 
companies. Third, institutional investors are likely to maximise shareholder wealth (i.e. 
incentives) – by increasing the share prices of their investee companies or by increasing 
dividend payments – by influencing the decision-making processes of their investee 
companies. 
Mixed results are found when assessing the effects of ownership structures. By studying 500 
US companies, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no relationships between levels of concentrated 
ownerships and company performances. On the contrary, Douma et al. (2006) suggest that 
there are positive relationships between levels of domestic corporate ownerships and the 
performances of investee companies, because these shareholders have business affiliation 
with their investee companies. These findings indicate that cash flow and control rights may be 
separated, during which concentrated shareholders may not be effective monitors if their 
control rights are limited, and their cash flow and control rights are separated in a dual class 
stock structure. In this circumstance, control rights may be improved through formal and 
informal shareholder engagements such as voting, shareholder activism, and consultations on 
the remuneration and nomination processes. 
Contrary to the conventional views on concentrated shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), 
studying European banks between 1999 and 2008, and García-Kuhnert et al. (2015) find that 
banks with diversified shareholders tend to have greater risk-taking levels, indicating that a 
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positive relationship exists between levels of ownership and control rights which affect 
shareholder monitoring effectiveness. 
In the context of Japan, although levels of foreign ownerships remain low compared to 
domestic ownerships, the increased levels of foreign shareholders arguably alter corporate 
governance practices in Japanese companies. In the empirical studies assessing the impacts of 
shareholders on corporate governance, scholars find that foreign shareholders improve 
market liquidity and transparency in Japan (Sakawa et al., 2014), facilitate management 
turnovers as a result of influencing internal monitoring (Denis et al., 1997), and change internal 
governance mechanisms, such as increased board independence, through shareholder 
activism (Gillan and Starks, 2003). 
Contrary to the effects of foreign shareholders on corporate governance practices, other 
scholars find that majority shareholders, who are cross-shareholders, may lead to poor 
disclosures by their investee companies (Fan and Wong, 2002; Sakawa et al., 2014), and 
reduce the disciplinary effects of markets (Sakawa et al., 2014) in both East Asian countries 
and Japan. 
Another school of literature examines the effects on minority and majority shareholders. 
Backer (2002) argues that majority shareholders may owe fiduciary duties to minority 
shareholders, but empirical studies find that agency costs increase when concentrated 
shareholders try to influence their managements in order to maximise the interests of 
concentrated shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders and other stakeholders 
(Claessens et al., 1999; Young et al., 2002), such as through excessive risk-taking. Similar 
results are found in a cross-country study (Laeven and Levine, 2009), in which the authors 
suggest that a positive relationship exists between concentrated ownerships and risk-taking at 
banks, indicating that concentrated ownerships increase agency costs. 
Following the above arguments, this chapter examines the effects of different types of 
institutional shareholders on the corporate governance of banks that results in different 
lending and risk-taking behaviours. The following sections review literature on various types of 
shareholders associated with corporate governance.  
5.2.2 Domestic Institutional Shareholders 
Domestic investors are arguably better monitors than foreign investors, because they have in-
depth understandings of their domestic business environments (Gehrig, 1993). Information 
asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors is driven by the nature of private 
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information structures (Choe et al., 2004; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), from which foreign 
investors can obtain country-specific information through intermediaries. 
Empirical studies show that domestic investors tend to have superior information as a result of 
home ground advantage. Studying Korean companies between 1996 and 1998, Choe et al. 
(2004) find that foreign investors generally pay more and sell less compared to domestic 
investors, despite the fact that foreign investors are more experienced and have greater access 
to research information. Similarly, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that US domestic investors 
tend to invest in US companies rather than invest abroad. These findings suggest that domestic 
investors tend to have greater access to local information, and have better ties with the 
executives of local companies. Large foreign investment companies are arguably likely to have 
the same access to local information as domestic investors, and they may also have greater 
recourse to proprietary research information (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). 
From a corporate governance perspective, Douma et al. (2006) find that domestic institutions 
often have group businesses that are affiliated with investee companies, and are able to have 
positive influences on the performances of investee companies. Scholars also argue that cross-
shareholders may influence the internal governance of companies (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Douma et al., 2006). In summary, these studies imply that domestic institutions have greater 
access to company-specific information, and are able to influence the managements of their 
investee companies through their affiliations and concentrated ownerships. 
In contrast with these results, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) find that cross-shareholdings 
with domestic shareholders may block monitoring by investors who are outside the cross-
shareholding groups. Sakawa et al. (2014) suggest that cross-shareholding lowers information 
asymmetry. As a result, cross-shareholding increases agency costs (Isagawa, 2007). 
In summary, mixed results are shown in empirical studies. It should be noted that most of 
these empirical studies are based on countries that are operating under bank-based corporate 
governance systems in which large creditors play monitoring roles.  
5.2.3 Foreign Institutional Shareholders 
Scholars suggest that the investment objectives of foreign institutional investors are either 
profit-oriented (Ahmadjian, 2008), or technology-driven, in which foreign investors bring state-
of-the-art technologies and human capital to their investee banks (Bonin et al., 2005), instead 
of developing long-term relationships with investee companies/banks (Ahmadjian and 
Robbins, 2005). At the same time, foreign investors may also influence the corporate 
governance standards of their investee companies through voice or by threating to exit their 
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investments (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005), and can do so free from political influences (Choe 
et al., 2004). 
Foreign investors who come from countries with greater standards of corporate governance 
believe that poor corporate governance may dampen company performances. As a result, they 
often encourage their investee companies to initiate corporate governance reforms 
(Ahmadjian, 2008; Jacoby, 2009), and demand greater board independence (Jacoby, 2009), 
management/CEO accountability, transparency, and disclosure (Sakawa et al., 2014). 
From a performance perspective, some empirical studies show that foreign institutional share 
ownerships are positively related to corporate growth (Shinada, 2010), market liquidity 
(Sakawa et al., 2014), and downsizing and restructuring (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001). On 
the contrary, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) find that Japanese non-financial companies with 
greater levels of domestic financial ownerships are less affected by foreign investors. The 
results might not be surprising, since Japanese non-financial companies are likely to be 
shielded from foreign investor voice or exit threats, and their friendly shareholders are unlikely 
to vote against them. 
In terms of risk-taking at banks, few studies assess banks with foreign ownership. Instead, 
studies compare different risk-taking and performance levels between state-owned, domestic-
privately-owned, and foreign-owned banks (Agoraki et al., 2011; Buch and DeLong, 2008; 
Deyoung and Nolle, 1996; Kick and von Westernhagen, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
Overall, the literature finds that foreign-owned banks/banks with majority foreign ownerships 
are less profitable (Deyoung and Nolle, 1996), but the results on risk-taking are mixed. When 
studying banks from emerging-market countries between 1992 and 1996, Laeven (1999) finds 
that banks with majority foreign ownerships tend to take fewer risks, because they are less 
likely to commit insider lending. Similar results are found in Agoraki et al. (2011) and the 
authors find that foreign-owned banks enjoy better human resource and information 
technologies in transition economy countries. On the contrary, Buch and DeLong (2008) find 
that foreign-owned banks tend to engage in riskier projects, if these banks originate from 
countries with weaker supervisory frameworks. 
Nevertheless, the findings do not conclude whether foreign investors are better or worse 
monitors, compared to domestic investors. Although foreign investors may suffer from 
information asymmetry (Choe et al., 2004; Gehrig, 1993), compared to domestic investors, the 
majority of empirical studies suggest that foreign investors originating from countries with 
strong corporate governance and supervisory frameworks could provide technological 
advancements and guidance on corporate governance enhancements for their banks. 
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Additionally, foreign investors may overcome the home bias and effectively monitor their 
investee companies through voice or exit mechanisms (Miyajima and Hoda, 2015). 
5.2.4 Shareholders: Financial Institutions versus Non-Financial Companies 
Theoretical arguments propose that the investment decisions of companies are affected by 
their different types of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1985), because their residual claims 
and residual risk bearing tolerances often differ. Additionally, the risk preferences of financial 
institutional investors and non-financial companies also arguably differ because they have 
different investment objectives and investment horizons. Financial institutional investors 
might focus on profit maximisation and portfolio risk diversification, while non-financial 
institutional investors might place an emphasis on the survival of their investee companies, 
with which they may have business affiliations. Additionally, financial institutions (such as 
pension funds or wealth management companies) may also have fiduciary duties on behalf of 
beneficiaries (Hawley and Williams, 1997). Fiduciary duties require institutions to promote and 
safeguard the interests of their beneficiaries. As a result, the criteria for the stock selection 
processes of financial institutions emphasise whether the stocks are part of a major index 
which fulfils the performance and corporate governance requirements (Lysandrou and 
Stoyanova, 2007; Miyajima and Hoda, 2015), because these stocks are likely to have greater 
levels of disclosure as a result of the reduced cost of monitoring. 
Non-financial companies and financial institutions may use different performance indicators as 
benchmarks, which helps them to identify the strategic activities and the strategic plans of 
their investee companies. Non-financial companies are likely to assess company performances 
using performance indicators such as sales growth to measure the profitability and market 
shares of their investee companies. On the contrary, financial institutions may prefer to use 
financial performance matrices, such as return on equity and return on assets, as performance 
indicators, which emphasise shareholder returns and long-term probability trends. 
Studying European non-financial companies, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find that levels of 
financial institutional shareholdings are positively associated with the financial performances 
of their investee companies, and that non-financial company shareholders have greater effects 
on sales growth, but have negative effects on financial performances of their investee 
companies. But similar research suggests otherwise. Studying the banks of western European 
countries between 1999 and 2008, Barry et al. (2011) find that the risk-return preferences are 
similar between financial institutions and non-financial companies, except for banks with 
greater levels of financial institutional ownerships that tend to decrease their credit risk levels. 
This indicates that the investment objectives of financial institutional shareholders may be 
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similar to those of their investee banks. The authors also find positive associations between 
the concentrated ownerships of non-financial companies and insider lending, indicating the 
possibility of shareholder expropriations. 
Furthermore, studying Japanese non-financial companies between 1985 and 2002, Miyajima 
and Kuroki (2008) find a positive relationship between financial institutional ownerships and 
company performances, but a negative relationship between stable shareholders and 
company performances. This indicates that financial institutions have greater monitoring 
abilities which lead to improved performances at their investee companies. 
In summary, the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical framework of Fama and 
Jensen (1985), and show the characteristics, the possible investment objectives, and their 
influences on their investee companies. However, these studies have not considered the time-
horizons and the levels of investor portfolio diversification. Perhaps time-horizons and 
portfolio diversification may not be the only considerations affecting monitoring. Other 
factors, such as cross-shareholdings, geographical proximities, and business affiliations, should 
be taken into account.  
5.2.5 Government Shareholders (Domestic and Foreign) 
The objectives of governmental authorities may differ when compared to private companies, 
in which state-owned/public sector banks are controlled by bureaucrats who have no cash 
flow rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this circumstance, governmental 
authorities/bureaucrats may forgo profit maximisation for social objectives or political goals 
(Levine, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1997), which lead to inefficiencies (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997) and poor performances (Berger et al., 2005) at banks. 
The majority of empirical studies find that state-owned/public sector banks tend to take 
greater risks, because they are less restrained from insider lending (Laeven, 1999), moral 
hazards resulting from explicit guarantees (Iannotta et al., 2007), or for the purpose of 
economic policies and enhancing economic welfare (García-Marco and Robles-Fernández, 
2008). Additionally, the natures of risks are likely to differ between state-owned and privately-
owned banks (García-Marco and Robles-Fernández, 2008), in which state-owned banks tend to 
increase their credit risk levels through lending, while privately-owned banks tend to generate 
other types of risks through non-lending businesses.  
Contrary to domestic governmental authorities, foreign states may invest abroad for a variety 
of reasons, ranging from political, nonfinancial social (creating employment or obtaining 
technologies for their domestic companies), or for strategic and financial objectives (Fotak et 
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al., 2008; Gilson and Milhaupt, 2007). The foreign states often invest through their sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs), and invest in foreign currency-denominated assets (Jen, 2007; Johnson, 
2007). 
From a corporate governance perspective, empirical studies find mixed results on the 
monitoring of SWFs. Scholars argue that the fund managers of SWFs are likely to have prior 
knowledge relating to the polices of governments that affect their investee companies (Fotak 
et al., 2008; Gilson and Milhaupt, 2007). As a result, these fund managers may lobby for 
potential policy changes that benefit/harm their investee companies. Moreover, the majority 
of share ownerships have also given SWFs the right to appoint their representatives to the 
boards of their investee companies for monitoring purposes (Dewenter et al., 2010). However, 
Gilson and Milhaupt (2007) argue that the controlling (voting) rights may be removed from the 
governments of investee companies for national security reasons, and the removal of 
controlling rights is likely to prevent the SWFs from changing the corporate governance 
standards of their investee companies.  
Empirical studies find mixed results between levels of SWF ownerships and company 
performances. Dewenter et al. (2010) find a positive relationship between SWFs and the 
performances of their investee companies, and the authors argue that there are possible 
signalling effects, i.e. the market perceives that SWFs may have insider information. On the 
contrary, the empirical study of Fotak et al. (2008) shows a negative relationship between 
SWFs and the performances of their investee companies, which suggests that the SWFs 
increase agency costs due to conflicting interests between them and the managements of their 
investee companies. 
In summary, empirical studies suggest that state ownerships lead to poor bank governance, 
while the effects of SWFs are similar to those of financial institutions which are likely to 
improve bank governance. It is not clear whether the SWFs have any political motives which 
could affect lending and risk-taking at banks. 
5.2.6 Ownership Structures of Japanese Companies 
In Japan, the external governance role is traditionally performed by the main banks, which are 
able to influence and monitor their borrowers through cross-shareholding, and relationship 
banking and lending. 
The ownership structures of Japanese companies and banks have been widely studied from 
three perspectives: (i) cross-shareholdings, (ii) foreign investors, and (iii) the convoy system. 
The first two perspectives are arguably in conjunction with each other, because the reduction 
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of cross-shareholding has prompted increased ownerships by foreign investors in Japanese 
companies and banks. The latter (the convoy system) is a mechanism which prevents 
competition among Japanese banks, and is designed to encourage healthier banks to support 
weaker banks for the benefit of the stability of the whole Japanese banking industry.  
5.2.6.1 Cross-shareholdings and Foreign Investors 
Stable cross-shareholdings arise from the keiretsu, in which a group of companies hold shares 
in each other, and have close ties with their main banks through relationship banking and 
lending. These companies establish and maintain long-term business relationships with each 
other through their keiretsu group networks. As a result of cross-shareholdings, companies are 
insensitive to profits, able to focus on employee-centred corporate governance, and can resist 
takeovers (Araki, 2009; Miyajima and Kuroki, 2008). From the external governance 
perspective, non-financial companies are monitored by their main banks and their majority 
shareholders, which belong to the same keiretsu group (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Randall et 
al., 2000; Yafeh and Yosha, 2003).  
In the aftermath of the banking crisis of the 1990s, the majority of Japanese studies shifted 
their research interests from cross-shareholding to (i) the effects of the unwinding from cross-
shareholding, and (ii) examine the effects of companies resulting from the ownerships of main 
banks being substituted from those of foreign and domestic shareholders. The unwinding from 
cross-shareholding between 1995 and 2002 was due to (i) the weakened main bank 
relationships, and (ii) the increased awareness of the high risks of holding bank shares as a 
result of the 1990s banking crisis (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2008). 
As a result of the unwinding, scholars argue that the rapid change of ownership structures led 
to the growing number of foreign investors (Araki, 2009, p. 224), which gradually changed the 
Japanese corporate governance model from stakeholder supremacy to shareholder supremacy 
(Ahmadjian, 2008). As a result of these changes, scholars find that (i) foreign investors tend to 
pressure their Japanese investee companies to adopt specific governance practices which may 
enhance shareholder returns (Jacoby, 2009), and (ii) there is an increased awareness of 
fiduciary responsibility among the domestic financial institutional investors (Miyajima and 
Hoda, 2015). 
Despite the unwinding of cross-shareholding, the influences of foreign investors are limited to 
companies that receive strong support from their main banks. By studying Japanese non-
financial companies between 1991 and 1997, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) find a positive 
relationship between foreign ownerships and the likelihood of non-financial companies 
downsizing, but companies show no propensity to downsize if they are largely owned by 
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domestic financial institutions. Scholars also find that domestic financial institutions continue 
to be the majority shareholders of banks, and these domestic financial institutions and their 
investee banks are likely to be affiliated with bank-oriented or keiretsu groups (Hiraki et al., 
2003; Miyajima and Hoda, 2015).  
Even with the increased influences of foreign investors, domestic financial institutions (such as 
the main banks and pension funds) remain the key monitors of Japanese companies. By 
studying Japanese financial companies between 1998 and 2008, Miyajima and Hoda (2015) 
find that financial performances and investments in growth are positively associated with the 
ownership levels of foreign and domestic institutions, indicating that foreign and domestic 
institutions monitor and strengthen the financial performances of their (Japanese) investee 
companies. At the same time, both foreign and domestic institutions promote the long-term 
values of their investee companies, instead of only focusing on short-term returns. 
In summary, in the absence of main bank monitoring, foreign investors play an important role 
in monitoring their Japanese companies (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005), and promoting 
corporate governance reforms (Ahmadjian, 2008). Overall, these changes are improving the 
awareness of fiduciary responsibilities among Japanese financial institutions, and are gradually 
shifting the Japanese corporate governance model from stakeholder to shareholder 
supremacy (Dore, 2000; Jacoby, 2009). Nevertheless, foreign investor monitoring mechanisms 
are still limited by the keiretsu groups, and various anti-takeover mechanisms. 
5.2.6.2 The Convoy System 
The convoy system is designed to protect weak banks and to maintain the stability of the 
Japanese banking industry, which prohibits competitive behaviour. In order to prevent any 
Japanese banks from collapsing, large banks may acquire small (potentially failing) banks as 
directed by their government. However, following governmental guidelines and incorporating 
social distributions are likely to dampen shareholder rights, instead of maximising profits 
(Tandon, 2005). 
Studying the Japanese banking industry, scholars argue that the convoy system creates moral 
hazards, because banks were taking excessive risks to increase profits (Hoshi, 2002; Malcolm, 
2001). This is because (i) the convoy system prevents weak banks with large volumes of non-
performing loans from failing (Malcolm, 2001, pp. 97–101), (ii) the government provides 
explicit guarantees to persuade healthier banks to acquire failing banks (Hoshi, 2002), and (iii) 
the government provides additional liquidity to support mergers between failing banks 
(Hosono et al., 2009). As a result, the convoy system weakens the external monitoring and 
disciplining processes. 
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Although takeover mechanisms (such as the disciplining process) exist, mergers and 
acquisitions of Japanese banks are (i) normally conducted under the instructions of the 
Ministry of Finance (Hoshi, 2002; Malcolm, 2001), or (ii) under the same bank-oriented or 
keiretsu groups (Anderson and Campbell II, 2000). 
Additionally, empirical studies and industry research show that the Japanese government 
introduced various forms of implicit protection mechanisms to prevent banks from bank runs 
(Suzuki, 2011a). These mechanisms include (i) deposit insurance schemes, (ii) central bank 
lender of last resort facilities, (ii) information sharing mechanisms between regulators and 
major banks which ensure greater flexibilities for regulators to amend financial regulations to 
resolve structural problems, and (iv) allowing the government to inject funds into problem 
banks in the form of equity (Moody’s, 2013).  
Additionally, the revised 2001 Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) Act provides a permanent 
framework for helping failing banks, including the DIC taking over failing banks, and then 
transferring them to assuming financial institutions (Harada et al., 2015). Moreover, the 
Japanese government introduced public capital infusion programs in 1998 and 1999, which 
injected public money into banks, which are systematically important major bank (Guizani and 
Watanabe, 2016). Although the polices of the Japanese government no longer explicitly 
guarantee that they will rescue failing banks, the DIC Act and the public capital infusion 
programs provide a softened version of the convoy system.  
Despite the fact that Japanese banks continue to operate under the (softened) convoy system, 
scholars find that it has weakened since the late 1990s banking crisis (Hoshi, 2002), and 
shareholder value has improved. The study of Radić (2015) assessing Japanese banks between 
1999 and 2011 finds that Japanese banks generate at least 40 percent greater shareholder 
value for their owners. In particular, the author finds that small Japanese banks tend to have 
higher shareholder value creation, compared to large Japanese banks. Similar results are found 
in Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000).  
In summary, the (softened) convoy system or the newly formed implicit protection 
mechanisms may hinder the external governance control mechanisms of Japanese banks. 
Nevertheless, Japanese policy makers should consider alternative measures to safeguard the 
interests of stakeholders, to be accountable to shareholders, and to ensure the stability of 
their banking industry. 
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5.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest a strong relationship exists between ownership and control, 
in which concentrated ownerships reduce agency costs. The conceptual framework of this 
study focuses on ownership structures (different types of shareholders) which have different 
investment objectives and risk appetites. As a result, their influences are likely to affect the 
business strategies of their investee banks, such as levels of lending and risk-taking.  
Six categories of institutional shareholders are considered: (i) foreign financial institutions 
(FFI), (ii) foreign non-financial companies (FNFC), (iii) foreign governmental institutions (FGov), 
(iv) domestic financial institutions (DFI), (v) domestic non-financial companies (DNFC), and (vi) 
domestic governmental institutions DGov. FFI, FNFC, FGov, DFI, DNFC, and DGov are the 
percentage of shares owned by each type of institutional shareholder. 
Five hypotheses are used to examine the effects of different types of institutional shareholders 
on levels of bank lending and insolvency risks. 
Hypothesis 5.1 suggests that (i) a positive relationship exists between domestic financial 
institutional shareholders (DFI) and lending ratios (LoanDeps), and (ii) a negative relationship 
exists between foreign financial institutional shareholders (FFI) and lending ratios (LoanDeps). 
The hypothesis argues that domestic and foreign financial institutional shareholders have the 
incentives and have acquired sufficient knowledge to monitor their investee banks, but their 
monitoring effects may differ as a result of different investment objectives (Douma et al., 
2006). 
The investment objectives of domestic and foreign financial institutional shareholders are 
likely to differ for two reasons. First, domestic financial institutions are likely to have closer 
ties, and/or long-term business relationships with their investee banks (Ahmadjian and 
Robbins, 2005; Douma et al., 2006). Domestic financial institutions are likely to encourage 
their banks to lend more, because increased credit supply may promote domestic growth, and 
as a result benefit domestic (financial and non-financial) companies. Second, foreign financial 
institutions may focus on financial returns (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Jacoby, 2009), and 
they may encourage their investee banks to lend less and re-distribute their resources away 
from lending as a result of the low interest rate environment in Japan (Nishiguchi, 2011). 
Moreover, foreign financial institutions, which are more familiar with transactional banks, are 
likely to be less familiar with the relationship lending practices of Japan-listed banks, because 
the lending decisions of Japan-listed banks depend on soft information. Therefore, foreign 
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financial institutional shareholders are less likely to rely on soft information and to encourage 
their investee banks to lend to companies that have low credit scores (Berger and Udell, 2002).  
Therefore, this hypothesis argues that domestic financial institutions are likely to the 
safeguard interests of stakeholders, while foreign financial institutions are likely to safeguard 
interests of shareholders.  
Additionally, foreign financial institutions may encourage their investee banks to invest in risky 
businesses (and change their business models to be closer to the bank holding company 
models that are operating in Anglo-American countries), while domestic financial institutions 
may prefer their investee banks to reduce their risk-taking and focus on stable income 
streams. 
Hypothesis 5.2 argues that DFI are likely to discourage their investee banks from taking risks 
(i.e. DFI is positively associated with the z-score), while FFI are likely to encourage their 
investee banks to increase levels of insolvency risks (i.e. FFI is negatively associated with the z-
score). 
Hypothesis 5.3 argues that the investment objectives of non-financial companies may be long-
term, as they focus on the health of their investee banks, and encourage their banks to focus 
on their core businesses, i.e. lending. The hypothesis argues that DNFC and FNFC are likely to 
encourage their investee banks to lend more, and to discourage their investee banks from 
investing in non-lending businesses such as derivatives businesses, because non-financial 
companies are unlikely to acquire sufficient levels of knowledge to effectively monitor their 
investee banks. 
Risk monitoring arguably varies between financial institutions and non-financial companies 
(Gedajlovic et al., 2005), and between domestic and foreign companies (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2000). This is for two reasons. First, it is because of levels of information 
asymmetry. Scholars argue that information asymmetry between domestic and foreign 
investors is driven by the nature of private information structures (Choe et al., 2004; Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999). Domestic investors may have home ground advantage, which enables them 
to obtain information through local business partners and personal networks (Douma et al., 
2006). Contrary to domestic investors, foreign investors can only obtain country-specific 
information through intermediaries (Choe et al., 2004). 
Second, incentives to monitor their investee banks invariably differ between domestic and 
foreign investors (Douma et al., 2006; Gedajlovic et al., 2005). Japanese domestic investors are 
likely to have business affiliations with their investee banks, and are less likely to focus on 
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financial returns (Gedajlovic et al., 2005). On the contrary, foreign investors are more likely to 
be profit-oriented (Jacoby, 2009), and are more likely to dispose of their investments if the 
country of their investments is experiencing economic uncertainties (Adler et al., 2016).  
In addition, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find that non-financial companies are likely to 
monitor the performances of their investee banks by evaluating their sales levels and market 
shares (i.e. volumes of lending), while financial institutions are likely to monitor the 
performances of their investee banks by using financial-based and market-based performance 
indicators, such as stock prices, Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. 
Hypothesis 5.4 argues that, first, domestic financial institutions (DFI) are the best risk monitors 
compared to other institutional investors and non-financial companies. This hypothesis argues 
that domestic financial institutions are one of biggest shareholders and may be, arguably, 
under the same keiretsu group (Suzuki, 2011a).  
On the contrary, domestic non-financial companies (DNFC) and foreign financial institutions 
(FFI) may induce their investee banks to take greater risks (Jacoby, 2009). Second, the 
hypothesis argues that (i) these domestic non-financial companies are likely to have 
relationship-banking business with their investee banks, and may persuade their banks to 
provide insider lending (Barry et al., 2011); and (ii) foreign financial institutions may encourage 
their investee banks to take greater risks to maximise profits (Buch and DeLong, 2008; Jacoby, 
2009). 
Third, the hypothesis further argues that foreign non-financial companies (FNFC) are 
ineffective at monitoring the risks of investments in businesses that may be using products 
such as derivatives. They may not have acquired the expertise and information to monitor 
their investee banks as a result of the complexity of the banking business and the Japanese 
business culture. Figure 5.1 shows the degrees of risk monitoring abilities among different 
types of shareholders. 
Hypothesis 5.5 argues that foreign and domestic governmental institutions (FGov, DGov) 
encourage banks to lend less. This is because the balance sheets of Japanese banks are heavily 
exposed to the credit and liquidity risks which led to the Japanese banking sector being 
structurally fragile because of the slowdown in Japan’s economy and the 2008 financial crisis 
(Nishiguchi, 2011). This hypothesis argues that foreign governmental institutions (FGov) would 
be better at monitoring compared to domestic governmental institutions (DGov), because they 
are free from political influence (Choe et al., 2004). This hypothesis further argues that DGov is 
likely to be positively associated with risk-taking (i.e. especially non-lending risks) at Japanese 
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banks, and the Japanese government may encourage banks to diversify their lending at home 
and abroad, as loan demand has been decreasing since the 1990s. 
Figure 5.1 Degrees of Risk Monitoring Abilities Model 
 Domestic Foreign 
Non-Financial Companies Low Insignificant 
Financial Institutions High Low 
 
Hypothesis 5.1 - Hypothesis 5.5 are examined using the following models. 
Model 5.1: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐹𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 5.2: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐷𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌1𝑖,𝑡 is (i) the lending ratio (LoanDeps) of bank i in time t, (ii) the insolvency risk level (z-
score) of bank i in time t, (iii) the level of interest incomes (IntInc) of bank i in time t, and (iv) 
the level of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) of bank i in time t. 
FFI is the level of foreign financial institutional ownerships. FNFC is the level of foreign non-
financial institutional ownerships. FGov is the level of foreign governmental ownerships. DFI is 
the level of domestic financial institutional ownerships. DNFC is the level of domestic non-
financial institutional ownerships. DGov is the level of domestic governmental ownerships. 
TCapR and Disc are used to control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-
specific effects. TCapR is the total regulatory capital ratio. Disc measures the level of bank 
financial disclosure. Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, 
and 0 equals 2005-2007. The fixed-effects (FE), random-effects (RE) and the system 
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generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimations are used to examine 
Model 5.1 and Model 5.2.  
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5.4 Data and Variable Descriptions 
5.4.1 Data Sample 
The objective of this section is to examine the effects of institutional ownership structures on 
bank lending and risk-taking using data consisting of Japan-listed banks from 2005 to 2013.  
Information on individual banks and their shareholders was extracted from the Bankscope and 
Datastream databases. In the Bankscope database, both consolidated and unconsolidated 
financial account data are available. The consolidated data was used to study lending and risk-
taking behaviours by banks. 
Levels of institutional ownership were extracted from the Bankscope database, in which types 
of shareholders were filtered. Nine categories of shareholders were selected from the 
Bankscope database: (i) banks, (ii) financial companies, (iii) foundations/research institutes, (iv) 
industrial companies, (v) insurance companies, (vi) mutual and pension 
funds/nominees/trusts/trustees, (vii) private equity firms, (viii) publicly listed companies, and 
(xi) public authorities, states, governments. 
These nine types of shareholders were then categorised into six groups: (i) foreign financial 
institutions (FFI), (ii) foreign non-financial companies (FNFC), (iii) foreign governmental 
institutions (FGov), (iv) domestic financial institutions (DFI), (v) domestic non-financial 
companies (DNFC), and (vi) domestic governmental institutions (DGov). 
The original sample data consists of 662 bank-year observations between 2005 and 2013 
containing 73 Japan-listed banks. The sample banks are listed on their domestic stock 
exchanges, which fulfilled the listed bank requirements such as corporate governance 
requirements, disclosure requirements. These listed-bank corporate governance requirements 
include the need to appoint outsiders to boards, to adopt specific board structures and the 
need to fulfil the regulatory capital and disclosure requirements. The data is an unbalanced 
panel.  
5.4.2 Variable Descriptions 
This chapter attempts to examine the effects of different types of institutional shareholders on 
bank lending and risk-taking at Japan-listed banks from 2005 to 2013. 
The following sub-sections briefly present the definitions of dependent and control variables, 
which are discussed in sections 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.3 of chapter four in detail. Additionally, 
section 5.4.2.2 discusses the definitions of independent variables in detail. 
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5.4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
There are four dependent variables. Banking lending ratios (LoanDeps) and the insolvency risk 
levels (z-score) are used in Model 5.1 and Model 5.2, which assess the effects of various 
institutional share ownerships. The levels of interest incomes (IntInc) and impaired loans 
(ImpLoanR) are used as alternative measures of LoanDeps and the z-score in robustness tests, 
respectively. 
5.4.2.1.1 Bank Lending Ratios (LoanDeps) 
Bank lending ratios are the ratios of loans to total deposits, money market and short-term 
funding (LoanDeps), which the data is extracted from using the Bankscope database. The ratios 
of loans to total assets also show the composition of the asset portfolios of banks (Novickytė 
and Petraitytė, 2014), which consist of loans and investment securities. 
5.4.2.1.2 Insolvency Risk Levels (z-score) 
The level of bank risk-taking is a measure of a bank being insolvent (z-score), in which the 
lower value of the z-score indicates a higher probability of insolvency risks at a bank (Hannan 
and Hanweck, 1988; Roy, 1952). 
It is often used in a number of empirical studies to examine the relationships between the 
financial stabilities of countries and their banking sectors (De Nicolo, 2000; Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Yeyati and Micco, 2007). The z-score is defined as  
𝑧 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
∑ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
where the car is a ratio of a bank’s total equity to its total assets, and 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 are the mean 
and standard deviations of the return on assets (ROA) of bank i at time t, respectively. ROA is 
defined as the ratio of net income (loss) to total assets. The z-score is a measure of the falling 
profits which offset equity, and the natural logarithm of the z-score is normally distributed.  
5.4.2.1.3 Other Dependent Variables: (i) levels of interest incomes (IntInc) and (ii) levels 
of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) 
IntInc and ImpLoanR are used in the robustness tests. The levels of interest incomes (IntInc) 
are the percentages of interest incomes over gross loans. The gross loans include net loans 
minus the reserves for impaired loans/non-performing loans. The levels of impaired loans 
(ImpLoanR) are the percentages of impaired loans over gross loans.  
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5.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
Six groups of shareholders are considered: (i) foreign financial institutions (FFI), (ii) foreign 
non-financial companies (FNFC), (iii) foreign governmental institutions (FGov), (iv) domestic 
financial institutions (DFI), (v) domestic non-financial companies (DNFC), and (vi) domestic 
governmental institutions (DGov). The Bankscope shareholder types are categorised according 
to Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Shareholder categorisation. FI represents financial institutions. NFC represents non-financial companies. 
Gov represents governmental authorities. The ownership levels are aggregated according to the following: 
Shareholder - Type (Bankscope) Type of Shareholders 
Bank FI 
Financial company FI 
Foundation/Research Institute NFC 
Venture capital FI 
Hedge funds FI 
Industrial company NFC 
Insurance company FI 
Mutual & Pension Fund/Nominee/Trust/Trustee FI 
Private Equity firms FI 
Public (publicly listed companies) NFC 
Public authority, State, Government Gov 
 
5.4.2.3 Control Variables 
Control variables are used to isolate any potential influences on the regression results. A set of 
control variables is used to control for bank-specific, and year-specific effects. 
Three variables – Post2008, TCapR and Disc – are used in Model 5.1 - Model 5.2 to control for 
year-specific effects and bank-specific characteristics as a result of minimising the size effects 
and the economic (macroeconomic and microeconomic) effects on bank lending ratios and 
insolvency risk levels. 
Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, and 0 equals 2005-
2007. Post2008 is used as a year dummy to capture the influences of the 2008 financial crisis 
and control for year-specific effects. 
TCapR is the total regulatory capital ratio. It is used to measure capital regulatory stringency in 
literature (Barth et al., 2004), because banks are required to hold a minimum level of capital 
against their asset risks, i.e. a bank is required to hold a greater level of capital to act as a 
buffer against a higher level of risk-taking. Therefore, TCapR controls for bank-specific effects. 
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Disc measures the level of bank financial disclosure which is constructed using 18 categories20 
of core disclosures that are published in the annual reports of the banks (Nier and Baumann, 
2006). The level of accounting information is voluntarily disclosed according to director 
expertise and board characteristics (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), which improves board 
monitoring. 
5.4.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the statistics for the variables used in the empirical analyses. 
The mean of the lending ratios (LoanDeps) of Japan-listed banks is 0.71, while the mean of the 
insolvency risk levels (z-score) is 125.25. On average, the interest incomes over gross loans are 
1.95 percent, and impaired loans over gross loans are 3.67 percent.  
In terms of ownership structures, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 show that the majority of 
shareholders of Japan-listed banks are domestic financial institutions (DFI), and foreign 
financial institutions (FFI). The mean of DFI is 14.14 percent and its maximum is 100 percent. 
The mean of FFI is 4.76 percent and its maximum is 75.48 percent21. Only a small percentage 
of banking shares are owned by domestic non-financial companies (DNFC). Figure 5.3 shows 
that FFI increased from 2.16 percent to 6.09 percent in the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis. Although it was only a small increase, it may indicate that foreign financial institutions 
have become one of the important shareholders in monitoring Japan-listed banks. The 
ownership structures of banks between 2005 and 2013 are similar to those between 1985 and 
1996 (Anderson and Campbell II, 2004), which show that (i) the majority shareholders of banks 
are domestic financial institutions; and (ii) there has been an increase in foreign ownership of 
Japan-listed banks. Additionally, Figure 5.2 shows that the ownership of domestic non-
financial institutions (DNFC) decreased from 1.04 percent to 0.77 percent from 2005 to 2013.  
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 5.3. In terms of lending ratios (LoanDeps), six 
variables – DGov, DNFC, FGov, Post2008, TCapR, and the z-score – are negatively correlated 
with LoanDeps at a 10 percent significance level; and five variables – DFI, Disc, FFI, FNFC, and 
IntInc – are positively correlated with LoanDeps at a 10 percent significance level. In terms of 
                                                          
20 Disc is constructed using 18 categories of information on bank balance sheets (Nier and Baumann, 
2006), which includes (i) loans by maturity, (ii) loans by type, (iii) loans by counterparty, (iv) problem 
loans, (v) problem loans by type, (vi) securities by type (detailed breakdown), (vii) securities by type 
(coarse breakdown), (viii) securities by holding purpose, (ix) deposits by maturity, (x) deposits by type of 
customer, (xi) money market funding, (xii) long-term funding, (xiii) reserves, (xiv) capital, (xv) contingent 
liabilities, (xvi) off-balance sheet items, (xvii) non-interest incomes, and (xviii) loan loss provisions. The 
breakdowns of the 18 categories are listed in Appendix Table A.2.  
21 Among Japan-listed banks, Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank are composed of the highest foreign 
shareholders. These banks were formerly specialty banks created for the purpose of providing long-term 
credit to Japanese companies. The majority of their shares were sold to foreign investors as part of the 
rescue plans during the late 1990s Japanese financial crisis (Tett, 2003). 
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risk-taking levels (z-score), four variables – FFI, ImpLoanR, IntInc, and LoanDeps – are 
negatively correlated with the z-score at a 10 percent significance level; and three variables – 
DNFC, FGov, and TCapR – are positively correlated with the z-score at a 10 percent significance 
level. 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics: variables used. 
The sample consists of 662 bank-year observations between 2005 and 2013. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. of Obs. 
DFI 14.14 14.82 0 100.00 662 
DGov 0.05 0.51 0 6.21 662 
Disc 0.53 0.04 0.40 0.70 655 
DNFC 0.86 2.12 0 14.23 662 
FFI 4.76 9.10 0 75.48 662 
FGov 0.28 0.38 0 2.83 662 
FNFC 0.37 2.23 0 40.40 662 
ImpLoanR 3.67 1.32 0.84 10.83 653 
IntInc 1.95 0.41 1.15 4.56 655 
LoanDeps 0.71 0.08 0.49 1.07 655 
Post2008 0.66 0.47 0 1 662 
TCapR 11.55 1.96 5.71 19.48 655 
z-score 125.25 173.49 -0.85 1948.99 649 
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Table 5.3 Pairwise correlation coefficients. 
* indicates that the pairwise correlation coefficient is statistically significant at a 10 percent level. 
  DFI DGov Disc DNFC FFI FGov FNFC ImpLoanR IntInc LoanDeps Post2008 TCapR z-score 
DFI 1                         
DGov -0.0355 1                       
Disc 0.0655* -0.0239 1                     
DNFC 0.1136* -0.0101 -0.0466 1                   
FFI 0.0694* 0.1058* 0.0512 -0.0715* 1                 
FGov 0.0224 0 0.0201 0.0212 0.3020* 1               
FNFC 0.0564 -0.0154 0.1165* -0.0361 0.1954* 0.1278* 1             
ImpLoanR -0.1633* -0.0358 0.0422 -0.0816* -0.1141* -0.2961* 0.0457 1           
IntInc -0.0946* -0.0893* 0.0624 -0.1166* 0.1692* -0.1549* 0.2123* 0.3467* 1         
LoanDeps 0.1447* -0.1951* 0.0719* -0.1433* 0.1048* -0.0868* 0.1171* 0.0034 0.3369* 1       
Post2008 0.0247 0.0461 -0.1225* -0.0027 0.2215* 0.4589* 0.0256 -0.3056* -0.3098* -0.0967* 1     
TCapR 0.0836* 0.0791* -0.0447 0.1471* 0.3186* 0.3539* 0.0416 -0.3407* -0.3821* -0.3226* 0.2144* 1   
z-score 0.0086 -0.0273 0.0439 0.0743* -0.0871* 0.0846* -0.0405 -0.1445* -0.2711* -0.1047* -0.0257 0.2465* 1 
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Figure 5.2 The distribution of the ownership structures of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
FGov represents foreign governmental institutions. FNFC represents foreign non-financial companies. FFI represents 
foreign financial institutions. DFI represents domestic financial institutions. DNFC represents domestic non-financial 
companies. FGov represents domestic governmental institutions. 
 
Figure 5.3 The ownership structures of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
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5.5 Methodology 
This chapter assesses the effects of different types of institutional shareholders on bank 
lending and risk-taking at Japan-listed banks from 2005 to 2013. 
It argues that different types of institutional shareholders, whose investment objectives differ, 
affect the levels of lending and insolvency risks of their investee banks.  
In order to address problems of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity in the models, the 
fixed-effects (FE), random-effects (RE) and the system generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Arellano Bond estimations are used. The latter method is run using two-step estimators with 
an option that the estimated variance–covariance matrix is robust to heteroskedasticity in case 
of any misspecification causing weak instruments and large sample biases (Windmeijer, 2005). 
The regressions results shown in Table 5.5 are only considered if they satisfy the Sargan and 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation (AR) tests. 
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5.6 Results 
The results shown in the regressions (1) – (2) of Table 5.4 are consistent with Hypothesis 5.1, 
but are not consistent with Hypothesis 5.2, Hypothesis 5.3, Hypothesis 5.4 and Hypothesis 5.5. 
The key finding from the regressions in Table 5.4 is that the levels of foreign financial 
institution share ownerships (FFI) are positively associated with risk-taking at Japan-listed 
banks. 
In terms of the model specification test, the Hausman test is used to determine the 
consistencies and efficiencies of the fixed-effects (FE) estimators. The results of the Hausman 
tests shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5.4, and columns (1) – (3) of Table 5.6 indicate that 
random-effects (RE) estimations are preferred.  
To test for the model specification of system generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano 
Bond estimations, Sargan and Arellano Bond autocorrelation (AR) tests are used. The results of 
Table 5.5 satisfy the null hypotheses of the Sargan and Arellano Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests, 
except for columns (3) and (4) of Table 5.5 in which the p-values of the Arellano Bond AR(1) 
tests are only significant at 10 percent levels. The results in regressions (1) and (2) of Table 5.7 
accept the null hypothesis at 5 percent levels, indicating that the instruments used in the 
regressions are weak, and the problems cannot be corrected using additional moment 
conditions (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Overall, the test results of the 
Sargan and Arellano Bond AR tests suggest that the specifications of Model 5.1 and Model 5.2 
are reliable. 
Robustness tests are presented in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6. Table 5.4 summarise the results of 
the system GMM Arellano Bond estimations. Table 5.6 summarises the results of the fixed-
effects (FE) estimations using alternative dependent variables, levels of interest incomes 
(IntInc) and impaired loans (ImpLoans). 
However, the results show that the models are poorly explained, in which neither R2 (overall), 
R2 (between) or R2 (within) is more than 0.33. The findings additionally provide four key 
messages on the relationships between ownership structures and banking activities (lending 
and risk-taking). 
First, the results shown in Table 5.4 are consistent with Hypothesis 5.1 that there is a positive 
relationship between the domestic financial institutional shareholders (DFI) and the lending 
ratios of their investee banks (LoanDeps), and a negative relationship between the foreign 
financial institutional shareholders (FFI) and the lending ratios of their investee banks 
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(LoanDeps). But the results are statistically and economically insignificant, indicating that 
neither investor affects bank lending behaviours.  
Second, the results shown in Table 5.4 are inconsistent with Hypothesis 5.2. The results in 
Table 5.4 show (i) a negative and statistically significant relationship between the levels of 
foreign financial institutional ownerships (FFI) and the z-score, and (ii) a negative relationship 
between domestic financial institutional ownerships (DFI) and the z-score, but it is statistically 
insignificant.  
The relationship between FFI and the z-score is robust using the GMM estimations shown in 
column (4) of Table 5.5. However, the results (the relationship between FFI and ImpLoanR) 
using alternative variables are not robust in column (4) of Table 5.6 and column (4) of 
Table 5.7. They are statistically and economically significant. The findings offer two potential 
explanations: (i) foreign investors may suffer from information asymmetry (Choe et al., 2004; 
Gehrig, 1993), and they are unable to monitor Japanese banks; (ii) FFI may offer professional 
advice and encourage their investee banks to engage in non-lending investments for greater 
returns (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Additionally, foreign financial institutions may be profit-
oriented and their investment objectives may be short-term.  
Third, the results shown in Table 5.4 indicate that a positive relationship exists between the 
levels of governmental institutional ownerships (DGov) and insolvency risks (i.e. DGov is 
negatively related to the z-score), and it is statistically significant at a 1 percent level. But the 
result is not robust against GMM regressions and regressions using an alternative variable 
(ImpLoanR).  
Nevertheless, the result indicates that governmental institutional shareholders are likely to 
worsen bank governance, which is consistent with previous empirical studies suggesting that 
social objectives or political goals dampen effective bank governance; and governmental 
institutional ownerships create conflicts of interest as a result of a lack of independence and 
from political goals creating moral hazards (Grossman, 2013; Hoshi, 2002; Levine, 2003; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1997). One possible explanation is that the governmental 
institutional ownerships reduce information asymmetries between bank regulators and banks, 
which enhance more efficient protective structures within the domestic banking industry and 
assist banks in addressing their nonperforming loans problems. For example, state 
shareholders would then obtain more precise risk-related information from their investee 
banks, which in turn coordinate with their regulators to provide these banks with regulatory 
forbearance to not fully revalue their nonperforming loans avoiding any potential realised 
credit losses. It is debatable whether governmental institutional ownerships will improve 
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monitoring at banks, because governmental institutional ownerships may hinder competition 
among banks and lower the effectiveness of market for corporate control. 
Fourth, the results in Table 5.4 are inconsistent with Hypothesis 5.4. But they suggest that 
domestic financial institutions and (domestic and foreign) non-financial institutional 
shareholders may be unable to monitor risk-taking at banks sufficiently, i.e. neither of these 
coefficients ae statistically significant. 
Overall, the results show that shareholders either have negative or no effects on risk-taking on 
Japan-listed banks, indicating that shareholder monitoring may be ineffective in lowering risk-
taking levels at Japan-listed banks. 
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Table 5.4 The summary of the results of the fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) estimations examine the 
effects of foreign and domestic institutional ownerships on the levels of bank lending ratios (LoanDeps) and 
insolvency risks (z-score). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. FFI is the level of foreign financial institutional 
ownerships. FNFC is the level of foreign non-financial institutional ownerships. FGov is the level of foreign 
governmental ownerships. DFI is the level of domestic financial institutional ownerships. DNFC is the level of 
domestic non-financial institutional ownerships. DGov is the level of domestic governmental ownerships. TCapR and 
Disc control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The Hausman test is used to test for the consistency and efficiency of the FE 
estimations. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is used to test for whether the variance of the 
unobserved fixed effects is zero. 
The results of columns (5) and (6) using RE estimations correspond with those of columns (3) and (4) using FE 
estimations, respectively. 
Estimation FE FE FE FE RE RE 
Dependent Variable LoanDeps LoanDeps z-score z-score z-score z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.776*** 0.765*** -344.6* -316.0 -251.4 -266.6 
 (20.52) (19.65) (-2.31) (-1.94) (-1.76) (-1.74) 
L.DFI 0.000158  0.257  -0.0844  
 (0.68)  (0.46)  (-0.19)  
L.DNFC -0.000649  0.0144  2.427  
 (-0.61)  (0.00)  (0.80)  
L.DGov -0.00605***  2.712  -9.234***  
 (-10.04)  (1.59)  (-3.34)   
L.FFI  -0.000167  -2.721  -3.490*** 
  (-0.21)  (-1.47)  (-4.13) 
L.FNFC  0.00270*  -0.626  -1.803 
  (2.09)  (-0.25)  (-0.86) 
L.FGov  -0.0105  18.47  25.95 
  (-1.18)  (0.51)  (0.72) 
L.Post2008 -0.0299*** -0.0272*** 9.449 14.09 13.96 17.32 
 (-5.27) (-4.71) (0.64) (0.93) (0.92) (1.06) 
L.TCapR -0.00226 -0.00101 30.77*** 31.87*** 25.71*** 28.55*** 
 (-1.19) (-0.43) (3.72) (3.73) (3.82) (4.50) 
L.Disc -0.0451 -0.0482 203.8 143.7 138.3 121.7 
 (-0.81) (-0.89) (0.81) (0.51) (0.63) (0.52) 
No. of obs. 581 581 578 578 578 578 
R2 0.208 0.234 0.046 0.052   
Adj. R2 0.200 0.226 0.036 0.042   
R2 (within) 0.208 0.234 0.0464 0.0520 0.0445 0.0512 
R2 (between) 0.157 0.0212 0.121 0.196 0.139 0.212 
R2 (overall) 0.0964 0.0557 0.0724 0.102 0.0776 0.106 
Hausman test: p-value 0.025 0.000 0.757 0.983   
LM test: p-value     0.00 0.00 
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Table 5.5 The summary of the results of the system generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond 
estimations which examine the effects of foreign and domestic institutional ownerships on the levels of bank 
lending ratios (LoanDeps) and insolvency risks (z-score). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. FFI is the level of foreign financial institutional 
ownerships. FNFC is the level of foreign non-financial institutional ownerships. FGov is the level of foreign 
governmental ownerships. DFI is the level of domestic financial institutional ownerships. DNFC is the level of 
domestic non-financial institutional ownerships. DGov is the level of domestic governmental ownerships. TCapR and 
Disc control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The instruments are the first-differenced and the levels equations. The first-
differenced equations are the lagged observations of the explanatory variables. The number of lags used varies 
slightly across the estimations. The levels of equations include TCapR.  
The Arellano Bond test is used to determine for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors in which the null 
hypothesis indicates no autocorrelation. The number of lags used varies slightly across the estimations. The 
estimations passed the Sargan and the Arellano Bond (AR) tests for the validity of instruments. 
 
Dependent Variable LoanDeps LoanDeps z-score z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.DFI 0.000184  -0.207  
 (1.19)  (-0.20)  
L.DNFC -0.000547  0.339  
 (-0.54)  (0.08)  
L.DGov 0.00410  1.491  
 (0.93)  (0.10)  
L.FFI  -0.000361  -4.529* 
  (-0.50)  (-2.00) 
L.FNFC  -0.000898  -3.709 
  (-0.80)  (-1.06) 
L.FGov  0.00660  76.28 
  (0.88)  (1.11) 
L.Post2008 -0.0251*** -0.0244*** 11.65 9.534 
 (-9.32) (-4.62) (0.79) (0.39) 
L.TCapR 0.00534** 0.00561** 11.05 17.98 
 (2.92) (2.80) (1.47) (1.84) 
L.Disc 0.0552* 0.0410 -512.0 -507.6 
 (2.37) (1.10) (-1.50) (-1.37) 
L.LoanDeps 0.873*** 0.900***   
 (35.33) (26.76)   
L.z-score   0.561*** 0.515*** 
   (5.26) (4.94) 
TCapR 0.000438 -0.000451 17.88 12.25 
 (0.21) (-0.17) (1.34) (0.87) 
No. of obs. 581 581 575 575 
No. of instruments 56 56 62 62 
Sargan test 45.36 43.97 65.15 66.99 
Sargan test: p-value 0.582 0.639 0.142 0.110 
Arellano Bond AR(1) test -4.092 -3.871 -2.467 -2.562 
AR(1) test: p-value 0 0 0.0136 0.0104 
Arellano Bond AR(2) test -0.847 -0.846 -0.838 -0.880 
AR(2) test: p-value 0.397 0.397 0.402 0.379 
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Table 5.6 The summary of the results of the fixed-effects (FE) and the random-effects (RE) estimations which examine the effects of foreign and domestic institutional ownerships on levels of interest 
income (IntInc) and impaired loans (ImpLoanR). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. FFI is the level of foreign financial institutional ownerships. FNFC is the level of foreign non-financial institutional ownerships. FGov is 
the level of foreign governmental ownerships. DFI is the level of domestic financial institutional ownerships. DNFC is the level of domestic non-financial institutional ownerships. DGov is the level of 
domestic governmental ownerships. TCapR and Disc control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
The Hausman test is used to test for the consistency and efficiency of the FE estimations. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is used to test for whether the variance of the 
unobserved fixed effects is zero. The results of columns (5), (6) and (7) using RE estimations correspond with those of columns (1), (2) and (3) using FE estimations, respectively. 
Estimation FE FE FE FE RE RE RE 
Dependent Variable IntInc IntInc ImpLoanR ImpLoanR IntInc IntInc ImpLoanR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 4.015*** 3.885*** 6.871*** 6.882*** 3.974*** 3.856*** 6.831*** 
 (20.49) (18.36) (6.92) (6.39) (20.88) (18.70) (8.63) 
L.DFI 0.000663  -0.00630  0.000494  -0.00661 
 (1.05)  (-1.30)  (0.82)  (-1.60) 
L.DNFC -0.00793  -0.00869  -0.00818  -0.00739 
 (-1.42)  (-0.36)  (-1.46)  (-0.35) 
L.DGov -0.0210***  -0.00358  -0.0218***  -0.0100 
 (-7.09)  (-0.14)  (-8.25)  (-0.62) 
L.FFI  0.00355*  -0.0211   0.00761***   
  (2.07)  (-1.87)   (4.02)   
L.FNFC  0.00735  0.0199   0.0136*   
  (1.02)  (0.72)   (2.36)   
L.FGov  -0.116**  0.168   -0.0969*   
  (-2.81)  (0.78)   (-2.02)   
L.Post2008 -0.323*** -0.304*** -0.364 -0.361 -0.325*** -0.327*** -0.376* 
 (-12.58) (-9.63) (-1.88) (-1.90) (-13.13) (-12.77) (-2.16) 
L.TCapR -0.0834*** -0.0791** -0.226 -0.207 -0.0802*** -0.0789*** -0.210* 
 (-3.99) (-3.35) (-1.83) (-1.86) (-4.20) (-3.55) (-2.20) 
L.Disc -1.730*** -1.580*** -0.755 -1.295 -1.714*** -1.552*** -1.012 
 (-6.47) (-5.73) (-0.65) (-1.50) (-6.08) (-5.16) (-0.89) 
(Table continues overleaf) 
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Table 5.6 (table continues from the previous page) 
Estimation FE FE FE FE RE RE RE 
Dependent Variable IntInc IntInc ImpLoanR ImpLoanR IntInc IntInc ImpLoanR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
No. of obs. 581 581 579 579 581 581 579 
R2 0.641 0.652 0.188 0.204    
Adj. R2 0.637 0.648 0.179 0.196    
R2 (within) 0.641 0.652 0.188 0.204 0.641 0.648 0.187 
R2 (between) 0.0660 0.109 0.122 0.0591 0.0668 0.214 0.124 
R2 (overall) 0.283 0.327 0.150 0.111 0.285 0.393 0.152 
Hausman test: p-value 0.236 0.173 0.931 0.000    
LM test: p-value     0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5.7 The summary of the results of the system generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond 
estimations which examine the effects of foreign and domestic institutional ownerships on levels of interest income 
(IntInc) and impaired loans (ImpLoanR). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. FFI is the level of foreign financial institutional 
ownerships. FNFC is the level of foreign non-financial institutional ownerships. FGov is the level of foreign 
governmental ownerships. DFI is the level of domestic financial institutional ownerships. DNFC is the level of 
domestic non-financial institutional ownerships. DGov is the level of domestic governmental ownerships. TCapR and 
Disc control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The instruments are the first-differenced and the levels equations. The first-
differenced equations are the lagged observations of the explanatory variables. The number of lags used varies 
slightly across the estimations. The levels of equations include TCapR. All instruments pass the Sargan test for the 
validity of instruments. 
 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Dependent Variable IntInc IntInc ImpLoanR ImpLoanR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.DFI -0.000750  0.00490  
 (-0.98)  (1.38)  
L.DNFC -0.00486  -0.0157  
 (-1.26)  (-0.81)  
L.DGov -0.00202  0.00273  
 (-0.29)  (0.02)  
L.FFI  0.00263  0.00969 
  (1.73)  (1.65) 
L.FNFC  0.00642  0.0692*** 
  (1.18)  (3.44) 
L.FGov  -0.0990  -0.226 
  (-1.73)  (-0.91) 
L.Post2008 -0.179*** -0.173*** 0.109 0.139 
 (-8.40) (-12.55) (0.79) (0.64) 
L.TCapR 0.00325 0.0000645 0.0259 0.000469 
 (0.31) (0.01) (0.72) (0.01) 
L.Disc 0.179 0.274 0.527 0.486 
 (0.73) (0.99) (0.49) (0.70) 
L.IntInc 0.953*** 0.904***   
 (16.43) (14.16)   
L.ImpLoanR   0.853*** 0.851*** 
   (9.32) (7.94) 
TCapR 0.00186 0.00791 -0.0319 -0.00573 
 (0.08) (0.33) (-0.40) (-0.06) 
No. of obs. 581 581 578 578 
No. of instruments 56 56 62 62 
Sargan test 72.56 72.44 63.12 62.00 
Sargan test: p-value 0.0126 0.0129 0.185 0.212 
Arellano Bond AR(1) test -2.677 -2.604 -3.775 -3.907 
AR(1) test: p-value 0.00743 0.00922 0.00016 0.00009 
Arellano Bond AR(2) test 0.817 0.453 -1.201 -1.128 
AR(2) test: p-value 0.414 0.651 0.230 0.259 
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5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter conducts the first empirical assessments of the theories of ownership structures, 
and their effects on lending and risk-taking at Japan-listed banks. There are three important 
empirical findings that are listed below. 
First, greater levels of foreign financial institutional shareholders tend to increase levels of risk-
taking at banks, indicating that foreign-owned banks tend to encourage their investee banks to 
engage in riskier projects. This shows that foreign financial institutional shareholders weaken 
risk monitoring at banks. 
Second, the empirical findings highlight that increased state ownership may weaken bank 
governance. The findings are consistent with the views that state ownerships create conflicts 
of interest, because states play important roles in setting up financial regulatory policies and in 
monitoring their banking industries. 
Third, shareholder monitoring may be ineffective in monitoring risk-taking at banks. One of the 
possible explanations is the inefficient market for corporate control in Japan, i.e. making it 
challenging to discipline company managements.  
From a policy perspective, regulators22 may consider imposing restrictions on the control rights 
of foreign institutional shareholders, which are likely to promote risk-taking at banks. 
Regulators should encourage shareholder engagements and promote bank governance. 
                                                          
22 The current Japanese regulations do not have any specific regulations restricting foreign investors 
from acquiring shares of Japanese companies/banks. But, in the case of designated sectors, Japan’s 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act requires foreign investors to seek prior approval from the 
Ministry of Finance and the ministry that regulates the specific industry if they want to acquire more 
than 10 percent of shares of any Japanese companies in listed designated sectors (including agriculture, 
aerospace, forestry, petroleum, electric/gas/water utilities, telecommunications, and leather 
manufacturing) (U.S. Department of State, 2015). 
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Chapter 6 The Substitution/Complementary Effects between 
Internal and External Monitoring 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the substitution or complementary effects between internal and external 
monitoring. 
Internal monitoring is performed by internal directors and external directors in which the 
quality and sufficiency of monitoring may be affected by the ratios of external directors to the 
boards (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Minton et al., 2010), the director incentive levels (Grove et 
al., 2011), levels of expertise (Booth and Deli, 1999; Van Ness et al., 2010), and board dynamics 
affected by board homogeneity (Berger et al., 2014; Mahadeo et al., 2012). 
External monitoring is often performed by shareholders and regulatory authorities, although 
their monitoring objectives may differ. The objectives of shareholders are to maximise wealth 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), and to prevent managers from exploiting company resources 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The objectives of regulatory authorities are to prevent banks 
from excessive risk-taking, to protect investors and depositors from bank insolvencies, and to 
maintain financial stability (Barth et al., 2004). 
Previous studies suggest that external monitoring may be substituted for weak internal 
governance (Weisbach, 1988; Williamson, 1983), or that external monitoring can complement 
strong internal governance (Fung and Tsai, 2012; Kim et al., 2007). 
Japanese banks operate under the convoy system described in Section 5.2.6.2 of chapter five 
(Aoki and Patrick, 1994). It is designed to protect/prevent banks from competition and to 
rescue failing banks (Nishiguchi, 2011; Yafeh, 2000).  
Scholars argue that the convoy system has weakened Japanese bank governance (Grossman, 
2013) because the system continues to support banks which are supposedly insolvent. Yet 
Japanese regulators have implemented various measures – such as the Basel Accords, and 
deposit insurance schemes – to improve bank governance and protect depositors. Moreover, 
as a result of foreign investor pressures, some banks have started to implement corporate 
governance mechanisms that are similar to the Anglo-American model, and are increasing 
their board independence by introducing external directors and board committees. 
Additionally, Japanese banks are monitored by their cross-shareholders (Dore, 2000), which is 
considered to be an insider-system (i.e. dominance of internal controls). Scholars argue that 
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cross-shareholding or keiretsu groups lower the disciplinary effects of other outside 
shareholders (who do not belong to the keiretsu groups or have any cross-shareholding 
relationships). Instead of focusing on shareholder wealth maximisation, cross-shareholders 
tend to focus on the long-term performances of their banks because of their business 
affiliations. (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Randall et al., 2000; Yafeh and Yosha, 2003). 
In this chapter, empirical analyses are designed to examine the substitution and 
complementary effects between the internal controls and the external monitoring 
mechanisms of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. The internal control mechanisms 
include board monitoring mechanisms, board bonding mechanisms, board expertise 
homogeneity, and board age diversity. The external monitoring mechanisms include (i) 
regulatory monitoring, and (ii) the monitoring of institutional shareholders (including those of 
domestic financial institutional shareholders). 
The motivation for this research is based on the views of Rediker and Seth (1995), who argue 
that various corporate governance mechanisms do not work independently, and that 
corporate governance mechanisms work concurrently in a bundle to reduce agency costs. 
Similar to this argument, Williamson (1983) proposes the substitution hypothesis which 
suggests that strong internal governance compensates for weak external governance, and vice 
versa. For example, organisations such as universities may require strong internal controls to 
compensate for the absence of the market for corporate control. While the market for 
corporate control is strong, shareholder monitoring may substitute (or complement) for weak 
(or strong) internal controls, because shareholders may protest against weak internal controls, 
and call for a change or review of management decisions, or demand that certain executives 
be dismissed. 
Although the substitution/complementary effects of corporate governance mechanisms have 
been widely studied by scholars, a few have studied the context of Japanese banks which are 
internally governed (Dore, 2000), are operating under a (softened) convoy system (Nishiguchi, 
2011) and where the banking industry is heavily influenced by its regulators (Grossman, 2013). 
Mixed results are found when examining the substitution hypothesis between (i) board and 
shareholder monitoring, and (ii) board and regulatory monitoring. The majority of studies 
examine US companies and often find that there are substitute effects between board and 
shareholder monitoring. This is likely due to the institutional frameworks and board 
composition which companies are operating in. Studying US companies, Gillan et al. (2003) 
find that weak internal controls are associated with shareholder-friendly boards, and 
substitute effects are found between board and shareholder monitoring. Similar results are 
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also found in Brickley and James (1987). However, the substitute hypothesis may not be 
supported if internal controls prevail in companies. For example, Weisbach (1988) finds no 
relationship between poor company performance and CEO turnover in US companies with 
insider-dominated boards. Studying Spanish banks, Fernández and Arrondo (2005) find that 
the market for corporate control mechanism is substituted by top three shareholder 
monitoring and a joint monitoring mechanism amongst internal directors, and there are no 
substitute effects between internal and shareholder monitoring when internal controls prevail. 
Yet no previous research assesses the theoretical implications in Japan where the banking 
industry operates under the convoy, the keiretsu, and the cross-shareholding systems. The 
empirical assessments of this chapter are underpinned by three theoretical keystones of 
corporate governance and the substitute hypothesis.  
First, a theoretical argument suggests that a substitute hypothesis prevails when companies 
operate under weak regulatory environments (Williamson, 1983), and that external directors 
and shareholders act as substitute devices in monitoring management in order to safeguard 
the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Second, insider-dominated boards weaken board monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but 
joint monitoring by internal directors may replace external directors as monitors (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). As a result, the internal controls prevail, and external (regulatory and 
shareholder) monitoring will be complementary. 
Third, the convoy system weakens joint monitoring amongst internal directors (Aoki, 1994b), 
because, in the event of an insolvency, they are expected to receive support from the Japanese 
government (Moody’s, 2013). Therefore, internal directors may not optimise their monitoring, 
because there is no potential loss of employment. 
To assess the predictions empirically, a database was compiled and consists of 662 bank-year 
observations of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. Due to the nature of endogeneity 
in corporate governance, a two-step model is used. In the first stage of the analysis, in order to 
reduce the dimensionality of a variable set, three internal corporate governance (CG) indices 
are created to capture eight internal CG mechanisms using principal component analysis. In 
the second stage of the analysis, the fixed-effects (FE), the random-effects (RE) and the system 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations are used. Due to the presence of 
endogeneity and heterogeneity, the FE, the RE and the GMM estimations are used to 
investigate the substitution/complementary effects of the internal CG indices on external 
governance, such as regulatory and shareholder monitoring. 
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The key findings are as follows. First, regulatory and internal directors are complementary 
monitoring mechanisms. Second, regulatory and external directors are complementary 
monitoring mechanisms. Third, internal director share ownerships and financial institutional 
shareholders act as substitute devices in monitoring banks, indicating that internal director 
share ownerships incentivise internal directors to align the interests of bank managers and 
shareholders, and potentially lower the costs of shareholding monitoring.  
This chapter concludes that internal controls prevail in the governance of Japanese banks, and 
that complementary regulatory monitoring remains weak. The convoy system is arguably 
embedded in the Japanese bank governance framework. The Japanese government has 
introduced various policies to prevent banks from failing, and these policies include 
encouraging mergers among regional banks (Nakamoto, 2006), and to urge city banks to seek 
investments abroad (MacDougall, 2013; Narayanan, 2017). In addition, the complementary 
effects of regulatory and institutional shareholder monitoring may highlight that additional 
governance mechanisms are required to ensure the stability of the Japanese banking industry. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 reviews literature on the effects of substitute 
and complementary monitoring devices, and the mechanisms hindering 
substituted/complementary effects in Japan.  Section 6.3 presents the conceptual framework 
and its associated hypotheses. Section 6.4.1 summarises the data samples. Section 6.4.2 
provides descriptions on the variables used in the empirical analyses. Section 6.4.3 provides 
summary statistics. Section 6.5 describes the methodology used in these empirical 
assessments. Section 6.6 discusses the results. Section 6.7 contains the conclusions. 
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6.2 Literature Review 
6.2.1 Substitution and Complementary Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The monitoring role is a key component in corporate governance. It may be performed 
internally and/or externally. The internal monitoring role is performed by internal directors 
(Rediker and Seth, 1995), and/or by external directors. Internal directors jointly oversee the 
business, and jointly monitor each other (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). External directors are 
hired to monitor company managements on behalf of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). On the contrary, the external monitoring role is performed by investors, (concentrated) 
shareholders (Fama, 1980; La Porta et al., 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and regulators 
(Gillan et al., 2003).  
Scholars argue that effective internal and external monitoring mechanisms should be 
examined jointly (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Walsh and Seward, 1990), because the 
interrelationships between these two mechanisms are contingent on their acting together 
(Walsh and Seward, 1990). For example, in the case of internal directors who are failing to 
monitor managers that are taking excessive risks, shareholders may protest and request that 
the existing management be replaced. These phenomena may be considered under the 
substitute hypothesis. 
According to the substitute hypothesis (Williamson, 1983), the internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms may substitute or complement each other, especially when one of 
these mechanisms weakens, because strong internal governance is compensated for in the 
absence of the market for corporate control, or a weak regulatory environment. For example, 
if regulatory monitoring is used as a substitute for the internal governance of banks, the 
increased regulatory monitoring should lead banks to loosen their internal monitoring. 
Therefore, the coefficients of regulatory monitoring and internal monitoring are negatively 
associated with each other in a regression model. On the contrary, if regulatory monitoring 
complements the internal governance of banks, the loosening of regulatory monitoring should 
not affect the internal monitoring of banks, i.e. the coefficients of regulatory monitoring and 
internal monitoring are positively associated with each other. 
In the case of the Japanese banking industry, the takeover market is weak as a result of cross-
shareholding and because of banking regulation restrictions on the market for corporate 
control (Kanaya and Woo, 2000; Prowse, 2014). Internal governance mechanisms and 
shareholder monitoring may act as complementary or substitute devices in monitoring bank 
management. 
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Strong boards may resist shareholder pressures. As a result, a substitute hypothesis is not 
applicable (Weisbach, 1988). For example, strong boards, such as insider-dominated boards, 
may have a greater resistance to external pressures, compared to outsider-dominated boards. 
Studying US companies between 1977 and 1980, Weisbach (1988) finds that poorly performing 
companies are less likely to experience CEO turnovers, if their boards are insider-dominated. 
This indicates that the substitute hypothesis may not be applicable to companies that are 
insider-dominated. On the contrary, Gillan et al. (2003) show that weak internal controls are 
associated with shareholder-friendly boards, indicating that shareholders and boards act as 
substitute devices in monitoring company managements23. 
Although internal controls may arguably be essential in corporate governance, highly regulated 
industries may require fewer internal controls or other forms of external controls (Becher and 
Frye, 2011; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), because the interests of shareholders and stakeholders 
are adequately protected by various regulations and legislations such as anti-competition laws, 
corporate laws, contract laws and labour laws (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). In comparing 
regulated and unregulated industries, when studying US companies between 1976 and 1980, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find lower concentrated ownership levels in companies operating in 
regulated industries such as financial or utility companies, compared to those operating in 
unregulated industries. This indicates that regulated industries arguably require less external 
shareholder monitoring, given that they are expected to be monitored by regulators. On the 
contrary, studying US companies (including banks and non-financial companies) in the years 
1993, 1996, and 1998, Becher and Frye (2011) find that internal (insider shareholding) and 
shareholder monitoring are substitute devices for monitoring the managements of banks, and 
show that deregulation lowers the internal monitoring of banks, because insider shareholding 
significantly decreases.  
Moreover, increased shareholder protection may complement internal monitoring, and lead to 
lower agency costs (La Porta et al., 2000), because increased shareholder protection enables 
minority shareholders to demand that their investee companies improve their monitoring 
mechanisms, such as board independence. In a study on the effects of minority shareholders 
on European non-financial companies in 2000, Kim et al. (2007) find a positive relationship 
between the levels of shareholder protection and board independence, indicating that 
minority shareholders are more adept at influencing their investee companies to increase 
                                                          
23Gillan et al. (2003) construct a board index to measure the degree of internal controls, which include: 
(i) board sizes, (ii) board independence, (iii) independence of audit, compensation, and nominating 
committees, and (iv) CEO duality. 
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board independence in countries with strong shareholder protection. Fung and Tsai (2012) 
who study US companies between 1997 and 2006 found similar results. 
Moreover, shareholder protection may be weak in the absence of the market for corporate 
control, because shareholders are less able to discipline the managements of their investee 
companies. Fernández and Arrondo (2005) examine Spanish companies between 1990 and 
1997, when Spain exhibited features of high ownership concentration with an undeveloped 
takeover market (La Porta et al., 1998). Fernández and Arrondo (2005) find that the market for 
corporate control mechanism is substituted by the top three shareholders’ monitoring and the 
joint monitoring mechanism amongst internal directors, indicating that internal controls are 
prevalent at Spanish companies. The authors suggest that shareholders and internal director 
monitoring are key governance mechanisms in the absence of the market for corporate 
control.  
In terms of the banking industry, the majority of empirical studies are consistent with the 
substitute hypothesis. Studying US banks between 1987-1989 and 1992-1994, Anderson and 
Fraser (2000) examine the relationships between managerial ownerships and risk-taking in 
which risk-taking is used as a proxy for measuring the effectiveness of board monitoring. This is 
because strong boards are likely to mitigate the kind of management exploitation that could 
lead to excessive risk-taking. The authors find managerial ownerships and risk-taking differing 
between two periods: (i) the relationship is positive during the period of 1987-1989 when 
banks were less constricted by regulations; and (ii) the relationship is negative during the 
period of 1992-1994 when bank regulations became stricter. These two findings are consistent 
with the substitute hypothesis, which suggests that regulatory monitoring substitutes for weak 
board monitoring. Moreover, in a study of US banks in 1982 when the US regulatory 
environment strengthened, Rediker and Seth (1995) find that internal monitoring is likely to be 
substituted by monitoring of the concentrated shareholders, when board independence (the 
ratio of external directors to the total number of board members) is low. 
In a comparative study of US banks in 1979, Brickley and James (1987) find that (i) there are 
lower levels of external directors in states with greater restrictions on the acquisitions of 
banks, compared to those with fewer restrictions; and (ii) when the takeover market is weak, 
concentrated ownerships and external directors complement each other in monitoring 
company managements; and (iii) concentrated ownerships are likely to act as a substitute for a 
takeover mechanism as a governance device. These results are similar to those found in the 
study of Fernández and Arrondo (2005) examining Spanish non-financial companies between 
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1990 and 1997. Their study indicates that the predictions of substitute hypothesis are similar 
between banks and non-financial companies.  
In summary, the majority of studies find substitute/complementary effects between 
shareholder and regulatory monitoring (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Fung and Tsai, 2012; Kim et 
al., 2007), or between shareholder and board monitoring (Becher and Frye, 2011; Brickley and 
James, 1987; Rediker and Seth, 1995). These external substitute/complemented devices are 
able to control agency conflicts within company managements, and improve governance. 
6.2.2 Regulatory Monitoring 
Other than internal corporate governance mechanisms and shareholder monitoring, banks are 
also monitored and disciplined by financial authorities, which also design banking and 
prudential regulations to prevent banks from excessive risk-taking. A number of banking and 
prudential regulations have been introduced to protect investors and depositors from bank 
insolvencies, and to maintain financial stability. These regulations include the introduction of 
governance requirements (FRC, 2012; Walker, 2009), deposit insurance schemes (Keeley, 
1990), and regulatory capital requirements (Levine, 2003). 
Regulatory capital requirements were introduced to protect depositors and ensure that banks 
maintain adequate levels of regulatory capital as reserves to act as buffers during periods of 
severe economic distress. Holding adequate levels of liquidity in the event of macroeconomic 
downturns is an attempt by regulators to prevent bank runs (BCBS, 2016b). The regulatory 
capital reserve is calculated against the on-balance sheet items, and consists of the minimum 
regulatory capital (Tier 1 core capital) and supplementary capital (Tier 2). Regulatory capital is 
often used as a proxy for measuring levels of regulatory monitoring because regulators are 
likely to increase the amount of capital required as regulatory pressure increases (Furfine, 
2001), and banks are likely to adjust their capital levels under regulatory pressure (Shrieves 
and Dahl, 1992). 
Regulatory capital reserves are calculated against risk-weighted assets, which require that 
banks hold higher percentages of their capital in reserve against loans, compared to those of 
government securities. By failing to hold the required regulatory capital reserves, banks may 
face statutory penalties such as the imposition of restrictions on certain types of banking 
activities (Furfine, 2001), which include ceasing or limiting their lending businesses, limits on 
new investments, limits on operational expenses, etc.  
Mixed results are found in examining the effectiveness of regulatory capital for minimising 
excessive risk-taking at banks. This is because off-balance sheet exposures and financial 
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innovations such as securitisation were not taken into account when calculating the amount of 
required regulatory capital prior to the 2008 financial crisis. Studying Canadian commercial 
banks between 1988 and 1998, Dionne and Harchaoui (2008) find that banks use securitisation 
and off-balance sheet activities as regulatory capital arbitrage, as these banks are likely to 
already have high levels of credit risks, and also high leverage ratios. Similar results are found 
in examining the relationships between securitisation and risk-taking at US and European 
banks (Acharya et al., 2013; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). 
Contrary to these views, scholars argue that regulatory capital effectively constrains risk-taking 
at banks, and increases bank efficiencies (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992). Studying US commercial 
banks between 1983 and 1987, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) find that a positive and statistically 
significant relationship exists between levels of regulatory capital and risk-taking, indicating 
that regulatory capital is effective in constraining risk-taking at banks in the absence of 
financial innovations. 
Despite the mixed results on the relationship between regulatory capital and risk-taking at 
banks, some scholars argue that mechanisms such as regulatory capital requirements may 
substitute or complement internal monitoring. In a simulation study, Furfine (2001) finds that, 
after the risk-based capital requirements increase, US banks switch from holding high risk 
assets (i.e. loans) to low risks assets (i.e. government securities), as well as indicating a 
preference for safer loans, suggesting that regulatory pressures encourage greater monitoring. 
Studying US commercial banks between 1983 and 1987, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) find that 
regulatory capital is effective in constraining risk-taking at banks, indicating that the increased 
levels of regulatory capital discourages bank managements from taking on additional asset 
risks, and acts to reduce agency costs. Similar results are found in Laeven and Levine (2009) 
whose study focused on 48 countries between 1996 and 2001. The authors suggest that capital 
stringency has direct effects on discouraging risk-taking, but also find that the effects of capital 
stringency may be limited, if majority shareholders encourage their banks to take greater risks 
to compensate for the loss of income as a result of the increased costs of regulatory capital.  
In summary, regulators may be unable to improve bank governance by imposing regulatory 
capital requirements, because shareholders may offset the effects of regulatory monitoring by 
directly influencing managers to invest in riskier projects for greater returns. 
6.2.3 External Monitoring (Institutional Investors) 
Conceptually, under separation of ownership and control, owners delegate management 
responsibilities to internal directors, who deal with the decision-making processes and controls 
of companies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the case of poorly performing companies, 
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owners (institutional shareholders) are only able to discipline their investee companies 
through exit or voice mechanisms (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005), and may request changes in 
company managements such as through executive dismissals (Denis et al., 1997). 
Scholars and policy makers argue that institutional shareholders are motivated to their 
monitor managements, because they may own sufficient numbers of shares, and have the 
knowledge and experience to adequately monitor their investee companies/banks (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). Moreover, shareholder monitoring may improve governance, especially 
when internal/regulatory monitoring is weak (Williamson, 1983). 
Studying European non-financial companies, Kim et al. (2007) also find that countries with 
weak shareholder protection tend to have greater amounts of concentrated share ownerships 
and less independent directors at companies. This study indicates that concentrated 
shareholders and external directors act as substitute devices in monitoring managements. 
These results are consistent with studies focusing on banks operating in emerging-market 
countries. In the study of Laeven (1999) focusing on East Asian banks between 1992 and 1996, 
the findings indicate that banks with majority foreign ownerships tend to take fewer risks, 
because they are less likely to engage in insider lending, indicating that foreign shareholders 
act as key substitute monitors when regulatory and internal governance mechanisms are 
weak. 
Contrary to the benefits of substitute or complementary institutional shareholder monitoring, 
institutional shareholders may also dampen regulatory and internal controls by encouraging 
their investee companies to invest in riskier projects for grater expected returns. In a cross-
country study, Laeven and Levine (2009) find a positive relationship between the cash flow 
rights of majority shareholders and risk-taking at banks between 1996 and 2001, indicating 
that majority shareholders are able to encourage their investee banks to take greater risks. 
The study covers the deregulation periods of the banking industry in the 1990s. This shows a 
negative relationship between regulatory and shareholder monitoring (i.e. these two 
monitoring mechanisms substitute for each other), and, more importantly, the result show 
that shareholders fail to monitor risk-taking at banks during the deregulation periods. 
As discussed, the literature offers mixed findings concerning shareholder monitoring, which is 
arguably affected by the risk preferences of shareholders and the levels of control (or cash 
flow) rights. This is because shareholders may serve as better monitors and use their capacities 
to enforce discipline on their managers if they believe that their risk preferences are being 
ignored. Moreover, some scholars also suggest that shareholders may be happy to see their 
investee companies/banks take risks, because they can diversify their portfolio risks (French 
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and Poterba, 1991; Wright et al., 1996). Nevertheless, shareholder monitoring remain an 
effective governance mechanism when internal governance and takeover markets are weak 
(Fernández and Arrondo, 2005; Grossman, 2013; Williamson, 1983). 
6.2.4 The Mechanisms Hindering Substitute/Complementary Effects in Japan 
Japanese regulatory monitors have been under scrutiny because (i) the convoy system hinders 
the development of the domestic banking sector, (ii) cross-shareholdings or keiretsu groups 
hinder takeover bids (Morck and Nakamura, 1999), (iii) the appointment of amakudari as bank 
board directors (Grossman, 2013; Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001), and (iv) weak disciplinary 
mechanisms such as executive turnover. These criticisms are discussed as follows. 
6.2.4.1 The Convoy System 
The traditional objective of the convoy system is to prevent excessive competition amongst 
banks in order to ensure financial stability, in which banks mutually support each other under 
regulatory guidelines. These guidelines may negate the interest of the general public, such as 
by financially supporting non-performing banks in the aftermath of the asset bubble bursts in 
1990 and 1991 (Cargill, 2000). Since then, the convoy system has been under scrutiny, because 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF) tried to support weak banks from failing (Grossman, 2013; 
Rosenbluth and Schaap, 2003). 
Scholars argue that the convoy system is weakening (Imai, 2007; Murata and Hori, 2004), 
because the Japanese government has encouraged competition in the banking industry (Bikker 
and Spierdijk, 2008; Frankel and Morgan, 1992), and has implemented various implicit 
protection mechanisms, similar to those of Anglo-American countries, such as the deposit 
insurance scheme to prevent banks from being affected by the impact of bank runs (Suzuki, 
2011a). These protection mechanisms include deposit insurance schemes, central bank lender 
of last resort facilities, and information sharing mechanisms between regulators and major 
banks which ensures a certain degree of flexibility for regulators when amending financial 
regulations for resolving problems (Suzuki, 2011a, p. 39). In addition, the Japanese 
government may choose to maintain banks as going concerns instead of bailing them out, and 
also by injecting funds into them as equity (Moody’s, 2013).  
From the institutional framework perspective, the lifetime employment system encourages 
internally promoted directors to jointly monitor their banks, because those directors may fear 
the loss of their employment in the case of the insolvency of their banks (Aoki, 1994b). 
However, the efforts of joint monitoring may be undermined by the implicit protective 
mechanisms, because their banks expect to be rescued by the Japanese government. 
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6.2.4.2 Cross-Shareholding 
Other than the convoy system, scholars also argue that cross-shareholdings or keiretsu groups 
lower the disciplinary effects of other shareholders, because their cross-shareholders tend to 
be long-term concentrated shareholders, and also have business affiliations with them (Kang 
and Shivdasani, 1995; Randall et al., 2000; Yafeh and Yosha, 2003). As a result, they may also 
be reluctant to sell their shares in order to discipline their investee banks/companies. 
Moreover, these cross-shareholders, who are the main banks of the investee banks, may also 
appoint external directors to the boards of their investee banks for monitoring purposes (Van 
Rixtel and Hassink, 2002). 
In a study of Japanese non-financial companies between 1981 and 1987, Morck and Nakamura 
(1999) find imperfect substitute monitoring between shareholders and main banks. The 
authors find that (i) companies that belong to keiretsu groups tend to have higher 
entertainment costs, compared those which do not belong to keiretsu groups, (ii) the share 
prices of keiretsu group companies increase after the appointment of bank directors, 
compared to those outside the keiretsu groups. These findings indicate that only companies 
belonging to keiretsu groups enjoy the substitute monitoring between shareholders and main 
banks. In terms of bank governance, Milhaupt (1999) argues that investee banks are 
monitored by their main banks within the same keiretsu groups, because these main banks are 
expected to rescue/support failing banks in the same group. For example, as a result of the 
falling share prices of financial companies and banks in the early 2000s, six major groups were 
reduced to four groups (Grabowiecki, 2006, pp. 47–48), which became Mizuho Financial 
Group, Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, and UFJ 
Group.  
Therefore, the takeover markets are weak as a result of cross-shareholdings. Takeovers of 
banks rarely happen, unless it is under the instructions of the MoF (Hoshi, 2002; Malcolm, 
2001), or banks merge with, or are acquired by, members of their keiretsu groups (Anderson 
and Campbell II, 2000). 
6.2.4.3 The Amakudari and Disciplinary Mechanisms 
Amakudari and disciplinary mechanisms are often discussed conjointly, because amakudari act 
as external directors to monitor and discipline managements. Amakudari are former civil 
servants who are often appointed to senior positions in private sector companies after they 
retire from the public sector. Amakudari may perform ex post monitoring on behalf of the 
Japanese financial authorities, and act as facilitators between banks and financial authorities 
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(Schaede, 1995). Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) argue that amakudari and the main bank-
appointed directors act as substitute devices in monitoring bank management. 
However, contrasting results are found in amakudari studies. Studying Japanese banks 
between 1977 and 1993, Van Rixtel and Hassink (2002) find that a positive relationship exists 
between the appointments of amakudari and risk-taking at banks, i.e. an increase in lending to 
high risk industries. The results are consistent with those found in Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001), 
which indicates that amakudari weaken ex post monitoring at banks. 
Other than the appointments of amakudari, Japanese banks may select their external directors 
through external networks such as their keiretsu groups, or companies with which they have 
business affiliations. An external director is also referred to as an outside director in most 
Japanese studies. Under the legal definition, outside directors should not have any personal 
relationships with any employees of the companies to which they are appointed, or previously 
have worked in any related companies (such as their subsidiaries, or their parent companies, 
or any other subsidiaries of their parent companies) in the past 10 years. 
Although the ratios of external/independent directors remain low on the boards of listed 
Japanese companies, they are gradually increasing their influences in monitoring the boards 
(Liu et al., 2011). In a study of Japan-listed companies between 2007 and 2008, Liu et al. (2011) 
find that greater ratios of independent directors lead to increased probabilities of executive 
turnover and decreased dividend levels during the 2008 financial crisis, but find no relationship 
between external directors and executive turnover. This indicates that independent directors 
effectively monitor managements by disciplining poorly performing boards and safeguarding 
shareholder wealth.  
In summary, the above studies highlight that external directors – who had business affiliations 
with their banks prior to their appointments to their boards, or hold shares in their banks – 
may not effectively monitor bank managements. Instead, monitoring should be performed by 
independent directors who have no affiliations or hold any shares in the banks/companies 
which they serve on the boards of. 
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6.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
To prevent managers from exploiting company resources, scholars suggest that control 
mechanisms may be used to monitor and align the interests of shareholders and managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Board monitoring and performance-based incentives are internal 
control devices, while the market for corporate control and regulatory monitoring are external 
control devices. Rediker and Seth (1995) suggest that various corporate governance 
mechanisms should operate concurrently to minimise agency costs. Once internal control 
mechanisms weaken, external control mechanisms arguably play substitution/complementary 
effects as monitors to prevent banks from excessive lending and risk-taking.  
This section develops hypotheses to assess the interactions between internal and external 
control mechanisms, which further the understandings on internal and external control 
mechanisms.  
The internal controls are measured by three internal CG indices (VPC1, VPC2, VPC3), which are 
constructed using principal component analysis. VPC1 consists of the eigenvalues of the ratios 
of lifetime bankers (BB), financial experts (BF), legal experts (BL), and external directors (ExDir). 
VPC2 consists of the eigenvalues of board age diversity (AgeRange) and external director 
tenures (ExDir_T). VPC3 consists of the eigenvalue of internal director ownerships (InDir_O). 
The constructions of these internal CG indices are discussed in Section 6.4.2.2 in detail. The 
principal components are named as: (i) board independence and expertise (VPC1), (ii) tenure 
and board dynamics (VPC2), and (iii) internal director joint monitoring (VPC3). 
Three external control mechanisms are considered: financial regulatory authorities, 
institutional shareholders, and domestic foreign institutional shareholders. The levels of total 
regulatory capital ratio (TCapR) are used as proxies for measuring the regulatory monitoring 
effects. Increased levels of regulatory capital reserves may incentivise bank managements to 
reduce their assets risks (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). As a result, regulatory capital reserves can 
be viewed as a corporate governance mechanism for reducing agency costs. 
The levels of institutional share ownerships (II) are used as proxies for measuring institutional 
shareholder monitoring effectiveness. The levels of domestic financial institutional share 
ownerships (DFI) are used as proxies for measuring domestic financial institutional shareholder 
monitoring effectiveness. 
This section argues that regulatory monitoring (TCapR) is complementary to the internal 
control devices of banks (VPC1, VPC2, VPC3), because the managements of Japanese banks 
work closely, but informally, with their financial regulators and the financial authorities 
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(Kanaya and Woo, 2000). As a result, additional regulatory mechanisms, such as the 
implementation of capital reserves, are used as complementary device to strengthen 
corporate governance. 
Hypothesis 6.1 suggests a positive relationship between TCapR and VPC1, suggesting that 
regulatory monitoring complements the board monitoring that is performed by external 
directors, financial experts, legal experts, and lifetime bankers. 
Hypothesis 6.2 argues that the regulatory monitoring (TCapR) is positively related to VPC2, 
suggesting that external directors with greater tenures and increased board age diversity 
complements regulatory monitoring. 
Hypothesis 6.3 suggests a positive relationship between TCapR and VPC3, indicating that 
internal director share ownerships complement regulatory monitoring. 
In the context of Japan, there were historically only small numbers of mergers and acquisitions 
of financial institutions as a result of cross-shareholding (Jackson and Moerke, 2005) and the 
Antimonopoly Act (Junko Fujita, 2017). In case of failing Japanese banks, large healthy banks 
may be requested to acquire or merge with potentially failing banks as directed by the 
government (Lee and Nagano, 2008). As a result, market for corporate control is arguably 
weak in Japan. 
Following the substitute hypothesis proposed by Williamson (1983), when the market for 
corporate control is weak, shareholders and internal controls act as substitute devices in 
monitoring company managements. This section argues that institutional shareholders and 
joint monitoring are substitute devices at monitoring company managements. The majority of 
Japan-listed banks have insider-dominated boards, in which internal director joint monitoring 
(VPC3) is key to bank governance. Therefore, institutional shareholders step in when bank 
governance is weak. 
Hypothesis 6.4 suggests a negative relationship between II and VPC1, suggesting that 
institutional shareholder monitoring substitutes the board governance role being performed 
by external directors and board experts.  
Hypothesis 6.5 suggests a negative relationship between II and VPC2, indicating that increased 
external director tenures and board age diversity enhance board monitoring, because external 
directors increase their influences as their tenures length (ExDir_T) and board age diversity 
(AgeRange) allows for greater varieties of experiences at boards. As a result, the board 
monitoring strengthens and act as a substitute for institutional shareholder monitoring.  
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Hypothesis 6.6 suggests a negative relationship between II and VPC3, and argues that 
shareholder interests are aligned with performance-based incentives, in which rewarding 
internal directors with share ownerships (InDir_O) would make internal directors effectively de 
jure owners. Therefore, internal directors with share ownerships are likely to effectively 
monitor their banks on behalf of institutional shareholders. 
If internal governance fails, domestic financial institutional shareholders (DFI) and the internal 
control devices of banks (VPC1, VPC2, VPC3) are substitute devices at monitoring 
managements. It also argues that DFI step in when bank governance is weak, because financial 
institutional shareholders might have business relationships with their investee banks and may 
be concerned about the financial health of their investee banks. 
Hypothesis 6.7 argues that a negative relationship exists between DFI and VPC1, indicating that 
domestic institutional shareholder monitoring (DFI) act as a substitute for the board 
governance being performed by external directors (ExDir) and board experts (BL, BF), but 
domestic institutional shareholders complement the board governance being performed by 
life-time bankers (BB). 
Hypothesis 6.8 argues that a negative relationship exists between DFI and VPC2, suggesting 
that increased external director tenures and board age diversity improve board monitoring, 
and act as a substitute for domestic institutional shareholder monitoring (DFI). 
Hypothesis 6.9 argues that a negative relationship exists between DFI and VPC3, suggesting 
that increased ownership levels of internal directors (InDir_O) are likely to align the interests of 
internal directors with domestic institutional shareholders (DFI). 
Model 6.1 is used to determine the substitution/complementary effects of external controls 
(TCapR, II, DFI) on the internal controls (VPC1, VPC2, VPC3): 
Model 6.1: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝑉𝑃𝐶1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑃𝐶2𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝑉𝑃𝐶3𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖,t−1
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the level of total regulatory capital ratio (TCapR) of bank i in time t, the level of 
institutional share ownerships (II) of bank i in time t, and the level of domestic financial 
institutional share ownerships (DFI) of bank i in time t. 
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VPC1, VPC2, and VPC3 are internal CG indices which represent: board independence and 
expertise (VPC1), tenure and board dynamics (VPC2), and internal director joint monitoring 
(VPC3). 
The levels of impaired loans (ImpLoanR), financial disclosure (Disc), bank asset sizes (logA), and 
non-interest income (NIIR) control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 is a categorical variable 
in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, and 0 equals 2005-2007. Post2008 controls for year-
specific effects. The fixed-effects (FE) estimations are used to examine Model 6.1.
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6.4 Data and Variable Descriptions 
6.4.1 Data Sample 
The objective of this chapter is to assess the substitution and/or complementary effects of 
internal and external monitoring using data from Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
The same set of sample data is used in chapters four and five. However, for the sake of 
consistency, the data sample descriptions of this chapter are also listed below.  
The sample data consists of information relating to the balance sheets and corporate 
governance of each bank. The balance sheet information was extracted from the Bankscope 
database, in which consolidated data are used. 
Corporate governance information on Japan-listed banks was extracted from the Nikkei Needs 
database and annual company reports. The annual reports were downloaded from the 
websites of each bank. However, some annual reports were not available from the websites of 
Japan-listed banks, and were instead downloaded from the websites of Kabupro24 (株主プロ) 
and the Electronic Disclosure for Investors’ NETwork25. 
The information relating to the backgrounds of individual Japanese bank board directors was 
extracted from the Nikkei Telecom 21 database, and hand collected from the individual annual 
reports. Levels of managerial ownership were extracted from the annual reports of banks, and 
then cross-checked with the data extracted from the Bankscope database and the Nikkei 
Needs database. 
The sample banks are listed on their domestic stock exchanges, which fulfilled the listed bank 
requirements such as corporate governance requirements, disclosure requirements, etc. These 
listed-bank corporate governance requirements include the need to appoint outsiders to 
boards, to adopt specific board structures, and the need to fulfil the regulatory capital and 
disclosure requirements. 
In addition, the sample set is unbalanced.  
                                                          
24 http://www.kabupro.jp/list/t0028.htm 
25 disclosure.edinet-fsa.go.jp 
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6.4.2 Variable Descriptions 
This chapter examines the substitution and/or complementary effects of external and internal 
monitoring. Three dependent variables are used in this chapter, which are proxies for external 
monitoring. 
The following sections (sections 6.4.2.1 and 6.4.2.2) present the definitions of dependent and 
independent variables in detail. Additionally, the following sub-sections briefly present the 
definitions of control variables, which are discussed in section 4.5.2.3 of chapter four in detail. 
6.4.2.1 Dependent Variables: External Controls 
6.4.2.1.1 The Total Regulatory Capital Ratio (TCapR) 
TCapR is the total regulatory capital ratio. It is used as a proxy for the levels of regulatory 
monitoring. It is used to measure capital regulatory stringency (Barth et al., 2004), because 
banks are required to hold a minimum level of capital against their asset risks, i.e. a bank is 
required to hold a greater level of capital to act as a buffer against a higher level of risk-taking. 
It is also used as a proxy to measure bank capitalisation, or the financial soundness of banks 
(Michalak and Uhde, 2012). Additionally, scholars consider regulatory monitoring as an 
external control that is separate from the market (Ciancanelli and Reyes-Gonzalez, 2000). 
6.4.2.1.2 Institutional Ownership Levels (II) 
The level of institutional ownerships (II) is used as a proxy to measure the monitoring of 
institutional shareholders. It is a sum of the domestic and foreign financial institutions (DFI, 
FFI), and the domestic and foreign non-financial companies (DNFC, FNFC). Theoretical 
perspectives suggest that large shareholders (i.e. block shareholders/institutional investors) 
limit agency problems, and are likely to have greater resources and incentives to monitor the 
boards of their investee companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). This is because they have 
greater access to information, greater influence over their investee companies, and higher 
proportions of investments compared to minority shareholders. Additionally, institutional 
shareholders often have more knowledge and more expertise to overcome the problems of 
information asymmetry (Pound, 1988). As a result, they are more capable of monitoring their 
investee companies, compared to other shareholders. 
6.4.2.1.3 Domestic Financial Institutional Share Ownership Levels 
Domestic financial institutional shareholders are arguably better monitors, because they have 
in-depth understandings of their domestic business environments (Gehrig, 1993), and greater 
understandings of the banking business, and similar risk preferences to their investee banks 
(Barry et al., 2011). Additionally, domestic financial institutional shareholders may be affiliated 
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with bank-oriented or keiretsu groups (Hiraki et al., 2003; Miyajima and Hoda, 2015), and 
therefore are likely to acquire company-specific information on their investee banks. 
6.4.2.2 Independent Variables: Internal Controls (Corporate Governance Indices) 
Board monitoring effectiveness is determined by multiple elements such as board composition 
(i.e. ratios of board independence, expertise and board homogeneity) and director share 
ownerships.  
In order to measure these elements, internal corporate governance (CG) indices are created 
using principal component analysis (PCA), which produces three factors characterising the 
dimensionality of eight board mechanisms. The eight mechanisms (variables) are: (i) the ratio 
of external directors to the total number of board members (ExDir), (ii) the average tenure of 
external directors at boards (ExDir_T), (iii) the amount of external director share ownerships 
(ExDir_O), (iv) the amount of internal director share ownerships (InDir_O), (v) the ratio of 
financial experts to the total number of board members (BF), (vi) the ratio of legal experts to 
the total number of board members (BL), (vii) the ratio of lifetime bankers to the total of 
number of board members (BB), and (viii) board age diversity (AgeRange), which is calculated 
by subtracting the age of the oldest directors from the youngest directors on the boards. 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the statistics for the variables that are used to compose the 
principal components of VPC1, VPC2, and VPC3. The data shows that the boards of Japan-listed 
banks are of a similar age, and the average difference between the oldest and youngest 
members is 16 years. Compared to the boards of Anglo-American companies, the boards of 
Japan-listed banks are composed of insiders, of which only 10 percent of their board members 
are external directors (ExDir), and the majority of their board members are lifetime bankers 
(BB). Additionally, the average external director tenure is two years.  
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Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics: the variables used when composing principal components. 
This sample consists of approximately 662 Japan-listed bank-year observations between 2005 and 2013. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. of Obs. 
AgeRange 16.38 6.85 0 37.00 662 
BB 88.97 13.48 0 100.00 624 
BF 0.64 2.20 0 12.50 624 
BL 1.10 3.85 0 27.27 624 
ExDir 0.10 0.15 0 0.86 657 
ExDir_O 0.07 0.50 0 6.59 662 
ExDir_T 1.73 3.46 0 26.00 657 
InDir_O 0.15 0.31 0 6.86 662 
The principal components (CG indices) are constructed according to the statistical properties 
of each variable, and they are associated with each factor, in which the components are 
retained based on the Kaiser’s rule, i.e. the eigenvalues of the component exceeds one. Three 
components are kept, which have 35.6 percent of unexplained variances. These components 
contain positive and negative loadings. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is able to reduce the dimensions of the data without any 
loss of information. However, the invariances of individual variables (prior to the PCA 
transformation) cannot be captured (Karamizadeh et al., 2013). 
Table 6.2 shows the compositions of VPC1, VPC2, and VPC3. VPC1 captures the monitoring 
levels of external directors (0.4753), financial experts (0.469), legal experts (0.4722) and the 
substitute effects of the monitoring levels of lifetime bankers (-0.5186). VPC2 is composed of 
the positive loading of tenures (0.7055) and board age diversity (0.5108). The tenures of 
external directors (ExDir_T) capture the monitoring abilities of external directors whose 
monitoring abilities increase as their tenures lengthen as they acquire adequate levels of 
company-specific knowledge (Sun and Liu, 2014). Board age diversity (AgeRange) captures the 
effects of board dynamics and succession planning (Houle, 1990), and managers who are 
dissimilar in age may be better at risk monitoring because they tend to differ in their risk 
preferences (Berger et al., 2014; Kesner, 1988; Van Ness et al., 2010). VPC3 is dominated by 
internal director share ownerships (0.8577) which capture the alignment effects of internal 
director share ownerships and joint monitoring amongst internal directors (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a), although the amounts of internal director share ownerships are relatively small, which 
Table 6.1 shows that the mean of the internal director share ownerships (IOwn) is 0.15 
percent. 
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Table 6.2 The principal components of the internal control mechanisms, and its varimax rotation. 
Items in boldface exceed 0.4. 
 Pattern of Principal Components  Pattern of Components: Varimax Rotation 
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3 Unexplained VPC1 VPC2 VPC3 
ExDir 0.5246 -0.0171 -0.0368 0.1762 0.4753 0.2251 -0.0181 
ExDir_T 0.2268 0.5505 -0.393 0.3464 -0.0759 0.7055 -0.0736 
ExDir_O 0.2979 -0.0107 -0.4046 0.562 0.2059 0.2986 -0.3479 
InDir_O 0.0491 0.408 0.7529 0.2093 0.0112 0.0055 0.8577 
BF 0.3276 -0.4136 0.0642 0.4849 0.469 -0.2159 -0.1264 
BL 0.3381 -0.291 0.3123 0.4614 0.4722 -0.2258 0.1504 
BB -0.4971 0.1387 -0.0865 0.2327 -0.5186 -0.0625 -0.0312 
AgeRange 0.3368 0.5051 0.0666 0.3729 0.1184 0.5108 0.3132 
The naming of each component corresponds to the largest eigenvalues of the varimax 
rotations26 which exceed 0.4. Table 6.2 shows the three principal components and their 
corresponding varimax rotations which represent the six aspects of corporate governance. The 
principal components of varimax rotations are named as: (i) board independence and 
expertise (VPC1), (ii) tenure and board dynamics (VPC2), and (iii) internal director joint 
monitoring (VPC3). 
6.4.2.3 Control Variables 
Control variables are used to isolate any potential influences on the results. A set of control 
variables is used to control for bank-specific and year-specific effects. 
At the bank level, three variables – the levels of financial disclosure (Disc), bank asset sizes 
(logA), and non-interest income (NIIR) – control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 is a 
categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, and 0 equals 2005-2007. Post2008 
controls for year-specific effects. 
Disc measures the level of bank financial disclosure which is constructed using 18 categories27 
of core disclosures that are published in the annual reports of the banks (Nier and Baumann, 
2006). The level of accounting information is voluntarily disclosed according to director 
expertise and board characteristics (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), which improves board 
monitoring. 
                                                          
26 The varimax rotated principal components are used in the regression models, because varimax 
rotation retains the orthogonality of the principal components and maximises the sum of the variances 
of the squared loadings (Jolliffe, 2002).  
27 Disc is constructed using 18 categories of information on bank balance sheets (Nier and Baumann, 
2006), which includes (i) loans by maturity, (ii) loans by type, (iii) loans by counterparty, (iv) problem 
loans, (v) problem loans by type, (vi) securities by type (detailed breakdown), (vii) securities by type 
(coarse breakdown), (viii) securities by holding purpose, (ix) deposits by maturity, (x) deposits by type of 
customer, (xi) money market funding, (xii) long-term funding, (xiii) reserves, (xiv) capital, (xv) contingent 
liabilities, (xvi) off-balance sheet items, (xvii) non-interest incomes, and (xviii) loan loss provisions. The 
breakdowns of the 18 categories are listed in Appendix Table A.2. 
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logA is the natural logarithm of total bank assets, which measures bank asset sizes. logA 
controls for bank-specific effects, because large banks have greater abilities to diversify their 
risk portfolios (Saunders et al., 1990), or to engage in securitisation businesses (Cardone-
Riportella et al., 2010). 
NIIR is the ratio of non-interest income over gross revenues, which measures the proportion of 
incomes contributing from non-lending businesses, including proprietary trading revenues and 
advisory fees. NIIR can be used to reflect the business strategies of banks (Köhler, 2012). For 
example, banks – with greater levels of NIIR – may focus on increasing their incomes from 
investments and advisory-related businesses, instead of focusing on traditional bank lending 
businesses. 
Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, and 0 equals 2005-
2007. Post2008 is used as a year dummy to capture the influences of the 2008 financial crisis 
and control for year-specific effects. 
6.4.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 6.3 provides a summary of the statistics for the variables used in the empirical analyses. 
The mean of the total regulatory capital ratio (TCapR) of Japan-listed banks is 11.55, while its 
minimum is 5.71 and its maximum is 19.48.  
In terms of ownership structure, on average, 20.47 percent of the bank shares are owned by 
institutional investors (II), of which 14.14 percent are domestic financial institutional investors 
(DFI). In terms of independent variables, the mean of board monitoring and expertise 
composition (VPC1), external director monitoring abilities and board dynamics (VPC2), and 
internal director joint monitoring (VPC3) are 0. 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 6.4. First, TCapR is statistically and positively 
correlated with VPC1 and VPC2 at 10 percent levels. But only a number of eigenvalues of VPC1 
and VPC2 are statistically related to TCapR. Table 6.4 shows that the associated eigenvalues of 
VPC1 and VPC2 – AgeRange, BF, ExDir and ExDir_T – are positively statistically related to 
TCapR, suggesting that there are positive relationships (i) between the levels of regulatory 
monitoring, and board age diversity, (ii) between regulatory monitoring and legal experts, and 
(iii) between regulatory monitoring and external directors.  
Second, the levels of institutional share ownerships (II) are positively and statistically 
correlated with VPC1 and VPC2, but negatively and statistically correlated with VPC3. Only a 
number of the associated eigenvalues of VPC1, VPC2 and VPC3 – AgeRange, BF, ExDir, and 
ExDir_T – are positively statistically related to II, and the eigenvalues BB and InDir_T are 
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negatively statistically correlated with II. High positive correlation coefficients exist (i) between 
the level of institutional share ownerships and the ratio of financial experts, and (ii) between 
the level of institutional share ownerships and the ratio of external directors. 
The level of domestic financial institutional share ownerships (DFI) is positively and statistically 
correlated with VPC1, and is negatively and statistically correlated with VPC3. Only the 
eigenvalues of VPC1 – BF and ExDir – are positively statistically related to DFI. But the 
eigenvalues of VPC1 and VPC3 – BB and InDir_O, respectively – are negatively statistically 
related to DFI.  
Interestingly, the levels of financial disclosure (Disc) are positively and statistically correlated 
with the levels of institutional share ownerships (II) and those of domestic financial 
institutional share ownerships (DFI), indicating that shareholders may have a direct influence 
on improving the levels of financial disclosure at banks. On the contrary, Disc and TCapR are 
not statistically correlated.  
In terms of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor does not exceed 2 in each model, and 
the correlation coefficients of variables do not exceed 0.4 in each model.  
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics: variables used. 
This sample consists of approximately 662 Japan-listed bank-year observations between 2005 and 2013. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. of Obs. 
AgeRange 16.38  6.85  0 37.00  662 
BB 88.97  13.48  0 100.00  624 
BF 0.64  2.20  0 12.50  624 
BL 1.10  3.85  0 27.27  624 
DFI 14.14  14.82  0 100 662 
Disc 0.53  0.04  0.4 0.70  655 
ExDir 0.10  0.15  0 0.86  657 
ExDir_O 0.07  0.50  0 6.59  662 
ExDir_T 1.73  3.46  0 26.00  657 
II 20.14  18.61  0 100.00  662 
ImpLoanR 3.67  1.32  0.84  10.83  653 
InDir_O 0.15  0.31  0 6.86  662 
logA 17.34  0.99  15.35  21.66  655 
NIIR 15.70  13.78  -62.27  191.04  654 
Post2008 0.66  0.47  0 1 662 
TCapR 11.55  1.96  5.71  19.48  655 
VPC1 -0.00  1.63  -1.33  8.13  619 
VPC2 0.00  1.20  -1.59  5.96  619 
VPC3 -0.00  1.04  -3.96  18.86  619 
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Table 6.4 Pairwise correlation coefficients. 
* indicates that the pairwise correlation coefficient is statistically significant at a 10 percent level. 
 
AgeRange BB BF BL DFI Disc ExDir ExDir_O ExDir_T II ImpLoanR InDir_O logA NIIR Post2008 TCapR VPC1 VPC2 VPC3
AgeRange 1
BB -0.1601* 1
BF 0.1043* -0.3280* 1
BL 0.2130* -0.3922* 0.2531* 1
DFI 0.0595 -0.1546* 0.1794* 0.0167 1
Disc -0.0172 -0.0730* 0.011 0.0186 0.0655* 1
ExDir 0.4731* -0.7936* 0.4405* 0.4207* 0.1241* 0.0971* 1
ExDir_O 0.2005* -0.2170* 0.2430* 0.1029* -0.0034 0.0949* 0.4484* 1
ExDir_T 0.2992* -0.2285* 0.0629 0.0564 0.0527 -0.1059* 0.3008* 0.1607* 1
II 0.1905* -0.2477* 0.3166* 0.0383 0.8454* 0.0854* 0.4292* 0.2620* 0.1203* 1
ImpLoanR -0.0662* -0.1007* 0.0256 0.0435 -0.1633* 0.0422 0.0119 0.1351* 0.0327 -0.1958* 1
InDir_O 0.1539* -0.0037 0.0279 0.0308 -0.1113* -0.0634 0.0465 -0.0371 -0.0081 -0.0767* -0.0820* 1
logA 0.2098* -0.1246* 0.2369* 0.1066* 0.3001* 0.2011* 0.2904* 0.1050* 0.0684* 0.4200* -0.3605* -0.1115* 1
NIIR 0.0884* -0.2325* 0.1096* 0.0361 0.1854* 0.1351* 0.3057* 0.1704* 0.0791* 0.3008* -0.0842* 0.0541 0.4208* 1
Post2008 0.0345 -0.025 0.1063* 0.0289 0.0247 -0.1225* 0.0754* -0.0066 0.1361* 0.1406* -0.3056* -0.0695* 0.1675* 0.0301 1
TCapR 0.2535* 0.0557 0.0881* 0.0043 0.0836* -0.0447 0.2304* 0.0054 0.2576* 0.2522* -0.3407* -0.018 0.4793* 0.3048* 0.2144* 1
VPC1 0.4319* -0.8725* 0.6619* 0.6736* 0.1271* 0.0728* 0.8723* 0.4538* 0.1870* 0.3576* 0.0710* 0.0545 0.2485* 0.2285* 0.0754* 0.0953* 1
VPC2 0.6982* -0.3890* 0.018 0.021 0.0542 -0.0309 0.5554* 0.4658* 0.7964* 0.2556* 0.0088 0.0533 0.1580* 0.1873* 0.0748* 0.2736* 0.3706* 1
VPC3 0.3592* -0.0679* -0.1134* 0.1728* -0.0824* -0.0777* 0.0229 -0.3312* -0.0428 -0.1273* -0.1363* 0.8890* -0.0706* 0.0244 -0.0744* 0.0264 0.0381 0.0451 1
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6.5 Methodology 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the substituted/complementary effects between 
the internal and external governance mechanisms of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 
2013. 
This chapter argues that external governance mechanisms – such as institutional shareholder 
and regulatory monitoring – can be used as substitution (or complementary) mechanisms 
when internal controls are weak (or strong).  
In order to examine the substitution and complementary corporate governance mechanisms, a 
two-step model is used. First, in order to capture the multiple dimensionalities of the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms of Japan-listed banks, internal corporate governance (CG) 
indices are developed using principal component analysis (PCA), in which the principal 
components are uncorrelated with each other. For the purpose of interpretation, the final 
principal components are then produced using varimax rotation. Second, fixed-effects (FE), 
random-effects (RE) and system generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond 
estimations are used to examine the substitution and complementary effects between 
external monitoring (regulatory and shareholder monitoring) and internal control mechanisms 
(internal CG indices). 
In order to address problems of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity, (i) fixed-effects 
(FE) and random-effects (RE) estimations with lagged independent and control variables are 
used. The estimations control for bank-specific and year-specific effects, and cluster standard 
errors at the bank level. If the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is accepted, then the RE 
estimation is preferred over the FE estimation. But if the null hypothesis is rejected, then it 
indicates that the RE estimators are inconsistent and the FE estimation is preferred. 
The system generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond Arellano estimations, and 
estimations using alternative independent variables are used as robustness tests. The GMM 
estimations are run using two-step estimators with an option that the estimated variance–
covariance matrix is robust to heteroskedasticity in case of any misspecification causing weak 
instruments and large sample biases (Windmeijer, 2005). In the GMM estimations, the control 
variables lead to endogenous explanatory variables that are less correlated with the 
instrumental variable(s). The alternative independent variables used as robustness tests are 
the lagged variables of BB, BF, BL, ExDir, AgeRange, ExDir_T, and InDir_O, which correspond to 
VPC1, VPC2 and VPC3. 
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6.6 Results 
The results shown in columns (1) – (5) of Table 6.5 are consistent with Hypothesis 6.3 and 
Hypothesis 6.9, and weakly support Hypothesis 6.2, Hypothesis 6.5, Hypothesis 6.6, and 
Hypothesis 6.8. But the results do not support Hypothesis 6.1, Hypothesis 6.4 and 
Hypothesis 6.7. The key finding is that internal director joint monitoring (VPC3) is statistically 
significant at a 10 percent level in columns (4) and (5) of Table 6.5, indicating that regulatory 
monitoring and internal director ownerships are complementary devices in bank monitoring, 
and domestic shareholder monitoring and internal director ownerships are substitute devices 
in bank monitoring.  
In terms of the model specification test, the Hausman test is used to determine the 
consistencies and efficiencies of the fixed-effects (FE) estimators. The results of the Hausman 
tests shown in columns (1) and (3) of Table 6.5, and columns (1), (3), (4) and (6) of Table 6.7 
indicate that the random-effects (RE) estimations are preferred.  
In terms of the model specification test for the system generalised method of moments 
(GMM) Arellano Bond estimation, the null hypotheses of the Sargan and Arellano Bond AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests are accepted in Table 6.6 and Table 6.9, indicating that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid, and the instrumental variable(s) are valid. 
However, the results also show that the majority of models are poorly explained, in which the 
R2 (overall) are less than 0.3. The results provide three key findings. 
First, the RE regression results shown in column (4) of Table 6.5 are consistent with 
Hypothesis 6.3 in which TCapR is positively and statistically associated with VPC3 at a one 
percent level, suggesting that regulatory monitoring (TCapR) and the principal component (PC) 
of internal director joint monitoring28 (VPC3) complementarily monitor bank governance. 
Inconsistent with the substitute hypothesis, the results show important policy implications for 
three reasons. First, it shows that internal director ownerships induce internal director joint 
monitoring, which shows that internal director joint monitoring prevails in the internal 
Japanese corporate governance model. The result is consistent with the concepts of dominant 
internal controls suggested by Dore (2000). Second, internal directors work closely with their 
regulators, although scholars argue that the bonds between bank managers and their 
regulators gradually weaken (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001). Nevertheless, joint monitoring 
creates concerns of potential collusion among internal directors, leading to suspicions of fraud 
or accounting manipulations. Third, as for robustness, the results in Table 6.7 and Table 6.9 
                                                          
28 Table 6.2 shows that the largest eigenvalue of VPC3 is InDic_O (0.8577).  
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show the positive relationships between the eigenvalue of VPC3 – InDic_O – and TCapR, 
indicating that internal director ownerships incentivise board monitoring; although the 
relationship between InDic_O and TCapR is only statistically significant in the GMM estimation 
in Table 6.9. It suggests that the current levels of internal director ownerships are likely to be 
affected by the preceding pressures from the regulators. In summary, the results show that 
internal director ownerships incentivise board monitoring, which increases the complementary 
monitoring effects between internal directors and regulators. 
Second, the results presented in column (5) of Table 6.5 are consistent with Hypothesis 6.9. 
The RE regression result in column (5) of Table 6.5 shows negative relationships between the 
level of domestic financial institutional ownerships (DFI) and the principal components of 
internal director joint monitoring (VPC3), and it is statistically significant at a 1 percent level. 
Consistent with agency theory, the results indicate that internal director share ownerships can 
be used to align the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and internal 
director ownerships (InDir_O) can be used as a substitute device to lower the costs of 
monitoring performed by domestic financial shareholders. As for robustness, the result is 
robust against the GMM results in Table 6.5, and the results of the regression model using the 
alternative variable (InDir_O) in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9. This indicates that the monitoring of 
domestic financial institutional shareholders act as a substitute in internal governance, i.e. the 
coefficients of domestic financial institutional ownerships (DFI) are negatively and statistically 
related to internal director joint monitoring (InDir_O) in the RE and GMM regressions shown in 
Table 6.8 and Table 6.9, respectively.  
Third, although the results in Table 6.5 show that the independent variables (VPC1, VPC2 and 
VPC3) are statistically insignificantly related to institutional shareholders (II) when estimating 
with fixed-effects specification, column (2) of Table 6.6 shows that VPC1, VPC2 and VPC3 are 
positively and statistically significantly related to institutional shareholders (II) when estimating 
with the system GMM Arellano Bond specification. This suggests that the relationship between 
institutional shareholders (II) and independent variables related to internal governance (VPC1, 
VPC2 and VPC3) may be driven by the unobserved characteristics of banks, and the lagged 
dependent and independent variables are likely to be persistent over time (Blundell and Bond, 
1998). As a result, the system GMM Arellano Bond estimations are likely to be more 
appropriate in estimating the relationships between II and VCP1, between II and VCP2, and 
between II and VCP3. 
Moreover, contrary to Hypothesis 6.4, Hypothesis 6.5 and Hypothesis 6.6, VPC1, VPC2 and 
VPC3 are positively and statistically significantly associated with II, indicating that institutional 
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shareholders complementarily monitor their investee banks with the boards of their investee 
banks. 
In addition, the results shown in Table 6.5 suggest that Hypothesis 6.2, Hypothesis 6.5, 
Hypothesis 6.6, and Hypothesis 6.8 are weakly supported, i.e. the signs of coefficients are 
consistent with the proposed hypotheses, but they are not statistically significant. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 6.2, but result is weakly supported. The result shown in Table 6.5 
indicates that regulatory monitoring (TCapR) is positively and statistically insignificantly related 
to VPC2, and the results in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 show that TCapR is positively and 
statistically related to ExDir, indicating that regulators and external directors complement each 
other in monitoring their banks. However, the results should be interpreted with caution, 
because Table 6.9 shows that TCapR is negatively related to ExDir and the coefficient is not 
statistically significant when estimating with the system GMM Arellano Bond specification.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 6.5, but result is weakly supported. The result shown in Table 6.5 
indicates that institutional shareholder monitoring (II) is negatively and statistically 
insignificantly related to VPC2, and only the result shown in Table 6.9 is statistically significant 
– the coefficient of AgeRange is positively related to II when estimating with the system GMM 
Arellano Bond specification. This indicates that the relationship between institutional 
shareholder monitoring and board age diversity is likely to be driven by unobserved bank 
characteristics.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 6.6, but result is weakly supported. The result shown in Table 6.5 
indicates that institutional shareholder monitoring (II) is negatively and statistically 
insignificantly related to VPC3. As shown in Table 6.2, VPC3 can be largely explained by the 
principal component of InDir_O. The results shown in Table 6.7 and Table 6.9 indicate that the 
coefficient of InDir_O is not statistically significantly related to II.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 6.8, but result is weakly supported. The result shown in Table 6.5 
suggests that domestic institutional shareholder monitoring (DFI) is negatively and statistically 
insignificantly related to VPC2. As shown in Table 6.2, the majority of VPC2 is composed of the 
eigenvalues of ExDir_T and AgeRange. But the coefficients of ExDir_T and AgeRange are not 
statistically significantly related to DFI in Table 6.7 and Table 6.9 
In conclusion, the results show that, first, external directors may act as a bridge in 
communicating with regulators in reducing information asymmetry between Japan-listed 
banks and the regulatory authorities. As a result, the complementary mechanisms improve 
monitoring, and enhance the protective banking industry (Suzuki, 2011a). Second, the use of 
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internal shareholder ownerships is effectively aligned with the interests of domestic 
institutional shareholders, indicating that domestic financial institutional shareholders are 
likely to step in, if bank internal governance fails. This suggests that the Japanese governance 
system is dominated by internal controls being performed by domestic shareholders. Lastly, 
the results also show that the institutional shareholders complementarily monitor their 
investee banks with the banks’ boards. 
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Table 6.5 A summary of the results of the fixed-effects (FE) and the system generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Arellano Bond estimations which examine the relationships between external monitoring mechanisms (TCapR, II, 
DFI), and board compositions (VPC1, VPC2, VPC3). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. VPC1 represents board monitoring consisting of the 
eigenvalues of BB, BF, BL and ExDir. VPC2 represents the board dynamics and external director monitoring abilities 
consisting of the eigenvalues of AgeRange and ExDir_T. VPC3 represents the joint monitoring consisting of the 
eigenvalue of InDir_O. ImpLoanR, Disc, logA, and NIIR control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-
specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate a significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
The Hausman test is used to test the consistency and efficiency of the FE estimations. The Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is used to test for whether the variance of the unobserved fixed effects is zero. 
The results of columns (4) and (5) using RE estimations correspond with those of columns (1) and (3) using FE 
estimations, respectively.  
Estimation type FE RE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable TCapR II DFI TCapR DFI 
Intercept 13.91 -23.84 34.62 0.483 -21.39 
  (1.56) (-0.24) (0.39) (0.15) (-0.81) 
L.VPC1 0.0823 1.586 1.682 -0.00111 1.330 
  (0.56) (1.34) (1.15) (-0.01) (1.15) 
L.VPC2 0.0663 -0.627 -0.201 0.124 -0.350 
  (0.47) (-0.53) (-0.18) (0.89) (-0.36) 
L.VPC3 0.0589* -0.0763 -0.446* 0.0597* -0.572* 
  (2.16) (-0.30) (-2.03) (2.18) (-2.50) 
L.ImpLoanR 0.0884 -0.764 -0.606 0.0735 -0.722 
  (1.40) (-1.42) (-1.03) (1.23) (-1.34) 
L.Disc -0.186 -6.870 -14.01 -1.013 -14.94 
  (-0.14) (-0.36) (-0.84) (-0.76) (-0.93) 
L.logA -0.201 2.965 -0.567 0.613*** 2.758* 
  (-0.40) (0.50) (-0.11) (3.80) (1.99) 
L.NIIR 0.0216** -0.0154 0.0114 0.0197** 0.00161 
  (3.13) (-0.29) (0.27) (2.93) (0.04) 
L.Post2008 1.149*** 0.328 -0.957 0.888*** -2.023 
  (7.38) (0.18) (-0.57) (7.12) (-1.55) 
No. of obs. 542 542 542 542 542 
R2 0.333 0.025 0.019   
Adj. R2 0.323 0.010 0.004   
R2 (within) 0.333 0.0247 0.0188 0.321 0.0169 
R2 (between) 0.00468 0.312 0.0350 0.289 0.149 
R2 (overall) 0.0400 0.202 0.0265 0.276 0.0935 
Hausman test: p-value 0.928 0.0110 0.942   
LM test: p-value    0.00 0.00 
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Table 6.6 A summary of the results of the system generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond 
estimations which examine the relationships between external monitoring mechanisms (TCapR, II, DFI), and board 
compositions (VPC1, VPC2, VPC3). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. VPC1 represents board monitoring consisting of the 
eigenvalues of BB, BF, BL and ExDir. VPC2 represents the board dynamics and external director monitoring abilities 
consisting of the eigenvalues of AgeRange and ExDir_T. VPC3 represents the joint monitoring consisting of the 
eigenvalue of InDir_O. ImpLoanR, Disc, logA, and NIIR control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-
specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate a significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
The instruments used for the first-differenced equations are the lagged observations of the explanatory variables, 
and the instruments used for the levels of equations are the lagged observations of the dependent variable. The 
estimations passed the Sargan and the Arellano Bond (AR) tests in columns (1) – (3) for the validity of instruments. 
The Sargan test is used to determine whether the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The Arellano Bond test is 
used to determine for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors, in which the null hypothesis indicates no 
autocorrelation.  
Estimation type GMM Arellano Bond 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable TCapR II DFI 
L.VPC1 -0.0780* 1.839** 0.740 
  (-2.12) (2.71) (1.78) 
L.VPC2 0.0368 3.833*** 0.594 
  (0.81) (5.00) (1.07) 
L.VPC3 0.0675*** 0.451** -0.0392 
  (5.85) (3.06) (-0.32) 
L.TCapR 0.532***     
  (20.65)     
L.II   -0.0273   
    (-1.15)   
L.DFI     0.0722** 
      (2.61) 
L.ImpLoanR 0.230*** -0.596 -0.426 
  (7.95) (-1.84) (-1.65) 
L.Disc -2.026*** -4.418 -14.37 
  (-3.80) (-0.41) (-1.83) 
L.logA 0.323*** 1.519*** 1.108*** 
  (12.35) (4.29) (3.74) 
L.NIIR 0.000191 -0.0734* 0.0153 
  (0.08) (-2.40) (0.53) 
L.Post2008 0.657*** -1.582* -2.213*** 
  (11.18) (-2.17) (-3.32) 
No. of obs. 542 542 542 
No. of instruments 43 43 43 
Sargan test 37.76 42.95 43.92 
Sargan test: p-value 0.301 0.140 0.119 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test -4.054 -3.824 -4.249 
AR(1) test: p-value 0 0 0 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test -1.111 0.864 1.068 
AR(2) test: p-value 0.267 0.388 0.285 
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Table 6.7 A summary of the results of the fixed-effects (FE) estimations which examine the relationships between 
external monitoring mechanisms (TCapR, II, DFI), and board compositions (BF, BB, BL, ExDir, AgeRange, ExDir_T, 
InDir_O). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. ImpLoanR, Disc, logA, and NIIR control for bank-
specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate a significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. The Hausman test is used to test the consistency and efficiency of the FE estimations. 
Estimation type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable TCapR TCapR II II II DFI DFI 
Intercept 13.47 9.717 -7.162 -33.37 -84.50 -32.80 16.75 
  (1.36) (1.04) (-0.07) (-0.35) (-0.83) (-0.37) (0.20) 
L.BB 0.0212   -0.0852        
  (1.24)   (-0.41)        
L.BF 0.000769   0.492        
  (0.01)   (1.22)        
L.BL 0.00227   0.0663        
  (0.08)   (0.18)        
L.ExDir 3.629**   8.703        
  (2.80)   (0.59)        
L.AgeRange       0.0183     0.108 
        (0.11)     (0.68) 
L.ExDir_T       0.278     0.203 
        (0.67)     (0.53) 
L.InDir_O   0.138     -0.202 -1.610**  
    (1.27)     (-0.30) (-2.83)  
L.ImpLoanR 0.0891 0.0759 -0.737 -0.827 -0.952 -0.841 -0.567 
  (1.34) (1.18) (-1.32) (-1.59) (-1.62) (-1.31) (-0.84) 
L.Disc -0.779 -0.0632 -7.876 -2.429 -0.787 -8.337 -8.901 
  (-0.59) (-0.05) (-0.42) (-0.14) (-0.04) (-0.55) (-0.58) 
L.logA -0.289 0.0455 2.401 3.347 6.471 3.378 0.176 
  (-0.55) (0.09) (0.40) (0.59) (1.06) (0.64) (0.04) 
L.NIIR 0.0224** 0.0125 -0.0155 -0.0325 -0.145 -0.122 -0.00790 
  (3.20) (1.78) (-0.29) (-0.64) (-1.72) (-1.45) (-0.19) 
L.Post2008 1.148*** 1.077*** 0.274 -0.138 -1.258 -2.610 -1.211 
  (7.15) (7.20) (0.15) (-0.08) (-0.62) (-1.46) (-0.77) 
No. of obs. 542 578 542 574 578 578 574 
R2 0.345 0.319 0.028 0.016 0.034 0.030 0.008 
Adj. R2 0.334 0.312 0.011 0.004 0.024 0.020 -0.004 
R2 (within) 0.345 0.319 0.0275 0.0165 0.0340 0.0304 0.00797 
R2 (between) 0.00151 0.0813 0.386 0.248 0.195 0.119 0.0487 
R2 (overall) 0.0494 0.101 0.247 0.160 0.136 0.0877 0.0307 
Hausman test 4.579 10.83 12.92 7.860 19.47 8.961 1.010 
Hausman test: p-value 0.869 0.0936 0.166 0.345 0.00345 0.176 0.995 
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Table 6.8 A summary of the results of the random-effects (RE) estimations which examine the relationships 
between external monitoring mechanisms (TCapR, II, DFI), and board compositions (BF, BB, BL, ExDir, AgeRange, 
ExDir_T, InDir_O). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. ImpLoanR, Disc, logA, and NIIR control for bank-
specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate a significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is used to test for whether the variance of the unobserved 
fixed effects is zero. 
Estimation type RE RE RE RE RE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable TCapR II II DFI DFI 
Intercept -0.667 -58.80* -91.71** -54.95* -43.08 
  (-0.18) (-2.10) (-3.13) (-1.98) (-1.74) 
L.BB 0.0308* 0.0742      
  (1.98) (0.41)      
L.BF 0.00307 0.896**      
  (0.06) (3.16)      
L.BL -0.00864 -0.374      
  (-0.48) (-1.65)      
L.ExDir 3.263* 33.80*      
  (2.39) (2.06)      
L.AgeRange     0.124   0.0918 
      (0.76)   (0.69) 
L.ExDir_T     0.328   0.156 
      (1.08)   (0.59) 
L.InDir_O       -2.116**  
        (-3.01)  
L.ImpLoanR 0.0681 -0.744 -0.637 -0.820 -0.517 
  (1.05) (-1.46) (-1.28) (-1.57) (-0.92) 
L.Disc -1.565 -11.13 -0.541 -8.181 -8.966 
  (-1.17) (-0.59) (-0.03) (-0.55) (-0.60) 
L.logA 0.518** 4.550*** 6.531*** 4.660** 3.680** 
  (3.09) (3.36) (4.30) (3.03) (2.67) 
L.NIIR 0.0206** 0.000575 -0.0159 -0.103 -0.0157 
  (3.10) (0.01) (-0.32) (-1.46) (-0.40) 
L.Post2008 0.897*** -0.792 -1.035 -3.124* -2.219 
  (7.18) (-0.62) (-0.82) (-2.27) (-1.71) 
No. of obs. 542 542 574 578 574 
R2 (within) 0.333 0.0227 0.0142 0.0295 0.00660 
R2 (between) 0.289 0.459 0.275 0.141 0.159 
R2 (overall) 0.277 0.298 0.181 0.0972 0.0962 
RMSE 0.840 11.17 11.02 10.41 9.464 
LM test: p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 6.9 A summary of the results of generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimations which 
examine the relationships between external monitoring mechanisms (TCapR, II, DFI), and board compositions (BF, 
BB, BL, ExDir, AgeRange, ExDir_T, InDir_O). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. ImpLoanR, Disc, logA, and NIIR control for bank-
specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. *, **, and *** indicate a significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. The instruments used for the first-differenced equations are the lagged observations of the 
explanatory variables, and the instruments used for the levels of equations are the lagged observations of the 
dependent variable. The estimations passed the Sargan and the Arellano Bond (AR) tests in columns (4) – (6) for the 
validity of instruments. The Sargan test is used to determine whether the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The 
Arellano Bond autocorrelation tests (AR test (1) and AR test (2)) are used to determine for zero autocorrelation in 
the first-differenced errors in which the null hypothesis indicates no autocorrelation.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable TCapR TCapR II II II DFI DFI 
L.BB 0.00164   0.0225        
  (0.22)   (0.24)        
L.BF -0.0395*   0.148        
  (-2.56)   (0.57)        
L.BL 0.0295*   -0.449        
  (2.03)   (-1.65)        
L.ExDir -0.496   43.70***        
  (-1.16)   (7.45)        
L.AgeRange       0.379***     0.188 
        (3.91)     (1.96) 
L.ExDir_T       0.124     0.271 
        (0.29)     (1.38) 
L.InDir_O   0.207***     0.0714 -0.470***  
    (16.25)     (0.44) (-4.44)  
L.TCapR 0.539*** 0.584***          
  (23.04) (29.08)          
L.II     -0.0179 -0.0190 0.0485    
      (-0.81) (-0.73) (1.80)    
L.DFI           0.120*** 0.0504 
            (4.59) (1.78) 
L.ImpLoanR 0.227*** 0.262*** -0.836* -1.084** -0.825* 0.0871 -0.425 
  (8.13) (8.31) (-2.32) (-3.09) (-2.22) (0.33) (-1.73) 
L.Disc -1.973*** -2.497*** -7.548 -3.414 5.336 -2.261 -7.529 
  (-3.42) (-4.20) (-0.73) (-0.35) (0.52) (-0.26) (-0.99) 
L.logA 0.308*** 0.294*** 1.328* 1.133*** 1.458*** 1.166*** 0.690* 
  (7.55) (13.16) (2.09) (3.41) (4.21) (3.91) (2.34) 
L.NIIR 0.000753 -0.00321* -0.0582 -0.0601* -0.153*** -0.106*** -0.0158 
  (0.32) (-2.16) (-1.90) (-2.24) (-5.45) (-3.89) (-0.60) 
L.Post2008 0.660*** 0.654*** -1.689* -1.336 -3.040*** -3.374*** -2.538*** 
  (10.08) (11.04) (-2.48) (-1.82) (-4.74) (-5.57) (-3.98) 
No. of obs. 542 578 542 574 578 578 574 
No. of instruments 44 41 44 42 41 41 42 
Sargan test 37.75 44.36 43.43 42.68 39.80 41.66 41.14 
Sargan test: p-value 0.302 0.110 0.129 0.146 0.228 0.172 0.186 
AR(1) test -4.147 -4.428 -3.949 -3.985 -4.101 -4.242 -4.322 
AR(1) test: p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR(2) test -1.382 -1.371 0.919 1.008 0.194 -0.117 1.181 
AR(2) test: p-value 0.167 0.170 0.358 0.314 0.846 0.907 0.238 
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6.7 Conclusions 
This section provides empirical assessments of the substitution and/or complementary effects 
between internal and external monitoring at Japan-listed banks. The empirical findings 
highlight that internal controls prevail at Japan-listed banks, which are consistent with those of 
Japanese companies (Dore, 2000). 
The main results find that (i) external directors complement regulatory monitoring, (ii) internal 
director joint monitoring complements regulatory monitoring, and (iii) internal director joint 
monitoring substitute with institutional shareholder monitoring, i.e. the use of internal 
shareholder ownerships is effectively aligned with the interests of domestic financial 
institutional shareholders, and domestic financial shareholders are likely to intervene in the 
event of weak bank board governance. 
These results correspond to the fact that (i) external directors (especially amakudari 
appointments) act as communicators with regulators, (ii) the majority of Japan-listed bank 
boards are insider-dominated and the use of internal director share ownerships are to align 
the interests of internal directors with domestic financial shareholders, and (iii) the results 
suggest that the bank-centred or keiretsu groups may be the key monitors at Japan-listed 
banks.  
The results show that domestic financial shareholders act as monitors of Japan-listed banks, 
and may show concerns over the insufficiency of regulatory monitoring of Japan-listed banks, 
especially as banks have low disclosure levels and a weak market for corporate controls. 
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Chapter 7 Comparative Studies of Japan-listed and UK-listed 
Banks 
7.1 Introduction 
The 2008 financial crisis cast doubt on the Anglo-American corporate governance model and 
the sufficiency of bank governance. A review by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) on corporate governance and the 2008 financial crisis highlights the 
failure of the bank risk management oversight, poor disclosure, and insufficient internal 
controls that contributed to the crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Despite this, policy markets also 
suggest that shareholders such as financial institutions should monitor their investee banks 
(Walker, 2009), and ensure that appropriate directors/experts are appointed to safeguard the 
interests of shareholders (FRC, 2014). 
However, it is difficult to ascertain which governance mechanisms are appropriate for banks 
operating in different countries. This chapter presents the comparative views of shareholder 
risk monitoring (external controls) and board risk oversight (internal controls) using UK-listed 
and Japan-listed banks. It determines whether the same corporate governance mechanisms 
have the same effects in banks operating in countries where corporate governance approaches 
and social norms differ, specifically shareholder and stakeholder supremacy (Dore, 2000). 
In order to evaluate the appropriateness of governance mechanisms applicable to banks 
operating in the UK and Japan, this chapter first assesses the relationships between ownership 
structures (four types of shareholders) and risk-taking at UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. 
Second, it examines the effects of board characteristics (such as board independence, and 
board homogeneity/diversity) and the amounts of director share ownerships on risk-taking at 
UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. The studies cover between 2005 and 2013. 
While scholars and regulators put an emphasis on the shareholder returns of UK-listed banks 
(Walker, 2009), the primary objectives of Japan-listed banks are to maintain their social 
responsibilities such as assisting their borrowers during periods of financial distress 
(Nishiguchi, 2011). Meanwhile, UK-listed and Japan-listed banks must comply with the 
requirements proposed by their financial authorities which focus on safeguarding the stability 
of their banking industries. 
Given that UK-listed banks operate under the shareholder supremacy approach, and Japan-
listed banks arguably operate under a hybrid model consisting of shareholder and stakeholder 
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supremacy approaches, the effects of internal and external controls on risk-taking are 
expected to differ between the banks in the two countries. 
However, researchers still have not fully appraised how internal and external controls impact 
risk-taking in countries that are adopting corporate governance approaches to shareholder and 
stakeholder supremacy. This study aims to fill this gap. This chapter argues that similar 
corporate governance mechanisms could have different effects on bank risk-taking, depending 
on whether banks adopt corporate governance approaches to shareholder or stakeholder 
supremacy. 
The theoretical approach to shareholder supremacy focuses on the economic aspects of 
governance. Its objective is to satisfy the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), while stakeholder supremacy places an emphasis on the relationship between the 
organisation and other stakeholder groups (Pesqueux and Damak-Ayadi, 2005), which suggests 
that stakeholders have legitimate interests in their companies, and managers are responsible 
for safeguarding the interests of their employees and other stakeholders associated with their 
companies (Dodd, 1932). 
The shareholder supremacy approach prompts various research interests to examine how 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structures affect company 
performances and risk-taking. These internal corporate governance mechanisms include the 
appointments of external directors, the introduction of performance-based incentives, and 
board homogeneity/diversity. 
Similar to the shareholder supremacy approach, companies operating under the stakeholder 
supremacy approach may also (i) hire external directors to safeguard the interests of their 
stakeholders, and to increase board accountability (Aguilera, 2005); (ii) reward managers with 
performance-based incentives, such as stock options or restricted stocks with long-term 
vesting periods to align them with the long-term interests of their companies and stakeholders 
(Falck and Heblich, 2007); and (iii) increase board diversity to represent their stakeholders such 
as employees and interest groups (Goodstein et al., 1994; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
While these corporate governance mechanisms are designed to reduce agency costs, the 
purposes for their use are different, and as a result the effects may differ. In the UK, the 
governance mechanisms are meant to align the interests of managers with their shareholders. 
Meanwhile, the adoption of Anglo-American corporate governance mechanisms is about 
complying with the requests of foreign investors (Jacoby, 2009). However, scholars argue that 
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these governance mechanisms may be ineffective as a result of the unique ownership 
structures and main bank relationships in Japan (Dewenter and Warther, 1998). 
Existing research provides mixed views on the effects of internal and external controls in 
companies/banks operating in Anglo-American countries (shareholder supremacy) or in Japan 
(stakeholder supremacy). Studying Anglo-American companies/banks, scholars find that the 
levels of performance and risk-taking reflecting the interests of their shareholders (Pathan, 
2009), are associated with internal director ownerships (Demsetz et al., 1997; Laeven and 
Levine, 2009), and board tenure (Sun and Liu, 2014). Compared to American companies/banks, 
scholars also find similar results when examining Japanese banks/companies in which the risk-
taking levels are associated with the interests of their shareholders, i.e. shareholder wealth 
maximisation (Konishi and Yasuda, 2004). 
In terms of internal controls, company performances are positively related with performance-
based incentives (Kato and Kubo, 2006), and risk-taking is associated with the backgrounds of 
external directors (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001; Kato and Kubo, 2006). 
This chapter develops the empirical analyses around four theoretical keystones. First, 
increased board independence (the ratio of external directors to the total number of board 
members) tends to increase levels of monitoring on behalf of both shareholders and 
stakeholders (Aguilera, 2005; Dodd, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and these external 
directors are hired to safeguard the interests of their stakeholders and shareholders, and to 
increase board accountability (Aguilera, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005). 
Second, the shareholder supremacy approach to corporate governance predicts that 
performance-based incentives influence risk-taking at banks. Risk-seeking managers may 
increase lending to risky industries and invest in risk-taking activities for the purpose of 
shareholder wealth maximisation. But risk-averse managers may safeguard the interests of 
their shareholders by preventing their banks from lending to risky industries and refraining 
from engaging in excessive risk-taking which could lead to the insolvency of their banks, or 
lead to a loss of employment.  
From a stakeholder supremacy perspective, performance-based incentives may be used to 
align the interests of managers with the long-term interests of their companies, such as long-
term sustainable growth and returns, and excessive risk-taking prevention. 
Third, resource dependence theory suggests that greater board diversity (or decreased board 
homogeneity) helps to safeguard the interests of stakeholders, and external directors may be 
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appointed to represent employees and various interest groups. However, increased board 
diversity may dampen board efficiency (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). 
Fourth, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that the effects of ownership structures may differ 
depending on the levels of concentrated ownerships and legal investor protections, which 
influence managers to pursue certain business strategies and risk-taking (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Köhler, 2012). Additionally, shareholder influences may differ depending on whether the 
corporate governance system is an insider or outsider system (Franks and Mayer, 1997). 
As in UK-listed companies, shareholders have sufficient influences over the management of 
their investee companies through the market for corporate control (Aguilera, 2005). On the 
contrary, Japan-listed companies are likely to be the cross-shareholders whose relationships 
are long term and whose businesses are affiliated with each other. In summary, the abilities of 
shareholders to influence managers are likely to be dependent on the comparative powers of 
individual shareholders, as well as whether the companies operate under insider or outsider 
systems. 
These theoretical keystones form 12 hypotheses, in which 10 hypotheses focus on the effects 
of the corporate governance mechanisms of UK-listed banks, and the two remaining 
hypotheses examine the effects of the board characteristics, director share ownerships and 
ownership structures between UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. 
To examine these hypotheses, a database is compiled which consists of 662 Japan-listed and 
45 UK-listed bank-years observations between 2005 and 2013. Fixed-effects (FE), random-
effects (RE) and generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimations are used 
to determine the effects of internal corporate governance control mechanisms and 
institutional share ownerships on bank risk-taking. 
The internal corporate governance control mechanisms are composed of board monitoring 
mechanisms (ExDir, ExDir_T), board bonding mechanisms (ExDir_O, InDir_O), and levels of 
board homogeneity or diversity (BB, AgeRange). The details of these mechanisms are 
discussed in chapter four. 
In terms of shareholder monitoring, four types of institutional share ownerships are 
considered: (i) domestic non-financial companies (DNFC), (ii) foreign non-financial companies 
(FNFC), (iii) domestic financial institutions (DFI), and (vi) foreign financial institutions (FFI). The 
details of the effects of these institutional shareholders are discussed in chapter five. 
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The levels of risk-taking are measured using the insolvency risk levels (z-score), in which the 
lower value of the z-score indicates a higher probability of insolvency risks at banks. 
The key findings are as follows. First, apart from domestic financial shareholders, other types 
of institutional shareholders are likely to have positive impacts on risk-taking of UK-listed 
banks, i.e. the coefficients of shareholders (who are foreign financial institutions, foreign and 
domestic non-financial companies) are negatively related to the z-score. 
Second, domestic financial institutional shareholders have negative effects on the insolvency 
risk levels of UK-listed and Japan-listed banks, indicating that UK-listed and Japan-listed banks 
are likely to be subject to stronger shareholder monitoring domestically. One possible 
explanation is that domestic financial institutional shareholders are likely to have long-term 
investment horizons, and to be risk averse. Therefore, they are likely to influence the 
managements of their investee companies to focus on long-term sustainable growth and 
returns (Murrall, 2011). However, these coefficients are statistically insignificant.  
Third, greater levels of external directors lead to increased risk-taking at UK-listed and Japan-
listed banks. The findings are inconsistent with the views that external directors act as (risk) 
monitors and lower agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
This chapter concludes that the corporate governance approach to shareholder supremacy 
weakens board risk monitoring at UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. Meanwhile, domestic 
financial institutional shareholders may be effective at monitoring risk-taking at Japan-listed 
and UK-listed banks. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 provides overviews of the banking industries, 
the legal requirements of internal corporate controls, and shareholder protections in the UK 
and Japan. Section 7.3 reviews the comparative literature that examines internal and external 
controls. Section 7.4 presents the conceptual framework and its associated hypotheses 
focusing on the effects of internal controls and the levels of institutional ownerships on risk-
taking, and investigates if there are any obvious differences between UK-listed and Japan-
listed banks. Section 7.5.1 summarises the data samples. Section 7.5.2 provides descriptions 
on the variables used in the empirical analyses. Section 7.5.3 provides summary statistics. 
Section 7.6 describes the methodology used in these empirical assessments. Section 7.7 
discusses the results and the associated robustness tests. Section 7.8 contains the conclusion.
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7.2 Backgrounds: Corporate and Bank Governance: The UK Versus 
Japan 
7.2.1 Banking Industry 
The banking industries in the UK and Japan operate under two contrasting systems: the UK 
economy is a market-based system, and the Japanese economy is a bank-based system (Allen 
and Gale, 2000). 
In the UK’s market-based economy, banks usually provide short-term financing to companies, 
but companies can also obtain long-term financing by issuing equities or corporate bonds 
(Bank of England, 2014). Although the UK’s banking industry is composed of foreign and 
domestic banks, foreign banks do not provide any domestic commercial banking services and 
products (Allen and Gale, 2000, p. 59). According to the Bank of England, the majority of 
domestic commercial lending – 70 percent of business lending and 75 percent of mortgage 
lending – was provided by six major banks29 in 2013 (Bank of England, 2014). Despite banks 
providing the majority of financing, UK companies can also obtain funds from the capital 
markets by issuing bonds, equities, or commercial paper. 
The UK’s banking and financial industries are regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The PRA is part of the Bank of England (BOE), 
and is responsible for regulating and supervising the UK’s banking and financial industries. The 
objectives of the PRA are to promote the soundness of companies, protect investors and 
customers, and facilitate effective competition among the UK’s banking and financial 
industries. While the PRA is a governmental authority, the FCA is a statutory independent 
authority funded by companies which they regulate and it is accountable to HM Treasury. The 
FCA is customer protection-focused and exists to ensure that the banking and financial 
industry operates with integrity. 
Banks in Japan operate under a bank-based system, and its banks provide financing and 
governance to domestic companies. The banking industry is comprised of various bank types, 
including city banks, trust banks, regional banks, bank holding companies, credit associations, 
and financial institutions which engage in trust businesses.  
The Japanese banking industry has traditionally been governed under the convoy system 
(Nishiguchi, 2011), in which competition among Japanese banks was restricted to branch 
                                                          
29 The six major UK lenders are Banco Santander, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Nationwide, and 
Royal Bank of Scotland. Banco Santander is not included in the sample data, because it is not a UK-
domiciled bank. 
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expansion, while interest rates were controlled (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). Scholars argue 
that, in the aftermath of the financial deregulations of the late 1990s, the effects of the convoy 
system have gradually diminished for two reasons. First, the Japanese government allowed 
large city banks (such as Hokkaido Takushoku Bank) to fail, while it introduced the Financial 
Reform Act and the Rapid Revitalization Act to provide funds to assist with the orderly closure 
of failing banks (Imai, 2007). Second, competition among Japanese banks was gradually 
allowed to increase (Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008). In the absence of an explicit convoy system, 
the disciplinary effects have arguably been replaced by independent regulators such as the 
Financial Services Agency (Murata and Hori, 2004), subordinated debt-holders (Baba and 
Inada, 2009; Imai, 2007), and depositors (Murata and Hori, 2004). It is debatable whether 
market disciplines and regulatory oversights completely replaced the convoy system, because 
industry reports show that the Japanese government demonstrated (i) a willingness to support 
weak banks by directly injecting equity, and (ii) a strong preference to avoid public bond 
defaults while implicitly protecting subordinated debt-holders (Moody’s, 2013). 
In summary, UK banks operate in a market-based economy and Japanese banks operate in a 
bank-based economy. Additionally, UK banks are regulated by governmental and semi-
governmental authorities, although Japanese banks are regulated under a similar regulatory 
framework, they are protected by the convoy system. The following section provides 
overviews of the legal aspects of corporate governance. 
7.2.2 The Legal Requirements of Internal Corporate Controls 
Corporate governance legal frameworks differ between the UK and Japan. This is principally 
due to their legal frameworks and their approaches to corporate governance. The prime 
objective of the UK corporate governance approach is shareholder supremacy, while the 
Japanese corporate governance approach is stakeholder supremacy, such as maintaining 
employment stability (Abe and Hoshi, 2008; Dore, 2000). 
The UK is governed by common law and its corporate governance codes operate under the 
principle of ‘comply or explain’, which is also known as the Combined Code. Under the 
principle of ‘comply or explain’, if companies choose not to comply with the Combined Code, 
then they must explain their reasons for not doing so. 
The Combined Code is consolidated from many corporate governance reports such as the 
Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1988), the Turnbull 
Report (1999), the Myners Report (2001), the Higgs Review (2003), and the Smith Report 
(2003). The Combined Code is designed to enhance board monitoring on behalf of 
shareholders, and to ensure shareholder supremacy (Arcot et al., 2010). The UK’s banking 
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industry is widely considered to be self-governed, to have strong investor protection, and to be 
strongly regulated. 
For example, the Cadbury Code suggests that the role of the chairman and chief executive 
officer should be separate. The Higgs Review recommends that independent directors should 
have no material relationships with, or own shares in, the listed companies on which they 
serve. The combined codes recommend that boards be independent, and highlight that they 
should consist of 50 percent of independent directors (FRC, 2012, 2003). Walker (2009) 
suggests that institutional investors should act as stewards in monitoring their investee 
companies/banks.  
Instead of adopting principle-based codes, Japan is governed by civil law. Japanese corporate 
governance codes are codified and are part of legislative regulation. They are a part of the 
Company Law (previously known as the Commercial Code) that highlights the board structure 
requirements of Japanese companies. 
Since 2002, the Company Law/Commercial Code requires listed companies to select their 
corporate governance systems from the traditional kansayaku system as well as the new 
committees systems. The statutory audit and supervisory board which is better known as the 
kansayaku, requires that at least half of the board members should be external directors. 
Kansayaku are also required to have at least one full-time statutory auditor to monitor and 
supervise the managements of their companies. New committee systems consist of Secchi 
gaisha and Kansa-kantoku i-inkai secchi gaisha (a company with an audit and supervisory 
committee), in which the boards of directors act as the monitors and supervisors of their 
company managements. Under these new committees systems, boards of directors can also 
appoint and dismiss executive directors. 
In addition to the Company Law, the Japan Audit and Supervisory Board Members Association 
also provides corporate governance codes. However, these codes are not statutory 
requirements; they are merely used as a basis for deciding whether companies violate any 
duties of care. 
In summary, there are only a few differences between the legal corporate governance 
frameworks of the UK and those of Japan, and both countries promote board independence, 
although their approaches to corporate governance differ.  
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7.2.3 Institutional Shareholder Monitoring 
In terms of shareholder safeguards, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that common law countries 
have greater shareholder and creditor protections which are likely increase shareholder wealth 
(La Porta et al., 2002). Although La Porta et al. (1998) show that both the UK and Japan have 
relatively high levels of shareholder protections30 among 49 countries they study, there are 
clear distinctions in the levels of shareholder protections between the two countries. For 
example, shareholders of Japanese companies benefit from the ‘one vote per share’ system, 
while those of UK companies only have one vote, regardless of their holdings31.  
Levels of shareholder protections, such as voting rights, are likely to reflect the abilities of 
shareholders to influence the affairs of their investee companies, because greater shareholder 
protections enable shareholders to protest against management decisions which may harm 
shareholder value. In the absence of sufficient levels of shareholder protections, shareholder 
monitoring acts as a substitute for the protection of shareholder values. 
The effectiveness of shareholder monitoring is likely to be subject to the ownership structures 
of each company (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the UK, the majority of ownerships are highly 
dispersed among institutions and individuals (Aguilera, 2005; Allen and Gale, 2000; Franks and 
Mayer, 1997), in which institutional shareholders have a fiduciary duty to monitor their 
investee companies. Shareholders may engage with their investee companies through senior 
independent directors, annual general meetings, and company roadshows (FRC, 2009a).  
In additional, the Financial Reporting Council issued the Stewardship Code, which encourages 
institutional shareholder monitoring through collective engagement, as well as by persuading 
them to disclose their stewardship responsibilities relating to any engagements with their 
investee companies (FRC, 2009b).  
In summary, the UK’s corporate governance codes, such as the Combined Code and the 
Stewardship Code, implicitly refer to shareholder supremacy. Board monitoring (through 
external directors) and institutional investor monitoring ensures that company policies are 
                                                          
30 The degree of shareholder protection is measured by enforcement indictors, which include (i) the 
efficiency of the judicial system, (ii) the rule of law, (iii) corruption, (iv) the risk of expropriation, (v) the 
risk of contract repudiation, and (vi) the rating on accounting standards (La Porta et al., 1998). 
31 Voting can be done in two ways at UK companies, which are described under section 320 and section 
321 of the Company Act 2006 (CA 2006). According to section 320 of CA 2006, voting can be done “on a 
show of hands”, in which shareholders only have one vote, regardless of their holdings. Shareholders 
can also demand a poll according to section 321 of CA 2006, in which each shareholder’s vote is 
counted. 
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aligned with the interests of shareholders, and exist to prevent managers from exploiting their 
company resources.  
Contrary to the UK’s, Japan-listed companies are financed and governed by their main banks 
and the members of their keiretsu groups (Aoki et al., 1994), which are block shareholders. In 
order to improve minority shareholder protections, the Japanese government introduced the 
Anti-Monopoly Law Reform of 1977 which limits the ability of financial institutions from 
holding no more than five percent of shares in a single company (Itō, 1992, p. 180).  
Additionally, the Japan Corporate Governance Forum32 (the Forum) and the Financial Services 
Agency (FSA) also issued various corporate governance guidelines for Japan-listed companies 
in an attempt to encourage institutional shareholder monitoring. For example, the Forum 
places an emphasis on increased levels of disclosure, and on the transparency of the 
performances of their investee companies (Revised Corporate Governance Principles, 2001). 
The Forum also encourages their members to vote in the annual general meetings of their 
investee companies. However, the Forum does not include any shareholder responsibilities.  
The Japanese government has actively attempted to improve the corporate governance of 
Japanese companies in the aftermath of the Olympus scandal, which took place in 2011. For 
example, the FSA issued the Japan’s Stewardship Code in 2013 and a final proposal on Japan’s 
Corporate Governance Code was launched in 2014. Japan’s Stewardship Code uses a principle-
based approach (as opposed to a rule-based approach under civil law), and a ‘comply and 
explain’ approach. Both approaches are similar to those in the UK. This might indicate that the 
Japanese governance approach is moving towards the principle-based approach. The 
introduction of the Japan’s Stewardship Code and ‘comply and explain’ approach governance 
code indicates that there is an increased focus on the protection of shareholder wealth. Yet, 
the Japanese corporate governance model largely remains stakeholder supremacy, and the 
Japanese government has deployed various programmes to support employment stability and 
small businesses (Haghirian, 2016; Ishikawa et al., 2013; METI, 2013). 
                                                          
32 The Japan Corporate Governance Forum’s corporate governance principles recommend that 
companies increase their levels of disclose and transparency when reporting their company 
performances  
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7.3 Literature Review 
7.3.1 Corporate Governance Models: The UK Versus Japan 
Although there is only a limited contrast between the legal corporate governance frameworks 
in both countries, there are sharp distinctions between the UK approach to corporate 
governance and the Japanese approach (Abe and Hoshi, 2008; Dore, 2000). The primary 
objective of the UK approach to corporate governance is to increase shareholder value 
(Llewellyn, 2005), while that of the Japanese approach is to provide financing and governance 
to their borrowers (Aoki et al., 1994). 
The following subsections provide brief literature reviews on internal and external governance 
in the UK and Japan, and the associated literature is discussed in chapters two, four, five and 
six in detail. 
7.3.1.1 Empirical Studies of Corporate Governance 
The majority of agency theory-related empirical studies focus on UK or US companies, which 
employ the internal governance mechanisms suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). These 
empirical studies assess the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms (such as board 
independence) and performance-based incentive remuneration schemes (such as director 
share ownerships). 
Mixed empirical results are found. Studying US companies between 1992 and 1998, Mishra 
and Nielsen (2000) find a positive relationship between board independence and return on 
assets. The boards of these companies consist of, on average, of 64 percent of independent 
directors. The results indicate that greater levels of board independence lower agency costs 
and enhance company performance. On the contrary, Bhagat and Black (1999) find a negative 
relationship between board independence and the company performances of US companies 
between 1985 and 1995, in which the majority of company boards are composed of external 
directors. The authors suggest that outsider-dominated boards are likely to dampen board 
efficiencies. One possible explanation for having contradictory results between these two 
empirical studies is that the external directors, in the latter studies, may lack sufficient levels of 
company-specific information which could enable them to make effective decisions. 
Mixed results are found in studies of performance-based incentive remuneration schemes. 
Consistent with the bonding mechanism hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), Grove et al. 
(2011) find a positive relationship between levels of executive remunerations and company 
performances of US commercial banks between 2005 and 2008. Similar results are also shown 
in a study of technology-based entrepreneurial firms between 1990 and 1995 (Kor and 
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Sundaramurthy, 2008). The results indicate that knowledge-intensive industries may benefit 
from performance-based incentive remuneration schemes. However, Mudambi and Nicosia 
(1998) find that highly concentrated internal director share ownerships dampen company 
performances, because internal directors may expropriate company resources from 
other/minority shareholders. 
In summary, board independence and performance-based incentive remuneration schemes 
are only suitable in individual cases or in a particular industry, and both mechanisms should be 
used concurrently. For example, performance-based incentives may increase board 
efficiencies, when boards are monitored by external directors who prevent internal directors 
from expropriating company resources. 
7.3.1.2 The UK 
7.3.1.2.1 Internal Governance 
As per Jensen and Meckling (1976), the internal governance mechanisms are designed to lower 
agency costs and increase board efficiencies. The appointments of external directors and the 
introductions of performance-based remuneration schemes are commonly implemented in 
companies located in Anglo-American countries.  
The conventional roles of external directors are to monitor internal directors, and to prevent 
internal directors from exploiting company resources. Empirical literature assesses monitoring 
effectiveness by examining the relationship between board independence and company 
performance (or levels of risk-taking). However, the results are mixed. 
Studying US financial companies between 1997 and 2004, Pathan (2009) finds that external 
directors – who are independent from shareholder influences – are negatively associated with 
risk-taking. However, the opposite result is found in Minton et al. (2010) whose study consists 
of US banks between 2003 and 2008. These results suggest that external directors weaken 
bank governance during deregulation periods, i.e. when a part of the Glass–Steagall Act of 
1933 was repealed in 1999. 
Nevertheless, a number of studies support the idea that the appointments of external 
directors improve company performances (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Kor and 
Sundaramurthy, 2008; Mishra and Nielsen, 2000). These results indicate that external directors 
align their company strategies with the interests of shareholders, i.e. enhancing shareholder 
wealth.  
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Other commonly-used internal governance mechanisms to enhance shareholder wealth 
include performance-based remuneration schemes. Scholars argue that internal director share 
ownerships may incentivise internal directors to pursue risky projects for higher possible 
returns (Demsetz et al., 1997; Grove et al., 2011). 
A number of studies show positive relationships between levels of performance-based 
remuneration schemes (or internal director share ownerships) and risk-taking. Studying the 
effects of the remuneration schemes of the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the world’s 
largest banks between 2000 and 2008, Suntheim (2010) finds that performance-based 
remuneration schemes incentivise risk-taking. In particular, the results show greater effects of 
performance-based remuneration on risk-taking at US banks. Similar results are found in 
studies on US banks (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2007). 
In summary, the UK corporate governance approach is designed to ensure that the interests of 
shareholders are attended to. However, this is likely to be at the expense of the interests of 
stakeholders.  
7.3.1.2.2 External Governance 
The ownership structures of US and UK companies are characterised as dispersed (OECD, 
2017). As a result, there should not be any minority concentrated shareholders owning 
controlling interests in companies. Nevertheless, UK institutional shareholders, which may only 
own a small percentage of company shares, are perceived to be effective monitors as a result 
of their expertise. 
Mixed results are found when assessing the effects of shareholders in Anglo-American 
countries. In studying US companies and banks, scholars find mixed relationships between 
levels of share ownerships and the return on equity (Bushee et al., 2014; Prowse, 1995), and 
no relationship between levels of shareholders and market-based performance (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001). These results indicate that diffuse ownership structures prevent 
shareholders from monitoring the managements of their investee companies effectively. 
In a study of UK non-financial companies between 2000 and 2004, Dong and Ozkan (2008) find 
that institutional shareholders, who have long investment horizons, are effective monitors. 
The authors also find that institutional shareholders strengthen the relationship between 
company performance and executive pay. The findings are consistent with the views that 
institutional shareholders, that have long-term investment horizons, may act as monitors to 
limit agency costs by overseeing the management decisions of their investee companies 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Murrall, 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
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In summary, in the absence of controlling shareholders, institutional shareholders act as the 
primary monitors when their investments are sufficiently benefiting from monitoring.  
7.3.1.3 Japan 
7.3.1.3.1 Internal Governance 
Japanese companies have gradually developed a hybrid governance model. Its objective is to 
increase the role of external directors and to implement performance-based incentive 
remuneration schemes. The new hybrid model incorporates Anglo-American governance 
mechanisms with existing institutional frameworks (Abe and Hoshi, 2008; Dore, 2000). 
Scholars argue that external directors are less effective on boards of Japanese companies or 
banks because the majority of Japanese boards are composed of insiders. Therefore, the 
influences of external directors are limited. Studying the board independence of Japanese 
manufacturing companies in 1998, Bonn et al. (2004) find no relationship between the ratios 
of external directors and company performances. Moreover, studying Japanese banks 
between the 1970s and 1990s, Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) find that the appointments of 
amakudari to bank boards increase levels of risk-taking, i.e. reducing capital adequacy levels 
and increasing non-performing loan levels. The results show potential moral hazard problems 
which amakudari may not be effective monitors of, because amakudari may be more lenient 
towards their prospective employers. 
In addition, scholars suggest that the external directors of Japanese companies safeguard the 
interests of shareholder instead of stakeholders (Liu et al., 2011). Studying Japanese 
companies in 2008, Liu et al. (2011) find that companies with external directors are less likely 
to reduce dividends during economic downturns in Japan, indicating that external directors 
may harm the interests of stakeholders. 
In terms of performance-based incentives, the empirical findings of Kubo and Saito (2008) 
show two contrasting results before and after the 1990s: (i) the results suggest that the pay-
performance sensitivities of Japanese company presidents are similar to those of senior US 
company executives prior to the 1990s; and (ii) pay-performance sensitivities decreased after 
the 1990s as a result of reduced internal director share ownership levels.  
Overall, empirical studies show that Anglo-American internal governance mechanisms may not 
be effective at monitoring risk-taking at banks, or at improving bank performances. 
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7.3.1.3.2 External Governance 
Contrary to Anglo-American countries, the ownership structures of Japanese companies are 
described as mixed between dispersed and concentrated (OECD, 2017), and their ownership 
structures were previously concentrated prior to the 1977 reform of the Anti-Monopoly Law, 
and the Japanese financial crisis of the 1990s. Yet, domestic financial institutions such as main 
banks remain as substitutes for the external controls of the Anglo-American governance model 
(Allen and Gale, 2000, chap. 4). 
In the case of Japan, outside shareholders have a limited influence on their Japanese 
companies, because affiliated shareholders with concentrated ownerships have greater 
influences over the managements of their investee companies. These insider shareholders 
often belong to the same keiretsu or bank-centred groups (insiders), and have controlling 
interests in the governance of their investee companies/banks. In order to maintain the group 
system, hostile-takeovers are limited in Japan as a result of cross-shareholdings (Miyajima, 
1994; Yafeh, 2000).  
Kaplan and Minton (1994) assess the relationships between executive turnovers at US and 
Japanese non-financial companies between 1980 and 1988, and find similar turnover patterns. 
These Japanese companies had strong associations with their main banks and affiliated 
companies. This indicates that cross-shareholders are likely to have an impact on the 
effectiveness of shareholder monitoring, because they often obtain company-specific 
information with regard to the business dealings of their investee companies. The results 
suggest that main banks act as a substitute for Anglo-American systems in monitoring their 
investee companies. 
However, the levels of main bank shareholders and concentrated shareholders may have 
negative impacts on the return on assets (ROA) of their investee companies, or dampen the 
stock liquidity of their investee banks. Low liquidity may incentivise shareholders to monitor 
their investee companies, because it is more difficult for them to sell their shares. However, 
shareholders have limit capacities to influence the managements of their investee companies 
(Maug, 1998).  
Studying Japanese companies in 2007, Sakawa et al. (2014) find a positive relationship 
between the levels of outside shareholders and the liquidity of the associated company shares 
being traded, but also find a negative relationship between the levels of main bank 
shareholders and the liquidity of the associated company shares being traded. Studying 
Japanese non-financial companies between 1997 and 2006, Nitta (2008) finds a positive 
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relationship between the levels of institutional ownerships and ROA, but also suggests that the 
increased ownerships of cross-shareholders and financial institutions reduces ROA.  
These results show that cross-shareholders and financial institutional shareholders are likely to 
weaken the performances and market liquidity of their investee companies. It is puzzling that 
cross-shareholding weakens company performances, because cross-shareholders are arguably 
better monitors than outside shareholders, given that cross-shareholders have greater access 
to company-specific information as a result of their long-term cross-shareholding and business 
relationships (Lincoln et al., 1996). The poor company performances could have two 
explanations. First, cross-shareholders may expropriate the resources of their investee 
companies. Second, cross-shareholders may forgo short-term profits, and focus on the long-
term performances of their investee companies (Lee and O’Neill, 2003), i.e. sustainable growth 
and returns. 
In summary, these empirical results reflect the effects of ownership structures on the 
relationship-oriented (stakeholder supremacy) governance model (Kaplan, 1997). 
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7.4 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
7.4.1 External versus Internal Governance: UK-listed Banks 
The conventional views of shareholder monitoring is that diversified shareholders may not be 
able to gather adequate levels of information to monitor their managers as a result of 
information asymmetry (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, institutional shareholders may 
act as delegated monitors, because they are likely to have greater incentives (i.e. owning 
greater proportions of shares), and have greater expertise. 
The investment communities and policy makers encourage institutional shareholders to 
monitor the risk-taking levels of their investee banks, because they owe fiduciary duties to 
their beneficiaries. However, institutional shareholders may forgo their monitoring 
responsibilities or encourage risk-taking, if their investment risks can be diversified in their 
portfolios (Graves and Waddock, 1990; Murrall, 2011; OECD, 2009). Therefore, institutional 
shareholders are likely to encourage risk-taking at banks.  
Hypothesis 7.1 argues that foreign financial institutional shareholders (FFI) encourage risk-
taking at UK-listed banks, i.e. a negative relationship exists between FFI and the z-score. This 
hypothesis argues that (i) FFI suffers from information asymmetry and are unlikely to 
efficiently monitor risk-taking at banks, or (ii) FFI are likely to encourage their investee banks 
to promote/develop non-lending businesses. As a result, the coefficient of FFI is positively 
associated with the z-score of UK-listed banks. 
Hypothesis 7.2 suggests a negative relationship exists between foreign non-financial 
companies (FNFC) and the z-score. This hypothesis argues that FNFC are unlikely to have 
sufficient understandings of financial companies in order to be effective monitors, because 
FNFC are likely to use different performance indicators to identify the strategic activities and 
the strategic plans of non-financial companies. Therefore, they may not be able to understand 
the complexities of banking businesses. Moreover, this hypothesis also argues that FNFC may 
encourage their investee banks to take greater risks for possible higher returns.  
Hypothesis 7.3 suggests that a negative relationship exists between domestic financial 
institutions (DFI) and the z-score. Although DFI are likely to be effective monitors resulting 
from greater access to domestic businesses, this hypothesis argues that DFI are likely to 
encourage their investee banks to take greater risks for possible higher returns. 
Hypothesis 7.4 suggests that a negative relationship exists between domestic non-financial 
companies (DNFC) and the z-score. This hypothesis argues that DNFC behave similarly to FNFC, 
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which (i) may not have the expertise to monitor financial companies/banks, and (ii) encourage 
their investee banks to take greater risks for possible greater returns. 
At the same time, the corporate governance approach to shareholder supremacy affects the 
internal governance mechanisms of UK-listed banks. This section argues that the appointments 
of external directors and the introduction of director share ownerships are designed to 
monitor company managements, incentivise directors to maximise shareholder wealth, and to 
align their interests with shareholders. As a result, under the view that expected returns rise 
with increased risks, greater ratios of external directors, and director share ownerships lead to 
greater risk-taking at banks (Minton et al., 2010; Saunders et al., 1990). 
Hypothesis 7.5 argues that the ratio of external directors (ExDir) is negatively associated with 
the z-score. This hypothesis argues that external directors are likely to encourage their banks 
to take greater risks, as they are hired to safeguard the interests of shareholders and promote 
shareholder wealth maximisation. 
Hypothesis 7.6 argues that a negative relationship exists between external director tenures 
(ExDir_T) and the z-score of UK-listed banks, because (i) external director tenures are likely to 
become more homogeneous with the interests of internal directors, leaving them less able to 
monitor risks, or (ii) external directors are more eager to prove their abilities to their current 
and prospective employers as their tenures lengthen (Fama, 1980). 
Hypothesis 7.7 argues that a negative relationship exists between the levels of internal 
director share ownerships (InDir_O) and the z-score of UK-listed banks, because performance-
based incentives are likely to encourage risk-taking at banks (Grove et al., 2011).  
Hypothesis 7.8 argues that a negative relationship exists between the levels of external 
director share ownerships (ExDir_O) and the z-score of UK-listed banks, because performance-
based incentives are likely to align their interests with those of shareholders and encourage 
risk-taking at banks (Grove et al., 2011; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Moreover, greater board diversity are likely to enhance governance of UK-listed banks. Nakano 
and Nguyen (2012) find that greater board diversity tends to decrease risk-taking at UK-listed 
banks, because board diversity decreases the possibilities that extreme decisions are being 
taken  
Hypothesis 7.9 argues that a positive relationship exists between board age diversity 
(AgeRange) and the z-score of UK-listed banks, because increased board age diversity is likely 
to decrease the cohesiveness in decision-making processes (Michel and Hambrick, 1992), and 
 
 
213 
 
directors that are dissimilar in age may be better at risk monitoring, because they tend to 
differ in their risk preferences (Kesner, 1988).  
Hypothesis 7.10 suggests that a negative relationship exists between board expert 
homogeneity (BB) and the z-score of UK-listed banks, because decreased board expert 
homogeneity is likely to decrease the cohesiveness in decision-making processes (Michel and 
Hambrick, 1992). 
7.4.2 External versus Internal Governance: The UK Versus Japan 
The conventional views are that the Japanese corporate governance model is composed of 
strong internal controls and weak external controls as a result of the weak market for 
corporate control and regulatory forbearance (Allen and Gale, 2000; Anderson and Campbell II, 
2004; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). In contrast, the UK model consists of strong external 
controls and relatively weak internal controls (Allen and Gale, 2000), in which mechanisms 
such as board independence and performance-based remuneration are designed to align their 
interests with shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Scholars suggest that external monitoring may be substituted for weak internal monitoring 
(Weisbach, 1988; Williamson, 1983), or external monitoring can complement strong internal 
governance controls (Fung and Tsai, 2012; Kim et al., 2007). For example, in Japan, the weak 
market for corporate control is substituted by long-term shareholder and main bank 
monitoring, which is arguably able to influence the managements of their investee companies 
through their long-term relationships (Gibson, 1998; Gilson and Roe, 1993; Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1995). 
In the previous chapters, the empirical studies show the effects of internal governance and 
shareholder monitoring on risk-taking at Japan-listed banks, which are expected to be the 
same as to those computed in the current chapter.  
The empirical findings of chapter four suggest that: (i) greater ratios of external directors 
(ExDir) tend to increase insolvency risk levels; (ii) increased levels of external director tenures 
(ExDir_T) reduce insolvency risk levels; (iii) greater amounts of internal and external director 
ownerships (InDir_O, ExDir_O) tend to increase insolvency risk levels; (iv) greater board expert 
homogeneity (BB) tends to decrease insolvency risk levels; and (v) increased board age 
diversity (AgeRange) increases insolvency risk levels. The results are statistically insignificant in 
the FE estimations, but the results of the system generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Arellano Bond estimation show that the ratio of external directors (ExDir) is statistically 
significant at a 10 percent level. The results shows that the internal governance of Japan-listed 
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banks has remained weak as a result of a lack of board diversity (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012), 
and the lifetime employment system (OECD, 2009).  
Chapter five finds that (i) a negative and statistically significant relationship exists between 
foreign financial institutional shareholders (FFI) and the z-score, suggesting that the rise of 
foreign financial institutional ownership levels increases risk-taking at Japan-listed banks.  
Hypothesis 7.11 argues that shareholder supremacy corporate governance mechanisms 
weaken internal and external controls (i.e. risk monitoring) at UK-listed banks compared to 
Japan-listed banks, because the internal governance mechanisms of UK-listed bank are 
designed to align the interests of managements with shareholders, with the aim of 
shareholder wealth maximisation.  
This hypothesis expects that (i) internal governance mechanisms such as board independence 
(ExDir) and internal director share ownerships (InDir_O) may increase insolvency risk levels at 
UK-listed banks; and (ii) shareholder monitoring (domestic and foreign financial institutions 
(DFI, FFI) and domestic and foreign non-financial companies (DNFC, FNFC)) could increase 
insolvency risk levels at UK-listed banks. 
Therefore, this hypothesis expects negative relationships between (i) ExDir and the z-score, (ii) 
between InDir_O and the z-score, (iii) between DFI and the z-score, (iv) between FFI and the z-
score, (v) between DNFC and the z-score, and (vi) between FNFC and the z-score. 
This hypothesis argues that external directors who are exposed to the treat of employment 
termination (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and are eager to prove their abilities to their 
current and prospective employers (Fama, 1980), may be tempted to implement strategies to 
improve their company performances. These strategies may include investing in risky projects 
with the aim of providing higher returns to lead to maximise shareholder wealth. Second, the 
hypothesis argues that performance-based incentives such as director share ownerships 
encourage risk-taking, because managers are motivated to improve their personal wealth 
(Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Third, the hypothesis argues that institutional 
shareholders can diversify their investment risks by investing in portfolios, and are likely to 
encourage their investee banks to take greater risks for greater expected returns. Figure 7.1 
shows the risk-monitoring model between the UK and Japan. 
Hypothesis 7.12 argues that Japan has stronger shareholder monitoring compared to the UK. 
This is because the domestic shareholders of Japan-listed banks are required to safeguard the 
interests of their stakeholders. This hypothesis argues that stakeholders focus on employment 
stability and business continuation, instead of shareholder wealth maximisation. As a result, 
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domestic shareholders act as effective risk monitors. This hypothesis expects to find greater 
numbers of shareholders of Japan-listed banks being positively associated with the z-score, 
compared to those of UK-listed banks. 
Figure 7.1 Risk Monitoring Model: The UK versus Japan 
 
 
Hypothesis 7.1 - Hypothesis 7.12 are analysed using the following models. 
Model 7.1: 
𝑌2𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝑋1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑋1𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ C𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑋2𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ C𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌2𝑖,𝑡 is the insolvency risk level (z-score) of bank i in time t, and the level of impaired 
loans (ImpLoanR) of bank i in time t. 
𝑋1𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of external directors (ExDir) of bank i in time t, the external director share 
ownerships (ExDir_O) of bank i in time t, and the lifetime bankers (BB) of bank i in time t. 
𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 is the average external director tenure (ExDir_T) of bank i in time t, the internal director 
share ownerships (InDir_O) of bank i in time t, and the age diversity (AgeRange) of bank i in 
time t.  
C is a categorical variable in which 1 equals UK-listed banks, and 0 equals Japan-listed banks.  
The levels of market-based performance (TobinQ), interest income (IntInc), and total capital 
regulatory ratio (TCapR) control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific 
effects. GDP controls for country-specific effects.   
 UK Japan 
Internal Governance 
(Board Independence, 
Director Share Ownerships) 
Weak Weak 
External Governance 
(Shareholder Monitoring) 
Weak Strong 
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Model 7.2: 
𝑌2𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+𝛽1𝑋1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑋1𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ C𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑋2𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ C𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌2𝑖,𝑡 is the insolvency risk level (z-score) of bank i in time t, and the level of impaired 
loans (ImpLoanR) of bank i in time t. 
𝑋1𝑖,𝑡 is the level of domestic non-financial institutional ownerships (DNFC) of bank i in time t, 
and the level of domestic financial institutional ownerships (DFI) of bank i in time t. 
𝑋2𝑖,𝑡 is the level of foreign non-financial institutional ownerships (FNFC) of bank i in time t, and 
the level of foreign financial institutional ownerships (FFI) of bank i in time t.  
C is a categorical variable in which 1 equals UK-listed banks, and 0 equals Japan-listed banks.  
The levels of market-based performance (TobinQ), interest income (IntInc), and total capital 
regulatory ratio (TCapR) control for bank-specific effects. Post2008 controls for year-specific 
effects. GDP controls for country-specific effects.  
The fixed-effects estimations are used to examine Model 7.1 and Model 7.2.
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7.5 Data and Variable Descriptions 
7.5.1 Data Sample 
This chapter examines (i) the effects of institutional ownership structures on the insolvency 
risk levels of banks, and (ii) the effects of various internal governance mechanisms on the 
insolvency risk levels of banks. The assessments focus on UK-listed and Japan-listed banks 
between 2005 and 2013. 
The data sample of Japan-listed banks is described in chapters four, five and six. The following 
only provides descriptions on the data sample of UK-listed banks.  
The sample data consists of information relating to the balance sheets and corporate 
governance of each UK-listed bank. The balance sheet information was extracted from the 
Bankscope database, in which consolidated data are used. 
Corporate governance information on UK-listed banks was extracted from annual company 
reports that were downloaded from the websites of each UK-listed bank.  
The information relating to the backgrounds of individual UK-listed bank board directors was 
hand-collected from individual annual reports. Levels of institutional and director share 
ownership were extracted from the annual reports of banks, and then cross-checked with the 
data extracted from the Bankscope database. 
The constraint on the availability of UK-listed data limits empirical analysis on single country 
studies. Although the number of UK-listed banks is small compared to that of Japan-listed 
banks, the majority of lending – 70 percent of business lending and 75 percent of mortgage 
lending – was provided by six major banks33 in the UK (Bank of England, 2014). The UK sample 
should represent the entire population of UK-listed banks. 
In addition, the sample set is unbalanced. 
7.5.2 Variable Descriptions 
This chapter attempts to examine the effects of (i) the levels of institutional share ownerships 
and (ii) board characteristics and director share ownerships on risk-taking at UK-listed and 
Japan-listed banks. 
                                                          
33 The six major UK lenders are Banco Santander, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Nationwide, and 
Royal Bank of Scotland. Banco Santander is not included in the sample data, because it is not a UK-
domiciled bank.  
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The same set of dependent, independent, and control variables are used in chapters four and 
five. The dependent and control variables are described in sections 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.3 of 
chapter four in detail, and independent variables are described in section 4.5.2.2 of chapter 
four and section 5.4.2.2 of chapter five in detail.  
The following sub-sections briefly present the definitions of dependent, independent, and 
control variables used in this chapter. 
7.5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
7.5.2.1.1 Insolvency Risk Levels (z-score) 
The level of bank risk-taking is a measure of a bank being insolvent (z-score), in which the 
lower value of the z-score indicates a higher probability of insolvency risks at a bank (Hannan 
and Hanweck, 1988; Roy, 1952). 
It is often used in a number of empirical studies to examine the relationships between the 
financial stabilities of countries and their banking sectors (De Nicolo, 2000; Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Yeyati and Micco, 2007). The z-score is defined as  
𝑧 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
∑ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
where the car is a ratio of a bank’s total equity to its total assets, and 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 are the mean 
and standard deviations of the return on assets (ROA) of bank i at time t, respectively. ROA is 
defined as the ratio of net income (loss) to total assets. The z-score is a measure of the falling 
profits which offset equity, and the natural logarithm of the z-score is normally distributed.  
7.5.2.1.2 Other Dependent Variable: Level of Impaired Loans (ImpLoanR) 
ImpLoanR is used in the robustness tests. The levels of impaired loans (ImpLoanR) are the 
percentages of impaired loans over gross loans.  
7.5.2.2 Independent Variables 
7.5.2.2.1 Board Characteristics 
Six variables are used to examine the effects of internal governance controls : (i) the ratio of 
external directors to the total number of board members (ExDir), (ii) the average tenure of 
external directors on boards (ExDir_T), (iii) the amount of external director share ownerships 
(ExDir_O), (iv) the amount of internal director share ownerships (InDir_O), (v) the ratio of 
lifetime bankers to the total of number of board members (BB), and (vi) the level of age 
diversity (AgeRange). 
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7.5.2.2.2 Institutional Share Ownerships 
Four groups of shareholders are considered: (i) foreign financial institutions (FFI), (ii) foreign 
non-financial companies (FNFC), (iii) domestic financial institutions (DFI), and (iv) domestic 
non-financial companies (DNFC). The shareholder types are categorised according to Table 5.1 
shown in chapter five. 
7.5.2.2.3 Dummy Variable 
C is a categorical variable in which 1 equals UK-listed banks; and 0 equals Japan-listed banks. 
7.5.2.3 Control Variables 
Control variables are used to isolate any potential influences on the results. A set of control 
variables is used to control for bank-specific, and year-specific effects. 
Market-based performance (TobinQ), interest income (IntInc), and the total regulatory capital 
ratio (TCapR) control for bank-specific effects. GDP controls for country-specific effects. 
Post2008 controls for year-specific effects. 
TobinQ is a measure of market-based performance, and is a ratio of the total market value 
over the total asset value. The level of market-based performance is likely to affect lending and 
risk-taking strategies (Galloway et al., 1997; Konishi and Yasuda, 2004), because banks may 
change their asset allocations between lending and non-lending businesses to focus on long-
term growth or short-term profits.  
IntInc is the level of interest income over gross loans, and controls for bank-specific effects. 
This is because interest income levels are likely to affect levels of risk-taking (z-score, 
ImpLoanR) at banks, i.e. banks are required to earn adequate returns from interest incomes in 
order to offset their monitoring costs. As a result, the levels of IntInc may affect bank 
corporate governance practices such as the effectiveness of ex ante monitoring, interim 
monitoring, and ex post monitoring. Therefore, IntInc should be controlled for when assessing 
risk-taking at banks. 
TCapR is the total regulatory capital ratio. It is used to measure capital regulatory stringency in 
literature (Barth et al., 2004), because banks are required to hold a minimum level of capital 
against their asset risks, i.e. a bank is required to hold a greater level of capital to act as a 
buffer against a higher level of risk-taking. Therefore, TCapR controls for bank-specific effects. 
Post2008 is a categorical variable in which 1 equals the years 2008-2013, and 0 equals 2005-
2007.  
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Gross domestic product (GDP) controls for country-specific effects, and loan demand effects 
(Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). 
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7.5.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 7.1 provides a summary of the statistics for the variables used in the empirical analyses. 
A comparison of UK-listed and Japan-listed bank statistics in the sample shows that, on 
average, UK-listed banks take greater risks (i.e. having lower z-score34 values) compared to 
Japan-listed banks. The mean of the z-score of UK-listed and Japan-listed banks are 76.75 and 
125.25, respectively. 
Table 7.4 shows that, on average, UK-listed banks have greater levels of interest incomes 
(IntInc), non-interest incomes (NIIR), and regulatory capital ratios (TCapR), compared to Japan-
listed banks, except for levels of impaired loans (ImpLoanR). 
The levels of impaired loans of UK-listed banks have increased and are greater than those of 
Japan-listed banks in 2009. While the average impaired loan ratios of Japan-listed banks 
remains at 3.68 percent, the average impaired loan ratios of UK-listed banks has increased 
since 2009, because UK borrowers are unable to pay the interest or repay any of the capital 
(Dunkley, 2015). 
Additionally, the differences of regulatory capital ratios have widened between the two 
countries’ banks since 2009, and the banks of both countries have been under pressure to 
increase their capital ratios since the 2008 financial crisis (Cohen, 2013). 
In terms of board independence, Figure 7.2 shows that UK-listed banks, on average, have 
greater ratios of external directors on their boards, compared to Japan-listed banks. The figure 
also shows that the ratios of external directors to the total number of board members of 
Japan-listed banks have gradually increased from 2005 to 2013. Table 7.1 shows that the 
average tenures of external directors (ExDir_T) at the boards of UK-listed banks are higher than 
those of Japan-listed banks. 
In terms of the patterns of outsider-dominated/insider-dominated boards, Table 7.5 shows 
that the majority of UK-listed banks have outsider-dominated boards, while the majority of 
Japan-listed banks have insider-dominated boards. To distinguish between insider-dominated 
boards, outsider-dominated boards, and mixed boards, this study follows the categorisation 
technique used in Weisbach (1988). Insider-dominated boards have at least 60 percent of their 
board members as internal directors. Outsider-dominated boards have no more than 40 
percent of their board members as internal directors. A mixed board contains between 40 and 
60 percent of their board members as internal directors. According this categorisation, the 
                                                          
34 The z-score measures the level of risk-taking at banks in which the lower value of the z-score indicates 
a higher probability of a bank being insolvent. 
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majority of Japan-listed bank boards are insider-dominated. This result is expected given that 
Japan-listed companies can choose to adopt the kansayaku system. The kansayaku system 
does not require any external directors. 
The mean of the external director tenures (ExDir_T) of UK-listed banks are 3.47 years, while 
those of Japan-listed banks are 1.73. The maximum external director tenures at UK-listed listed 
banks are seven years, while those of Japan-listed banks are 26 years. In some cases, Japan-
listed banks appoint their former retired board directors as external directors, resulting in 
unusually long external director tenures.  
In terms of internal (InDir_O) and external (ExDir_O) director share ownership structures, 
Table 7.1 shows that Japan-listed banks, on average, have greater amounts of internal and 
external director share ownerships, compared to UK-listed banks. It should be noted that UK 
company law prohibits the independent directors of listed companies from owning shares in 
the companies on the boards of which they serve, while this restriction does not apply to the 
external directors of UK-listed companies and any directors of Japan-listed companies. In this 
thesis, external directors are recorded as the sum of independent and external directors. 
In terms of the levels of lifetime bankers (BB) and board age homogeneity (age diversity), on 
average, the levels of lifetime bankers are close to 90 percent at Japan-listed banks, while the 
UK-listed banks only have 37 percent.  
The mean of the board age diversity of Japan-listed banks is lower than that of UK-listed banks, 
which indicates that the directors of Japan-listed banks tend to be of a similar age. Board age 
diversity is calculated by subtracting the age of the oldest directors from the youngest 
directors on the boards. 
The levels of lifetime bankers and board age diversity suggest that the boards of Japan-listed 
banks are more homogeneous, compared to those of UK-listed banks. 
In terms of ownership structures, Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 show that, on average, the largest 
shareholders of UK-listed banks have been foreign financial institutions (FFI) and their 
ownership levels increased from 7.17 percent to 31.49 percent from 2007 to 2008, and 
domestic financial institutions (DFI) continued to be the largest shareholders of Japan-listed 
between 2005 and 2013. 
In terms of bank performances, Table 7.1 shows that UK-listed banks, on average, have greater 
performance levels (TobinQ), compared to those of Japan-listed banks.  
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The correlation matrices of data of UK-listed and Japan-listed banks are presented in Table 7.2 
and Table 7.3, respectively. In Table 7.2, ImpLoanR is negatively correlated with the z-score at 
a 10 percent significance level. Two variables – FNFC and GBP – are positively correlated with 
the z-score at 10 percent significance levels. 
In Table 7.3, five variables – FFI, ImpLoanR, IntInc, ExDir, and TobinQ – are negatively 
correlated with the z-score at 10 percent significance levels, i.e. they are positively associated 
with risk-taking at banks. Five variables – BB, DNFC, GDP, logA and TCapR – are positively 
correlated with the z-score at 10 percent significance levels. 
In the context of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor does not exceed five in each 
model. Each pair of variables, in which the correlation coefficients exceed 0.5, will not be used 
in the regression model. 
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Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics: variables used (Japan-listed and UK-listed banks). 
This sample consists of 662 Japan-listed bank-year observations and 45 UK-listed bank-year observations between 
2005 and 2013. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. of obs. 
Japan 
AgeRange 16.38 6.85 0 37.00 662 
BB 88.97 13.48 0 100.00 624 
DFI 14.14 14.82 0 100.00 662 
DNFC 0.86 2.12 0 14.23 662 
ExDir 0.10 0.15 0 0.86 657 
ExDir_O 0.07 0.50 0 6.59 662 
ExDir_T 1.73 3.46 0 26.00 657 
FFI 4.76 9.10 0 75.48 662 
FNFC 0.37 2.23 0 40.40 662 
GDP 0.68 2.69 -5.53 4.71 662 
ImpLoanR 3.67 1.32 0.84 10.83 653 
InDir_O 0.15 0.31 0 6.86 662 
IntInc 1.95 0.41 1.15 4.56 655 
NIIR 15.70 13.78 -62.27 191.04 654 
Post2008 0.66 0.47 0 1 662 
TCapR 11.55 1.96 5.71 19.48 655 
TobinQ 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.14 635 
z-score 125.25 173.49 -0.85 1,948.99 649 
UK 
AgeRange 22.27 3.61 17.00 29.00 45 
BB 36.85 8.89 22.73 57.89 45 
DFI 14.80 9.25 0 32.14 45 
DNFC 0.88 1.35 0 6.28 45 
ExDir 0.72 0.09 0.54 0.91 45 
ExDir_O 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 45 
ExDir_T 3.47 1.09 1.67 6.60 45 
FFI 21.46 17.20 0 55.49 45 
FNFC 1.42 1.94 0 8.08 45 
GDP 1.16 2.15 -4.19 3.00 45 
ImpLoanR 4.12 2.85 1.24 10.42 45 
InDir_O 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.18 45 
IntInc 4.96 1.51 2.98 9.23 40 
NIIR 46.59 10.68 2.24 62.33 45 
Post2008 0.67 0.48 0 1 45 
TCapR 14.49 2.35 10.70 18.80 45 
TobinQ 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.16 42 
z-score 76.75 106.85 2.18 460.38 38 
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Table 7.2 Pairwise correlation coefficients of UK-listed banks. 
* indicates that the pairwise correlation coefficient is statistically significant at a 10 percent level. 
 
 
AgeRange BB DFI DNFC ExDir ExDir_O ExDir_T FFI FNFC GDP ImpLoanR InDir_O IntInc NIIR Post2008 TCapR TobinQ z-score
AgeRange 1
BB -0.211 1
DFI 0.1999 -0.2980* 1
DNFC 0.0683 -0.2650* 0.5512* 1
ExDir 0.0616 0.4681* 0.0181 0.0669 1
ExDir_O 0.1673 -0.1869 -0.0907 0.0428 -0.0455 1
ExDir_T 0.3306* -0.2593* 0.1051 -0.0354 0.0267 0.4962* 1
FFI 0.4336* -0.016 0.6758* 0.4095* 0.2754* -0.2755* -0.0026 1
FNFC -0.2863* 0.2872* 0.1978 0.3670* 0.2672* -0.0384 -0.2326 0.1297 1
GDP 0.0671 -0.074 -0.3902* -0.0719 0.0012 0.2068 0.2821* -0.4272* -0.1432 1
ImpLoanR -0.2015 0.5079* -0.1239 -0.0462 0.5265* -0.2464 -0.5760* 0.076 0.2637* -0.1792 1
InDir_O 0.3103* -0.2594* 0.3402* 0.3463* 0.1324 -0.1218 -0.0765 0.4028* 0.1398 -0.0453 -0.0374 1
IntInc 0.1221 -0.5848* -0.1183 -0.175 -0.3147* 0.5915* 0.5759* -0.4041* -0.5093* 0.2293 -0.6060* -0.2012 1
NIIR 0.148 -0.008 -0.3749* -0.0872 0.1559 -0.0764 -0.1702 -0.0622 -0.0762 0.0589 0.2187 0.2064 -0.1022 1
Post2008 0.1715 0.3744* 0.4245* 0.1073 0.5335* -0.4201* -0.3180* 0.7000* 0.225 -0.5278* 0.5706* 0.1963 -0.6950* -0.1186 1
TCapR 0.3882* 0.2644* 0.2871* 0.2409 0.5462* -0.1756 -0.0608 0.6178* 0.3526* -0.159 0.3054* 0.3374* -0.5662* 0.0923 0.6505* 1
TobinQ -0.4803* 0.4200* 0.2077 0.0372 0.3139* -0.2169 -0.2607* 0.1424 0.2943* -0.2475 0.3415* 0.019 -0.3501* -0.2422 0.3461* -0.0728 1
z-score 0.0848 -0.041 0.0255 0.2304 -0.0672 0.1423 0.1278 -0.0514 0.2971* 0.2775* -0.2727* -0.1347 -0.0271 -0.0441 -0.2374 0.1255 -0.123 1
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Table 7.3 Pairwise correlation coefficients of Japan-listed banks. 
* indicates that the pairwise correlation coefficient is statistically significant at a 10 percent level. 
 
 
AgeRange BB DFI DNFC ExDir ExDir_O ExDir_T FFI FNFC GDP ImpLoanR InDir_O IntInc NIIR Post2008 TCapR TobinQ z-score
AgeRange 1
BB -0.1601* 1
DFI 0.0595 -0.1546* 1
DNFC -0.0567 0.1612* 0.1136* 1
ExDir 0.4731* -0.7936* 0.1241* -0.1309* 1
ExDir_O 0.2005* -0.2170* -0.0034 -0.0472 0.4484* 1
ExDir_T 0.2992* -0.2285* 0.0527 -0.0071 0.3008* 0.1607* 1
FFI 0.2735* -0.2490* 0.0694* -0.0715* 0.6029* 0.4593* 0.1379* 1
FNFC 0.1098* -0.1430* 0.0564 -0.0361 0.3241* 0.3776* 0.061 0.1954* 1
GDP 0.0113 0.0009 -0.0116 -0.029 0.0275 -0.0031 -0.0074 -0.1188* 0.0316 1
ImpLoanR -0.0662* -0.1007* -0.1633* -0.0816* 0.0119 0.1351* 0.0327 -0.1141* 0.0457 0.0292 1
InDir_O 0.1539* -0.0037 -0.1113* -0.0163 0.0465 -0.0371 -0.0081 0.0418 -0.0384 0.0269 -0.0820* 1
IntInc -0.016 -0.1897* -0.0946* -0.1166* 0.2248* 0.3797* 0.038 0.1692* 0.2123* -0.0917* 0.3467* 0.0362 1
NIIR 0.0884* -0.2325* 0.1854* 0.0283 0.3057* 0.1704* 0.0791* 0.3010* 0.0224 0.0720* -0.0842* 0.0541 -0.1550* 1
Post2008 0.0345 -0.025 0.0247 -0.0027 0.0754* -0.0066 0.1361* 0.2215* 0.0256 -0.2771* -0.3056* -0.0695* -0.3098* 0.0301 1
TCapR 0.2535* 0.0557 0.0836* 0.1471* 0.2304* 0.0054 0.2576* 0.3186* 0.0416 0.0204 -0.3407* -0.018 -0.3821* 0.3048* 0.2144* 1
TobinQ -0.0627 -0.1379* -0.0861* -0.1205* 0.0304 -0.0081 0.0307 -0.0802* -0.0056 -0.0524 0.0879* -0.017 -0.1657* -0.0953* 0.5298* -0.2760* 1
z-score -0.0203 0.1469* 0.0086 0.0743* -0.1177* -0.0607 0.0261 -0.0871* -0.0405 0.1102* -0.1445* -0.0427 -0.2711* 0.031 -0.0257 0.2465* -0.1147* 1
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Table 7.4 A summary of the levels of insolvency risks (z-score), interest incomes over gross loans (IntInc), impaired loans over gross loans (ImpLoanR ), non-interest incomes over gross revenues (NIIR), 
and the total regulatory capital ratios (TCapR) of UK-listed and Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
 
 z-score IntInc ImpLoanR NIIR TCapR 
Year UK Japan UK Japan UK Japan UK Japan UK Japan 
2005  110.41 4.84% 2.07% 1.86% 4.69% 46.97% 15.88% 12.06% 10.69% 
2006 112.30 152.69 4.26% 2.08% 1.74% 4.13% 49.72% 16.10% 12.38% 11.12% 
2007 132.98 131.80 4.40% 2.23% 1.94% 3.93% 48.39% 13.39% 12.62% 11.03% 
2008 22.24 33.63 5.86% 2.18% 2.72% 3.64% 29.97% 4.67% 13.18% 10.75% 
2009 28.22 55.18 4.21% 2.04% 5.07% 3.53% 51.29% 16.80% 15.06% 11.69% 
2010 53.15 66.08 4.06% 1.93% 6.17% 3.50% 48.04% 18.32% 15.94% 11.92% 
2011 142.93 184.52 4.21% 1.79% 6.34% 3.45% 45.13% 17.71% 15.50% 12.19% 
2012 83.17 212.33 4.05% 1.66% 5.76% 3.31% 50.56% 19.49% 16.46% 12.30% 
2013 53.23 179.09 3.78% 1.55% 5.48% 2.92% 49.23% 18.82% 17.22% 12.20% 
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Figure 7.2 The average number of external directors on the boards (ExDir) of UK-listed and Japan-listed banks 
between 2005 and 2013. 
 
Table 7.5 A summary of the types of boards between UK-listed and Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
 Mixed Boards Insider-Dominated Boards Outsider-Dominated Boards 
Year UK Japan UK Japan UK Japan 
2005 20% 0% 0% 96% 80% 4% 
2006 40% 1% 0% 95% 60% 4% 
2007 20% 0% 0% 96% 80% 4% 
2008 0% 3% 0% 96% 100% 1% 
2009 20% 4% 0% 95% 80% 1% 
2010 0% 3% 0% 95% 100% 3% 
2011 0% 3% 0% 95% 100% 3% 
2012 0% 4% 0% 95% 100% 1% 
2013 0% 3% 0% 96% 100% 1% 
 
Figure 7.3 The average number of external and internal director share ownerships of Japan-listed and UK-listed 
banks between 2005 and 2013. ExDir_O is the percentage of external director share ownerships. InDir_O is the 
percentage of internal director share ownerships. 
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Figure 7.4 The distribution of the ownership structures of Japan-listed and UK-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
FNFC represents foreign non-financial companies. FFI represents foreign financial institutions. DFI represents 
domestic financial institutions. DNFC represents domestic non-financial companies. 
 
Figure 7.5 Ownership structures between 2005 and 2013: UK-listed banks versus Japan-listed banks. 
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7.6 Methodology 
This chapter examines (i) the effects of four types of institutional shareholders on bank 
insolvency risk levels, and (ii) the effects of board characteristics and levels of director share 
ownerships on bank insolvency risk levels. The assessments are based on data consisting of 
662 Japan-listed bank-year observations and 45 UK-listed bank-year observations between 
2005 and 2013. 
It argues that (i) the corporate governance approach to shareholder supremacy weakens the 
internal governance of UK-listed and Japan-listed banks, and (ii) Japan arguably has greater 
shareholder monitoring as a result of the insider system, compared to the UK. 
In order to examine the effects on insolvency risk levels, fixed-effects (FE), random-effects (RE) 
and system generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimations are used, 
which are able to mitigate the problems of endogenous, unobservable heteroskedasticity, and 
simultaneity.  
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7.7 Results 
The overarching messages from the regression results shown in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 are 
that shareholder supremacy weakens UK bank governance, and highlights: (i) the effects of 
board independence on the increased insolvency risk levels, and (ii) that foreign shareholders 
are likely to increase risk-taking at banks. This is inconsistent with the views of institutional 
shareholders encouraging risk-taking (García-Kuhnert et al., 2015; Laeven and Levine, 2009), 
and the results show that domestic financial institutional shareholders lower risk-taking levels 
at their investee-banks in the UK and Japan. Regressions adjust standard errors by controlling 
for clustering at country level, and control for year-effects, bank-specific effects, and country-
specific effects. 
The results shown in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 support Hypothesis 7.1, Hypothesis 7.2, 
Hypothesis 7.4, Hypothesis 7.5, Hypothesis 7.9, Hypothesis 10 and Hypothesis 7.12. 
In terms of the model specification test, the Hausman test is used to determine the 
consistencies and efficiencies of the fixed-effects (FE) estimations. The results of the Hausman 
tests shown in Table 7.8 and Table 7.10 indicate that random-effects (RE) estimations are 
preferred. Moreover, the model specification tests for the system generalised method of 
moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimation indicates that the instrumental variable(s) and the 
conditions of autocorrelations are valid in the regression results shown in Table 7.9 and 
Table 7.11.  
However, the results also show that the models are poorly explained, in which the R2 (overall) 
are approximately 0.14 in the regression models listed in Table 7.8 and Table 7.10, and the R2 
(between) improves slightly when the regression equations are estimated with the RE 
specifications. 
These results provide five key messages relating to external and internal governance between 
UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. 
First, consistent with Hypothesis 7.1, Hypothesis 7.2 and Hypothesis 7.4, the results of 
Table 7.6 show FFI, FNFC and DNFC are negatively related to the z-score, indicating that UK-
listed banks with shareholders, which are foreign financial institutions (FFI), foreign non-
financial companies (FNFC) and domestic non-financial companies (DNFC), are likely to take 
more risks. In terms of robustness, the majority of the results are robust against estimations 
with the FE and the GMM specifications and with alternative variables (ImpLoanR). However, 
the result of Hypothesis 7.2, showing the relationship between FNFC and the z-score, is not 
robust against the GMM estimation shown in Table 7.9, indicating that the risk-taking 
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behaviours of banks may be affected by unobserved bank characteristics and the lagged risk 
levels.  
Second, contrary to Hypothesis 7.3, UK-listed banks with domestic financial institutional 
shareholders (DFI) are likely to reduce risk-taking levels, indicating that domestic financial 
institutional shareholders are likely to be effective risk monitors. Two of the possible 
explanations are (i) they have greater understandings of their domestic business environments 
(Gehrig, 1993) and are better monitors resulting from lower information asymmetries between 
themselves and their investee banks; and (ii) they have greater incentives and influences to 
monitor their domestic investee banks, because any failing domestic banks are likely to have 
negative impacts on domestic growth, as banks may be reluctant to lend. In terms of 
robustness, the RE result is robust against regressions estimated with the FE and the GMM 
specifications. 
Third, the result shown in Table 7.7 is consistent with Hypothesis 7.5, indicating that having 
external directors on boards are likely to encourage risk-taking at UK-listed banks. The finding 
is inconsistent with the views that external directors act as risk monitors and lower agency 
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One possible explanation is that external directors 
encourage their banks to act in interests of their shareholders who are likely to forgo risk 
monitoring for maximising their wealth (Terence Tse, 2011). Therefore, the current corporate 
governance approach to shareholder supremacy weakens risk monitoring. In terms of 
robustness, the RE result is robust against regressions estimated with the FE and the GMM 
specifications. 
Fourth, the results are consistent with Hypothesis 7.9 and Hypothesis 7.10, suggesting that 
greater board diversity tends to decrease risk-taking at UK-listed banks. The findings are 
consistent with the views that diversified boards prevent board members from making 
extreme decisions (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012), and board members with different experiences 
are likely to assist their banks in developing new opportunities through their external 
connections (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Overall, the results signal that bank boards are 
required to have banking experts to manage the ever-increasing complexities of their banks.  
Paradoxically, the results found at UK-listed banks are opposite to those at Japan-listed banks, 
suggesting that (i) greater age diversity tends to increase levels of insolvency risks at Japan-
listed banks, which indicates that greater age diversity may affect board efficiency (Michel and 
Hambrick, 1992), and affect succession planning (Houle, 1990); and (ii) increased board 
expertise homogeneity lowers insolvency risk levels at Japan-listed banks.  
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Fifth, the results shown in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 indicate that the majority of corporate 
governance mechanisms fail to lower risk-taking at UK-listed and Japan-listed banks, i.e. ExDir, 
FFI and FNFC are negatively related to the z-score. Surprisingly, the levels of internal director 
share ownerships (InDir_O) are poitively related to the z-score of UK-listed banks, but are 
negatively and statistically significantly related to the z-score of Japan-listed banks. This 
indicates that the use of internal director share ownerships increases risk-taking at Japan-listed 
banks. 
Moreover, the result also shows that, in the UK, shareholders – which are domestic non-
financial companies (DNFC) – are likely to encourage their investee banks to take greater risks. 
On the contrary, the result shows that DNFC are positively and statistically related to the z-
score, indicating that Japanese domestic non-financial companies are likely to discourage this 
their investee banks to take risks. Lastly, the results show that domestic financial institutional 
shareholders (DFI) of UK-listed and Japan-listed banks are likely to act as risk monitors. 
In conclusion, board compositions, director share ownerships and ownership structures tend 
to have different affects on risk-taking at banks in the UK and Japan, indicating that 
researchers should also consider country-specific characteristics when examining the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. 
  
 
 
234 
 
Table 7.6 A summary of the random-effects regression results of columns (3) and (4) of Table 7.8 that shows the 
relationships between the institutional ownerships and the z-score. 
FFI is the level of foreign financial institutional ownerships. FNFC is the level of foreign non-financial institutional 
ownerships. DFI is the level of domestic financial institutional ownerships. DNFC is the level of domestic non-
financial institutional ownerships. ** and *** indicates significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  UK Japan 
FFI -3.317 (= -0.979 - 2.338***) -2.338*** 
FNFC -13.822 (= -13.28 - 0.542) -0.542 
DFI 3.079 (= 2.932 + 0.147) 0.147 
DNFC -7.467 (= -9.864 + 2.397**) 2.397** 
 
Table 7.7 A summary of the random-effects regression results of columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 7.10 that shows 
the relationships between board characteristics and the z-score. 
ExDir is the ratio of external directors to the total number of board members. ExDir_T is the average tenure of 
external directors on boards. ExDir_O is the amount of external director share ownerships. InDir_O is the amount of 
internal director share ownerships. BB is the ratio of lifetime bankers to the total number of board members. 
AgeRange is board age diversity. *, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  UK Japan 
ExDir -275.34 (= -74.84 - 200.5***) -200.5*** 
ExDir_T 65.322 (= 62.72 + 2.602***) 2.602*** 
ExDir_O 4,273.55 (= 4,284.5** -10.95*) -10.95* 
InDir_O 37.57 (= 61.05 + -23.48**) -23.48** 
BB -2.016 (= -2.863 + 0.847**) 0.847** 
AgeRange 6.199 (= 8.325 + -2.126***) -2.126*** 
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Table 7.8 A summary of the results of the fixed-effects (FE) and the random-effects (RE) estimations assessing the 
relationships between institutional ownerships, and the insolvency risk levels (z-score). 
L. indicates that the levels of independent variables have a one-year lag. C is a categorical variable in which 0 equals 
Japan-listed banks, and 1 equals UK-listed banks. FFI is the level of foreign financial institutional ownerships. FNFC is 
the level of foreign non-financial institutional ownerships. DFI is the level of domestic financial institutional 
ownerships. DNFC is the level of domestic non-financial institutional ownerships. IntInc, TCapR, TobinQ, Post2008, 
and GDP are control variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
The Hausman test is used to test the consistency and efficiency of the FE estimations. The Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is used to test for whether the variance of the unobserved fixed effects is zero. 
Estimation Type FE RE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 13.55 4.233 -31.48 -17.40 
  (0.08) (0.03) (-0.62) (-0.38) 
L.DFI 0.583  0.147   
  (5.87)  (1.27)   
L.FFI -1.359  -2.338***   
  (-3.16)  (-25.48)   
L.DFI*C 2.702  2.932   
  (0.55)  (0.59)   
L.FFI*C -3.920  -0.979   
  (-0.75)  (-0.66)   
L.DNFC  1.267**   2.397** 
   (78.00)   (2.73) 
L.FNFC  1.472   -0.542 
   (1.87)   (-0.75) 
L.DNFC*C  -15.79   -9.864 
   (-2.36)   (-0.67) 
L.FNFC*C  -32.29   -13.28 
   (-1.19)   (-1.64) 
L.TobinQ -340.5* -219.9* -781.6*** -528.8*** 
  (-12.77) (-21.09) (-32.68) (-5.99) 
L.IntInc -53.57 -45.16 -38.28 -38.41 
  (-0.70) (-0.65) (-1.21) (-1.23) 
L.TCapR 18.20 17.24 20.37*** 18.21*** 
  (12.30) (9.36) (13.17) (9.04) 
L.Post2008 36.30 31.63 49.38*** 37.16*** 
  (2.50) (2.06) (10.81) (13.31) 
L.GDP 9.954 10.38 10.11*** 10.64*** 
  (7.16) (8.51) (38.85) (33.24) 
No. of obs. 593 593 593 593 
R2 0.091 0.087   
Adj. R2 0.077 0.073   
R2 (within) 0.0913 0.0870 0.0877 0.0851 
R2 (between) 0.163 0.170 0.241 0.203 
R2 (overall) 0.119 0.121 0.143 0.130 
Hausman test: p-value 0.808 0.723   
LM test: p-value   0.00 0.00 
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Table 7.9 A summary of the results of the generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimations 
assessing the relationships between institutional ownerships, and the insolvency risk levels (z-score). 
L. indicates that the levels of independent variables have a one-year lag. C is a categorical variable in which 0 equals 
Japan-listed banks, and 1 equals UK-listed banks. FFI is the level of foreign financial institutional ownerships. FNFC is 
the level of foreign non-financial institutional ownerships. DFI is the level of domestic financial institutional 
ownerships. DNFC is the level of domestic non-financial institutional ownerships. IntInc, TCapR, TobinQ, Post2008, 
and GDP are control variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The 
instruments used for the first-differenced equations are the lagged observations of the explanatory variables, and 
the instruments used for the levels of equations are the lagged observations of the dependent variable and TobinQ 
(predetermined variable). 
The estimations passed the Sargan and the Arellano Bond (AR) tests for the validity of instruments. The Sargan test 
is used to determine whether the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The Arellano Bond test is used to determine 
for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors, in which the null hypothesis indicates no autocorrelation. 
 GMM 
  (1) (2) 
L.DFI -0.0535  
  (-0.32)  
L.FFI -1.954***  
  (-4.34)  
L.DFI*C 2.233**  
  (2.86)  
L.FFI*C 1.143*  
  (2.16)  
L.DNFC  1.052 
   (1.21) 
L.FNFC  1.967*** 
   (3.69) 
L.DNFC*C  -11.34*** 
   (-7.11) 
L.FNFC*C  9.652*** 
   (4.69) 
L.z-score 0.468*** 0.472*** 
 (81.15) (74.45) 
TobinQ -1260.9*** -1292.7*** 
 (-15.64) (-15.90) 
L.TobinQ -1041.4*** -860.9*** 
  (-10.77) (-16.53) 
L.IntInc -31.31*** -31.65*** 
  (-8.50) (-13.71) 
L.TCapR 15.93*** 15.25*** 
  (24.01) (30.18) 
L.Post2008 74.57*** 66.50*** 
  (24.22) (39.86) 
L.GDP 8.790*** 8.976*** 
  (27.40) (26.56) 
No. of obs. 587 587 
Number of instruments 65 65 
Sargan test: p-value 0.126 0.184 
Arellano Bond AR(1) test: p-value 0.00353 0.00345 
Arellano Bond AR(2) test: p-value 0.265 0.278 
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Table 7.10 A summary of the results of the fixed effects (FE) and the generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Arellano Bond estimations assessing the relationships between board characteristics, and the insolvency risk levels 
(z-score). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. C is a categorical variable in which 0 equals Japan-
listed banks, and 1 equals UK-listed banks. ExDir is the ratio of external directors to the total number of board 
members. ExDir_T is the average tenure of external directors on boards. ExDir_O is the amount of external director 
share ownerships. InDir_O is the amount of internal director share ownerships. BB is the amount of lifetime bankers 
to the total number of board members. AgeRange is board age diversity. TobinQ, IntInc, Post2008, TCapR and GDP 
are control variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
The Hausman test is used to test the consistency and efficiency of the FE estimations. The Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is used to test for whether the variance of the unobserved fixed effects is zero. 
  
Estimation Type FE RE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 63.02 63.67 224.8 29.19 46.39 -20.73 
 (0.31) (0.42) (1.84) (0.24) (0.67) (-0.14) 
L.ExDir -199.7   -200.5***   
 (-2.21)   (-5.07)   
L.ExDir_T 2.752   2.602***   
 (2.14)   (25.17)   
L.ExDir*C -444.8   -74.84   
 (-1.85)   (-1.10)   
L.ExDir_T*C 76.67   62.72   
 (0.84)   (1.16)   
L.ExDir_O  -25.10   -10.95*  
  (-2.71)   (-2.31)  
L.InDir_O  -30.10   -23.48**  
  (-1.60)   (-2.77)  
L.ExDir_O*C  3693.3   4284.5**  
  (0.81)   (2.80)  
L.InDir_O*C  -403.0   61.05  
  (-2.67)   (0.09)  
L.BB   -1.108   0.847** 
   (-1.63)   (2.91) 
L.AgeRange   -2.533*   -2.126*** 
   (-16.43)   (-840.69) 
L.BB*C   -11.01   -2.863 
   (-0.89)   (-1.10) 
L.AgeRange*C   2.656   8.325 
   (0.43)   (0.73) 
L.TobinQ -376.0* -314.7 -398.3 -608.5*** -712.1 -462.4*** 
 (-15.44) (-2.25) (-1.20) (-4.22) (-1.90) (-8.06) 
L.IntInc -65.60 -55.48 -55.99 -53.68 -52.78*** -44.79 
 (-0.77) (-0.69) (-0.77) (-1.01) (-3.83) (-0.78) 
L.Post2008 32.29 30.90 26.51 38.67*** 37.33 29.84** 
 (2.08) (1.43) (1.42) (6.25) (1.75) (2.99) 
L.TCapR 18.26** 14.73 14.65* 18.21*** 16.17** 16.21*** 
 (162.47) (5.16) (27.24) (16.28) (2.75) (46.26) 
L.GDP 10.42 10.44 9.794 10.55*** 10.51*** 9.791*** 
 (7.03) (6.39) (5.68) (14.50) (3.92) (9.18) 
No. of obs. 593 593 569 593 593 569 
R2 0.097 0.088 0.081    
Adj. R2 0.083 0.074 0.066    
R2 (within) 0.0968 0.0882 0.0809 0.0943 0.0871 0.0727 
R2 (between) 0.174 0.196 0.0630 0.297 0.221 0.259 
R2 (overall) 0.109 0.129 0.0523 0.158 0.137 0.134 
Hausman test: p-value 0.956 0.983 0.128    
LM test: p-value    0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 7.11 A summary of the results of the generalised method of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimations 
assessing the relationships between board characteristics, and the insolvency risk levels (z-score). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. C is a categorical variable in which 0 equals Japan-
listed banks, and 1 equals UK-listed banks. ExDir is the ratio of external directors to the total number of board 
members. ExDir_T is the average tenure of external directors on boards. ExDir_O is the amount of external director 
share ownerships. InDir_O is the amount of internal director share ownerships. BB is the amount of lifetime bankers 
to the total number of board members. AgeRange is board age diversity. TobinQ, IntInc, Post2008, TCapR and GDP 
are control variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The instruments used for 
the first-differenced equations are the lagged observations of the explanatory variables, and the instruments used 
for the levels of equations are the lagged observations of the dependent variable and TobinQ (predetermined 
variable). The estimations passed the Sargan and the Arellano Bond (AR) tests for the validity of instruments. The 
Sargan test is used to determine whether the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The Arellano Bond test is used to 
determine for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors, in which the null hypothesis indicates no 
autocorrelation. 
Estimation Type GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
L.ExDir -457.1*   
 (-2.44)   
L.ExDir_T 12.07*   
 (2.36)   
L.ExDir*C 201.7   
 (0.84)   
L.ExDir_T*C 78.10   
 (1.81)   
L.ExDir_O  -8.528  
  (-0.11)  
L.InDir_O  -5.339  
  (-0.08)  
L.ExDir_O*C  4392.6  
  (0.95)  
L.InDir_O*C  792.7  
  (0.58)  
L.BB   1.418 
   (1.62) 
L.AgeRange   -4.134 
   (-1.54) 
L.BB*C   5.775 
   (0.72) 
L.AgeRange*C   -1.732 
   (-0.10) 
L.z-score 0.450*** 0.473*** 0.462*** 
  (4.22) (4.63) (4.07) 
TobinQ -1129.2 -1218.7 -1375.7 
  (-1.07) (-1.09) (-1.12) 
L.TobinQ -796.7 -1065.5 -738.5 
 (-0.86) (-1.13) (-0.69) 
L.IntInc -50.40* -37.06 -40.31 
 (-1.99) (-1.85) (-1.19) 
L.Post2008 55.94 67.70* 62.28 
 (1.87) (2.46) (1.76) 
L.TCapR 20.11*** 16.54*** 11.23 
 (3.62) (3.81) (1.51) 
L.GDP 9.281*** 9.243*** 8.043*** 
 (3.64) (3.54) (3.31) 
No. of obs. 587 587 563 
Number of instruments 65 65 65 
Sargan test: p-value 0.112 0.102 0.140 
Arellano Bond AR(1) test: p-value 0.00899 0.00821 0.0114 
Arellano Bond AR(2) test: p-value 0.288 0.273 0.292 
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Table 7.12 A summary of the results of the fixed-effects (FE) estimations examining the relationships between the 
levels of institutional ownerships, and the levels of impaired loans (ImpLoanR). 
L. indicates that the levels of independent variables have a one-year lag. C is a categorical variable in which 0 equals 
Japan-listed banks, and 1 equals UK-listed banks. FFI is the level of foreign financial institutional ownerships. FNFC is 
the level of foreign non-financial institutional ownerships. DFI is the level of domestic financial institutional 
ownerships. DNFC is the level of domestic non-financial institutional ownerships. IntInc, ToninQ, TCapR, Post2008, 
and GDP are control variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The Hausman 
test is used to test the consistency and efficiency of the FE estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Estimation Type FE 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 5.724 6.175 
 (2.46) (2.74) 
L.DFI -0.00824  
 (-9.16)  
L.FFI -0.0333  
 (-3.32)  
L.DFI*C 0.0190  
 (0.31)  
L.FFI*C 0.101  
 (1.58)  
L.DNFC  -0.0191 
  (-5.29) 
L.FNFC  0.0450 
  (5.48) 
L.DNFC*C  0.513 
  (5.93) 
L.FNFC*C  0.967 
  (2.92) 
L.IntInc -0.0560 -0.168 
 (-0.06) (-0.19) 
L.TobinQ -8.338* -9.280* 
 (-39.72) (-45.89) 
L.TCapR -0.123** -0.153 
 (-124.19) (-7.30) 
L.Post2008 -0.145 -0.262 
 (-1.73) (-3.76) 
L.GDP -0.0235 -0.0182 
 (-0.99) (-1.06) 
No. of obs. 594 594 
R2 0.182 0.184 
Adj. R2 0.169 0.171 
R2 (within) 0.182 0.184 
R2 (between) 0.00664 0.109 
R2 (overall) 0.0483 0.120 
Hausman test: p-value 0 0 
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Table 7.13 A summary of the results of the fixed effects (FE) estimations assessing the relationships between board 
characteristics, and the levels of impaired loans (ImpLoanR). 
L. indicates that the independent variables have a one-year lag. C is a categorical variable in which 0 equals Japan-
listed banks, and 1 equals UK-listed banks. ExDir is the ratio of external directors to the total number of board 
members. ExDir_T is the average tenure of external directors on boards. ExDir_O is the amount of external director 
share ownerships. InDir_O is the amount of internal director share ownerships. BB is the ratio of lifetime bankers to 
the total number of board members. AgeRange is board age diversity. IntInc, TobinQ, Post2008, TCapR and GDP are 
control variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The Hausman test is used to 
test the consistency and efficiency of the FE estimations. 
Estimation Type FE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 5.116 6.305 2.581 
  (1.86) (3.03) (1.92) 
L.ExDir -4.087   
  (-3.78)   
L.ExDir_T -0.0635   
  (-2.31)   
L.ExDir*C 15.47   
  (5.97)   
L.ExDir_T*C -1.160   
  (-1.06)   
L.ExDir_O  -0.896*  
   (-13.77)  
L.InDir_O  -1.219  
   (-6.79)  
L.ExDir_O*C  -13.93  
   (-0.24)  
L.InDir_O*C  43.38*  
   (17.30)  
L.BB   0.0383 
    (2.97) 
L.AgeRange   0.00121 
    (0.36) 
L.BB*C   0.0952 
    (0.49) 
L.AgeRange*C   -0.0136 
    (-0.15) 
L.IntInc 0.0594 -0.355 -0.188 
  (0.06) (-0.36) (-0.17) 
L.TobinQ -2.537 -4.157 -1.435 
  (-0.91) (-5.09) (-0.26) 
L.Post2008 -0.237 -0.502 -0.330 
  (-2.51) (-3.99) (-1.81) 
L.TCapR -0.0991 -0.109 -0.153* 
  (-2.27) (-9.58) (-25.47) 
L.GDP -0.0131 -0.0263 -0.0262 
  (-0.48) (-1.19) (-0.78) 
No. of obs. 594 594 570 
R2 0.221 0.193 0.126 
Adj. R2 0.209 0.181 0.112 
R2 (within) 0.221 0.193 0.126 
R2 (between) 0.0882 0.0540 0.0269 
R2 (overall) 0.0738 0.0000445 0.0247 
Hausman test: p-value 0 0 0 
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7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presents empirical assessments by comparing insolvency risk levels at banks 
between two countries. It focuses on the effects of internal control mechanisms (board 
characteristics and director share ownerships) and levels of institutional ownerships. The 
results present two points that may have policy implications when recommending corporate 
governance policies for banks. 
First, the results show that current internal governance mechanisms, such as the appointments 
of external directors, possibly lead to greater risk-taking by UK-listed bank managements. In 
summary, the results show that, in the UK, internal governance mechanisms are designed to 
protect the interests of shareholders and incentivise managers to maximise shareholder 
wealth, but fail to safeguard the interests of stakeholders.  
Second, in Japan, domestic shareholders act as key monitors to their investee banks, because 
domestic shareholders are also key stakeholders who focus on maintaining long-term 
relationships and on being long-term investors. However, the results show that Anglo-
American internal governance mechanisms such as the appointments of external directors and 
performance-based incentives may encourage risk-taking at Japan-listed banks. In summary, 
the Japanese (shareholder) insider system safeguards the interests of stakeholders, and 
prevents excessive risk-taking, while Anglo-American internal governance mechanisms may 
encourage risk-taking at Japan-listed banks. 
From a policy perspective, states and financial authorities should promote stakeholder 
monitoring, and refrain from encouraging internal mechanisms that promote only the interests 
of shareholders. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the effects of internal governance (board 
characteristics and director ownerships), and external governance, such as shareholder and 
regulatory monitoring, of Japan-listed banks. It contains four core chapters.  
First, it investigates the effects of the ratios of external directors to the total number of board 
members (henceforth known as the ratios of external directors), the lengths of external 
director tenures, the amounts of director share ownerships, the ratios of financial and legal 
experts to the total number of board members (henceforth known as the ratios of finance 
and/or legal experts), board expertise homogeneity, and board age diversify on bank lending 
and risk-taking. 
Second, it examines the effects of six types of institutional shareholders on bank lending and 
risk-taking. Six types of institutional shareholders include foreign and domestic financial 
institutions, foreign and domestic non-financial companies, and foreign and domestic 
governments. 
Third, it assesses the substitution and complementary effects between internal governance 
and external monitoring. Three internal governance indices are specially constructed using 
principal component analysis to reduce the number of independent variables in a single 
regression analysis. They contain the ratios of external directors to the total number of board 
members, the lengths of external director tenures, the amounts of director share ownerships, 
the ratios of financial and legal experts to the total number of board members, board expertise 
homogeneity, and board age diversify. External governance is referred to as institutional 
shareholder and regulatory monitoring. 
Fourth, it compares the effects of internal governance and institutional shareholder 
monitoring between UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. It particularly focuses on levels of risk-
taking at banks.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.1 provides summaries of the empirical findings. 
Sections 8.2 and 8.3 discuss the theoretical and policy implications of the empirical findings, 
respectively. Section 8.4 discusses the shortcomings of this thesis. Section 8.5 discusses the 
scope for future work. 
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8.1 Empirical Findings 
The objectives of this thesis are to understand the effects of board characteristics, levels of 
director ownerships, and institutional shareholders on the lending and risk-taking behaviours 
of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2015. The bank lending ratios and the z-score are the 
conceptual variables for measuring lending and risk-taking behaviours, respectively.  
Bank lending ratios are used to measure the proportions of the assets allocated to real sector 
lending that have welfare implications. The z-score is a measure of bank-specific insolvency 
risks, which includes lending and non-lending risks. Two alternative measures, levels of interest 
incomes and levels of impaired loans, are used as robust measures of bank lending ratios and 
the z-score, respectively.  
To mitigate the problems of endogenous, unobservable heteroskedasticity, and simultaneity 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Wintoki et al., 2012), the empirical studies in chapters four to 
seven are conducted using the fixed-effects, random-effects and system generalised method 
of moments (GMM) Arellano Bond estimations.  
Chapter four first examines the effects of board characteristics and levels of director 
ownerships on the lending and risk-taking behaviours of Japan-listed banks. Second, it assesses 
the bank specific factors that affect the likelihood of banks participating in securitisation 
businesses. The empirical studies cover between 2005 and 2013. 
The findings of chapter four suggest that (ch4.i) the increased ratios of external directors raise 
levels of insolvency risks, but decrease levels of impaired loans; (ch4.ii) internal and external 
director share ownerships decrease levels of impaired loans; (ch4.iii) greater levels of board 
homogeneity increase interest incomes; (ch4.iv) the ratios of financial experts are statistically 
insignificantly associated with all examined dependent variables (LoanDeps, z-score, IntInc, and 
ImpLoanR); (ch4.v) greater ratios of legal experts tend to decrease levels of impaired loans; 
(ch4.vi) the likelihood of banks with assets and liabilities committees (ALCOs) participating in 
securitisation businesses is driven by greater ratios of external directors, but that likelihood 
decreases as ratios of financial experts increase; (ch4.vii) banks with ALCOs and bigger asset 
sizes and/or lower total regulatory capital ratios are likely to participate in securitisation 
businesses.  
Results (ch4.i) – (ch4.v) highlight the prevalence of insider-dominated boards at Japan-listed 
banks, where board monitoring tends to be jointly supervised among internal directors. The 
implementation of board independence is likely to be ineffective as a result of insider-
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dominated boards, and a limited supply of qualified directors and the increasing demand for 
directorships. 
Interestingly, no statistically significant relationships are found between variables of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms (board characteristics and director ownerships), and 
insolvency risks levels. But statistically significant relationships are found in some variables of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and impaired loans. The results show that greater 
ratios of external directors and legal experts, and increased amounts of internal and external 
director ownerships are associated with decreased levels of impaired loans, indicating that 
these mechanisms are effective in monitoring bank lending policies, i.e. preventing their banks 
from lending to risky industries. But these mechanisms are insufficient at monitoring non-
lending businesses.  
Results (ch4.vi) – (ch4.vii) highlight the following four points. First, the results suggest that, 
instead of strengthening monitoring, external directors are likely to be hired for their expertise 
in developing new business. For example, external directors may be expected to contribute to 
assisting with the development of complex non-lending businesses such as securitisation. This 
finding is consistent with result (ch4.i).  
Second, the result shows that greater ratios of financial experts on bank boards with ALCOs, 
tend to decrease the likelihood of banks participating in securitisation businesses, indicating 
that financial experts are likely to focus on bank balance sheet management (BCBS, 2016a), 
instead of encouraging their banks to engage in securitisation. In other words, financial experts 
are likely to be hired to monitor managements and to focus on interest rate and liquidity risks, 
instead of advising on new business.  
Third, banks with bigger asset sizes tend to engage in securitisation. The finding is consistent 
with Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010), which is not surprising, because bigger banks have 
greater levels of resources to facilitate complex projects.  
Fourth, banks with lower capital ratios tend to securitise their loans, and the finding confirms 
the regulatory capital arbitrage hypothesis (Dionne and Harchaoui, 2008). 
Chapter five examines the effects of levels of institutional share ownerships on the lending and 
risk-taking behaviours of Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013.  
The findings of chapter five suggest that (ch5.i) foreign financial institutional shareholders are 
likely to induce risk-taking at banks; (ch5.ii) domestic governmental shareholders are inclined 
to encourage their investee banks to take risks; and (ch5.iii) Japanese domestic financial and 
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non-financial institutional shareholders are insufficient at monitoring risks at their investee 
banks.  
Following the views of Ahmadjian (2008) that institutional investors act as catalysts for 
transferring foreign corporate mechanisms practices to Japan, result (ch5.i) shows that foreign 
financial institutional shareholders are at odds with the risk-taking behaviours of the internal 
directors of Japan-listed banks, indicating that the presence of foreign financial institutional 
investors encourages risk-taking at Japan-listed banks. 
Result (ch5.ii) indicates that, consistent with the views of Levine (2003), state ownerships may 
help regulators to overcome problems of information asymmetry and may improve bank 
governance. It also shows that the relationship between domestic governmental ownerships 
and the z-score is negatively and statistically significant when estimated with the random-
effects specification, but is positively and statistically insignificant when estimated with the 
fixed-effects and the system generalised method of moments Arellano Bond estimations 
specifications. 
Result (ch5.iii) shows that the coefficients of domestic financial and non-financial institutions 
are statistically insignificant when examining the relationships with the insolvency risks and 
impaired loan ratios. The random-effects estimation result is robust in comparison with the 
generalised method of moments Arellano Bond estimations. This indicates that domestic 
institutions may play limited roles in monitoring their investee banks.  
To illustrate the interactions between internal and external controls, chapter six assesses the 
substitution and complementary effects between the internal and external monitoring of 
Japan-listed banks. Eight elements of internal corporate governance mechanisms are 
compressed into three indices using principal component analysis. In terms of external 
monitoring, three external monitors are considered: financial regulators, domestic financial 
institutional shareholders, and institutional shareholders. Institutional shareholders include 
domestic and foreign financial institutions, and domestic and foreign non-financial companies.  
The findings of chapter six indicate that (ch6.i) internal directors and regulators 
complementarily monitor bank governance; (ch6.ii) internal director share ownerships are 
used to align the interests of domestic financial institutional shareholders; as a result, internal 
director and domestic financial institutional shareholders act as substitute devices in bank 
governance; and (ch6.iii) external directors and institutional shareholders act as 
complementary devices in bank governance. 
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Result (ch6.i), contrary to the substitution hypothesis (Williamson, 1983), suggests that 
regulatory monitoring and internal director joint monitoring are complementary, whereby 
internal directors jointly manage and monitor the governance of their banks. In contrast with 
internal director joint monitoring, regulators only rely on disclosed information to monitor 
listed banks, indicating possible insufficiencies in regulatory monitoring as a result of 
information asymmetry.  
Result (ch6.ii) shows that a substituted monitoring mechanism exists between internal 
directors and domestic financial institutional shareholders, indicating that banks with greater 
levels of domestic financial institutional shareholders are likely to influence the internal 
directors of their investee banks. 
Result (ch6.iii) shows the complementary relationship between external directors and 
institutional shareholders, indicating that external directors monitor the governance of their 
banks on behalf of their institutional shareholders. This result confirms that institutional 
shareholders may only play limited roles in monitoring, although the result suggests that 
external directors complementarily monitor their investee banks on behalf of their 
institutional shareholders. 
As described in previous chapters, Japan-listed banks have adopted a number of corporate 
governance mechanisms similar to their Anglo-American counterparts, and their corporate 
(ch7governance mechanisms have been widely studied. Chapter seven offers a comparative 
view by assessing the effects of the corporate governance mechanisms used in UK-listed and 
Japan-listed banks. 
Chapter seven first examines the effects of institutional ownership levels and board 
characteristics (the internal controls) of UK-listed banks on risk-taking. Second, it compares the 
effectiveness of board risk oversight (internal controls) and shareholder monitoring (external 
controls) between UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. The empirical studies cover UK-listed and 
Japan-listed banks between 2005 and 2013. 
The findings of chapter seven suggest that (ch7.i) compared to UK-listed banks, the 
institutional shareholders of Japan-listed banks are likely to play active roles in monitoring risk-
taking at banks; (ch7.ii) greater levels of board age and expert diversity at UK-listed banks tend 
to reduce insolvency risk levels, while the reverse effect occurs at Japan-listed banks; and 
(ch7.iii) the corporate governance approach to shareholder supremacy increases insolvency 
levels at Japan-listed and UK-listed banks. 
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Result (ch7.i) is consistent with the testable hypothesis that institutional shareholders may 
forgo their monitoring responsibilities or encourage risk-taking. The result is contrary to the 
conventional view that institutional shareholders have the expertise and incentives to monitor 
their investee companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The general assumption is that their risk-
taking behaviours may be driven by their short-term investment horizons (Graves and 
Waddock, 1990; Murrall, 2011; OECD, 2009). 
Result (ch7.ii) suggests that board age and expert diversity at UK-listed banks improves board 
dynamics and succession planning (Houle, 1990), because managers who are dissimilar in age 
may be better at risk monitoring, but tend to differ in their risk preferences (Berger et al., 
2014; Kesner, 1988; Van Ness et al., 2010). On the contrary, the result indicates that board age 
diversity at Japan-listed banks increases the insolvency risk levels. Two possible explanations 
are that (i) younger board members are less persuasive among older board members, because 
they are less authoritative and are likely to have less experience compared to older, existing 
board members; and (ii) board members with dissimilar backgrounds are often outsiders, and 
are less influential on insider-dominated boards of Japan-listed banks.  
Result (ch7.iii) suggests that the corporate governance approach to shareholder supremacy 
increases risk-taking at UK-listed and Japan-listed banks, in which board independence induce 
board members to pursue risky investments for greater returns. The result is consistent with 
the views that external directors are exposed to employment risks, and are eager to deliver to 
their shareholders’ expectations (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Second, internal director 
share ownerships incentivise risky projects for greater returns, because managers are 
motivated to improve their personal wealth. However, compared to Japan-listed banks, 
internal director share ownerships have reverse effects on UK-listed banks, i.e. a negative 
relationship exists between the levels of internal director share ownerships and risk-taking at 
UK-listed banks. Furthermore, the result shows a positive relationship between the ownership 
levels of institutional shareholders (except for the domestic financial institutions) and 
insolvency risk levels at UK-listed banks. Meanwhile, except for the foreign financial and non-
financial institutions, the results show negative relationships between the ownership levels of 
institutional shareholders and the insolvency risk levels of Japan-listed banks. In summary, 
result (ch7.iii) concludes that a corporate governance approach to shareholder supremacy 
increases risk-taking. 
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8.2 Theoretical Implications 
The aim in this study is to understand the effects of board characteristics and director share 
ownerships, and institutional share ownerships on lending and risk-taking. A number of 
theoretical implications are found in this study.  
First, the results in chapter four find no relationship between internal controls (such as 
external directors, director share ownerships, or board experts) and insolvency risks. But, 
consistent with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the results show that internal 
control mechanisms lower impaired loan ratios. The results indicate that monitoring and 
bonding mechanisms – proposed by the agency framework – lower lending risks (ratios of 
impaired loans), but fail to lower the insolvency risks. This indicates that bank boards are likely 
to focus on lending strategies, but may overlook their overall bank risk strategies, or pursue 
other non-lending businesses such as derivatives trading. Therefore, in bank governance 
research, agency theory needs to be applied when considering bank risk strategies, which may 
sufficiently alter the understanding between monitoring mechanisms and risk-taking, and 
between bonding mechanism and risk-taking.  
Second, the results in the second part of chapter four offer some insights on agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The 
results show that (i) external directors raise the likelihood of banks participating in 
securitisation businesses, but (ii) financial experts decrease the likelihood. These results also 
highlight that Japan-listed banks are likely to hire external directors for the purpose of 
obtaining external resources, and to hire financial experts for monitoring purposes. Therefore, 
the results suggest that agency and resource dependency theories apply differently in the 
context of Japanese corporate governance.  
Third, the results in chapter five are consistent with Douma et al. (2006), which suggest that 
shareholders with investment objectives lead to different monitoring effects. The findings 
emphasise the roles played by foreign financial institutional shareholders and domestic 
governmental shareholders in monitoring the risk-taking behaviours of banks. Therefore, more 
theoretical research is required to incorporate the objectives of shareholders, and agency 
theory. 
Fourth, inconsistent with the substitution hypothesis (Williamson, 1983), the results of chapter 
six show that (i) internal directors complement regulatory monitoring, and (ii) external 
directors complement institutional shareholder monitoring. Moreover, possible causal linkages 
may exist between external directors and institutional shareholders, because institutional 
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shareholders may monitor bank boards directly, as well as appoint external directors as 
monitors. Lastly, the results in chapter seven emphasise the differences in the roles of 
institutional shareholders between UK-listed and Japan-listed banks. In examining bank 
governance, researchers are required to cautiously consider the institutional settings and 
regulatory environments. 
8.3 Policy Implications 
Aside from theoretical implications, a number of policy implications are proposed based on the 
empirical findings of this thesis. 
First, the results in chapter four find that banks with external directors are likely to urge their 
Japan-listed banks to take greater risks, which lead to increase in insolvency risk levels and the 
likelihood of participating in securitisation businesses. These findings offer insights into the 
current debates focusing on whether independent external directors are sufficient risk 
monitors. Policy makers should consider the consequences of promoting board independence 
as highlighted in Japan’s 2015 Corporate Governance Code, because independent external 
directors may induce risk-taking, instead of enhance risk monitoring. 
Second, the results in chapter five show that foreign financial institutional shareholders have 
negative impacts on risk-taking levels at banks. For example, foreign financial institutional 
shareholders are likely to forgo the interests of (domestic) stakeholders, and promote the 
interests of shareholders, such as shareholder wealth maximisation. From a policy perspective, 
although the existing regulations of most developed countries require foreign shareholders to 
seek approval form authorities prior to acquiring sufficient portions of bank shares. For 
example, the European Central Bank requires any (foreign or domestic) investors to seek 
approval when attempting to acquire more than 10 percent of shares in banks operating in the 
Eurozone (ECB, 2016). In the United States, according to the Bank Holding Company Act, 
foreign investors are required to seek approval from the Federal Reserve Board when 
attempting to acquire more than five percent of a bank’s shares (Seitzinger, 2013). Domestic 
regulators should also be required to consider the types of influences of foreign shareholders 
on their banking industries, and whether the objectives of foreign investors are compatible 
with those of the stakeholders of the banks whose shares are being acquired.  
Third, the results in chapter six show that the Japanese bank governance model is a system of 
complementary elements. The boards and regulators work cooperatively to monitor the 
managements of banks, with which they share similar objectives and pursue coherent policies, 
i.e. the survival of Japanese banks.  
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Fourth, the results in chapter six also show a negative relationship between internal director 
share ownerships and domestic financial institutional ownerships (the economic size of the 
coefficient on domestic financial institutional ownerships is consequential), but no relationship 
between internal director ownerships and institutional ownerships. This indicates that internal 
director ownerships reduce agency conflicts between management and domestic financial 
shareholders, and domestic financial shareholders act as key monitors on risk-taking at banks. 
Hence, the results highlight the relationships among domestic financial institutions in Japan.  
Fifth, the results in chapter seven show that the corporate governance approach to 
shareholder supremacy weakens risk monitoring at banks. The results offer important policy 
implications for the ongoing debates on the sufficiency of corporate governance mechanisms 
for risk monitoring for banks. Moreover, regulators should limit managerial incentive 
structures that promote shareholder values, and instead promote alternative managerial 
incentive structures to align their decision-making processes with the interests of their 
stakeholders (Llewellyn, 2002).  
8.4 The Limitations of the Research 
Although some of the results satisfy the robustness tests, they should be interpreted 
cautiously along with the following limitations.  
First, although the problems of endogenous, unobservable heteroskedasticity, and 
simultaneity have been addressed by the GMM Arellano Bond estimations, scholars argue that 
problems of weak instruments may arise when the number of lags of the instrumental 
variables increase (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Second, the sample size of the Japan-listed banks is relatively large compared to that of the 
UK-listed banks in chapter seven, and the unequal group sizes of these regression analyses 
may cause two problems: (i) derivations of confidence levels among groups, and (ii) increased 
effects of heterogeneity of variance (Rusticus and Lovato, 2014). 
Third, consistent with previous studies, this thesis only includes listed banks, and ignores other 
financial institutions such as trust banks and credit associations (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; 
Uchida and Tsutsui, 2005). However, it may not provide an overall picture of corporate 
governance of the Japanese banking industry. 
Fourth, although the technique of principal component analysis is used in chapter six, this 
thesis is not able to assess the effects of the substitution/complementary effects between 
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internal and external controls on lending and risk-taking, because of the presence of 
multicollinearity between the variables of internal and external controls. 
8.5 The Scope for Future Work 
This thesis highlights the problems of the corporate governance approach to shareholder 
supremacy, and its effectiveness when operating under frameworks of stakeholder supremacy. 
In this context, researchers could consider further studies on the Japanese corporate 
governance model, and compare the findings of current studies with countries operating 
under stakeholder frameworks. The following lists are suggested for future research. However, 
this list is not exhaustive. 
First, Herfindahl indices may be included when studying the effects of ownership structures. 
Herfindahl indices measure ownership concentrations and weight the effects of controlling 
shareholders (Baysinger et al., 1991; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).  
Second, future research could incorporate relationship lending in examining the effects of 
shareholder monitoring, because shareholders, who finance their businesses from bank 
borrowings, may have limited influences over the corporate affairs of their banks (Kanaya and 
Woo, 2000).  
Third, future work could focus on the relationships between disclosures, banks and regulators, 
in which regulatory monitoring may be ineffective as a result of information asymmetry 
(Suzuki, 2011a).  
Fourth, future research could test the effects of the granular levels of financial institutional 
shareholders on levels of lending (and risk-taking) at banks, because different types of financial 
institutional shareholders such as insurance companies, private equity companies, and banks 
are likely to have different investment objectives, which may affect levels of lending (and risk-
taking) at their investee banks 
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A. Appendix 
Table A.1 The list of the collected bank data. 
Country Bank Bank Name in Japanese 
Japan Aozora Bank （株）あおぞら銀行 
Japan Tomato Bank （株）トマト銀行 
Japan Fukuoka Financial Group （株）ふくおかフィナンシャルグループ 
Japan Hokuhoku Financial Group （株）ほくほくフィナンシャルグループ 
Japan Michinoku Bank （株）みちのく銀行 
Japan Minato Bank （株）みなと銀行 
Japan Resona Holdings （株）りそなホールディングス 
Japan 77 Bank （株）七十七銀行 
Japan Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group （株）三井住友フィナンシャルグループ 
Japan Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group （株）三菱ＵＦＪフィナンシャル・グループ 
Japan Mie Bank （株）三重銀行 
Japan Chu Kyo Bank （株）中京銀行 
Japan Chugoku Bank （株）中国銀行 
Japan Kei Yo Bank （株）京葉銀行 
Japan Kyoto Bank （株）京都銀行 
Japan Iyo Bank （株）伊予銀行 
Japan Saga Bank （株）佐賀銀行 
Japan Hachijuni Bank （株）八十二銀行 
Japan Hokkoku Bank （株）北國銀行 
Japan Kita-Nippon Bank （株）北日本銀行 
Japan North Pacific Bank （株）北洋銀行 
Japan Hokuetsu Bank （株）北越銀行 
Japan Eighteenth Bank （株）十八銀行 
Japan Juroku Bank,Ltd （株）十六銀行 
Japan Chiba Kogyo Bank （株）千葉興業銀行 
Japan Chiba Bank （株）千葉銀行 
Japan Nanto Bank （株）南都銀行 
Japan Bank of Nagoya （株）名古屋銀行 
Japan Shikoku Bank （株）四国銀行 
Japan Taiko Bank （株）大光銀行 
Japan Oita Bank Co. Ltd. （株）大分銀行 
Japan Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank （株）大垣共立銀行 
Japan Daito Bank （株）大東銀行 
Japan Miyazaki Taiyo Bank （株）宮崎太陽銀行 
Japan Miyazaki Bank （株）宮崎銀行 
Japan Yamaguchi Financial Group （株）山口フィナンシャルグループ 
Japan Yamagata Bank （株）山形銀行 
Japan Yamanashi Chuo Bank （株）山梨中央銀行 
(Table continues overleaf)  
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Table A.1 (table continues from the previous page) 
Country Bank Bank Name in Japanese 
Japan San-In Godo Bank （株）山陰合同銀行 
Japan Bank of Iwate （株）岩手銀行 
Japan Joyo Bank （株）常陽銀行 
Japan Hiroshima Bank （株）広島銀行 
Japan Ehime Bank （株）愛媛銀行 
Japan Aichi Bank （株）愛知銀行 
Japan Shinsei Bank （株）新生銀行 
Japan Tohoku Bank （株）東北銀行 
Japan Towa Bank （株）東和銀行 
Japan Higashi-Nippon Bank （株）東日本銀行 
Japan Toho Bank （株）東邦銀行 
Japan Tochigi Bank （株）栃木銀行 
Japan Bank of Yokohama （株）横浜銀行 
Japan Musashino Bank （株）武蔵野銀行 
Japan Bank of Okinawa （株）沖縄銀行 
Japan Shimizu Bank （株）清水銀行 
Japan Shiga Bank （株）滋賀銀行 
Japan Bank of Ryukyus （株）琉球銀行 
Japan Hyakugo Bank （株）百五銀行 
Japan Hyakujushi Bank （株）百十四銀行 
Japan Fukui Bank （株）福井銀行 
Japan Fukushima Bank （株）福島銀行 
Japan Akita Bank （株）秋田銀行 
Japan Daisan Bank （株）第三銀行 
Japan Daishi Bank （株）第四銀行 
Japan Tsukuba Bank （株）筑波銀行 
Japan Gunma Bank （株）群馬銀行 
Japan Higo Bank, Ltd （株）肥後銀行 
Japan Nishi-Nippon City Bank （株）西日本シティ銀行 
Japan Nagano Bank （株）長野銀行 
Japan Kansai Urban Banking Corporation （株）関西アーバン銀行 
Japan Awa Bank （株）阿波銀行 
Japan Aomori Bank （株）青森銀行 
Japan Shizuoka Bank （株）静岡銀行 
Japan Tottori Bank （株）鳥取銀行 
Japan Kagoshima Bank （株）鹿児島銀行 
Japan Suruga Bank Ltd. （株）スルガ銀行 
Japan Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings （株）三井住友トラスト・ホールディングス 
UK HSBC Holdings   
UK Lloyds Banking Group   
UK Barclays   
UK Royal Bank of Scotland Group   
UK Standard Chartered   
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Table A.2 The Bankscope data used to construct the disclosure index. 
Assets/Liabilities Index Bankscope Items 
Assets S1: Loans by maturity Loans & Advances to Customers < 3 months 
Assets S1: Loans by maturity Loans & Advances to Customers 3 - 12 Months 
Assets S1: Loans by maturity Loans and Advances to Customers 1 - 5 Years 
Assets S1: Loans by maturity Loans & Advances  to Customers > 5  years 
Assets S1: Loans by maturity Loans & Advances to Banks < 3 Months 
Assets S1: Loans by maturity Loans & Advances to Banks 3 - 12 Months 
Assets S1: Loans by maturity Loans & Advances to Banks 1 - 5 Years 
Assets S1: Loans by maturity Loans & Advances to Banks > 5 Years 
Assets S1: Loans by maturity 
Loans and Advances to banks (<3 Months to 
maturity) 
Assets S2: Loans by type Residential Mortgage Loans 
Assets S2: Loans by type Other Mortgage Loans 
Assets S2: Loans by type Commercial Mortgages 
Assets S2: Loans by type Lease Financing 
Assets S2: Loans by type Other Consumer/Retail Loans 
Assets S2: Loans by type Other Loans 
Assets S3: Loans by counterparty Other Loans & Advances to Banks 
Assets S3: Loans by counterparty Loans to other public institutions 
Assets S3: Loans by counterparty Loans to/guaranteed by sovereigns 
Assets S3: Loans by counterparty Loans to public institutions in arrear (memo) 
Assets S3: Loans by counterparty Loans to private sector 
Assets S3: Loans by counterparty Loans to private sector in arrear (memo) 
Assets S4: Problem loans Impaired Loans (Memo) 
Assets S4: Problem loans Overdue Receivables 
Assets S4: Problem loans Restructured Loans 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Investment securities - Treasury Bills, listed 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Investment securities - Treasury Bills, not listed 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Trading securities - Treasury Bills, listed 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Trading securities - Treasury Bills, not listed 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Covered Bonds 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Investment debt securities (bonds, shares,...) - 
(if no split) 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Investment debt securities (bonds, shares,...) - 
trading 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Investment debt securities (bonds, shares,...) - 
held for sale 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Investment debt securities (bonds, shares,...) - 
investment 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Convertible bonds 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Warrant bonds 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Bonds, options and other fixed income 
securities 
Assets 
S6: Securities by type (detailed 
breakdown) 
Equity investment 
Assets S8: Securities by holding purpose Investment securities - other securities, listed 
Assets S8: Securities by holding purpose 
Investment securities - other securities, not 
listed 
Assets S8: Securities by holding purpose Investment securities - shares, listed 
Assets S8: Securities by holding purpose Investment securities - shares, not listed 
Assets S5: Problem loans by type Overdue Receivables 
(Table continues overleaf)
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Table A.2 (table continues from the previous page) 
Assets/Liabilities Index Bankscope Items 
Assets S5: Problem loans by type Overdue Receivables 
Assets S5: Problem loans by type Restructured Loans 
Assets 
S7: Securities by type (coarse 
breakdown) 
Other Securities 
Assets 
S7: Securities by type (coarse 
breakdown) 
Memo: Government Securities Included Above 
Liabilities S10: Deposit by type of customer Deposits from Banks 
Liabilities S10: Deposit by type of customer Deposits & Short term funding 
Liabilities S9: Deposits by maturity Retail Deposits < 3 months 
Liabilities S9: Deposits by maturity Retail Deposits 3 - 12 Months 
Liabilities S9: Deposits by maturity Retail Deposits 1 - 5 Years 
Liabilities S9: Deposits by maturity Retail Deposits > 5 Years 
Liabilities S9: Deposits by maturity Other Deposits < 3 Months 
Liabilities S9: Deposits by maturity Other Deposits 3 - 12 Months 
Liabilities S9: Deposits by maturity Other Deposits 1 - 5 Years 
Liabilities S9: Deposits by maturity Other Deposits > 5 Years 
Liabilities S13: Reserves Loan Loss Reserves (Memo) 
Liabilities S14: Capital Total Capital 
Liabilities S14: Capital Tier 1 Ratio % 
Liabilities S14: Capital Tier 1 Capital 
Liabilities S15: Contingent Liabilities Other Contingent Liabilities 
Liabilities S16: Off-Balance Sheet Items 
First Loss Tranches of Off-Balance Sheet 
Securitizations 
Liabilities S16: Off-Balance Sheet Items 
Managed Securitized Assets Reported Off-
Balance Sheet 
Liabilities S18: Loan Loss Provisions Loan Loss Provisions 
Liabilities S16: Off-Balance Sheet Items 
Other Off-Balance Sheet Exposure to 
Securitizations 
Liabilities S10: Deposit by type of customer Customer Deposits - Savings 
Liabilities NA 
Deposits with banks, advances payable on 
demand 
Liabilities NA Convertible bonds 
Liabilities NA Total Subordinated Debt on Balance Sheet 
Liabilities NA Money Market Instruments 
Liabilities S12: Long-term funding Convertible bonds 
Liabilities S12: Long-term funding Residential Mortgage Loans 
Liabilities S12: Long-term funding Other Mortgage Loans 
Liabilities S12: Long-term funding Subordinated Debts (Memo) 
Liabilities S12: Long-term funding Subordinated Long-Term Debt 
Liabilities S12: Long-term funding 
Hybrid capital/near equity/qualifying perpetual 
debt 
Liabilities S15: Contingent Liabilities Other Contingent Liabilities 
Liabilities S17: Non-interest Income Commission & fees income 
Liabilities S17: Non-interest Income Others - Net Trading Income 
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B. Appendix 
The financial disclosure index (Disc) used in this thesis was constructed based on the 
methodology proposed by Nier and Baumann (2006). The accounting information was 
extracted from the Bankscope database, and was then mapped into the 18 sub-indices listed in 
Table A.2 of Appendix A. 
The financial disclosure index (Disc) is defined as: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 =  
1
20
∑ 𝑆𝑖
18
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑆𝑖 is each sub-index listed in Table A.2. 
To construct the financial disclosure index (Disc), 𝑆𝑖 equals 1 if there is an entry in the 
Bankscope database, otherwise, 𝑆𝑖 equals 0. For the capital index S14, 𝑆𝑖 equals 1 if there is 
one entry; 𝑆𝑖 equals 2 if there are two entries; and 𝑆𝑖 equals 3 if there are three or four entries.  
 
 
257 
 
References  
Abe, M., Hoshi, T., 2008. Corporate Finance and Human Resources Management in Japan, in: 
Aoki, M., Jackson, G., Miyajima, H. (Eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan : Institutional 
Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 257–281. 
Acharya, V.V., Schnabl, P., Suarez, G., 2013. Securitization Without Risk Transfer. J. Financ. 
Econ. 107, 515–536. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.004 
Aditi Gupta, David Otley, Steven Young, 2008. Does Superior Firm Performance Lead to Higher 
Quality Outside Directorships? Account. Audit. Account. J. 21, 907–932. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513570810907410 
Adler, G., Djigbenou, M.-L., Sosa, S., 2016. Global Financial Shocks and Foreign Asset 
Repatriation: Do Local Investors Play a Stabilizing Role? J. Int. Money Finance 60, 8–28. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.03.007 
Adrian, T., Shin, H.S., 2009. The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial Regulation. 
Fed. Reserve Bank N. Y. Staff Rep. 
Agoraki, M.-E.K., Delis, M.D., Pasiouras, F., 2011. Regulations, Competition and Bank Risk-
Taking in Transition Countries. J. Financ. Stab. 7, 38–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2009.08.002 
Aguilera, R.V., 2005. Corporate Governance and Director Accountability: an Institutional 
Comparative Perspective. Br. J. Manag. 16, S39–S53. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8551.2005.00446.x 
Aguilera, R.V., Cuervo-Cazurra, A., 2004. Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: What is the 
Trigger? Organ. Stud. 25, 415–443. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840604040669 
Ahmadjian, C., 2008. Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance in Japan, in: Aoki, M., 
Jackson, G., Miyajima, H. (Eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change 
and Organizational Diversity. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, pp. 125–150. 
Ahmadjian, C.L., 2000. Changing Japanese Corporate Governance. Jpn. Econ. 28, 59–84. 
https://doi.org/10.2753/JES1097-203X280659 
Ahmadjian, C.L., Robbins, G.E., 2005. A Clash of Capitalisms: Foreign Shareholders and 
Corporate Restructuring in 1990s Japan. Am. Sociol. Rev. 70, 451–471. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240507000305 
Ahmadjian, C.L., Robinson, P., 2001. Safety in Numbers: Downsizing and the 
Deinstitutionalization of Permanent Employment in Japan. Adm. Sci. Q. 46, 622–654. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3094826 
Alam, M., 2006. Stakeholder Theory, in: Hoque, Z. (Ed.), Methodological Issues in Accounting 
Research: Theories, Methods and Issues. Spiramus Press Ltd., pp. 207–222. 
Ali, A., Clarke, G.M., Trustrum, K., 1985. Principal Component Analysis Applied to Some Data 
from Fruit Nutrition Experiments. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. Stat. 34, 365–370. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2987824 
Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Comparing Financial Systems. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
 
258 
 
Allison, P.D., 1984. Event History Analysis: Regression for Longitudinal Event Data, Sage 
University Papers. Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. Sage Publications, 
Beverly Hills, Calif. 
Allison, P.D., 1982. Discrete-Time Methods for the Analysis of Event Histories. Sociol. 
Methodol. 13, 61–98. 
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J.C., Starks, L.T., 2005. Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of 
Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation. Financ. Manag. 34, 5–34. 
Altunbas, Y., Gambacorta, L., Marques-Ibanez, D., 2009. Securitisation and the Bank Lending 
Channel. Eur. Econ. Rev. 53, 996–1009. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.03.004 
Ambrose, B.W., Lacour-Little, M., Sanders, A.B., 2005. Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 
Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization? J. Financ. Serv. Res. 28, 
113–133. 
Anderson, C.W., Campbell II, T.L., 2004. Corporate Governance of Japanese Banks. J. Corp. 
Finance 10, 327–354. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00029-4 
Anderson, C.W., Campbell II, T.L., 2000. Restructuring the Japanese Banking System has Japan 
Gone Far Enough? Spec. Issue Int. Mergers Acquis. 9, 197–218. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-5219(00)00029-6 
Anderson, R.C., Fraser, D.R., 2000. Corporate Control, Bank Risk Taking, and the Health of the 
Banking industry. J. Bank. Finance 24, 1383–1398. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(99)00088-6 
Andres, P. de, Vallelado, E., 2008. Corporate Governance in Banking: The Role of the Board of 
Directors. J. Bank. Finance 32, 2570–2580. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.008 
Angbazo, L., 1997. Commercial Bank Net Interest Margins, Default Risk, Interest-Rate Risk, and 
Off-Balance Sheet Banking. J. Bank. Finance 21, 55–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(96)00025-8 
Aoki, M., 2001. Comparative Corporate Governance, in: Toward a Comparative Institutional 
Analysis, Comparative Institutional Analysis. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, pp. 279–306. 
Aoki, M., 2000. Information, Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity: 
Competitiveness in Japan, the USA, and the Transitional Economies. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford ; New York. 
Aoki, M., 1994a. Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Bank System: An Analytical and 
Development View, in: Aoki, M., Patrick, H.T. (Eds.), The Japanese Main Bank System: 
Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford [England] ; New York, pp. 109–141. 
Aoki, M., 1994b. The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional 
Complementarity. Int. Econ. Rev. 35, 657–676. https://doi.org/10.2307/2527079 
Aoki, M., Jackson, G., Miyajima, H. (Eds.), 2008. Corporate Governance in Japan : Institutional 
Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
 
259 
 
Aoki, M., Patrick, H.T. (Eds.), 1994. The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for 
Developing and Transforming Economies. Oxford University Press, Oxford [England] ; 
New York. 
Aoki, M., Patrick, H.T., Sheard, P., 1994. The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory 
Overview, in: Aoki, M., Patrick, H.T. (Eds.), The Japanese Main Bank System: Its 
Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford [England] ; New York, pp. 1–50. 
Araki, T., 2009. Changes in Japan’s Practice-Dependent Stakeholder Model and Employee-
Centered Corporate Governance, in: Whittaker, D.H., Deakin, S.F. (Eds.), Corporate 
Governance and Managerial Reform in Japan. Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New 
York, pp. 222–253. 
Araki, T., 2005a. Corporate Governance Reforms, Labor Law Developments, and the Future of 
Japan’s Practice-Dependent Stakeholder Model. Jpn. Labor Rev. 2, 26–57. 
Araki, T., 2005b. Corporate Governance Reforms, Labor Law Developments, and the Future of 
Japan’s Practice-Dependent Stakeholder Model. Jpn. Labor Rev. 2, 26–57. 
Arcot, S., Bruno, V., Faure-Grimaud, A., 2010. Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply 
or Explain Approach Working? Int. Rev. Law Econ. 30, 193–201. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2010.03.002 
Arellano, M., 2003. Panel Data Econometrics, Advanced Texts in Econometrics. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford ; New York. 
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence 
and an Application to Employment Equations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 58, 277–297. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2297968 
Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-
Components Models. J. Econom. 68, 29–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-
4076(94)01642-D 
Ariga, K., 2000. Internal labour markets in Japan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Aronson, B.E., 2011. A Japanese Calpers or a New Model for Institutional Investor Activism - 
Japan’s Pension Fund Association and the Emergence of Shareholder Activism in Japan. 
NYU J. Law Bus. 571–640. 
Baba, N., Inada, M., 2009. Why do Japanese Regional Banks Issue Subordinated Debts? Jpn. 
World Econ. 21, 358–364. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.japwor.2009.03.001 
Backer, L.C., 2002. Comparative Corporate Law : United States, European Union, China, and 
Japan : Cases and Materials. Carolina Academic Press, Durham, N.C. 
Bai, C.-E., Liu, Q., Lu, J., Song, F.M., Zhang, J., 2004. Corporate Governance and Market 
Valuation in China. J. Comp. Econ. 32, 599–616. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2004.07.002 
Bainbridge, S.M., 2002. Why a Board - Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance. 
Vanderbilt Law Rev. 55, 1. 
Baltagi, B.H., 1995. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Wiley, Chichester ; New York. 
 
 
260 
 
Bank of England, 2014. Trends in Lending. 
Barney, J.B., 1990. The Debate between Traditional Management Theory and Organizational 
Economics: Substantive Differences or Intergroup Conflict? Acad. Manage. Rev. 15, 
382–393. https://doi.org/10.2307/258014 
Barry, T.A., Lepetit, L., Tarazi, A., 2011. Ownership Structure and Risk in Publicly Held and 
Privately Owned Banks. J. Bank. Finance 35, 1327–1340. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.10.004 
Barth, J.R., Caprio Jr., G., Levine, R., 2004. Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best? 
Bank Cap. Adequacy Regul. New Basel Accord 13, 205–248. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2003.06.002 
Battaglia, F., Gallo, A., 2017. Strong Boards, Ownership Concentration and EU Banks’ Systemic 
Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Financial Crisis. J. Int. Financ. Mark. Inst. Money 46, 
128–146. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2016.08.002 
Baysinger, B.D., Kosnik, R.D., Turk, T.A., 1991. Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on 
Corporate R&D Strategy. Acad. Manage. J. 34, 205–214. 
BCBS, 2016a. Standards - Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book. 
BCBS (Ed.), 2016b. Literature Review on integration of Regulatory Capital and Liquidity 
Instruments, Working Paper. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for 
International Settlements, Basel. 
BCBS, 2011. Report on Asset Securitisation Incentives. Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. 
BCBS, 2000. Principles for the Management of Credit Risk. 
Becher, D.A., Frye, M.B., 2011. Does Regulation Substitute Or Complement Governance? 
Australas. Finance Conf. Glob. Financ. Crisis Int. Financ. Archit. Regul. 35, 736–751. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.09.003 
Beck, T., Levine, R., 2004. Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence. J. Bank. Finance 
28, 423–442. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00408-9 
Berger, A.N., Clarke, G.R.G., Cull, R., Klapper, L., Udell, G.F., 2005. Corporate Governance and 
Bank Performance: A Joint Analysis of the Static, Selection, and Dynamic Effects of 
Domestic, Foreign, and State Ownership. J. Bank. Finance 29, 2179–2221. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.03.013 
Berger, A.N., Kick, T., Schaeck, K., 2014. Executive Board Composition and Bank Risk Taking. 
Board Room 28, 48–65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.006 
Berger, A.N., Udell, G.F., 2002. Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The 
Importance of Bank Organisational Structure. Econ. J. 112, F32–F53. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00682 
Berle, A.A., Means, G.C., 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Macmillan, New 
York. 
 
 
261 
 
Bernanke, B.S., Blinder, A.S., 1988. Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand. Am. Econ. Rev. 78, 
435–439. 
Bhagat, S., Black, B., 1999. The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance. Bus. Lawyer 54, 921–963. 
Bhagat, S., Bolton, B., 2008. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. J. Corp. Finance 14, 
257–273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.006 
Bikker, J.A., Spierdijk, L., 2008. How Banking Competition Changed Over Time (Discussion 
Paper Series No. 08–04). Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht University. 
Bin-Sariman, A.S., Ali, A., Nor, M.N.M., 2016. Board of Directors’ Quality and Firms’ Debt 
Financing: The Moderating Effect of Insider Ownership--Evidence from Omani Firms. 
Appl. Econ. 48, 402–410. 
Black, B.S., Love, I., Rachinsky, A., 2006. Corporate Governance Indices and Firms’ Market 
Values: Time Series Evidence from Russia. Financ. Mark. Dev. Cent. East. Eur. Ctries. 7, 
361–379. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2006.09.004 
Black, F., 1975. Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market. J. Financ. Econ. 2, 323–339. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(75)90008-2 
Blackwell, D.W., Winters, D.B., 1997. Banking Relationships and the Effect of Monitoring on 
Loan Pricing. J. Financ. Res. 20, 275–289. 
Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data 
Models. J. Econom. 87, 115–143. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00009-8 
Blundell-Wignall, A., Atkinson, P.E., Lee, S.H., 2008. The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and 
Policy Issues. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Bolton, P., Freixas, X., Gambacorta, L., Mistrulli, P.E., 2013. Relationship and Transaction 
Lending in a Crisis (BIS Working Papers No. 417). Bank for International Settlements. 
Bonin, J.P., Hasan, I., Wachtel, P., 2005. Bank Performance, Efficiency and Ownership in 
Transition Countries. Bank. Financ. Sect. Transit. Emerg. Mark. Econ. 29, 31–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.06.015 
Bonn, I., Yoshikawa, T., Phan, P.H., 2004. Effects of Board Structure on Firm Performance: A 
Comparison Between Japan and Australia. Asian Bus. Manag. 3, 105–125. 
Boot, A.W.A., Thakor, A.V., 2000. Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition? J. Finance 55, 
679–713. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00223 
Booth, J.R., Deli, D.N., 1999. On Executives of Financial Institutions as Outside Directors. J. 
Corp. Finance 5, 227–250. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(99)00004-8 
Boubaker, S., Nguyen, D.K. (Eds.), 2015. Corporate Governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Emerging Markets Focus. World Scientific, New Jersey. 
Boyd, J.H., Chang, C., Smith, B.D., 1998. Moral Hazard under Commercial and Universal 
Banking. J. Money Credit Bank. 30, 426–468. https://doi.org/10.2307/2601249 
 
 
262 
 
Boyd, J.H., De Nicoló, G., 2005. The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited. J. 
Finance 60, 1329–1343. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00763.x 
Brickley, J.A., James, C.M., 1987. The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and 
Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking. J. Law Econ. 30, 161–180. 
Buch, C.M., DeLong, G., 2008. Do Weak Supervisory Systems Encourage Bank Risk-Taking? J. 
Financ. Stab. 4, 23–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2007.12.002 
Bushee, B.J., Carter, M.E., Gerakos, J., 2014. Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms. J. Manag. Account. Res. 26, 123–149. 
Bushman, R.M., Piotroski, J.D., Smith, A.J., 2004. What Determines Corporate Transparency? J. 
Account. Res. 42, 207–252. 
Cameron, A.C., Miller, D.L., 2015. A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference. J. Hum. 
Resour. 50, 317–372. 
Cameron, A.C., Trivedi, P.K., 2010. Microeconometrics using Stata. Stata Press, College Station, 
Tex. 
Canada, D., Oct/Nov2004. The Importance of Auditing the Asset/Liability Management 
Process. Bank Account. Finance 08943958 17, 17–22. 
Cardone-Riportella, C., Samaniego-Medina, R., Trujillo-Ponce, A., 2010. What Drives Bank 
Securitisation? The Spanish Experience. J. Bank. Finance 34, 2639–2651. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.05.003 
Cargill, T.F., 2000. What Caused Japan’s Banking Crisis?, in: Hoshi, T., Patrick, H.T. (Eds.), Crisis 
and Change in the Japanese Financial System, Innovations in Financial Markets and 
Institutions. Kluwer Academic, Boston, pp. 37–58. 
Casu, B., Clare, A., Sarkisyan, A., Thomas, S., 2011. Does Securitization Reduce Credit Risk 
Taking? Empirical Evidence from US Bank Holding Companies. Eur. J. Finance 17, 769–
788. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2010.538526 
Cebenoyan, A.S., Strahan, P.E., 2004. Risk Management, Capital Structure and Lending at 
Banks. J. Bank. Finance 28, 19–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00391-6 
Cecchetti, S.G., Kharroubi, E., 2015. Why Does Financial Sector Growth Crowd Out Real 
Economic Growth? (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10642). Social Science Research 
Network. 
Chan, E.H.P., Davies, M.R.L., Gyntelberg, J., 2006. The Role of Government-Supported Housing 
Finance Agencies in Asia. BIS Q. Rev. Dec. 
Charkham, J.P., Ploix, H., 2008. Keeping Better Company: Corporate Governance Ten Years On, 
2nd ed. ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York. 
Choe, H., Kho, B.-C., Stulz, R.M., 2004. Do Domestic Investors Have an Edge? The Trading 
Experience of Foreign Investors in Korea. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Ciancanelli, P., Reyes-Gonzalez, J.A., 2000. Corporate Governance in Banking: A Conceptual 
Framework (No. 253714). Social Science Research Network. 
 
 
263 
 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H.., 2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East 
Asian Corporations. Spec. Issue Int. Corp. Gov. 58, 81–112. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00067-2 
Claessens, S., Fan, J.P., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H., 1999. On Expropriation of Minority 
Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia. 
Cohen, B.H., 2013. How Have Banks Adjusted to Higher Capital Requirements? (BIS Quarterly 
Review). Bank for International Settlements. 
Conway, D.A., Roberts, H.V., 1983. Reverse Regression, Fairness, and Employment 
Discrimination. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 1, 75–85. https://doi.org/10.2307/1391775 
Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., Larcker, D.F., 1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive officer 
Compensation, and Firm Performance. J. Financ. Econ. 51, 371–406. 
Cornell, B., Shapiro, A.C., 1987. Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance. Financ. Manag. 
16, 5–14. https://doi.org/10.2307/3665543 
Coval, J.D., Moskowitz, T.J., 1999. Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic 
Portfolios. J. Finance 54, 2045–2073. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00181 
Cox, D.R., 1972. Regression Models and Life-Tables. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. B Methodol. 34, 187–
220. 
Crotty, M., 1998. The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the 
Research Process. Sage Publications, London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. 
Daily, C.M., Dalton, D.R., Cannella Jr., A.A., 2003. Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue 
and Data. Acad. Manage. Rev. 28, 371–382. 
Dass, N., Kini, O., Nanda, V., Onal, B., Wang, J., 2014. Board Expertise: Do Directors from 
Related Industries Help Bridge the Information Gap? Rev. Financ. Stud. 27, 1533–1592. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht071 
Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D., Donaldson, L., 1997. Toward a Stewardship Theory of 
Management. Acad. Manage. Rev. 22, 20–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/259223 
De Nicolo, G., 2000. Size, Charter Value and Risk in Banking: An international Perspective. 
Board Gov. Fed. Reserve Syst., International Finance Discussion Papers. 
De Nicolò, G., Loukoianova, E., 2007. Bank Ownership, Market Structure and Risk (IMF Working 
Paper No. WP/07/215). International Monetary Fund. 
Deeg, R., Jackson, G., 2007. Towards a More Dynamic Theory of Capitalist Variety. Socio-Econ. 
Rev. 5, 149–179. 
Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences. 
J. Polit. Econ. 93, 1155–1177. 
Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance. J. Corp. 
Finance 7, 209–233. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00020-7 
Demsetz, R.S., Saidenberg, M.R., Strahan, P.E., 1997. Agency Problems and Risk Taking at 
Banks. Fed. Reserve Bank N. Y. Staff Rep. 29. 
 
 
264 
 
Demski, J.S., Feltham, G.A., 1978. Economic Incentives in Budgetary Control Systems. Account. 
Rev. 53, 336–359. 
Denis, D.J., Denis, D.K., Sarin, A., 1997. Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover. J. 
Financ. Econ. 45, 193–221. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00016-0 
Dewenter, K.L., Han, X., Malatesta, P.H., 2010. Firm Values and Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investments. J. Financ. Econ. 98, 256–278. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.05.006 
Dewenter, K.L., Hess, A.C., 2000. Risks and Returns in Relationship and Transactional Banks: 
Evidence from Banks’ Returns in Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S., in: Harker, 
P.T., Zenios, S.A. (Eds.), Performance of Financial Institutions: Efficiency, Innovation, 
Regulation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY, USA, pp. 443–
461. 
Dewenter, K.L., Warther, V.A., 1998. Dividends, Asymmetric Information, and Agency Conflicts: 
Evidence from a Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms. J. 
Finance 53, 879–904. 
Deyoung, R., Nolle, D.E., 1996. Foreign-Owned Banks in the United States: Earning Market 
Share or Buying It? J. Money Credit Bank. 28, 622–636. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2078074 
Dickerson, A.P., Gibson, H.D., Tsakalotos, E., 1998. Takeover Risk and Dividend Strategy: A 
Study of UK Firms. J. Ind. Econ. 46, 281–300. 
Dieleman, J.L., Templin, T., 2014. Random-Effects, Fixed-Effects and the Within-Between 
Specification for Clustered Data in Observational Health Studies: A Simulation Study. 
Plos One 9, e110257–e110257. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0110257 
Dionne, G., Harchaoui, T.M., 2008. Banks’ Capital, Securitization and Credit Risk: An Empirical 
Evidence for Canada. Insur. Risk Manag. 75, 459–485. 
Dodd, E.M., 1932. For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? Harv. Law Rev. 45, 1145–
1163. https://doi.org/10.2307/1331697 
Donaldson, L., 1990. The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and Management Theory. 
Acad. Manage. Rev. 15, 369–381. https://doi.org/10.2307/258013 
Donaldson, L., Davis, J.H., 1991. Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and 
Shareholder Returns. Aust. J. Manag. 16, 49–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/031289629101600103 
Donaldson, T., 2012. The Epistemic Fault Line in Corporate Governance. Acad. Manage. Rev. 
37, 256–271. 
Donaldson, T., Preston, L.E., 1995. The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, and Implications. Acad. Manage. Rev. 20, 65–91. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1995.9503271992 
Dong, M., Ozkan, A., 2008. Institutional Investors and Director Pay: An Empirical Study of UK 
Companies. Int. Perspect. Exec. Compens. 18, 16–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mulfin.2007.06.001 
 
 
265 
 
Dore, R., 2008. Insider Management and Board Reform: For Whose Benefit?, in: Aoki, M., 
Jackson, G., Miyajima, H. (Eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan : Institutional Change 
and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 330–369. 
Dore, R.P., 2000. Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany Versus the 
Anglo-Saxons. Oxford University Press, Oxford [UK] ;a New York. 
Dormann, C.F., Elith, J., Bacher, S., Buchmann, C., Carl, G., Carré, G., Marquéz, J.R.G., Gruber, 
B., Lafourcade, B., Leitão, P.J., Münkemüller, T., McClean, C., Osborne, P.E., Reineking, 
B., Schröder, B., Skidmore, A.K., Zurell, D., Lautenbach, S., 2013. Collinearity: A Review 
of Methods to Deal with It and a Simulation Study Evaluating their Performance. 
Ecography 36, 27–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0587.2012.07348.x 
Douma, S., George, R., Kabir, R., 2006. foreign and Domestic Ownership, Business Groups, and 
Firm Performance: Evidence from a Large Emerging Market. Strateg. Manag. J. 27, 
637–657. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.535 
Duffee, G.R., Zhou, C., 2001. Credit Derivatives in Banking: Useful tools for Managing Risk? J. 
Monet. Econ. 48, 25–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00063-0 
Dunkley, E., 2015. UK Banks Stem Domestic Loan Losses [WWW Document]. Financ. Times. 
URL https://www.ft.com/content/72a9262a-ddd9-11e4-9d29-00144feab7de (accessed 
8.25.17). 
Dynan, K.E., Elmendorf, D.W., Sichel, D.E., 2006. Can Financial Innovation Help to Explain the 
Reduced Volatility of Economic Activity? J. Monet. Econ. 53, 123–150. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.10.012 
ECB, 2016. What is a Qualifying Holding? [WWW Document]. Eur. Cent. Bank Bank. Superv. 
URL 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/ssmexplained/html/qh.en.html 
(accessed 9.5.17). 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and Review. Acad. Manage. Rev. 14, 
57–74. 
Elsas, R., Krahnen, J.P., 1998. Is Relationship Lending Special? Evidence from Credit-File Data in 
Germany. J. Bank. Finance 22, 1283–1316. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(98)00063-6 
Eng, L.L., Mak, Y.T., 2003. Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure. J. Account. Public 
Policy 22, 325–345. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0278-4254(03)00037-1 
Erkens, D.H., Hung, M., Matos, P., 2012. Corporate Governance in the 2007–2008 Financial 
Crisis: Evidence from Financial institutions Worldwide. J. Corp. Finance 18, 389–411. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.005 
Estrella, A., 2002. Securitization and the Efficacy of Monetary Policy. Fed. Reserve Bank N. Y. 
Econ. Policy Rev. 8, 241–255. 
Fahlenbrach, R., Stulz, R.M., 2011. Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis. J. Financ. Econ. 
99, 11–26. 
 
 
266 
 
Falck, O., Heblich, S., 2007. Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing Well By Doing Good. Bus. 
Horiz. 50, 247–254. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2006.12.002 
Fama, E.F., 1985. What’s Different About Banks? J. Monet. Econ. 15, 29–39. 
Fama, E.F., 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. J. Polit. Econ. 88, 288–307. 
Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1985. Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions. J. Financ. Econ. 
14, 101–119. 
Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983a. Separation of Ownership and Control. J. Law Econ. 26, 301–
325. https://doi.org/10.2307/725104 
Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983b. Agency Problems and Residual Claims. J. Law Econ. 26, 327–
349. https://doi.org/10.2307/725105 
Fan, J.P.., Wong, T.., 2002. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of 
Accounting Earnings in East Asia. J. Account. Econ. 33, 401–425. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00047-2 
Fernández, C., Arrondo, R., 2005. Alternative Internal Controls as Substitutes of the Board of 
Directors. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 13, 856–866. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2005.00476.x 
Ferreira, D., Kirchmaier, T., Metzger, D., 2010. Boards of Banks. ECGI-Finance Work. Pap. 
Financial Services Agency, 2014. Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors ≪Japan’s 
Stewardship Code≫ － To Promote Sustainable Growth of Companies through 
Investment and Dialogue. 
Fotak, V., Bortolotti, B., Megginson, W., Miracky, W., 2008. The Financial Impact of Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Investments in Listed Companies. ResearchGate. 
Frankel, A.B., Morgan, P.B., 1992. Deregulation and Competition in Japanese Banking. Fed. 
Reserve Bull. 579–593. 
Franks, J., Mayer, C., 1997. Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany, and 
France. J. Appl. Corp. Finance 9, 30–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-
6622.1997.tb00622.x 
FRC, 2014. The UK Corporate Governance Code. 
FRC, 2012. The UK Corporate Governance Code. 
FRC, 2009a. Review of the Effectiveness of the Combined Code: Summary of the Main Points 
Raised in Responses to the March 2009 Call for Evidence. 
FRC, 2009b. The UK Stewardship Code. 
FRC, 2003. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance. Financial Reporting Council. 
Freeman, R.E., McVea, J., 2001. A stakeholder approach to strategic management. 
French, K.R., Poterba, J.M., 1991. Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
 
267 
 
Fukukawa, K., Moon, J., 2004. A Japanese Model of Corporate Social Responsibility? J. Corp. 
Citizsh. 45–59. 
Fung, S., Tsai, S.-C., 2012. Institutional Ownership and Corporate Investment Performance. 
Rev. Can. Sci. Adm. J. Adm. Sci. 29, 348–365. 
Furfine, C., 2001. Bank Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Capital Requirements, Regulatory 
Monitoring, and Economic Conditions. J. Financ. Serv. Res. 20, 33–56. 
Furlong, F.T., Keeley, M.C., 1989. Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking: A Note. J. Bank. 
Finance 13, 883–891. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(89)90008-3 
Galloway, T.M., Lee, W.B., Roden, D.M., 1997. Banks’ Changing Incentives and Opportunities 
for Risk Taking. J. Bank. Finance 21, 509–527. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(96)00052-0 
Gambacorta, L., Mistrulli, P.E., 2004. Does Bank Capital affect Lending Behavior? J. Financ. 
Intermediation 13, 436–457. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2004.06.001 
García-Kuhnert, Y., Marchica, M.-T., Mura, R., 2015. Shareholder Diversification and Bank Risk-
Taking. J. Financ. Intermediation 24, 602–635. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2015.03.001 
García-Marco, T., Robles-Fernández, M.D., 2008. Risk-Taking Behaviour and Ownership in the 
Banking Industry: The Spanish Evidence. J. Econ. Bus. 60, 332–354. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.04.008 
Gedajlovic, E., Shapiro, D.M., 2002. Ownership Structure and Firm Profitability in Japan. Acad. 
Manage. J. 45, 565–575. 
Gedajlovic, E., Yoshikawa, T., Hashimoto, M., 2005. Ownership Structure, Investment 
Behaviour and Firm Performance in Japanese Manufacturing Industries. Organ. Stud. 
26, 7–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840605046346 
Gehrig, T., 1993. An Information Based Explanation of the Domestic Bias in International Equity 
Investment. Scand. J. Econ. 95, 97–109. https://doi.org/10.2307/3440137 
Gibson, M.S., 1998. “Big Bang” Deregulation and Japanese Corporate Governance: A Survey of 
the Issues. Federal Reserve Banks. 
Gietzmann, M., Marra, A., Pettinicchio, A., 2016. Comment Letter Frequency and CFO 
Turnover: A Dynamic Survival Analysis. J. Account. Audit. Finance 31, 79–99. 
Gillan, S., Hartzell, J.C., Starks, L.T., 2003. Explaining corporate governance: Boards, bylaws, 
and charter provisions (Working Paper Series No. 2003– 03). University of Delaware. 
Gillan, S.L., Starks, L.T., 2003. Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of 
Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective. J. Appl. Finance 13, 4–22. 
Gilson, R.J., Milhaupt, C.J., 2007. Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A 
Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism. Stanford Law Rev. 60, 1345–1370. 
Gilson, R.J., Roe, M.J., 1993. Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between 
Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization. Yale Law J. 102, 871–906. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/796835 
 
 
268 
 
Gomez-Gonzalez, J.E., Kiefer, N.M., 2009. Bank Failure: Evidence from the Colombian Financial 
Crisis. Int. J. Bus. Finance Res. 3. 
Gompers, P.A., Metrick, A., 2001. Institutional Investors and Equity Prices. Q. J. Econ. 116, 229–
259. 
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., Boeker, W., 1994. The Effects of Board Size and Diversity on 
Strategic Change. Strateg. Manag. J. 15, 241–250. 
Gordon, L.A., Pound, J., 1993. Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: 
Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals. J. Finance 48, 
697–718. 
Grabowiecki, J., 2006. Keiretsu groups: Their Role in the Japanese Economy and a Reference 
Point (or a paradigm) for Other Countries, V. R. F. Series. Institute of Developing 
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization. 
Graves, S.B., Waddock, S.A., 1990. Institutional Ownership and Control: Implications for Long-
Term Corporate Strategy. Exec. 19389779 4, 75–83. 
Greenbaum, S.I., Thakor, A.V., 1987. Bank Funding Modes: Securitization versus Deposits. J. 
Bank. Finance 11, 379–401. 
Greuning, H. van, Brajovic Bratanovic, S., 2009. Asset-Liability Management, in: Analyzing 
Banking Risk: A Framework for Assessing Corporate Governance and Risk 
Management. World Bank, Washington, D.C, pp. 277–291. 
Grinblatt, M., Keloharju, M., 2000. The Investment Behavior and Performance of Various 
Investor Types: A Study of Finland’s Unique Data Set. J. Financ. Econ. 55, 43–67. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00044-6 
Groeneveld, H., Llewellyn, D.T., 2012. Corporate governance in cooperative banks. 
Grossman, R.S., 2013. Why Didn’t Anyone Pull the Andon Cord’s? Japan’s Lost Decade, in: 
Wrong: Nine Economic Policy Disasters and What We Can Learn from Them. Oxford 
University Press, New York, NY, pp. 121–136. 
Grove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L.M., Xu, P. (Tracy), 2011. Corporate Governance and 
Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks. 
Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 19, 418–436. 
Guerrera, F., Larsen, P.T., 2008. Gone By the Board? Why Bank Directors Did Not Spot Credit 
Risks. Financ. Times Lond. Engl. 
Guizani, B., Watanabe, W., 2016. The Effects of Public Capital Infusions on Banks’ Risk-Shifting 
to the Deposit Insurance System in Japan. J. Financ. Stab. 26, 15–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2016.07.017 
Haghirian, P. (Ed.), 2016. Routledge Handbook of Japanese Business and Management. 
Routledge, London ; New York, NY. 
Hall, P.A., Soskice, D.W. (Eds.), 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press, Oxford [England] ; New York. 
 
 
269 
 
Hanazaki, M., Horiuchi, A., 2003. A Review of Japan’s Bank Crisis from the Governance 
Perspective. Corp. Gov. 11, 305–325. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-538X(03)00026-X 
Hannan, T.H., Hanweck, G.A., 1988. Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates 
of Deposit. J. Money Credit Bank. 20, 203–211. https://doi.org/10.2307/1992111 
Hansmann, H., Kraakman, R., 2001. The End of History for Corporate Law. Georgetown Law J. 
439–468. 
Harada, K., Hoshi, T., Imai, M., Koibuchi, S., Yasuda, A., 2015. Japan’s Financial Regulatory 
Responses to the Global Financial Crisis. J. Financ. Econ. Policy 7, 51–67. 
Hau, H., Thum, M., 2009. Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence: Private vs. Public Banks 
in Germany (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2640). CESifo GmbH. 
Hausman, J.A., 1978. Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica 46, 1251–1271. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1913827 
Hausman, J.A., Taylor, W.E., 1981. Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects. 
Econometrica 49, 1377–1398. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911406 
Hawley, J., Williams, A., 1997. The Emergence of Fiduciary Capitalism. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 5, 
206–213. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00062 
Hayakawa, M., Whittaker, D.H., 2009. Takeovers and Corporate Governance: Three Years of 
Tensions, in: Whittaker, D.H., Deakin, S.F. (Eds.), Corporate Governance and 
Managerial Reform in Japan. Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, pp. 70–92. 
Hellwig, M.F., 2009. Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis. Econ. 157, 129–207. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-009-
9110-0 
Hendry, J., 2001. Economic contracts versus social relationships as a foundation for normative 
stakeholder theory. Bus. Ethics Eur. Rev. 10, 223–232. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
8608.00236 
Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 1991. The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives 
on Firm Performance. Financ. Manag. 20, 101–112. https://doi.org/10.2307/3665716 
Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 1988. The Determinants of Board Composition. RAND J. Econ. 
19, 589–606. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555459 
Hill, C.W.L., Jones, T.M., 1992. Stakeholder-Agency Theory. J. Manag. Stud. 29, 131–154. 
Hill, C.W.L., Snell, S.A., 1988. External Control, Corporate Strategy, and Firm Performance in 
Research- Intensive Industries. Strateg. Manag. J. 9, 577–590. 
Hillman, A.J., Cannella, A.A., Paetzold, R.L., 2000. The Resource Dependence Role of Corporate 
Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to Environmental 
Change. J. Manag. Stud. 37, 235–256. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00179 
Hillman, A.J., Dalziel, T., 2003. Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: integrating Agency 
and Resource Dependence Perspectives. Acad. Manage. Rev. 28, 383–396. 
 
 
270 
 
Hillman, A.J., Withers, M.C., Collins, B.J., 2009. Resource Dependence theory: A Review. J. 
Manag. 35, 1404–1427. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206309343469 
Hiraki, T., Inoue, H., Ito, A., Kuroki, F., Masuda, H., 2003. Investor Biases in Japan (Working 
Paper). Niigata: International University of Japan. 
Hoitash, U., Hoitash, R., Bedard, J.C., 2009. Corporate Governance and Internal Control over 
Financial Reporting: A Comparison of Regulatory Regimes. Account. Rev. 84, 839–867. 
Horiuchi, A., Shimizu, K., 2001. Did Amakudari Undermine the Effectiveness of Regulator 
Monitoring in Japan? J. Bank. Finance 25, 573–596. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(00)00089-3 
Hoshi, T., 2002. The Convoy System for insolvent Banks: How it Originally Worked and Why it 
Failed in the 1990s. Jpn. World Econ. 14, 155–180. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0922-
1425(01)00086-X 
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., Scharfstein, D., 1991. Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: 
Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. Q. J. Econ. 106, 33–60. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2937905 
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., Scharfstein, D., 1990. The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of 
Financial Distress in Japan. J. Financ. Econ. 27, 67–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-
405X(90)90021-Q 
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A.K., 2001. Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the 
Future. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Hoskisson, R.E., Hitt, M.A., Johnson, R.A., Grossman, W., 2002. Conflicting Voices: The Effects 
of Institutional Ownership Heterogeneity and Internal Governance on Corporate 
Innovation Strategies. Acad. Manage. J. 45, 697–716. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069305 
Hosono, K., Sakai, K., Tsuru, K., 2009. Consolidation of Banks in Japan: Causes and 
Consequences. University of Chicago Press, pp. 265–309. 
Houle, C.O., 1990. Who Should Be on Your Board? Nonprofit World 8, 33–35. 
Houston, J.F., James, C., 1995. CEO Compensation and Bank Risk is Compensation in Banking 
Structured to Promote Risk Taking? J. Monet. Econ. 36, 405–431. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(95)01219-2 
Iannotta, G., Nocera, G., Sironi, A., 2007. Ownership Structure, Risk and Performance in the 
European Banking Industry. Dev. Eur. Bank. 31, 2127–2149. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.07.013 
Imai, M., 2007. The Emergence of Market Monitoring in Japanese Banks: Evidence from the 
Subordinated Debt Market. J. Bank. Finance 31, 1441–1460. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.07.007 
Isagawa, N., 2007. A Theory of Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding under Managerial 
Entrenchment. J. Financ. Res. 30, 163–179. 
Ishikawa, A., Tsuchiya, S., Nishioka, S., 2013. Financial Institutions’ Efforts to Support the 
Business Conditions of Small and Medium-Sized Firms: Intermediation Services 
 
 
271 
 
Utilizing Corporate Information and Customer Networks (Bank of Japan Review No. 
2013- E-1). Bank of Japan. 
Itō, T., 1992. The Japanese Economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Jackson, G., 2008. Employment Adjustment and Distributional Conflict in Japanese Firms, in: 
Aoki, M., Jackson, G., Miyajima, H. (Eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan : Institutional 
Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 282–309. 
Jackson, G., Moerke, A., 2005. Continuity and change in corporate governance: Comparing 
Germany and Japan. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 13, 351–361. 
Jacoby, S.M., 2009. Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance in Japan, in: Whittaker, D.H., 
Deakin, S.F. (Eds.), Corporate Governance and Managerial Reform in Japan. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford ; New York, pp. 93–133. 
Jen, S., 2007. Sovereign Wealth Funds. World Economics. 
Jensen, M.C., 2010. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems. J. Appl. Corp. Finance 22, 43–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-
6622.2010.00260.x 
Jensen, M.C., 2002. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, And The Corporate Objective 
Function. Bus. Ethics Q. 12, 235–256. 
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure. J. Financ. Econ. 3, 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-
405X(76)90026-X 
Jensen, M.C., Ruback, R.S., 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence. J. 
Financ. Econ. 11, 5–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(83)90004-1 
John, K., Litov, L., Yeung, B., 2008. Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking. J. Finance 63, 1679–
1728. 
John, K., Senbet, L.W., 1998. Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness. J. Bank. Finance 
22, 371–403. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00005-3 
Johnson, R.A., Hoskisson, R.E., Hitt, M.A., 1993. Board of Director Involvement in 
Restructuring: The Effects of Board Versus Managerial Controls and Characteristics. 
Strateg. Manag. J. 14, 33–50. 
Johnson, S., 2007. The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Finance Dev. 44, 56. 
Jolliffe, I.T., 2002. Principal Component Analysis, 2nd ed. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 
Jones, B.S., Branton, R.P., 2005. Beyond Logit and Probit: Cox Duration Models of Single, 
Repeating, and Competing Events for State Policy Adoption. State Polit. Policy Q. 5, 
420–443. 
Jones, D., 2000. Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage 
and Related Issues. J. Bank. Finance 24, 35–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(99)00052-7 
 
 
272 
 
Junko Fujita, 2017. Japan Approves Merger in Struggling Regional Bank Sector after Lengthy 
Review. Reuters. 
Kahane, Y., 1977. Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of Financial intermediaries. J. Bank. 
Finance 1, 207–218. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(77)90007-3 
Kanaya, A., Woo, D., 2000. The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990S: Sources and Lessons (IMF 
Working Paper No. WP/00/7). International Monetary Fund. 
Kang, J.-K., Shivdasani, A., 1995. Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive 
Turnover in Japan. J. Financ. Econ. 38, 29–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-
405X(94)00807-D 
Kano, M., Tsutsui, Y., 2003. Geographical segmentation in Japanese bank loan markets. Reg. 
Sci. Urban Econ. 33, 157–174. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-0462(02)00009-1 
Kaplan, E.L., Meier, P., 1958. Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete Observations. J. Am. 
Stat. Assoc. 53, 457–481. https://doi.org/10.2307/2281868 
Kaplan, S.N., 1997. Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Comparison of 
Germany, Japan, and the U.S. J. Appl. Corp. Finance 9, 86–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.1997.tb00627.x 
Kaplan, S.N., 1994. Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and 
the United States. J. Polit. Econ. 102, 510–546. 
Kaplan, S.N., Minton, B.A., 1994. Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants 
and Implications for Managers. J. Financ. Econ. 36, 225–258. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(94)90025-6 
Karamanou, I., Vafeas, N., 2005. The Association between Corporate Boards, Audit 
Committees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis. J. Account. 
Res. 43, 453–486. 
Karamizadeh, S., Abdullah, S.M., Manaf, A.A., Zamani, M., Hooman, A., 2013. An Overview of 
Principal Component Analysis. J. Signal Inf. Process. 4, 173–175. 
Kato, T., Kubo, K., 2006. CEO Compensation and Firm Performance in Japan: Evidence from 
New Panel Data on individual CEO Pay. J. Jpn. Int. Econ. 20, 1–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jjie.2004.05.003 
Keeley, M.C., 1990. Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking. Am. Econ. Rev. 80, 
1183–1200. 
Kesner, I.F., 1988. Directors’ Characteristics and Committee Membership: An Investigation of 
Type, Occupation, Tenure, and Gender. Acad. Manage. J. 31, 66–84. 
Kick, T.B.H.H.T., von Westernhagen, N., 2009. Bank ownership and stability: evidence from 
Germany. VOX CEPRs Policy Portal. 
Kiel, G.C., Nicholson, G.J., 2003. Board Composition and Corporate Performance: how the 
Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corp. 
Gov. Int. Rev. 11, 189–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00318 
 
 
273 
 
Kim, K.A., Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, P., Nofsinger, J.R., 2007. Large Shareholders, Board 
Independence, and Minority Shareholder Rights: Evidence from Europe. J. Corp. 
Finance 13, 859–880. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.09.001 
Kirkpatrick, G., 2009. The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Financial 
Market Trends No. 2009/1). OCED. 
Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., Masulis, R.W., 2013. The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board 
Independence. Rev. Financ. Stud. 26, 1561–1605. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht020 
Kobayashi, M., 2012. Housing Finance in Japan. 
Köhler, M., 2012. Which Banks Are More Risky? The Impact of Loan Growth and Business 
Model on Bank Risk-Taking (No. 33/2012). Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Konishi, M., Yasuda, Y., 2004. Factors Affecting Bank Risk Taking: Evidence from Japan. J. Bank. 
Finance 28, 215–232. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00405-3 
Kor, Y.Y., Sundaramurthy, C., 2008. Experience-Based Human Capital and Social Capital of 
Outside Directors. J. Manag. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206308321551 
Krishnan, J., Yuan Wen, Wanli Zhao, 2011. Legal Expertise on Corporate Audit Committees and 
Financial Reporting Quality. Account. Rev. 86, 2099–2130. 
Krug, J.A., Wright, P., Kroll, M.J., 2015. Top Management Turnover Following Mergers and 
Acquisitions: Solid Research to Date But Still Much to be Learned. Acad. Manag. 
Perspect. 3015, 30–46. 
Kubo, K., Saito, T., 2008. The Relationship between Financial Incentives for Company 
Presidents and Firm Performance in Japan. Jpn. Econ. Rev. 59, 401–418. 
La Porta, R., López de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law and finance. J. Polit. Econ. 
106, 1113–1155. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Investor Protection and 
Corporate Valuation. J. Finance 57, 1147–1170. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance. Spec. Issue Int. Corp. Gov. 58, 3–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00065-9 
Laeven, L., 1999. Risk and Efficiency in East Asian Banks (World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2255). 
Laeven, L., Levine, R., 2009. Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking. J. Financ. Econ. 93, 
259–275. 
Lane, W.R., Looney, S.W., Wansley, J.W., 1986. An Application of the Cox Proportional Hazards 
Model to Bank Failure. J. Bank. Finance 10, 511–531. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(86)80003-6 
Langevoort, D.C., 2012. Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the 
Financial Crisis Symposium: The Changing Role and Nature of In-House and General 
Counsel. Wis. Law Rev. 495–520. 
 
 
274 
 
Larcker, D.F., Richardson, S.A., Tuna, I., 2007. Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, 
and Organizational Performance. Account. Rev. 82, 963–1008. 
Lau, D.C., Murnighan, J.K., 1998. Demographic Diversity and Faultlines: The Compositional 
Dynamics of Organizational Groups. Acad. Manage. Rev. 23, 325–340. 
Lazonick, W., O’Sullivan, M., 2000. Maximizing Shareholder Value: a New Ideology for 
Corporate Governance. Econ. Soc. 29, 13–35. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/030851400360541 
Lee, M.H., Nagano, M., 2008. Market Competition before and after Bank Merger Wave: A 
Comparative Study of Korea and Japan. Pac. Econ. Rev. 13, 604–619. 
Lee, P.M., O’Neill, H.M., 2003. Ownership Structures and R&D Investments of U.S. and 
Japanese Firms: Agency and Stewardship Perspectives. Acad. Manage. J. 46, 212–225. 
Levine, R., 2003. The Corporate Governance of Banks, in: Global Corporate Governance Forum, 
Discussion. Citeseer. 
Li, X., Tripe, D.W., Malone, C.B., 2017. Measuring Bank Risk: An Exploration of Z-Score. Social 
Science Research Network. 
Lilling, M.S., 2006. The Link between CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: Does 
Simultaneity Matter? Atl. Econ. J. 34, 101–114. 
Linck, J.S., Netter, J.M., Yang, T., 2009. The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors. Rev. Financ. Stud. 22, 
3287–3328. 
Lincoln, J.R., Gerlach, M.L., Ahmadjian, C.L., 1996. Keiretsu Networks and Corporate 
Performance in Japan. Am. Sociol. Rev. 61, 67–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/2096407 
Liu, C., Liu, J., Uchida, K., 2011. Do Independent Boards Effectively Monitor Management? 
Evidence from Japan During the Financial Crisis, in: Sun, W., Stewart, J., Pollard, D. 
(Eds.), Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International 
Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York, pp. 188–214. 
Llewellyn, D.T., 2005. Competition and Profitability in European Banking: Why Are British 
Banks So Profitable? Econ. Notes 34, 279–311. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0391-
5026.2005.00152.x 
Llewellyn, D.T., 2002. Alternative Approaches to Regulation and Corporate Governance in 
Financial Firms. Financ. Risks Stab. Glob. 117–63. 
Loewenstein, M.J., 2001. What Can We Learn from Foreign Systems? Stakeholder Protection in 
Germany and Japan. Tulane Law Rev. 76, 1673–1690. 
Loutskina, E., 2011. The Role of Securitization in Bank Liquidity and Funding Management. J. 
Financ. Econ. 100, 663–684. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.005 
Low, A., 2009. Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior and Equity-Based Compensation. J. Financ. 
Econ. 92, 470–490. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.05.004 
Lowenstein, L., 1996. Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What 
You Measure. Columbia Law Rev. 96, 1335–1362. https://doi.org/10.2307/1123407 
 
 
275 
 
Lui, A., 2011. Multiple Principal-Agent Problems in Securitisation. Poznan Univ. Econ. Rev. 11, 
47–72. 
Luoma, P., Goodstein, J., 1999. Stakeholders and Corporate Boards: Institutional Influences on 
Board Composition and Structure. Acad. Manage. J. 42, 553–563. 
Lynall, M.D., Golden, B.R., Hillman, A.J., 2003. Board Composition from Adolescence to 
Maturity: A Multitheoretic View. Acad. Manage. Rev. 28, 416–431. 
Lysandrou, P., Stoyanova, D., 2007. The Anachronism of the Voice-Exit Paradigm: Institutional 
Investors and Corporate Governance in the UK. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 15, 1070–1078. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00631.x 
Ma, Y.Z., 2015. Simpson’s Paradox in GDP and Per Capita GDP Growths. 
MacDougall, R., 2013. Japanese Banks Say Hola, Go Local as They Woo Overseas Borrowers 
[WWW Document]. Reuters. URL https://www.cnbc.com/id/100659086 (accessed 
8.18.17). 
Macey, J.R., O’Hara, M., 2003. The Corporate Governance of Banks. Econ. Policy Rev. 9. 
Maddaloni, A., Peydró, J.-L., 2011. Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision, and Low 
Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro-Area and the US Lending Standards. Rev. 
Financ. Stud. 24, 2121–2165. 
Mahadeo, J.D., Soobaroyen, T., Hanuman, V.O., 2012. Board Composition and Financial 
Performance: Uncovering the Effects of Diversity in an Emerging Economy. J. Bus. 
Ethics 105, 375–388. 
Malcolm, J.D., 2001. Financial Globalisation and the Opening of the Japanese Economy. 
Curzon, London. 
Maug, E., 1998. Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and 
Control? J. Finance 53, 65–98. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.35053 
McGuire, J., Dow, S., 2003. The Persistence and Implications of Japanese Keiretsu Organization. 
J. Int. Bus. Stud. 34, 374–388. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400038 
McGuire, J., Dow, S., Argheyd, K., 2003. CEO Incentives and Corporate Social Performance. J. 
Bus. Ethics 45, 341–359. 
Mehran, H., Morrison, A.D., Shapiro, J.D., 2011. Corporate Governance and Banks: What Have 
We Learned from the Financial Crisis? FRB N. Y. Staff Rep. 
Mehran, H., Rosenberg, J.V., 2007. The Effect of Employee Stock Options on Bank Investment 
Choice, Borrowing, and Capital (Staff Reports No. 305). Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. 
Mehrhoff, J., 2009. A Solution to the Problem of Too Many Instruments in Dynamic Panel Data 
GMM (Discussion Paper No. 31/2009), Series 1: Economic Studies. 
Memmel, C., Schertler, A., 2012. The Dependency of the Banks’ Assets and Liabilities: Evidence 
from Germany. Eur. Financ. Manag. 18, 602–619. 
METI, 2013. Japan’s Policy on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Micro Enterprises. 
 
 
276 
 
Meyer, B.D., 1990. Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells. Econometrica 58, 
757–782. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938349 
Michalak, T.C., Uhde, A., 2012. Credit Risk Securitization and Bank Soundness in Europe. Q. 
Rev. Econ. Finance 52, 272–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2012.04.008 
Michel, J.G., Hambrick, D.C., 1992. Diversification Posture and Top Management Team 
Characteristics. Acad. Manage. J. 35, 9–37. https://doi.org/10.2307/256471 
Milhaupt, C.J., 1999. Japan’s Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks: Implications 
for Financial Regulatory Design. Wash. Univ. Law Q. 77, 399–432. 
Milhaupt, C.J., West, M.D. (Eds.), 2003. Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity 
through Deals, in: Global Markets, Domestic Institutions Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. Columbia University Press, New York, 
pp. 295–338. 
Minton, B., Taillard, J.P.A., Williamson, R., 2010. Do Independence and Financial Expertise of 
the Board Matter for Risk Taking and Performance? 
Minton, B.A., Taillard, J.P., Williamson, R., 2014. Financial Expertise of the Board, Risk Taking, 
and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies. J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 49, 
351–380. 
Misangyi, V.F., Acharya, A.G., 2014. Substitutes or Complements? A Configurational 
Examination of Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Acad. Manage. J. 57, 1681–1705. 
Mishra, C.S., Nielsen, J.F., 2000. Board Independence and Compensation Policies in Large Bank 
Holding Companies. Financ. Manag. 29, 51–69. 
Mitchell, R.K., Agle, B.R., Wood, D.J., 1998. Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and 
Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, in: The Corporation 
and Its Stakeholders, Classic and Contemporary Readings. University of Toronto Press, 
pp. 275–314. 
Miwa, Y., Ramseyer, J.M., 2005. Who Appoints Them, What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside 
Directors from Japan. J. Econ. Manag. Strategy 14, 299–337. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00043.x 
Miwa, Y., Ramseyer, J.M., Erlanger, H.S., 2002. The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and 
Comparative Corporate Governance. Law Soc. Inq. 27, 401. 
Miyajima, H., 1994. The Transformation of Zaibatsu to Postwar Corporate Groups—From 
Hierarchically Integrated Groups to Horizontally Integrated Groups. J. Jpn. Int. Econ. 8, 
293–328. 
Miyajima, H., Hoda, T., 2015. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance: Has an Increase 
in Institutional Investors’ Ownership Improved Business Performance? Public Policy 
Rev. 11, 361–393. 
Miyajima, H., Kuroki, F., 2008. The Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding in Japan: Causes, Effects, 
and Implications, in: Aoki, M., Jackson, G., Miyajima, H. (Eds.), Corporate Governance 
in Japan : Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, pp. 79–124. 
 
 
277 
 
Moody’s, 2013. Moody’s Confirms Subordinated Debt Ratings of Japanese Banks. 
Morck, R., Nakamura, M., 1999. Banks and Corporate Control in Japan. J. Finance 54, 319–339. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An 
Empirical Analysis. J. Financ. Econ. 20, 293–315. 
Mudambi, R., Nicosia, C., 1998. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from the 
UK Financial Services Industry. Appl. Financ. Econ. 8, 175–180. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/096031098333159 
Murata, K., Hori, M., 2004. End of the Convoy System and the Surge of Market Discipline (ESRI 
Discussion Paper Series No. 105). Economic and Social Research Institute, Tokyo, 
Japan. 
Murrall, L., 2011. The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making. 
Murray, A.I., 1989. Top Management Group Heterogeneity and Firm Performance. Strateg. 
Manag. J. 10, 125–141. 
Muth, M.M., Donaldson, L., 1998. Stewardship Theory and Board Structure: A Contingency 
Approach. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 6, 5. 
Nakamoto, M., 2006. Regional Banks Close to Merger [WWW Document]. Financ. Times. URL 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f57fc7ac-5b1f-11db-8f80-
0000779e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4qbf0yvt7 (accessed 7.12.16). 
Nakamura, L.I., 1991. Commercial Bank Information: Implications for the Structure Of Banking. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
Nakano, M., Nguyen, P., 2012. Board Size and Corporate Risk Taking: Further Evidence from 
Japan. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 20, 369–387. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2012.00924.x 
Narayanan, A., 2017. Japan’s Biggest Bank Is Hiring in Saudi Arabia [WWW Document]. 
Bloomberg. URL https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-13/mufg-plans-
saudi-arabia-hires-to-tap-350-billion-privatizations (accessed 8.23.17). 
Nassr, I.K., Wehinger, G., 2015. Unlocking SME Finance Through Market-Based Debt (No. 
2014/2). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Nier, E., Baumann, U., 2006. Market Discipline, Disclosure and Moral Hazard in Banking. Basel 
II Account. Transpar. Bank Stab. 15, 332–361. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2006.03.001 
Nikkei Asian Review, 2017. Japan’s Big Banks Take on More Lending Risk [WWW Document]. 
Nikkei Asian Rev. URL (accessed 2.20.18). 
Nishiguchi, K., 2011. Future Perspective on Financial Businesses Centering on Risk 
Management. Public Policy Rev. 7, 51–107. 
Nitta, K., 2008. Corporate Ownership Structure in Japan: Recent Trends and Their Impact. 
Financial Research Group. 
Nordberg, D., 2011. Corporate Governance: Principles and Issues. SAGE, Los Angeles. 
 
 
278 
 
North, G.R., Bell, T.L., Cahalan, R.F., Moeng, F.J., 1982. Sampling Errors in the Estimation of 
Empirical Orthogonal Functions. Mon. Weather Rev. 110, 699–706. 
Novickytė, L., Petraitytė, I., 2014. Assessment of Banks Asset and Liability Management: 
Problems and Perspectives (Case of Lithuania). 2-Dn Int. Sci. Conf. „Contemporary 
Issues Bus. Manag. Educ. 2013“ 110, 1082–1093. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.12.955 
OECD, 2017. OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2017. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
OECD, 2011. Board Practices: Incentives and Governing Risks, Corporate Governance. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
OECD, 2010. Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Conclusions and Emerging Good 
Practices to Enhance Implementation of the Principles. OECD Steering Group on 
Corporate Governance: Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs. 
OECD, 2009. Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Park, E.J., 1996. Allowing Japanese Banks to Engage in Securitization:  Potential Benefits, 
Regulatory Obstacles, and Theories for Reform Comment. Univ. Pa. J. Int. Econ. Law 
723–752. 
Pathan, S., 2009. Strong Boards, CEO Power and Bank Risk-Taking. J. Bank. Finance 33, 1340–
1350. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.001 
Peek, J., Rosengren, E.S., 2005. Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation 
of Credit in Japan. Am. Econ. Rev. 95, 1144–1166. 
Pérignon, C., Smith, D.R., 2010. The Level and Quality of Value-at-Risk Disclosure by 
Commercial Banks. J. Bank. Finance 34, 362–377. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.08.009 
Pesaran, M.H., 2015. Time Series and Panel Data Econometrics, First edition. ed. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. 
Pesqueux, Y., Damak-Ayadi, S., 2005. Stakeholder Theory in Perspective. Corp. Gov. Int. J. Bus. 
Soc. 5, 5–21. 
Pfeffer, J., Salancik, G.R., 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence 
Perspective. Harper & Row, New York. 
Pound, J., 1988. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight. Distrib. Power 
Corp. Manag. Sharehold. Dir. 20, 237–265. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-
405X(88)90046-3 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009. Balance Sheet Management Benchmark Survey: Status of 
Balance Sheet Management Practices Among International Banks – 2009. 
Prowse, S., 2014. The Corporate Governance System in Banking: What Do We Know? PSL Q. 
Rev. 50. 
 
 
279 
 
Prowse, S.D., 1995. Alternative Methods of Corporate Control in Commercial Banks. Fed. 
Reserve Bank Dallas Econ. Rev. 24–36. 
Prowse, S.D., 1992. The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan. J. Finance 47, 1121–1140. 
Radić, N., 2015. Shareholder Value Creation in Japanese Banking. J. Bank. Finance 52, 199–207. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.09.014 
Randall, M., Nakamura, M., Shivdasani, A., 2000. Banks, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value 
in Japan. J. Bus. 73, 539–567. https://doi.org/10.1086/209654 
Rediker, K.J., Seth, A., 1995. Boards of Directors and Substitution Effects of Alternative 
Governance Mechanisms. Strateg. Manag. J. 16, 85–99. 
Revised Corporate Governance Principles, 2001. . Japan Corporate Governance Forum. 
Roberts, J., McNulty, T., Stiles, P., 2005. Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of the Non‐
Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom. Br. J. Manag. 16, S5–
S26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00444.x 
Roberts, M.R., Whited, T.M., 2012. Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance (Working Paper 
No. FR 11-29). Simon School of Business, University of Rochester. 
Romer, C.D., Romer, D.H., Goldfeld, S.M., Friedman, B.M., 1990. New Evidence on the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism. Brook. Pap. Econ. Act. 1990, 149–213. 
Rosenbluth, F., Schaap, R., 2003. The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation. Int. Organ. 57, 
307–336. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303572034 
Roy, A.D., 1952. Safety First and the Holding of Assets. Econometrica 20, 431–449. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1907413 
Rusticus, S.A., Lovato, C.Y., 2014. Impact of Sample Size and Variability on the Power and Type 
I Error Rates of Equivalence Tests: A Simulation Study. Pract. Assess. Res. Eval. 19, 2. 
Sakawa, H., Ubukata, M., Watanabel, N., 2014. Market Liquidity and Bank-Dominated 
Corporate Governance: Evidence from Japan. Int. Rev. Econ. Finance 31, 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2013.11.005 
Santomero, A.M., Trester, J.J., 1998. Financial Innovation and Bank Risk Taking. J. Econ. Behav. 
Organ. 35, 25–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00103-0 
Saunders, A., Strock, E., Travlos, N.G., 1990. Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk 
Taking. J. Finance 45, 643–654. https://doi.org/10.2307/2328676 
Schaede, U., 1995. The “Old Boy” Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan. J. 
Jpn. Stud. 21, 293–317. https://doi.org/10.2307/133010 
Schultz, E.L., Tan, D.T., Walsh, K.D., 2010. Endogeneity and the Corporate Governance - 
Performance Relation. Aust. J. Manag. 35, 145–163. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0312896210370079 
Seitzinger, M.V., 2013. Foreign Investment in the United States: Major Federal Statutory 
Restrictions. 
 
 
280 
 
Shehzad, C.T., de Haan, J., Scholtens, B., 2010. The Impact of Bank Ownership Concentration 
on Impaired Loans and Capital Adequacy. J. Bank. Finance 34, 399–408. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.08.007 
Shin, H.S., 2009. Securitisation and Financial Stability. Econ. J. 119, 309–332. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02239.x 
Shinada, N., 2010. Stock Ownership and Corporate Performance in Japan: Corporate 
governance by institutional investors. Res. Inst. Econ. Trade Ind., DPRIETI Discussion 
Paper Series. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. J. Finance 52, 737–783. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1994. Politicians and Firms. Q. J. Econ. 109, 995–1025. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2118354 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. J. Polit. Econ. 94, 
461–488. https://doi.org/10.2307/1833044 
Shrestha, S., 2016. Asset Liability Management and Commercial Banks’ Profitability in Nepal. 
Acad. Voices Multidiscip. J. 5, 40–47. 
Shrieves, R.E., Dahl, D., 1992. The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in Commercial Banks. 
J. Bank. Finance 16, 439–457. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(92)90024-T 
Slovin, M.B., Sushka, M.E., Polonchek, J.A., 1993. The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as 
Bank Stakeholders. J. Finance 48, 247–266. https://doi.org/10.2307/2328888 
Smith, H.J., 2003. The Shareholders vs. Stakeholders Debate. MIT Sloan Manag. Rev. 44, 85–90. 
Smith, K.G., Smith, K.A., Olian, J.D., Sims, H.P., O’Bannon, D.P., Scully, J.A., 1994. Top 
Management Team Demography and Process: The Role of Social Integration and 
Communication. Adm. Sci. Q. 39, 412–438. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393297 
Sonnenfeld, J.A., 2002. What Makes Great Boards Great (Harvard Business Rewiew). Harvard 
University. 
Sowerbutts, R., Zimmerman, P., Zer, I., 2013. Banks’ Disclosure and Financial Stability. Bank 
Engl. Q. Bull. Q4. 
Standard & Poor’s, 2018. Japan Housing Finance Agency (S&P Global Ratings). Standard & 
Poor’s. 
Stout, L.A., 2012. The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms 
investors, Corporations, and the Public. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
Sun, J., Liu, G., 2014. Audit Committees’ Oversight of Bank Risk-Taking. J. Bank. Finance 40, 
376–387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.12.015 
Suntheim, F., 2010. Managerial Compensation in the Financial Service Industry. Financ. 
Conduct Auth. 
Suumo, 2015. Flat 35 Loan Interest Rate Drops for the First Time in Three Months - Blog. 
 
 
281 
 
Suzuki, Y., 2011a. Japan’s Financial Slump: Collapse of the Monitoring System under 
Institutional and Transition Failures, Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and 
Financial Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New 
York. 
Suzuki, Y., 2011b. Characteristics of the “Traditional” Japanese and Anglo-American Financial 
Systems, in: Japan’s Financial Slump: Collapse of the Monitoring System under 
Institutional and Transition Failures, Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and 
Financial Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New 
York, pp. 49–76. 
Tandon, R., 2005. The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s, in: The Japanese Economy and the 
Way Forward. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmils, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, pp. 
86–110. 
Tanimoto, K., 2010. Structural Change in Corporate Society and CSR in Japan, in: Fukukawa, K. 
(Ed.), Corporate Social Responsibility in Asia, Routledge International Business in Asia 
Series. Routledge, London ; New York, pp. 45–65. 
Terence Tse, 2011. Shareholder and Stakeholder Theory: After the Financial Crisis. Qual. Res. 
Financ. Mark. 3, 51–63. https://doi.org/10.1108/17554171111124612 
Tett, G., 2003. Saving the Sun: A Wall Street Gamble to Rescue Japan from its Trillion-Dollar 
Meltdown. HarperBusiness, New York. 
The Economist, 2012. Corporate Governance in Japan: Olympian depths. The Economist. 
The Economist, 2002. Nationalised Once, Nationalised Again? [WWW Document]. The 
Economist. URL http://www.economist.com/node/1219864 (accessed 7.15.17). 
Thomsen, S., Pedersen, T., 2000. Ownership Structure and Economic Performance in the 
Largest European Companies. Strateg. Manag. J. 21, 689–705. 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2015. Japan’s Corporate Governance Code: Seeking Sustainable 
Corporate Growth and Increased Corporate Value over the Mid- to Long-Term. 
Turnbull, S., 1997a. Stakeholder Governance: A Cybernetic and Property Rights Analysis. Corp. 
Gov. Int. Rev. 5, 11. 
Turnbull, S., 1997b. Corporate Governance: Its Scope, Concerns and Theories. Corp. Gov. Int. 
Rev. 5, 180. 
Uchida, H., Tsutsui, Y., 2005. Has Competition in the Japanese Banking Sector Improved? J. 
Bank. Finance 29, 419–439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.05.013 
Unite, A.A., Sullivan, M.J., 2003. The Effect of Foreign Entry and Ownership Structure on the 
Philippine Domestic Banking Market. J. Bank. Finance 27, 2323–2345. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00330-8 
U.S. Department of State, 2015. 2015 Investment Climate Statement - Japan. Bureau of 
Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State. 
Van der Elst, C., 2011. Risk Management in Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, in: Sun, 
W., Stewart, J., Pollard, D. (Eds.), Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: 
 
 
282 
 
International Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York, pp. 
215–242. 
Van Ness, R.K., Miesing, P., Kang, J., 2010. Board of Director Composition and Financial 
Performance in a Sarbanes-Oxley World. Acad. Bus. Econ. J. 5, 56–74. 
Van Rixtel, A.A.R.J.M., Hassink, W.H.J., 2002. Monitoring the Monitors: Are Old Boys Networks 
Being Used to Monitor Japanese Private Banks? J. Jpn. Int. Econ. 16, 1–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/jjie.2001.0480 
Wailerdsak, N., Suehiro, A., 2004. Top Executive Origins: Comparative Study between Japan 
and Thailand. Asian Bus. Manag. 3, 85–104. 
Walker, D., 2009. A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry 
Entities - Final Recommendations. 
Walsh, J.P., Seward, J.K., 1990. On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control 
Mechanisms. Acad. Manage. Rev. 15, 421–458. 
Wan, W.P., Yiu, D.W., Hoskisson, R.E., Kim, H., 2008. The Performance Implications of 
Relationship Banking During Macroeconomic Expansion and Contraction: A Study of 
Japanese Banks’ Social Relationships and Overseas Expansion. J. Int. Bus. Stud. 39, 
406–427. 
Wang, Y., Xia, H., 2014. Do Lenders Still Monitor When They can Securitize Loans? Rev. Financ. 
Stud. 27, 2354–2391. 
Warther, V.A., 1998. Board Effectiveness and Board Dissent: A Model of the Board’s 
Relationship to Management and Shareholders. J. Corp. Finance 4, 53–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(97)00009-6 
Weisbach, M.S., 1988. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover. Distrib. Power Corp. Manag. 
Sharehold. Dir. 20, 431–460. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90053-0 
Westphal, J.D., Zajac, E.J., 1998. The Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate 
Governance Reforms and Shareholder Reactions. Adm. Sci. Q. 43, 127–153. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2393593 
Whittaker, D.H., Deakin, S.F. (Eds.), 2009. Corporate Governance and Managerial Reform in 
Japan. Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York. 
Whittaker, D.H., Hayakawa, M., 2007. Contesting “Corporate Value” Through Takeover Bids in 
Japan. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 15, 16–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2006.00538.x 
Wiersema, M.F., Bird, A., 1993. Organizational Demography in Japanese Firms: Group 
Heterogeneity, Individual Dissimilarity, and Top Management Team Turnover. Acad. 
Manage. J. 36, 996–1025. 
Williamson, O.E., 1983. Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control. J. Law 
Econ. 26, 351–366. 
Windmeijer, F., 2005. A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Efficient Two-Step 
GMM Estimators. J. Econom. 126, 25–51. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2004.02.005 
 
 
283 
 
Wintoki, M.B., Linck, J.S., Netter, J.M., 2012. Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Internal 
Corporate Governance. J. Financ. Econ. 105, 581–606. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.03.005 
Wiseman, R.M., Gomez-Mejia, L.R., 1998. A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk 
Taking. Acad. Manage. Rev. 23, 133–153. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2003. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 2nd ed. ed. South-
Western College Pub, Australia ; Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Wright, P., Ferris, S.P., Sarin, A., Awasthi, V., 1996. Impact of Corporate Insider, Blockholder, 
and Institutional Equity Ownership on Firm Risk Taking. Acad. Manage. J. 39, 441–463. 
Wu, H.-L., Chen, C.-H., Lin, M.-H., 2007. The Effect of Foreign Bank Entry on the Operational 
Performance of Commercial Banks in the Chinese Transitional Economy. Post-
Communist Econ. 19, 343–357. 
Yafeh, Y., 2000. Corporate Governance in Japan: Past Performance and Future Prospects. Oxf. 
Rev. Econ. Policy 16, 74–84. 
Yafeh, Y., Yosha, O., 2003. Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How? Econ. J. 
113, 128–146. https://doi.org/10.2307/798445 
Yeh, Y.-H., Chung, H., Liu, C.-L., 2011. Committee Independence and Financial Institution 
Performance during the 2007-08 Credit Crunch: Evidence from a Multi-Country Study. 
Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 19, 437–458. 
Yermack, D., 1996. Higher Market Valuation of Companies With a Small Board of Directors. J. 
Financ. Econ. 40, 185–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5 
Yeyati, E.L., Micco, A., 2007. Concentration and Foreign Penetration in Latin American Banking 
Sectors: Impact On Competition and Risk. J. Bank. Finance 31, 1633–1647. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.11.003 
Yorozu, C., McCann, L., Hassard, J., Morris, J., 2013. Japan, Corporate Organizational Reform 
and the Global Financial Crisis: The Case of Shinsei Bank. Asia Pac. Bus. Rev. 19, 200–
216. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602381.2013.767636 
Yoshikawa, T., Phan, P.H., 2001. Alternative Corporate Governance Systems in Japanese Firms: 
Implications for a Shift to Stockholder-Centered Corporate Governance. Asia Pac. J. 
Manag. 18, 183–205. 
Yoshikawa, T., Rasheed, A.A., 2009. Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review and 
Future Directions. Corp. Gov. Int. Rev. 17, 388–404. 
Yoshikawa, T., Tsui-Auch, L.S., McGuire, J., 2007. Corporate Governance Reform as Institutional 
Innovation: The Case of Japan. Organ. Sci. 18, 973–988. 
Young, M.N., Peng, M.W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G.D., 2002. Governing the Corporation in 
Emerging Economies: A Principal-Principal Perspective, in: Academy of Management 
Proceedings & Membership Directory. Presented at the Academy of Management 
Proceedings & Membership Directory, Academy of Management, pp. E1–E6. 
 
 
284 
 
Zander, A., 1979. The Psychology of Group Processes. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 30, 417. 
 
